Civil War Monthly Featured Document return to document overview
Temple Place Sunday Dec. 7. 62 My dear travellers – You have solved the place that I have not seen suggested in the newspapers strikes me as more probable than either,- that is North Caro- lina,- with the view of joining the force already there, which would make a pretty formidable army, & threatening Richmond from that side. The putting to sea of the transports at lately anchored off Fortress Munroe, filled with troops, seems to negative the idea that Banks is bound either to Norfolk or the James River. He may however, I should suppose easily penetrate when a landing is once effected at Roanoke, or its neighborhood,- far enough into No. Car. to cooperate with the force already at Suffolk in a movement on Petersburgh, threatening Richmond on that side; on joining the force now at Newbern, he might be strong enough to advance to Goldsboro, cutting the line of the main Southern R.R., & pushing on, if strong e- eno', perhaps to Raleigh, & to threate- ning Richmond from the rear. I can not help thinking some such move- ment as this against Richmond, or at least endangering it, of far greater present importance than any more distant operation & therefore more likely. A serious threat on the opposite side of the rebel capital, could not but have the effect of draw- ing off part of Lee's army from the neighborhood of the Rappahannoc, and give the main army under Burnside an excellent chance to demolish Lee. It is difficult to account for Burnside's long inactivity, after every allow- ance for the deficiency's of the Quarter Master Gen. against whom complaints are now very loud,- except on the supposition that he is waiting for somebody else. The last story against the powers at Washington is, that Burn- side has discovered that nine out of ten of the bomb-shells sent him will not explode! At any rate, there stand the two armies still, shivering on the banks of the Rappahannoc. Neither moves;- un- less, as is said one day & denied the next, Lee has already thrown back part of his force nearer towards Richmond, So as to be ready to act on either side, as the case may require. It is also re- ported, & is probably true, that Jackson has wholly withdrawn from the Shenan- doah region, leaving only a few flying skirmishers here & there, & has effected a junction with Lee.- The beginnings of Congress, the Reports of the Departments, & the proceedings of the several Court Martials going on at Washington chiefly occupy attention. Halleck's Report is a renewed attack upon McLellan,- to whose dilatoriness in moving the his army, under peremptory orders, from the James River to Aquia Creek, he, to shift responsibility from himself, attributes, by insinuation at least, the defeat of Pope. But it is curious to see how McLellan, keeping perfect silence against all attacks, is constantly re- lieved from one charge after another by incidental pieces of evidence, which turn up out of the very proceedings intended to operate against him. Halleck's reports for instance, make very plain the origin of his going over to the side of McLellan's enemies. They differed entirely in their views of certain military points. Mc- Lellan was bent on pursueing his attack on Richmond from the point where he was in James River, & was confident of success, if he could have sufficent reinforcements. & believed that to be the true mode of securing Washington. Halleck thought, on the other hand, that the safety of Washington required that Pope should be strengthened- that the two armies must be united, neither being strong eno' to withstand the whole force of the enemy alone,- & that danger to Washington precluded the sending of Burnside to McLellan, & that the alter- native was the drawing of McLellan's army, as well as Burnside's, to Pope. In- cidentally he appends a letter from McLellan with his answer,- the former protesting, respectfully, but earnestly, against the withdrawing of his army from Harrisons Landing, & even entreating him to recall that order, assigning reasons which at least make a very strong case. Halleck was obliged to publish this for the sake of publishing his answer, which gives his reasons for insisting on the withdrawal. They are strong ones & I am not sure that they were not such as mustshould have prevailed. But at any rate McLellan's judgement on this part of the case is thus incidentally brought to light,& places him, so far, very favorably before the public. On the other hand, Halleck does not state any of the circumstances which go to account of delay in the movement,- as the further cor- respondence probably would. He simply states the date of the his order, & the date of the McLellan's movement, leaving it to be inferred that the delay was unreasonable & without without excuse, & then, somewhat disinge- nuously, states, by way of contrast, the date of his order to Burnside, & the date of his move- ment,- which was immediate. The difference of the two cases was, that Burnside was at Newport News, in transition merely, with his tranports before him, & no enemy near, waiting merelyfor orders to proceed either up the James River, or up the Potomac, as the order might be.- McLellan's encampment on the other hand was a fixed one, with an army five times as large as Burnside's required to move with sick, wounded, siege guns & great collections of things in the face of the enemy, & through the enemy's country. Such a movement re- quired vast previous arrangement & great caution,- Burnside's none at all.- Another piece of evidence comes out incidently on the trial of Gen. Fitz John Porter,- a letter from Mc- Lellan to that Gen. urging him in the most earnest terms to render all possible aid to Gen. Pope,- a letter exactly of a piece with his more recent appeals to the army to stand by Burnside. The pretence of McLellan's assailants has always been that he threw obstacles in the way of Pope & influen- ced his favorite generals to hold back.- Thus "little Mac" continues to come out brighter & brighter, just as fast as anything authentic appears; & whenever he comes to make his own exposé, as he probably will some timeor other, tho' not till it can do no harm to the cause I have little doubt that it will be clearly shown that his plans were al- ways interfered with, & overruled or marred by sideways blows, from the time of his being deprived of the general command of the armies. Halleck indeed takes care to re- lieve himself from the responsibility of all consequences of acts that had occured before he was made chief in command- as he has a right to do. All our misfortunes of the eastern campaign are very plainly consequences of the two grand mistakes made by the Admn before Halleck had any- thing more to look after than his own Western Dept. -viz. 1. dividing the command in Virga 2. stopping recruiting & omitting to provide any reserve for reinforce- ments of at any point that was found to need it. For both these the Abolition clique is responsible as the Presidents advisers to whom he yielded. To this must be added, I sup- pose, a small honest conceit, which led him to think it was his duty, & within his capacity to "run the machine himself" - quoting, as I do, words that are attributed to him. I presumed he had got cured of that, so far as the military part of the general machine is concerned, when he made Halleck his overseer of that Department. But one never knows whether it is Halleck's will, or Stanton's, or the President's, or that of the radical clique which at times seeming to control the Prest., which causes a par- ticular movement or appointment. There is at least a sad want of unity of purpose & all seems to indicate that the President him- self, with many excellent qualities, is notso strong a man as I at one time took him for. The gradual emancipation scheme of his mes- sage is, I presume, his own deliberate judgment; & if it could be made effectual my conclusion is that it is a good one, if not the only one, to relieve the country- fully & finally from its difficulties.- His immediate emancipation proclamation, on the other hand, I believe was altered merely as a quietus to radical pressure. But what shall we say to the combination of these two schemes, so utterly inconsis- tent, with each other? He seems to me, by his message, to treat his former pro- clamation as a thing of which wld have no practical consequence. If the slaves are to be made free on the 1st of Jan. by his own military act why propose to Congress a scheme that which will require a year or two at least, merely to put the machinery in motion, which is to accomplish their freedom on, or at some time before, the year 1900? Yet in his message, he alludes to the pro- clamation as if he really expected to act upon it on the 1st of Jan. - The Treasury's Report is clear, well written, & frank- but financiers differ greatly as to his banking scheme. The Bank interest will of course to be opposed to it. Mr. Chase seems to be startled by the effect of his paper money system, & while laboring to show that it is not a depreciated currency, but that the high price of gold is owing to other causes, he mani- festly does not with to pursue the system fur- ther if he can help it, except to the extent of substituting a U.S. currency for that of the Banks. At any rate he has got to raise in some way nearly 300 millions to carry us along to the 1st of July, & double that sum at least for theyear following, if the war lasts so long on the same scale. He exposes the necessity of the case fairly, & shows that, even should the present scale of expense continue till July 1, '64, the total debt then would be far short of 2000 millions, which has been represented to be the amount of the debt now, by the political opponents of the Admn.- and he shows great cause to believe that even this enormous sum would not be beyond the resources of the country on long loans. As to the best means of effecting such large loans he makes suggestions, but leaves it to Congress to work out the problem. He will have to meet the market of course; unless he runs into the more ruinous system of multiplying paper money. It is worthy of re- mark however that the disclosures of the report do not as yet materially affect the price of Govt. securities; i.e. do not seem, to shake the domestic credit of the Govt.- So far as any questions have yet been raised in the Ho. of Reps., by way of attack, the Admn. seems to command about two to one in votes. But I do not think that anything has yet been presented which fairly tests the relation of the Conservatives to the Radicals. I fear the latter will keep a large majority, at least a sufficient one for all working pur- poses. But in the Senate it is said it will be otherwise. At any rate the Radicals have only three months more to work mischief- in. The majority in the next Congress will cer- tainly be the other way. The danger then will be of a different kind, the machine is certainly rather ricketty in its working; but I believe on the whole we shall rule & go, as we have so often before. The three months of ultra Republican rule ought to do much towards settling the merely military questions- and certainlymust settle the question of immediate emancipation as a war measure. If as the Sumnerites assume, the four millions of negroes are all going to rush to arms on our side as soon as the 1st of Jan. comes & all the rebel armies are going to rush home to take care of their negroes, that certainly will settle the matter one way. our army & navy will have little in that case to oppose them. If on the other hand, not a solitary nigger flees as I believe, except where he has one of our soldiers along side of him to protect him, that certainly must settle the matter the other way. I do not see how even the abolitionists, out of the lunatic hospital, can get in that case get over the determina- tion that immediate emancipation is not a practical idea. That done with, we may hope to make some real progress in the legitimate objects of the war, and towards a peace on terms that will reduce the rebellion without abso- lutely revolutionizing either South or North. Dark & difficult it all is, but not hopeless. The South must suffer terribly this winter,- & perhaps the bulk of their people will be tired enough of the war to be ready to give up the notion of secession, if they find they can save their negroes. The North of course, Abolitio- nists excepted, will ask no more,- and possibly some scheme of distant emancipa- tion, similar to the President's, may be gradually worked through, the South having it the modus operandi entirely in their own hands: this to quiet the abolitionists, & satisfy the conscience of the world, and prevent any future quarrels about slavery. But all this is remote speculation,- & events move so rapidly that the idea of today is knocked in the head by the fact of tomorrow. The only cer- tain thing is that military success is indis- pensable to the working out of the problem fa- vorably for the north on any theory. I hope for that soon in some quarter. Tuesday
Dec. 9 There is a
report that a por- Affectionately yrs &c.,
W.H.G.
|