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Browsing: Legal Papers of John Adams, Volume 0


Foreword

Practitioners of the common law have often tried to utilize the civilian's comfortable distinction between the private and the public law. They have not often found satisfaction in the effort. It is not my purpose to search out the reasons why a continental concept does not easily fit the form of Anglo-American reality. All that I can do is suggest that the story of John Adams' career at the Massachusetts bar, as that story is revealed in these remarkable volumes, may help us to understand why common-law lawyers have tended to see so many bright colors of statecraft in the petty disputes of neighbors, and so many dull tones of legalism in the great cases of public moment. In any event, it seemed quite clear to the Trustees of the William Nelson Cromwell Foundation that they should give their support to a venture in scholarship which would encourage understanding of the intimate relations between the small details of private controversy and the larger design of public order. The progression of John Adams from a craftsman of laws to an architect of governments is a significant and exciting chapter in the history of American law and the chronicle of our public affairs.
[signed] Bruce Bromley

Preface

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Until recently the study of American legal history, except for legislative and constitutional developments involving public law, has not been considered academically respectable. Inquirers have had to make do with pious “Notices of Eminent Lawyers and Judges” in works of local history and “Historical Addresses on the Bench and Bar” of such-and-such a county—works which are occasionally useful but are always long on sentiment and anecdote and short on documentation.
Whatever the explanation may be, the result has been that we have known little about what colonial lawyers actually did as they earned their daily living and adapted to transatlantic conditions and purposes the British and still older legal institutions that they had inherited. To be sure, some advances into this terra incognita have lately been made, with the publication of early court records and of a few—too few—specialized studies. But general histories still usually ignore law as argued and adjudicated in the courts, and with few exceptions biographers of lawyers and judges famous in their time hurry over the legal chapters in their subjects' lives in order to get them into the more familiar and hence more comfortable arena of politics.
John Adams is a conspicuous example of this treatment. Everyone who has written about him has agreed with each other and with Adams himself that he was a hard-working, learned, and able lawyer, and that his reading and training in the law furnished him a firm base for his rise to the highest offices in the land. But surprisingly few details have been put forward, and only meager documentation for his practice has been published. In Charles Francis Adams' mid-19th-century edition of his grandfather's writings, hardly half a dozen of the sixty-four cases set out in the present volume were printed even in part, and only a few others were discussed either in the “Life” that occupies the entire first volume or in the extensive notes and appendixes in the other nine volumes. The cases partially printed in the Works have become the celebrated ones: the argument over Writs of Assistance in 1761, which Adams merely—though memorably—reported; Adams' defense of John Hancock against charges of {p. R20} smuggling in 1769; the trial later the same year of Michael Corbet for murder on the high seas; and the trials in 1770 of Captain Thomas Preston and the luckless British troops indicted for their part in what is known as the Boston Massacre. These important cases, naturally enough, have been worked hard by Adams' biographers, for every one of them has not only high human interest but large political implications. Yet taken all together they give little notion of Adams' laborious years at the bar, even when embellished with anecdotes, character sketches, and entertaining reflections on the life of a colonial lawyer drawn from Adams' Diary, Autobiography, and early letters.
The materials for doing much better than this existed but lay out of sight. In the handling of his grandfather's legal papers C. F. Adams fell signally below his own standards as a scholarly editor. He examined the voluminous and disorderly mass, printed some selected pieces, and levied on a few others for his “Life” and Works of John Adams. But he then gave up, bundled up the lot, and put them away for good. After the 1850's they seem to have been very seldom looked into until the Adams Papers editorial enterprise was launched in 1954 at the Massachusetts Historical Society, where the family archives had been deposited in 1902 but had not been made available to scholars.
The first inspection of them by the editor in chief of the Adams Papers was frustrating enough to evoke a certain sympathy with his predecessor, the family archivist and editor. Apart from a few bound or sewn volumes containing court dockets, commonplace-book entries, pleading forms, and records of several important cases in admiralty, John Adams' legal papers as found were a jumbled mass of stitched and loose leaves of various sizes that commonly showed wear from being carried in the lawyer's pocket. Almost all were written with the haste characteristic of an attorney under the usual pressures and distractions of courtroom and office. Many bear as a caption the name of the pertinent case, but few bear the name or term of the court, and virtually none gives the date when it was written. These orphic leaves may include copies of some of the actual documents pertaining to their respective cases and occasional scraps of correspondence and accounts with clients. But for the most part they are jottings of authorities and arguments used, or to be used, in a given trial; notes on depositions and courtroom evidence on one or both sides of a case; sometimes the judges' interjections and opinions; and, rarely, a written-up version of Adams' appeal to the jury. In short, they are Adams' working papers as a trial lawyer.
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How completely or incompletely they represent the entire body of Adams' records as a lawyer is beyond conjecture. Adams himself said that he lost important papers from his house and office during the British occupation of Boston in 1775–1776. Both the fragmentary character of many of the surviving pieces and the disorder in which the corpus was found strongly suggest that these are simply what happened to survive—in effect the sweepings of his office. This suggestion is supported by the fact that the manuscripts document more or less satisfactorily only a few hundred cases among the many hundreds in which we know from other evidence that Adams was professionally concerned.
At any rate, such were the legal materials found among the Adams family manuscripts in 1954. Despite their unpromising condition, it seemed clear even to an historian without legal training that there was valuable ore in this lode which should be mined. An examination of the material by Mark DeWolfe Howe, professor of law at Harvard and a member of the Adams Papers Editorial Advisory Committee, strongly confirmed this opinion. What was needed, clearly, was an intensive study, arrangement, and cataloguing of every piece by some one who was trained in the law and who cared about the history of the law in early America. These qualifications are not commonly found in combination, but beginning in 1957, with the active encouragement of Dean Erwin N. Griswold, arrangements were made for a pair of third-year Harvard law students to perform this task while enrolled for credit in a history course offered by the editor in chief of the Adams Papers in the Harvard Graduate School. They were Messrs. R. Tenney Johnson and Hiller B. Zobel; their work was later taken up by Mr. L. Kinvin Wroth, who had recently graduated from the Harvard Law School. In the summer of 1961, the study and arrangement of the legal papers having been substantially completed, Mr. Wroth (then assistant professor in the Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and now associate professor of law, University of Maine Law School) and Mr. Zobel (associated with the firm of Bingham, Dana and Gould in Boston) jointly proposed a plan for editing a selected but large-scale collection of John Adams' legal papers, the materials to be drawn not only from the family archives but from all other pertinent sources and to be accompanied by appropriate commentary and annotation. The plan was laid before the Adams Papers Administrative Board and approved in the fall after discussions with those interested at the Harvard Law School, the Harvard University Press, and the Massachusetts Historical Society. {p. R22} Through the good offices of Dean Griswold another essential party was brought into the agreement early in 1962. The Trustees of the William Nelson Cromwell Foundation of New York City, an organization devoted among other good causes to furthering studies in American legal history and with a distinguished record in that field, made a grant, later supplemented, to cover the costs of editorial work. Harvard University Press undertook to publish two (later increased to three) volumes of the Legal Papers of John Adams under its Belknap Press imprint, as a unit—though a separable one—of The Adams Papers. 1 The editors were to be, and are, Messrs. Wroth and Zobel, serving as research associates in law at Harvard University, under the general supervision of the editor in chief. Professor Howe has acted throughout the enterprise as a generous and invaluable consultant to all parties. Public announcement of the undertaking was made in March 1962. An office was made available in Austin Hall, adjacent to the Harvard Law School Library, Miss Judith Diekoff (now Mrs. Daniel J. Burton) was engaged as secretary and editorial assistant, photoduplicates of the relevant files in the Adams Papers were produced, and work on the Legal Papers of John Adams began in earnest in July 1962.
Figuratively, and in some respects almost literally, what the editors have carried out in the volumes now presented is an extended piece of archeological reconstruction, as imaginative in its controlling principles as it is meticulous in its scholarly details. The work could hardly have been done at all without the existence of the incomparable archives of early Massachusetts courts in the custody of the Clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County in Boston. Consisting of minute books and written-up records for the highest court in all counties and of file papers for over 175,000 cases before 1800, these have been described in more detail by the editors in their Introduction. What the editors have not described is the laborious process by which every case documented even fragmentarily in the Adams Papers {p. R23} has been checked against the court files for its date and history and for other papers bearing on the case. The yields of information and additional documentation have been tremendous and have led on to other judicial archives and to collections of personal papers in Massachusetts and elsewhere. A large portion of the findings is now laid before the reader. Adams' condensed, cryptic, and sometimes half-legible jottings are here dated, put in context, and frequently amplified by related documents that help tell the story; and the legal and historical significance of each case has been searchingly appraised. Moreover, the technical language of an old and conservative profession—what Adams called the “lignum Vitae words” of the law–has been explained so that laymen can understand what is going on, and the reports and statutes have been cited and quoted so that readers who care to can follow the judicial process into its last refinements. In short, the editors have brought John Adams the lawyer alive and have enabled us to watch him at work. Clearly no other method than this “documentary reconstruction” (to borrow a phrase used by Professor Goebel in his work on Alexander Hamilton's law practice) could accomplish this end so well.
One or two limitations must be mentioned. It has already been said that the materials now printed are only a selection from those extant. The editors have explained their principles of selection but would plainly admit that they have omitted some cases as worthy of editorial attention and publication as some that they have included. (All of those surviving in John Adams' files are available in the microfilm edition of the Adams Papers, but they are very partially and defectively identified and arranged there.) It should be added that the selection has been made within narrow bounds. Aside from the initial notes on Adams' early legal studies and his book of pleading forms, all the documents relate to actual cases or court actions. Deliberately excluded are whole classes of Adams' writing that have a different sort of legal interest, for example his papers as a town officer and as a legislator, his instructions written for the towns of Braintree and Boston to their members in the General Court, his argument against crown salaries for judges, and his numerous published and unpublished writings on constitutional issues during the ten-year public debate that preceded the Revolution. Although these have been touched on in the editors' Introduction and been drawn on in their commentary when relevant, the writings themselves have been left for presentation among Adams' papers as a statesman, which will include as well his principal contribution to public law, the Massa• {p. R24} chusetts Constitution of 1780, and his later writings on constitutional and international law. Chronologically the Legal Papers end with Adams' last case at the bar, the initial stage of Penhallow v. The Lusanna (No. 58 in these volumes) in the New Hampshire Court Maritime in December 1777. In his Autobiography Adams recalled that it was while he was speaking in that court that “Mr. Langdon came in from Phyladelphia and leaning over the bar whispered to me, that Mr. Deane was recalled [as a member of the American Commission in Paris], and I was appointed to go to France.” More than two decades of continuous and all-absorbing public service followed. Upon being retired from the Presidency in 1801, Adams considered the possibility of resuming his practice or at least taking in some students to read law, but he apparently never returned to the courtroom after sailing to France in February 1778.
The papers here assembled richly reveal the life and mind of John Adams the attorney and barrister, the life of the law in his time and place, and life in New England on the eve of the Revolution. To the first two of these topics the editors have addressed themselves systematically in their general Introduction, and to the second, of course, throughout the volumes. But on the third—Adams' legal papers as materials for social history—a nonlegal historian may be permitted to enlarge a little.
The concerns of litigants in the 1760's and 1770's were, as at any other time, representative of the concerns of their contemporaries generally. But people in court talk more, or at least talk more earnestly, and they are obliged to answer questions regarding matters that vitally affect their interests. They have to explain things that in other situations, say in writing a letter to a friend or a relative, can be assumed and therefore do not have to be explained. Just why and how did a dispute arise over a piece of property, an unpaid loan, a mill shut down for lack of water, a meadow flooded by too much water, a sailor's right to defend himself against impressment, a printer's right not to divulge the authorship of an offending article, a Negro man or woman's rights in colonial Massachusetts, a protested tax for the support of the town minister, the eligibility of a voter in a town meeting debating a heated issue, the right to dig clams on a tidal flat, the support of an errant wife, an illegitimate child, or a destitute family? It is the fullness of detail with which the relevant circumstances must be set forth on both sides of an argument that gives court testimony its peculiar value as a transcript of life in a given place and time.
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The cases in the Legal Papers of John Adams touch on almost every concern that 18th-century New Englanders had. The very first group of interrelated cases here printed documents a quarrel over an indentured boy among members of the great Mayhew clan of Martha's Vineyard, all of them bearing Old Testament names and many of them behaving according to the ancient code of an eye for an eye. In one of the trials Thomas Daggett, a member of the posse that had gone to serve a warrant on a particularly Amazonian Mayhew female, testified that during the melee that followed, “Bethiah said I shall go into a fit.” Bassett, the deputy sheriff, then “let her go.” Whereupon, “She struck him.” Feelings ran so high in this complex of suits and countersuits, John Adams said, that it was literally “impossible for human Sagacity to discover on which Side Justice lay.” And no wonder.
Respecting the next case, King v. Stewart (No. 2), we have hitherto had only a tantalizing reference in a letter John Adams wrote to his wife in 1774, on the very eve of his departure for the first Continental Congress, when traveling the “eastern circuit” for the last time. His letter expressed his detestation of “private Mobs” and described how a riffraff of merchant Richard King's disgruntled neighbors in Scarborough, Maine, “broke into his House and rifled his Papers, and terrifyed him, his wife [who was well along in pregnancy], Children and Servants in the Night.” Adams, who was counsel for King, called it “a famous Cause,” and it was certainly a protracted one since the mobbing had occurred eight years earlier during the Stamp Act troubles. It has, however, never been documented, or more than passingly mentioned in print, until now. The materials for doing so existed, notably in the New-York Historical Society among the papers of Senator Rufus King (son of the plaintiff), where an extensive file on the elder King's efforts “to bring the Parpitrators to Justice” reposes; in the Adams Papers, which contain Adams' emotional plea to the jury fully written out; and, for the progress of the case through the courts, in the judicial archives in the Suffolk County Courthouse. These have now at length been brought together to tell a dramatic and revealing tale of rural New England.
The name of the Province in which John Adams grew up and practiced law was Massachusetts Bay, and fittingly, since the sea furnished not only a great part of the colonists' livelihood but also of their diet. And since 18th-century Boston was virtually an island, almost all of its inhabitants were in some sense seafarers. The earliest court action of historical importance in which Adams was concerned, and hence {p. R26} the earliest included in these volumes (Petition of Lechmere,No. 44), was the argument before the Superior Court of Judicature in February 1761 over the legality of writs of assistance—instruments sought by customs officials to facilitate searches for goods smuggled in by water. The celebrated case of Sewall v. Hancock (No. 46) over John Hancock's sloop Liberty also involved smuggling and, as argued by Adams in defending Hancock, raised grave constitutional issues. Two of Adams' most spectacular cases, both of which were tried in special admiralty courts and in both of which he saved his clients from hanging, were on charges of murder at sea. Concerning Michael Corbet's killing of Lieutenant Henry Panton of the Royal Navy—the latter a man of such nonchalant elegance that one would suppose him more at home in Pall Mall than off Marblehead—we know every last detail because every man jack aboard the Pitt Packet seems to have testified except the dead man, who had bled to death from a harpoon driven into his neck (Rex v. Corbet,No. 56). In the other murder case Adams himself was never able to determine the innocence or guilt of his client Nickerson, the only survivor of a peculiarly “misterious, inexplicable Affair” (Rex v. Nickerson,No. 57); nor shall we. But the colorful documentation for both cases prompts the observation that there are materials among Adams' legal papers that writers of historical fiction, as well as historians, have overlooked. Another example is “the Case of the Whale” (Doane v. Gage,No. 43), in which more than seventy witnesses furnish in their own tarry language a superlatively vivid picture of life among the whalers of the North Atlantic and a virtual textbook of whaling practices and customs. The documents prove Melville right in representing whalers as generally talkative and contentious. But not even Melville has drawn a more engagingly eccentric character than the crew member whose credibility was questioned because he had a habit of jumping into the sea with his clothes on and kept a journal which he boasted was better than the captain's.
We know from John Adams' letters and Diary that he had a special talent for rendering dialogue, and the talk of the witnesses as he recorded it in his minutes of court actions is endlessly fascinating. It is the genuine, not invented, talk of his unsophisticated neighbors. Of old Mr. Clap of Scituate, whose peculiar will full of blank pages was being contested, a defense witness rejoicing in the name of Bezaliel Curtis remarked: “He said Will [Clap's eldest son, who had been cut off in the will] had wronged him, and had Creatures [i.e. had taken or borrowed some of his father's stock or “critters”] and not {p. R27} returned 'em” (Clap's Will,No. 15). In the bastardy case of Gage v. Headley (No. 29), poor, confused Lydia Gage of Lincoln is a classic type of the country girl in the worst trouble she could possibly get into; in the harsher language of the day she was “a common Strum.” It was agreed by all that her child was “got soon after the Trooping at Sudbury.” (The clergy were always pointing out that muster days, like elections, encouraged sinfulness.) But the question was, Who was the father? Witnesses said that from time to time during her pregnancy Lydia had mentioned various candidates. “Twas a transient Person, and [Simeon] Hagar, and Pucker, a poor Toad.” But some said that this was because the real offender had both bribed and threatened her to stop her from telling the truth. For example, Sufferana Hagar (could her name have been a Yankee version of Sophronia?) testified that the suspect Josiah Headley “said he would take his gun and shoot her. But I did not think, he intended to shoot deeper than some People think he had done.” To establish paternity, and thus assure support for the child, the law required, among other things, that the woman accuse the man during her actual travail. Fortunately Lydia (or humanity) had a friend in Deacon Humphry Farrar, who appeared as her first witness in court and declared that “At the Groaning I heard her say that it was Josiah Headleys of Weston the Miller and Tavernkeeper.” Since the records of the Middlesex Court of General Sessions have been lost, we do not know how this case came out. The Lincoln town records show that five years later the child, named Josiah “doubtless in honor of the putative father,” was living in Deacon Farrar's family. This may mean any one of several things that the reader's imagination will have to supply.
For the student of language, as well as of manners, education, religion, economics, or any other facet of colonial life, the documents furnish some agreeable finds and occasional puzzles. Here are “Pampousies,” probably to be equated with “pampouties,” a kind of slippers from the East Indies, and “Catalaber,” more or less recognizable as an early form of “cantilever,” a timber bracket under a projecting roof. But sound and context alone will have to supply the meaning of a few words so far not found in any general or specialized dictionary. “Hiddalo,” found in the case of Rex v. Richardson (No. 59) in a context suggesting uproar and confusion, may be etymologically related to our “hubbub” or “hullabaloo.” “Scurlogging,” the first word in Adams' minutes of the trial of Richard King's persecutors, apparently means a mobbing or a “roughing up” of some hapless victim by his neighbors. The phenomenon, if not the word itself, is no doubt {p. R28} related to the English “skimmington-ride,” found elsewhere in Adams' legal papers and well known from Hardy's description of such a rural incident in The Mayor of Casterbridge.
These are mere incidental notes that could be continued indefinitely. Every document throws at least a pinpoint of light on the way people in Massachusetts Bay felt, thought, spoke, and acted two centuries ago; and some of them throw strong and steady beams of light on matters we needed to know more about. The capital example is the assemblage of material in the third volume documenting the two major trials (Rex v. Preston, Rex v. Wemms,Nos. 63, 64) that grew out of the mobbing and killing in King Street (present State Street), Boston, on the night of 5 March 1770.
It is astonishing, but true, that despite all the words and ink spent on the subject, no comprehensive and reliable account of the Boston Massacre and its sequels has hitherto been written. The reasons are twofold. For a long time after the Massacre occurred, few if any people would have found a reliable, that is to say an impartial, account acceptable. That the British soldiers had committed bloody butchery in King Street was one of the pieties most firmly fixed in the American mind. But as the piety faded and history began to replace propaganda and folklore, such new documentation as appeared was defectively presented and much more of the essential documentation had dropped from sight. In these circumstances the present editors very properly determined to furnish the fullest possible record of the two Massacre trials in which John Adams was concerned. They have included, in text or notes, not only the transcript of the second trial (that of the soldiers), which was contemporaneously printed and has therefore been the main reliance of historians, but also a substantial but hitherto unpublished summary of the defense evidence in the first trial (that of Captain Preston), for which no transcript of the court proceedings exists. In addition, here are notes, in large part published for the first time, of most of the lawyers who participated in the trials, on their own witnesses and arguments and on those of the other counsel. Taken all together these constitute a body of documentation that is uniquely thick-textured and that brings us as fully and continuously into the courtroom of 1770 as 20th-century readers can ever hope to be.
About 120 witnesses furnished evidence in the Preston and Wemms trials. Their testimony and the half-dozen lawyers' arguments based on it present a morbid anatomy of a town torn and harried by political strife and military occupation. Everyone of course wanted to tell his own story of the fatal night, but the very profusion of evidence makes {p. R29} the truth hard, perhaps impossible, to isolate. What is truth in such circumstances? No surviving participant or witness could tell more than a fraction of what actually happened when the townspeople and soldiers shouted, shoved, tussled, slipped, and slid on the ice and snow around the gutter that ran in front of the Custom House. But here, at any rate, is what every available witness thought happened, and from this abundant and conflicting evidence readers must reconstruct the events of the night and assign responsibility for them as best they can.
More important, of course, than who did precisely what, is the question of how well the leaders of the community managed to bridle their emotions and to put their minds on the administration of justice, or on what the editors call “the control of vengeance.” Did anyone, in fact, really want impartial justice done? John Adams' testimony on this question is disappointingly meager and cryptic and merely contributes to the mysteries concerning the Massacre and the trials that will probably remain forever unsolved. He put down few of his private thoughts during 1770, and his reflections afterward were pervaded by a self-pity that hardly seems warranted. The known facts do not suggest that either he or Josiah Quincy lost status or suffered reprisals for their part in defending Preston and his troops. That there were threats of mob action and attempts to pack the juries is true, and it is also true that one of the judges wrote in a highly unjudicial way about “the Dishonour of the Inhabitants” while the first trial was in progress. Yet persons of both persuasions who attended that trial remarked on the “order and decorum” of the proceedings and spectators. And from a source highly placed and not likely to be prejudiced in favor of “the Inhabitants,” came a clear assertion soon after the trials were over that justice had been done in spite of the inflamed state of the community. In announcing the result to an English friend, Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson said: “There certainly is a stock of Virtue in the Country though sometimes overborne by the Violent Efforts of some as bad men perhaps as any upon the Globe.” However strongly feelings ran in Massachusetts Bay in 1770, they did not in this critical instance overrun the processes of law. This cannot be said of certain later and similar incidents in our history, some of them shamefully recent and even current. But if it can be said of the Boston Massacre, it restores that sad and somewhat squalid affair, considered in its larger implications, to rank among events in which Americans may take pride.
[signed] L. H. Butterfield
Editor in Chief
 
1. In the general plan of The Adams Papers , the present volumes, though complete in themselves, are to be considered as a supplement to the as yet unpublished Papers of John Adams, that is, to Part 1 of Series III, the General Correspondence and Other Papers of the three Adams statesmen. For the general plan of publication, necessarily though regrettably complex, see the Introduction to the Diary and Autobiography of John Adams , 1:xxxvii–xli. Since work is going on concurrently on several different and more or less completely independent series and parts of the edition, there can and will be no continuous volume numbering throughout The Adams Papers. All scholarly references to The Adams Papers should therefore be to the title and volume of the particular unit concerned—in this case, of course, to the Legal Papers of John Adams.

Introduction

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John Adams was before anything else a practicing lawyer—a man of the office, the library, and the courts. Future legal historians and biographers must describe in comprehensive detail the legal system of pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts in which he studied and practiced, and the extent to which his legal training and the habits thereby developed influenced his later public service. The Legal Papers of John Adams is intended to furnish some of the raw material for such comprehensive studies. This Introduction seeks only to help the reader find his way into the context of 18th-century Massachusetts practice and to describe briefly Adams' legal career.

Sources for This Edition

The Adams Legal Papers
If the effect of Adams' legal career upon his public life is still unknown, its impact upon the corpus of the Adams Papers is obvious and substantial. Adams, being a lawyer, constantly minuted and noted every variety of legal experience, from careful abstracts of reported opinions to barely legible jottings of courtroom testimony. And being an Adams, he rarely discarded any bit of writing, a trait multiplied in his descendants. The result is an accumulation of loose papers, notebooks, dockets, and miscellany that is impressive in bulk but that had remained largely unexplored until work began on the Adams Papers editorial enterprise. In arranging the family archives as a whole, the editors of the Adams Papers physically segregated these materials so far as they feasibly could. They now form a segment of the John Adams Miscellany that appears in the microfilm edition of the Adams Papers as Reels 182–186.1 In this Introduction they are designated as the Adams Legal Papers or simply as the Legal Papers.
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The order, if any, in which Adams retained his papers has not survived. Such rationality as exists in the papers resulted from Adams' not always uniform habit of recording all his courtroom minutes for any given term of court in a single booklet or leaflet of eight leaves, each leaf approximately six inches by four inches. We believe Adams made these booklets up himself as the occasion required, folding them out of a single sheet of paper, and then cutting the folds and pinning or stitching them together, if necessary. The evidence for this surmise is slender: the appearance from time to time in the Legal Papers of a leaflet with uncut pages, the writing on some pages upside down.
A combination of court materials and summaries, all relating to matters before the Court of Vice Admiralty and the Special Court of Admiralty for the Trial of Piracies, occupies a slightly larger notebook called in this edition the “Admiralty Book.” It is not clear whether Adams kept these materials together by choice, as he happened to inscribe them, or whether he collected the documents and reports of his Admiralty cases at some time after the litigation. There are indications that he hoped to publish at least some of this material as a political attack on the Vice Admiralty Court.
Many of the documents in the Legal Papers are not courtroom minutes. Careful lawyer that he was, Adams frequently looked into troublesome points of law prior to the trial or hearing at which they were expected to arise. The written results of this research, which in this edition are called notes (as distinguished from courtroom minutes),2 were usually inscribed on unfolded sheets of paper, in a much less hurried hand.
Besides the case-centered materials, the Legal Papers contain a group of office records. First, bound into two books, each about six inches by four inches, are long docket lists—lists of cases, term by court term, written in a clerk's neat hand, interspersed with Adams' notations: “to be demurred,” “agreed,” and so on. Second are various dockets and memoranda in Adams' hand; these are either lists of his cases to be heard at a particular session of court, or the documentary remains of his accounting system. Finally, there are fragmentary bills and accounts with sheriffs, clerks of courts, and clients.
At the start of his career, Adams kept notes of worthwhile points {p. R33} in a commonplace book; later he maintained a collection of noteworthy pleadings. Both of these remain in the Legal Papers; both have been printed in the present edition.
Court Papers
The largest source of information about John Adams' legal career exists strangely enough, not in the Legal Papers themselves, but in that legal and historical treasure which, largely unexplored by lawyers and historians alike, rests in the office of the Clerk of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, Pemberton Square, Boston. Here are record books, minute books, and file papers covering, with varying degrees of completeness, the entire period from 1629 to 1800. Over 300,000 documents have been serially numbered and neatly tipped into bound folio volumes (1289 of them). Finding, preserving, and organizing this unique documentary source was largely the work of one man, John Noble, Clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court from 1875 to 1908.3 The entire collection has been titled “Suffolk Files” in this edition.
The documentation covering the period of Adams' full-time legal practice, that is from 1758 to 1774, can be divided roughly into three groups: records, minute books, and file papers. The Records are folio volumes containing the “record”—the formal, official statement of the proceedings and the court's action—in each case. Substantially all the records of the Superior Court of Judicature for the period 1692–1776 are preserved in the Suffolk Files. The records for all terms of court in one calendar year are typically bound into a single volume (sometimes two or more years in a volume), where they are indexed roughly alphabetically. Nothing but fragments of the Inferior Court Records from Adams' time have survived; but from surviving records preceding and following his era, it appears that they were maintained exactly as were the Superior Court Records.4
Minute Books were quarto waste books maintained on a county-by-county basis. Typically, the clerks, prior to the commencement of {p. R34} any given term, wrote down in consecutive order, with space between each case, the names of all the civil actions pending at that term, the continued cases first, followed by the new entries. These were then numbered in two individual series. Criminal matters (not numbered) were also listed; although there appears to have been no firm practice as to the position of the criminal cases within the minute-book notations for any given term of court, they are generally found at or near the end of the term. The typical civil minute-book entry shows the full names of the parties, with each one's lawyers listed beneath his name. The name of the lawyer “entering” the case appears in the left margin; the disposition of the case at that term of court is noted in the space below the attorneys' names. It is impossible to tell from a minute-book entry just what a civil case is about. In criminal matters, by contrast, the entire indictment is usually set out, as well as the names of the jurors.
Many of the minute books for the Inferior Court, which had been missing and presumed lost, were located while the present edition was in preparation by Burnell Hersey, Esq., in the vault beneath the Old Court House Building, Pemberton Square, Boston, in the custody of the Clerk of the present Superior Court for Civil Business. The form of these books is generally similar to that used in the Superior Court except that continued and new cases are numbered in one sequence.
The File Papers of a given case are those documents which were figuratively, and, in matters which actually went to trial, literally, before the court. With respect to the period of Adams' practice, there are virtually complete files for those cases which came before the Superior Court, not only for Suffolk County, but for the other counties as well. The Suffolk Files contain skimpy documentation for the Suffolk Inferior Court for this period, but Mr. Hersey also discovered a substantial collection of Inferior Court file papers; it is to be hoped that these will soon receive the same careful preservation which has been bestowed on the rest of the documents.5
Other Manuscript Sources
In addition to documentary sources individually recognized in appropriate footnotes, the editors have drawn on the following:
Cushing Reports , a collection in the Harvard Law School Library {p. R35} of copies of notes in a hand which has not been identified, originally compiled by Judge William Cushing. Some of the cases covered have been printed in the present edition. The entire collection is being edited for publication by John D. Cushing of the Massachusetts Historical Society.
The Wetmore Notes , a collection in four volumes, of Essex County cases in the hand of William Wetmore (1749–1830), Harvard 1770, pupil and later son-in-law of the Salem lawyer, William Pynchon, whose jottings were apparently the source of many of the collected cases. (The editors are particularly indebted to L. H. Butterfield for identification of this source, the manuscript of which bears no author's name and which, by circumstances obscure and unexplained, found its way into the Adams Legal Papers.)
The Robert Treat Paine Papers in the Massachusetts Historical Society, containing a bound collection of Paine's own almost indecipherable courtroom minutes.6
The Adams Papers , the chronologically arranged general correspondence and other materials beyond those segregated as John Adams' Legal Papers.
Documents in the Public Record Office, London, primarily from the Treasury and Colonial Office Papers, available in photostat form in the British Reproductions Collection of the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division.
National Archives microcopies of three important files of public records in that repository: the Papers of the Continental Congress, the records of the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture, and the Appellate Case Files of the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Editorial Method

The plan of these volumes is topical. With the exception of the first two sections, which deal with law study and pleading, the materials published have been grouped under the time-honored divisions of the law—torts, contracts, property, and the rest. The headings chosen are very broad. For example, the section labeled “Property” treats numerous variants of the topic, including real estate, probate matters, and water rights. Many cases, of course, defy categorization; the ultimate location depends on what seemed to be the dominant theme. Each of the eighteen topics has been given a different alphabetical designation.
Since the Adams Legal Papers are primarily case-oriented, the {p. R36} documents published under each topical subdivision (again excepting the first two topics) have been grouped into sixty-four numbered principal cases. Within each topic the cases are usually in chronological order according to the date on which the litigation commenced.7 The dates affixed to each case represent the inclusive dates for the litigation—the years of commencement and final disposition. As an aid in relating each case to the general pattern of Adams' practice and career, the editors have prepared a Chronology in which the numbered cases published in this edition are placed, with other cases and biographical information, in order by date.
Each principal case consists of one or more separate documents, numbered with Roman numerals if more than one document appears in a case. The editors have supplied every document with a brief title and have attributed to it a court (if appropriate) and date.
Two editorial aids accompany the documents published: introductory essays (labeled “Editorial Notes”) and footnotes.
The editorial notes have been used flexibly to suit the nature of the materials covered. For example, before topics of great length or complexity the editors have summed up the historical and legal background, and the broader issues involved, in a topical editorial note. If the cases within a topic can be more effectively discussed in a single essay, this note covers all of them. In most instances, however, each case bears an individual editorial note discussing the facts of the case and problems peculiar to it. Where two cases are closely linked factually they may be covered in a single editorial note.
The footnotes are designed to permit the reader to follow the pattern of each trial or argument as closely as possible. All cases, statutes, and legal treatises cited in the documents published have been identified if possible, and relevant portions of the cited material have been quoted or summarized. Matters of historical interest not covered in the editorial notes have also been dealt with in footnotes to the documents. Finally, the documentary footnotes include editorial information necessary for full understanding of textual problems. In an effort to eliminate at least a few footnotes, the editors have supplied a Register of Bench and Bar containing biographical data on the leading lawyers and judges mentioned in these volumes.
In the editorial notes and annotation the editors have tried to explain enough of the law so that a layman could understand what he {p. R37} was reading; but this is, after all, a casebook, and explication of every legalism would have bored the legal reader and crowded out more essential information. Non-lawyers may find some of their occasional discomfort dispelled by resort to a good legal dictionary.
The editors have followed the general textual policy laid down for The Adams Papers as a whole.8 (The reader should particularly note the arbitrary italicization of speakers' names, whether lawyers, witnesses, or judges.) The editors have not attempted to regularize Adams' quotations, but have indicated in footnotes, or by bracketed insertions, major errors or omissions. It may be assumed that italics in a document printed, or in a quotation in editorial matter, reflect the existence of italics in the source, unless otherwise indicated.
The only major departure from usual Adams Papers form has been in the citations. Since so much of the material cited is legal in nature, the editors decided to render virtually all citations in the basic legal form—volume number preceding the name of the author or work and page numbers following, without punctuation or abbreviation for the word “page.” The basic guide to citation form has been the Harvard Law Review's Uniform System of Citation (the “Blue Book”),9 with certain variations to permit the adding of supplementary bibliographical information. Full details of the system as modified appear at the beginning of the “short title” list in the Guide to Editorial Apparatus which follows this Introduction. For cross references to materials in other principal cases in the present volumes, the number assigned to each case has been used. Unless the title of the case is material to the sense of the passage in which it appears, the form is simply “No. 2,” with any appropriate cross-referenced document or footnote number added.
Unlike diary entries and letters, which are usually dated, many of the Legal Papers bear no date; those which do are usually docketed only to the term of court (i.e. the place, month, and year). Exact dating of the documents here printed has therefore often proved impossible, but an attempt has been made throughout to supply, in the italicized line following the caption of each document, the actual or approximate date of the document, together with the name of the court which was at this stage hearing the case in question. When this information is conjectural, the editors have justified the assigned date in the annotation.
Occasionally, Adams' habit of taking down his courtroom minutes {p. R38} on anything handy has rendered the dating of the given document nothing more than an educated guess, based on Court Record, Minute Book, or some such extraneous source as the Robert Treat Paine Papers. Notes of legal authorities, which could have been made any time before disposition of the case, have arbitrarily been attributed to the term of court at which the disposition actually occurred—or to the term in which it seemed most likely that the authorities were used.
The diffuse nature and great volume of the materials in the Adams Legal Papers and other sources have raised problems of selection rare in the editing of the diaries and correspondence published in Series I and II of The Adams Papers. Because it would have been possible fairly to justify the inclusion or omission of any case in the Legal Papers or any Adams case in the various court files, the editors—happily aware of their total vulnerability—have relied on several criteria with approximately equal emphasis: (1) Did the case in question illuminate a particular legal point? (2) Did it contain an unusual document? (3) Did it (when considered with other cases) give balance to the general picture of Adams' practice? (4) Was it interesting, historically or socially, if not legally? (5) Was there any real reason for not including it?
Once a case was selected for inclusion, two basic principles applied: (1) Any Adams document would be printed, except for such trivial or formal items as bills of costs or stereotyped pleadings—“Adams document” being defined as any paper (a) in John Adams' hand, (b) about John Adams, or (c) found in the corpus of the Legal Papers. (2) Any other document would be printed if it: (a) explained or illuminated the case, or (b) was interesting for any other reason and was not cumulative of other material.

Practice and Procedure

The Courts of Provincial Massachusetts
It is a commentary, either on Adams' time or our own, that the court system in which he practiced was as jurisdictionally differentiated as the Massachusetts judicial system of today. The discussion which follows is not and cannot be definitive. Only enough detail has been included to permit an intelligent appreciation of the juridical framework of Adams' practice. A thorough treatment of the court system must, like so much other work on this subject, await the documentary exhumation of which the present edition is only a spadeful.
{p. R39}
At the bottom of the judicial pyramid came the individual courts of the justices of the peace. Appointed on a county-by-county basis, these justices held one-man courts with civil jurisdiction over “debts, trespasses, and other matters” involving controversies of under forty shillings (and not involving title to land); appeal lay to the Inferior Court.10 On the criminal side, the justices could hear complaints of breaches of the peace, violation of the Sabbath laws, and other minor offenses. A justice could impose a fine of up to twenty shillings, and could sentence a convicted prisoner to imprisonment up to twenty-four hours, to the stocks, or to be whipped.11 Appeals in criminal cases lay to the Court of General Sessions of the Peace.12
All the justices of the peace in each county were, in accordance with English practice, named and appointed in a single commission, which authorized all of them, jointly or severally, to keep the peace. The justices of each county, sitting together, jointly comprised the next rung of the judicial ladder, the Court of General Sessions of the Peace. One such court sat quarterly in each county, concurrently with the Inferior Court of Common Pleas for the county.13 It heard appeals in criminal matters from the courts of the individual justices of the peace, with the appeal apparently entailing a new trial, by jury.14 And appeals lay from the Sessions to the Superior Court of Judicature.15
{p. R40}
Administratively, the various Courts of General Sessions served their counties as regulatory agencies. An examination of the statutes and the available minute books and files shows that the Sessions supervised county finances; regulated highways; controlled the establishment of inns and liquor retailers; appointed a host of wine gaugers, sealers of leather, and the like; exercised a kind of pure-food jurisdiction; protected monopolies; supervised the operation of the poor laws; and even attended to the construction of public buildings. In the Suffolk Files, for example, are accounts and orders dealing with the construction of the new Suffolk County courthouse in the 1760's, richly illustrative, not only of the Sessions' administrative functions, but of the architectural practices of the time.16
Each county also had its own Inferior Court of Common Pleas, which sat quarterly, at one or more locations throughout the county. This court consisted of four judges, appointed by the governor and council, any three to be a quorum.17 A statute provided that “all civil actions, other than such as are cognizeable before a justice of the peace, shall be originally heard and tryed in an inferiour court of common pleas, except in suits where the king is concerned which may be brought in any of his majesty's courts within this province at the pleasure of the prosecutor.”18 Writs ran throughout the province, but venue of most personal actions lay only in the plaintiff's or the defendant's home county.19
A dissatisfied litigant in the Inferior Court might appeal to the next term of the Superior Court where a trial de novo was held, with each party “allowed the benefit of any new and further plea and evidence.”20 Occasionally, the legislature would allow relief to a would-be appellant who had a justifiable reason for a late filing.21
The Inferior Court for each county had its own clerk, its own bar, and its own rules of practice. An interesting note from the Suffolk Files is a letter dated 10 September 1763 from Daniel Leonard to Ezekiel Goldthwait, the clerk of the court, requesting “an attested {p. R41} copy of the Rules of Court that were made at July Term for the Regulation of Practice.”22
At the head of the judicial system came the Superior Court of Judicature, Court of Assize and General Gaol Delivery, a single court with five justices (any three of whom were a quorum) appointed, like all the other judges, by the governor “with the advice and consent of the Councill,”23 sometimes from the bar, but frequently (and with notable success) from the laity. While the court in Adams' day leaned heavily for what might be called legal advice on a brilliant and learned former barrister, Edmund Trowbridge, it is also true that such non-lawyers as Peter Oliver and Thomas Hutchinson made, as far as one can tell from imperfect evidence, reasonably astute judges. Hutchinson, the Chief Justice from 1760 to 1769, diligently compensated for his lack of legal education by wide reading, common sense, and a cultivated ability to make the barristers do the legal spadework for him. “I never presumed to call myself a Lawyer,” he wrote after leaving the bench. “The most I could pretend to was when I heard the Law laid on both sides to judge which was right.”24
It might be noted that, although special justices could be appointed by the Governor and Council to sit on specific cases where a justice might decline to act or disqualify himself,25 the regular justices could and sometimes did hold other government positions. Hutchinson, for example, was simultaneously Chief Justice of the Superior Court, Lieutenant Governor of the province, Councilor, and Judge of Probate for Suffolk County.26
By statute, the Superior Court exercised jurisdiction over all actions, real, personal, or mixed, including pleas of the crown—in other words, common-law jurisdiction as full and ample as the jurisdiction the common-law courts in England “have or ought to have.”27 The court possessed original jurisdiction only over matters involving the crown.28 {p. R42} Under its appellate jurisdiction, the appellant could claim an entire new trial in the Superior Court.29 The loser in an appeal, if his purse allowed, and provided he had not already lost in the Inferior Court, was entitled to bring an action of review in the Superior Court, which afforded still another opportunity for a new trial.30 The Province Charter also permitted an appeal to the Privy Council “in any Personall Accion” where the amount in controversy exceeded £300. But the word “Personall” appears to have been construed, in England at least, to include real actions, as well.31
An appeal also lay to the Superior Court from the Court of General Sessions in criminal matters. By means of the writ of certiorari, the Superior Court controlled the Sessions in administrative disputes as well,32 and, like the common-law courts in England, regulated the exercise of what was considered common-law jurisdiction by non-common-law courts. Thus the Superior Court occasionally issued a prohibition to the Royal Court of Vice Admiralty to prevent the prosecution of an action properly cognizable only at common law.33 Finally, the judges seem occasionally to have provided the Governor, on request, with advisory opinions of law.34
The Superior Court rode a statutorily established and frequently revised circuit of all the counties in the Province, including the “Eastern Counties” of York and Cumberland in what is now Maine. It had its own clerks and its own bar, which was not organized on a county-by-county basis, although certain lawyers, Joseph Hawley, for example, rarely practiced before the court except in their home counties. Cases arising within a county were tried at the court's sitting {p. R43} in that county, but points of law could be, and frequently were, argued at sittings in other counties.
Matters involving complicated factual issues or masses of evidence were frequently heard, under order of court, by specially appointed referees, usually three in number. The process was called “referring” a case, and the matter was said to be “under reference.” After taking evidence, the referees would then “report” to the court, somewhat in the manner of a jury bringing in a special verdict, and the court would then usually “accept” the report and enter judgment thereon. The Basset-Mayhew-Allen litigation, No. 1, is an excellent example of a reference.35
In commercial matters, or cases turning on bookkeeping or business practices, the parties were sent to panels of merchants called auditors, whose function, apparently, was similar to that of referees, although it seems to have been generally limited to the ascertainment or “auditing” of figures, rather than the finding of facts generally or specially.36
Although no separate court of equity or chancery jurisdiction existed, equitable concepts were apparently known and applied. Thus one action at law refers to litigation by trustees of a testamentary trust, the res being land in Roxbury “given to the use of the free school in said Roxbury.”37 In the absence of a chancellor, the existing legal institutions were used to apply what might be considered equitable relief. So by statute, in suits on penal bonds, the court was empowered to “chancer” plaintiff's recovery down from the amount of the bond to the actual amount of his loss.38 In one case, a petition was made to the General Court for relief from a mistake.39
The common-law jurisdiction of the justice courts and of the In• {p. R44} ferior and Superior Courts was supplemented by other specialized tribunals. Wills and intestacies were regulated by Courts of Probate, one to a county, presided over by a single Judge of Probate aided by a Register (i.e. Clerk) of Probate. Probate and common-law jurisdictions crossed in one recurrent way. When the personalty of an estate (that is, everything but the real property) was insufficient to pay the legacies, the Superior Court, on motion and upon presentation of a certificate from the cognizant Judge of Probate, would make an order permitting sale of so much of the real estate as was necessary to pay the legacies. But control over the various county judges of probate lay in the Governor and Council, sitting as a Supreme Court of Probate, to whom appeals from the county courts lay.40
The Governor and Council likewise constituted the Province's divorce court, having in this instance sole jurisdiction.41 Here, too, the Superior Court appears to have played a supplementary role, for a Minute Book of 1773 notes the filing of a petition by John Adams on behalf of Sarah Griffin “for Alimony.”42
Last, although in some ways highest, on the list of tribunals before which Adams practiced was the Court of Vice Admiralty, which unlike the other courts depended for its authority directly on the Crown rather than on the Massachusetts legislature.43 It was in this court, sitting without a jury, that the great revenue battles were fought, as well as the notable Case of the Whale.44
The Documents of a Law Suit
A discussion of the documents found in a typical Superior Court file will serve as an introduction to the basic pleading and practice in a civil action as well as to an understanding of the limitations of the Suffolk Files as a documentary source.
A file in the Superior Court of Judicature is comprised usually of two sorts of documents, copies of papers from the Inferior Court, {p. R45} and documents newly introduced in the Superior Court itself. A typical file contains various documents:
(1) The writ was the initial paper commencing the action in the Inferior Court, endorsed by the party or his attorney to guarantee payment of costs if the defendant prevailed. A copy was made for the Superior Court action, because it was not the practice to file a new writ for a Superior Court proceeding. The Inferior Court writ was a printed blank, strikingly similar to that used in Massachusetts today. It read in the form of a command from the sovereign to the sheriff of the county in question, directing him to summon the defendant to appear before a given session of the court “to answer unto” the plaintiff “in a plea of” whatever the form of action was. On the back of the writ the officer who had served the defendant made a “return,” that is, indicated in a brief sentence that he had complied with the command. If the plaintiff requested it, the officer might either take the defendant bodily, or attach his goods.
(2) In the body of the writ, the plaintiff set forth his declaration, a formalized statement of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant. Most of the forms in Adams' Pleading Book, printed below, are declarations.
(3) Further pleadings were generally inscribed on convenient blank places on the writ's front or back, or, if elaborate, on a separate sheet. Although the purpose of pleadings in Massachusetts, as in other courts, English and American, was to arrive at an issue or triable point of difference between the parties, the science of pleading in Massachusetts never reached the heights of complexity which it attained in 18th-century England.45
In most cases the defendant interposed a plea in bar, denying the facts alleged by the plaintiff, or asserting new facts in justification, either ordinarily being sufficient to bring the case to an issue of fact for the jury, and therefore to close the pleading phase of the matter.
Occasionally a defendant who disputed the legal basis for the plaintiff's claim, although admitting the existence of the facts of the matter, would file a demurrer. By demurring, the defendant would in effect be saying: “Everything you allege is true, but as a matter of law you are not entitled to recover anything.” At this point the dispute became a purely legal issue to be determined by the court alone, after argument by counsel. Another kind of legal question could be raised by a plea in abatement, which attacked the technical sufficiency of the writ without reference to the merits.
{p. R46}
Ordinarily the pleadings in the Inferior Court bound the parties in the Superior Court. Occasionally, to avoid the cost of two trials, a defendant in an Inferior Court action would frame a patently frivolous “sham” demurrer. In an action for trespass to land, for example, with the declaration in an acceptable form, the defendant might demur on the grounds that the plaintiff had no cause of action. The plaintiff would thereupon pray judgment, which would be allowed by the court.
Under appropriate circumstances, plaintiffs, as well as defendants, could set up one of these apparently frivolous objections. Thus, in the hypothetical trespass-to-land case mentioned earlier, the defendant's answer might be in proper form, but the plaintiff would demur, alleging that the plea was “insufficient in law.” Judgment would thereupon be rendered for the defendant.
In a variant of this procedure, the defendant, instead of demurring to the declaration, might answer legal gibberish. Thus, in the trespass case we have been considering, where the proper plea was “not guilty of the trespass in the form and manner as aforesaid,” the defendant might answer “that he never made the contract,” or even “that the defendant is an honest man.” Plaintiff would thereupon demur to the plea, and would receive judgment. Generally the party demurring took the precaution of expressly reserving his right to waive the demurrer in the Superior Court and plead over. When the matter came up before the Superior Court, he would file a pleading sufficient properly to raise the triable issue.
(4) Whether the action in the Inferior Court went on to trial or came up on one of the forms of demurrer, the court entered judgment for the prevailing party. An appropriate notation, reciting the writ, the subsequent pleadings, and the judgment, was made in the record; a certified copy of the record entry pertaining to this action was included as part of the file sent up to the Superior Court.
(5) Ostensibly to prevent unmeritorious appeals, a statute required the losing party in the Inferior Court contemplating an appeal to post an appeal bond,46 an undertaking to prosecute the appeal. The bond, signed by the party and two others, may usually be found in the Superior Court file. These obligations were apparently formal only, because the sureties almost invariably included the party's attorney, as well as other lawyers, and on occasion even one of the opposing counsel.
(6) Documents which had been put in evidence in the Inferior Court trial usually appeared in the Superior Court files, either in the {p. R47} original or by certified copy. And, of course, new documentary evidence introduced in the Superior Court also remains in the files. None of the papers are “exhibits” in the modern sense; frequently they contain no indication that the court admitted them as evidence, although occasionally a paper may be endorsed or subscribed “for this court.”
(7) Under a statute47 depositions could be taken in civil causes under limited circumstances: if the deponent was aged or infirm; if he was bound to sea; or if he lived more than thirty miles from the place of trial. The Superior Court files frequently contain depositions from the Inferior Court proceedings, as well as depositions taken in connection with the Superior Court litigation. Sometimes a deposition will bear the notation “sworn in court,” which suggests that, even when a witness was present at the trial, his previously taken deposition could be admitted, although the restrictions, if any, on its use do not appear.
(8) The jury always rendered its verdict written on a scrap of paper, in sentence form, as: “The jury find for the defendant costs of suit,” or, “The jury find for the plaintiff, and assess the damages as 10 pounds and costs of suit.” The file generally contains the Superior Court verdict, and, where the matter was tried in the Inferior Court, a copy of the verdict from that tribunal as well. Occasionally the jury found, either on its own initiative or at the request of the court, a special verdict. This was nothing more than the jury's finding of a specific fact or facts, leaving the legal effect to the court. In a trespass case, for example, the jury might find that the defendant had committed the acts alleged, but by special verdict leave to the court to decide whether or not plaintiff should prevail. Precisely when, if ever, the jury brought in a special verdict uninstructed, we do not know. Because some of the surviving special verdicts are in the identifiable hands of various attorneys, we know that sometimes the lawyers prepared them; it also appears that the judges sometimes participated in the process.48
(9) The prevailing party, at either stage of the case, was entitled to costs, governed by statute. These were drawn up by the party's attorney and then “taxed” (i.e. approved) by the clerk. The bills of costs, sometimes informally drawn, generally appear in the files. Costs in the Superior Court included any costs which might have been taxed against the party in the Inferior Court.
{p. R48}
(10) In cases where the losing party below had failed to prosecute his appeal, the Court, on prayer of the appellee, would affirm the Inferior Court judgment. The complaint, the document praying affirmation (usually a printed form), is frequently found in the files, because there seem to have been almost as many such cases as there were fully prosecuted appeals.
(11) If the losing party failed to satisfy the judgment voluntarily, the prevailing party could obtain from the clerk an execution, a writ directing the sheriff to seize the losing party's property, sell it, and turn the proceeds (up to the amount of the judgment) over to the winner. If the sheriff could find no property, he could jail the losing party until the judgment was satisfied.
The Courtroom
Of most of the actual courthouses where Adams practiced we know little, much of it trivial. The Cambridge courthouse, for instance, occupied the present site of the Harvard Trust Company in Harvard Square; at Falmouth (now Portland), court was held in a church.49 Details of the courts' seat in Boston are a bit more precise. From 1747 to 1769, the courts sat in the Town House (today the Old State House); in the latter year, a new courthouse—on Queen (now Court) Street—costing over £2400 in Massachusetts currency, was completed under the supervision of the Suffolk Sessions.50 It was a three-story building, with the Superior Court clerk's office at the east end of the ground floor, and the Inferior Court clerk's office at the west end. The courtroom itself was on the second floor, with a chimney and fireplace behind the “judges' seat.”51 The reported events of the Richardson trial, No. 59, suggest that the jail was located at some remove from the courthouse. This building had been reconstructed in 1766, and the prisoners moved in the meantime to the Cambridge jail.52
We have embarrassingly little knowledge of the way in which the Massachusetts courts regulated their business and conducted their trials. Litigation was certainly more peremptory than it is today; the {p. R49} Minute Books show that the Superior Court would dispose of as many as six jury trials (using only two twelve-man juries) in a single day, and the Massacre Trials, Nos. 63, 64, were said to have been the first criminal matters to require more than one day for trial in the history of Massachusetts.53 But even so, the court seems to have faced the problem of clogged dockets:
At Plymouth Court April Term 1763. Ordered—That for the future in all the Courts except for the County of Suffolk the continued Actions be first tried in the order they shall stand entered and then the new entries in the same order and in case of the continuance of any Action upon sufficient Reason offered the next Action in order shall be immediately called and brought to trial.54
What might constitute “sufficient Reason” is suggested by an entry in the Suffolk Inferior Court Minute Book: “Cont[inue]d by Order on the Motion of the Def[endan]t W. Story, he having made Oath that he has a material Witness absent, whose Evidence [i.e. deposition] he has not been able to Procure.”55
All issues of fact were tried to a jury; there is no presently known instance of trial to the court alone. The jury panel was assembled by the clerk of court's sending to each town in the county a document called a venire, requiring the inhabitants of the town to nominate a specified number of men for jury duty. Statutes regulated the entire proceedings, and failure to attend as a venireman was a fineable offense.56
Once assembled at court, the veniremen were divided into two panels of twelve, called respectively the first and second jury. Trials then commenced, with the juries alternating. In criminal cases, which appear from the Minute Books to have been tried in a block after the civil business, juries were apparently new-empaneled. At any rate, as some of the cases printed in this edition show,57 the judges could exert very little control over a jury once a case had been sent to the jury room.58
{p. R50}
The judges of the Superior Court rendered few opinions in writing, none on any regular or formal basis, although they seem occasionally to have reduced the reasoning in selected cases to writing and caused the “report” to be filed with the papers of the case.59 Sometimes matters presented to the court were considered so important that an attested memorandum was filed by leave of court, presumably as a guide for the future. In one case, for example, plaintiff's bookkeeper was testifying on his employer's behalf. Defendant's counsel on cross-examination asked if it were not true that some of plaintiff's goods had been seized by the customs officers for being unlawfully imported. Plaintiff's counsel objected to the question as being “impertinent to the Issue and tending to charge the plaintiff with an offence against which he was not prepared to Defend himself.” The four-judge Superior Court split, the objection was sustained, and the report filed.60
Whether the Inferior Courts followed the practice of memorandum opinions is not known, although on one notable occasion, “After the Court had given Judgment Mr. Gridley moved for a Minute of the Reasons of the Judgment. [Judge] Wells said the Court was not accountable to the Bar for their Reasons.” But, “after some Debate, the Clerk was ordered to minute the Reason.”61 Generally, however, except for such private and unofficial collections of arguments and decisions as that compiled by Josiah Quincy Jr., and the memory of bench and bar, little in the way of precedent and stare decisis bound the judges. A fine example of informal adherence to a prior decision is Alcock v. Warden, No. 8. But even English authority, cited so regularly, seems to have been only of persuasive, rather than binding, force. And, where the Massachusetts conditions seemed to justify the modification of an English rule, the local judges apparently innovated as necessary.62 But certainly the constant citation of so much English legal material, treatises as well as reports, suggests that the Massachusetts judges did not regard themselves as free to write on a blank slate.
{p. R51}
In the absence of a comprehensive set of reported decisions or a complete analysis of the Suffolk Files, it is difficult to generalize about the litigatory diet of the Massachusetts judicial system. The cases printed in this edition suggest that virtually every kind of action known to the common law came before the courts. Simple contracts and commercial relations were the most frequent types of litigation, with land cases second. Except for defamation and injuries to property, tort law seems to have been embryonic, as it was in England. Even in the Suffolk Files, very few “personal injury” actions (except assault) have come to light, although actions against physicians for malpractice seem to have been known, and several esoteric tort theories have been unearthed.63
Massachusetts had an exceptionally detailed approach to criminal law. In addition to what might be called “ordinary” offenses, such as murder, manslaughter, rape, burglary, forgery, and arson, the Massachusetts courts were concerned with punishing a host of somewhat more unusual crimes.64 Moreover, criminal procedure had many present-day features, such as extradition,65 habeas corpus,66 petition for change of venue,67 and appointment of counsel. This last was apparently an established practice, although it is not yet clear whether the practice was limited to capital cases. In an undated document one Hindrick Hirsst, “a Sweed by birth, not well acquainted with the English tongue,” petitioned the Superior Court for “an attorney to make his defense as in such Cases is usual in the Law.”68 And at {p. R52} Worcester, in September 1768, Adams himself represented such a defendant. Samuel Quinn, accused of rape, “named me to the Court for his Council. I was appointed, and the Man was acquitted, but remanded in order to be tryed on another Indictment for an assault with Intention to ravish. When he had returned to Prison, he broke out of his own Accord—God bless Mr. Adams. God bless his Soul I am not to be hanged, and I dont care what else they do to me.”69
Despite these manifestations of judicial sophistication, 18th-century Massachusetts law could be barbarous. A convicted counterfeiter might have his ear cut off, and a convicted thief, unable to pay for the goods stolen, might be sold for a term of years to one of His Majesty's subjects.70

John Adams the Lawyer

The Legal Education of John Adams
“Let us look upon a Lawyer,” wrote John Adams to his college classmate Charles Cushing in April 1756.
In the beginning of Life we see him, fumbling and raking amidst the rubbish of Writs, indightments, Pleas, ejectments, enfiefed, illatebration and a 1000 other lignum Vitae words that have neither harmony nor meaning. When he gets into Business he often foments more quarrells than he composes, and inriches himself at the expense of impoverishing others more honest and deserving than himself. Besides the noise and bustle of Courts and the labour of inquiring into and pleading dry and difficult Cases, have very few Charms in my Eye.71
These seem to have been the last brave arguments of a young man about to enter upon a course which he has known for some time that he will take. Adams' family had assumed when he went to Harvard, at some sacrifice to them, that he would enter the Congregational ministry, following in the footsteps of his uncle Joseph, Class of 1710, an eminent New Hampshire clergyman.72 Upon graduation in 1755, {p. R53} however, Adams put off the moment of decision by undertaking to keep a school in Worcester. There he had at first spent his leisure hours in reading and copying out sermons—an occupation which he found “worth while for a candidate for the ministry”—and in long evenings of theological discussion.73
Despite these activities, and letters of encouragement from his classmates, his resolve began to waver. In his Autobiography, written nearly fifty years later, Adams said that his “Inclination was fixed upon the Law” while he was still a student at Harvard through participation in readings and debates.74 Certainly at Worcester he seemed in no hurry to follow the paths of ministerial righteousness. He started to read works of political and natural, as well as moral, philosophy, and his evening conversations began to turn more and more toward practical affairs.75 And there was ample stimulus for one interested in the law. A leading member of Adams' social circle was James Putnam, Harvard 1746, a successful lawyer and an eager disputant on the topics of the day. Moreover, amidst rural boredom, the law was hardly an arid study but the principal entertainment after church-going—other pastimes being frowned upon by the godly and prohibited by the legislature. The county Inferior Court and Court of Sessions sat in Worcester four times a year, and every September the Superior Court, with its train of lawyers from Boston, came there on circuit.
In his April letter to Cushing, although Adams had pointed out as a serious drawback of the ministry the church's constant internal wrangling, he had concluded that it was still the most desirable of the professions. But he was “as yet very contented in the place of a School Master” and would “not therefore very suddenly become a preacher.” This phrase should have warned all his solicitous friends. After a {p. R54} spring in which “Company, and the noisy Bustle of the publick Occasion” engendered by the May term of the Inferior Court had interrupted his meditations,76 and a summer in which he achieved nothing worth speaking of, he made the decision that he had been resisting for a year. On 21 August 1756 he “compleated a Contract with Mr. Putnam, to study Law under his Inspection for two years,” and on the following day he “Came to Mr. Putnams and began Law. And studied not very closely this Week.”77
Adams kept no diary during his two years with Putnam, but his course of study can be pieced together from other sources. The bulk of the curriculum seems to have been readings in the traditional masters of the common law. Two years after the completion of his studies, he wrote:
Wood. Coke. 2 Vols. Lillies Ab[ridgemen]t. 2 Vols. Salk[eld's] Rep[orts]. Swinburne. Hawkins Pleas of the Crown. Fortescue. Fitzgibbons. Ten Volumes in folio I read, at Worcester, quite thro—besides Octavos and Lesser Volumes, and many others of all sizes that I consulted occasionally, without Reading in Course as Dictionaries, Reporters, Entries, and Abridgements, &c.78
Putnam seems to have done little in the way of active teaching. Soon after his admission to the bar Adams complained: “Now I feel the Dissadvantages of Putnams Insociability, and neglect of me. Had he given me now and then a few Hints concerning Practice, I should be able to judge better at this Hour than I can now.”79 Improvements in methods of legal instruction have not altogether eliminated this problem.
His apprenticeship completed, Adams came home in the fall of 1758, despite the urgings of friends in Worcester that he remain there. He was determined to settle in Braintree, there being no other practitioner in Suffolk County established outside of Boston. Because he had not been admitted to the bar of the Inferior Court in Worcester, he had to present himself to the leading lawyers in Boston, who subjected him to a series of oral quizzes in order to ascertain his qualifica• {p. R55} tions for practice. There were giants at the bar in those days—at least in the eyes of a raw young lawyer. On his first appearance in the court house he “felt Shy, under Awe and concern, for Mr. Gridley, Mr. Prat, Mr. Otis, Mr. Kent, and Mr. Thatcher were all present and looked sour.”80 Mastering his fears, however, he proceeded to call on these men, seeking their approval.
For Adams, the most meaningful of these interviews was that with Jeremiah Gridley, dean of the Massachusetts bar. After asking the candidate about his studies, Gridley urged upon him a broad course, covering not only the common law, but also “civil Law, and natural Law, and Admiralty Law,” and gave him directions for study in each. Then came timeless words of counsel:
I have a few Pieces of Advice to give you Mr. Adams. One is to pursue the study of the Law rather than the Gain of it. Pursue the Gain of it enough to keep out of the Briars, but give your main Attention to the study of it. The next is, not to marry early. For an early Marriage will obstruct your Improvement, and in the next Place, twill involve you in Expence. Another Thing is not to keep much Company. For the application of a Man who aims to be a lawyer must be incessant. His Attention to his Books must be constant, which is inconsistent with keeping much Company.81
Adams took these words as his guide. Gridley's approach fitted his own intellectual inclinations precisely, so that throughout his life he remained a student, considering all legal learning his domain, and from that moment looked to Gridley as his master. His wry comment years later indicates that Gridley's philosophy had its disadvantages:
His Advice made so deep an Impression on my mind that I believe no Lawyer in America ever did so much Business as I did afterwards in the seventeen Years that I passed in the Practice at the Bar, for so little profit: and although my Propensity to marriage was ardent enough, I determined I would not indulge it, till I saw a clear prospect of Business and profit enough to support a family without Embarrassment.82
Upon the recommendations of Gridley and others, Adams was sworn an attorney in the Suffolk County Inferior Court on 6 November 1758, taking substantially the same oath still given at the Massachusetts bar.83 He then settled down in Braintree to pursue the lonely {p. R56} and arduous routine of any young lawyer starting out for himself. Since he was not at once overrun with clients, he was able to devote much of his time to the furtherance of his legal education. Following Gridley's advice, he embarked upon an impressive course of reading in the civil law, reporting in November 1760 that, in spite of occasional lapses for which he constantly chided himself, “Justinian's Institutes I have read, thro, in Latin with Vinnius's perpetual Notes, Van Muydens Tractatio Institutionum Justiniani, I read thro, and translated, mostly into English, from the same Language. Woods Institute of the Civil Law, I read thro. These on the civil Law.” In the same period, he had read four common-law treatises, as well as “some Reporters” and “a general Treatise of naval Trade and Commerce.”84 One product of this enterprise was certainly his Commonplace Book, printed in the present edition,85 which he filled with abstracts drawn from his reading.
Not all learning came from books. Adams was barely back in Braintree before he attended a trial before Col. Josiah Quincy, one of the local justices of the peace, and he went to court in Boston even before he was admitted to the bar.86 His diary shows that after his admission he was in frequent attendance on both the Inferior and Superior Courts, making notes of the arguments which he heard, digesting the authorities cited in these arguments, and elaborating in his own words upon the points raised. He also sought practical information from all available sources. While reading the treatise on naval trade, for example, he asked the master of a ship “what is a Bill of Lading, what the Pursers Book. What Invoices they keep. What Account they keep of Goods received on Board, and of Goods delivered out, at another Port. &c.”87 On another occasion, after a discussion of real-estate leases with several Braintree neighbors, he wrote: “I find that as much knowledge in my Profession is to be acquired by Conversing with common People about the Division of Estates, Proceedings of Judge of Probate, Cases that they have heard as Jurors, Witnesses, Parties, as is acquired by Books.”88
{p. R57}
However knowledgeable the litigious yeomanry of Braintree may have been, the bar was undoubtedly an educational resource of more lasting value. Adams took frequent opportunity to ask his seniors questions “concerning some Points of Practice in Law” that puzzled him, and to record their conversations upon such matters. On at least one occasion he sought advice more formally, asking Gridley for specific criticism of a declaration which he had drawn.89 Further self-education resulted from correspondence with lawyers of his own generation on interesting points which each had come upon.90
The Development and Extent of Adams' Practice
Less than two months after his admission to practice, Adams drew his first writ, a “Declaration in Trespass for a Rescue.” This suit, before a local justice of the peace, arose between two Braintree neighbors, one of whose cattle grazed on the field of the other. Unfortunately, Adams' declaration was defective and the writ abated. In his diary he bemoaned his “Precipitation” in taking the case, blaming “the cruel Reproaches” of his mother, “the Importunity” of the client, and “the fear of having it thought I was incapable of drawing the Writt.”91 He was sure that the episode would make him a laughingstock and drive away potential clients, but the next month he appeared again before a justice, and in July 1759 he entered his first action in the Inferior Court.92 His diary entries for the year reflect other business as well.
Early in 1760, Adams took positive steps to bring himself to the attention of potential clients. In May he wrote an essay decrying the number of alehouses in Braintree. After a year's campaign, he succeeded: the town meeting passed a resolution limiting the number of liquor licenses to three.93 At about the same time he launched another reform movement, this time against “pettyfoggers,” local deputy sheriffs and scriveners who gave bad legal advice and fomented {p. R58} litigation.94 Perhaps because of these activities, he was able to report in June 1760 that he “had secured 6 Actions” for the July Inferior Court, and a day later “3 entirely new clients.”95 From that point on, his diary contains numerous drafts of arguments and other notes which indicate a steadily developing practice. His fragmentary lists of writs drawn, beginning in January 1761, show that he soon had from ten to twenty writs per term in the Inferior Court in the years before 1763.96
In November 1761 Adams was admitted an attorney in the Superior Court.97 The following year, in a move attributed to Chief Justice Thomas Hutchinson's desire to add dignity to the proceedings of that court, all members of its bar were formally called as barristers at the August term. Adams was among those who thereafter appeared in “Gowns and Bands and Tye Wiggs.”98 This marked the beginning of his practice in the Suffolk Superior Court, where, according to the Minute Books, for the next two or three years he was of counsel in from one to five actions at each term. For the time being, however, his principal concern remained the Common Pleas. In January 1763, for example, he had thirty-six actions at the Suffolk Inferior Court.99 It was not until 1765 that he seems to have made any significant progress in the Superior Court. In March of that year he appeared in at least five actions there, two of which he tried to a jury without success. He was of counsel in eight actions at the August term, prevailing in two of four jury actions.
As he became better established, Adams' business began to expand outside Suffolk County. As early as June 1762, his diary records that he journeyed “To the Land of the Leonards” (Bristol County, a region populated by lawyers and judges of that name) to attend the Inferior Court at Taunton.100 His surviving docket lists for the years 1764 to 1768 show that he attended the Taunton Inferior Court frequently {p. R59} and had cases at nearly every term of the Plymouth Inferior Court during this period. In addition, he was sometimes present at the Barnstable and Middlesex Inferior Courts and even traveled at least once to the Inferior Court at Pownalborough in Lincoln County, District of Maine, the farthest extent of Massachusetts justice to the eastward.101 At the same time, he rode circuit with the Superior Court, appearing at Bristol in October 1764 and subsequent terms, at Plymouth for the first time in 1765, Worcester and Essex in 1766, Barnstable and Middlesex in 1767, Hampshire in 1768, and Cumberland and Lincoln in 1769.
Adams entered the most active phase of his career in 1768. He appeared in a total of 110 cases entered at nine different terms of the Superior Court (nearly double his previous best annual total) and about 200 cases in various Inferior Courts; he also began to practice in the royal Vice Admiralty Court, where he had one civil case and several important actions for breach of the Acts of Trade.102 His practice seems to have reached a peak in 1772 and 1773. In 1772 he appeared in 202 Superior Court cases in all counties. The next year he drew 262 writs in the Suffolk Inferior Court (not all of which were served or entered) and in 38 more cases there represented the defendants.103 In these years he was certainly the busiest lawyer in the Province, being engaged in 85 entries at the August 1772 Suffolk superior Court. Thereafter he had fewer cases, because political developments in 1773 and 1774 hurt all lawyers' business. After 1774 his political activities kept him out of what little law business there was until his retirement from Congress at the end of 1777. He then returned to Massachusetts, fired by tales of prosperity at the bar and full of expectations of profit. But he was almost immediately appointed Joint Commissioner to France. His departure for that post in February 1778 after only one known court appearance marked the end of his career as a practicing lawyer.104
{p. R60}
The content of Adams' practice has not yet been analyzed in detail, but it is safe to say that it covered almost every public and private activity carried on in the Province. The majority of his cases arose out of the simpler financial transactions of trade and commerce, being suits to recover obligations embodied in promissory notes, bonds, or accounts. The more complicated suits of this variety stemmed from the involved affairs of Boston's merchants and their European and West Indian correspondents. Another significant group of cases concerned real estate. Land was one of the principal elements of provincial wealth, and land speculation was a major stimulus to settlement and exploitation of the still empty back country. In the realm of tort, the majority of cases seemed to involve injury to property interests, whether real or personal. Adams also had many suits for defamation in an era of strict honor and tender feelings, as well as a number of actions for assault and battery.
Public matters, too, produced a substantial amount of litigation. Adams devoted much time to suits to collect taxes, to enforce other Province laws, and to protect town interests in land. Other town matters—proceedings under the poor laws, on highway regulation, and the like—brought him often before the county courts of general sessions of the peace, which were charged with administering the great bulk of local regulation. As an active trial lawyer, Adams also had many criminal cases. This branch of the practice involved a familiar range of ills—murder, rape, larceny, assault, counterfeiting—and some more peculiar to Adams' times, such as rioting, mobbing, and tarring and feathering.
Although most of Adams' cases were in the courts of common law, he ventured into every other type of court held in the Province. His practice in the Vice Admiralty Court, almost entirely limited to actions under the Acts of Trade, has already been mentioned. He also appeared in special courts of admiralty called for the trial of felonies committed at sea; in the county courts of probate, as well as before the Governor and Council sitting as the Supreme Court of Probate; and before Governor and Council in their capacity as a court of divorce.
Adams spent most of his time in the trial of cases. In 18th-century Massachusetts much of the office work that today occupies many lawyers almost exclusively—the drafting of wills, deeds, and con• {p. R61} tracts—seems to have been performed by such non-lawyers as scriveners, notaries, or the parties themselves. The bar apparently claimed no monopoly in these matters, trying to protect itself only from unauthorized practice in the courts. Nevertheless, Adams did on occasion perform counseling and drafting services for his clients in matters not directly connected with litigation.
In his diary for 1759–1760 appear entries which show that he had been called upon to draft a deed, to give advice orally to several “Consultors” who came to his office, and to render a written opinion to a client contemplating suit on an obligation owed to an apprentice.105 Thereafter, such matters continued to form a small but steady part of Adams' practice. For example, his dockets for the southern counties to which he rode circuit contain occasional entries for fees received for “advice” apparently rendered from the saddlebag. Adams' account with John Hancock, receipted in December 1771, contains two items for “advice” and one for drawing a bill of sale.106 Documents pertaining to the Boston Tea Party in 1773 show that Adams and another lawyer were retained by the owners of one of the tea ships to give legal advice just before the events which made their queries moot.107 Letters in the Adams Papers indicate also that clients sometimes sought counsel in a formal way. In March 1773, one W. L. Morgan, who said that he had previously conducted certain “Evening Amusements” at Portsmouth and now wished to put on his entertainment in Boston, wrote for a legal opinion on his plans. He enclosed a proposal, evidently for a kind of private subscription arrangement, which he hoped would “secure me and my necessary Assistants from being troubled by the Act of the Province (if it now exists) against Theatrical Entertainments.”108 Adams' reply unfortunately has not been found.
{p. R62}
On at least one occasion Adams served as administrator of the estate of a deceased intestate, as is evidenced by a copy of the letters of administration in the Adams Papers.109 Litigation itself produced a certain amount of activity more in the nature of negotiation than advocacy. In January 1767, for example, Adams informed his friend and brother-in-law, Richard Cranch, that, rather than again sue a “miserable animal” of a debtor who would be badly hurt by the costs, he had taken the debtor's note for the amount of a debt owed Cranch on a previous judgment and was forwarding the note with an account that the debtor claimed Cranch owed him.110 Satisfaction of a judgment could lead a lawyer to extraordinary efforts. On 1 April 1770 Adams wrote to George Hayley, London merchant and correspondent of John Hancock, that he had been obliged to travel to Gloucester with an execution in Hayley's favor, which he was there able to satisfy out of the real estate of the debtor, who had absconded. The letter describes the problems and mechanics of sale, concluding with a request that someone else be given charge of the property, because “it lies so far out of my Province, both in the Nature and Situation of it.”111
Adams' clients came from all segments of Massachusetts society. Probably the majority of them were the solid yeomen of Suffolk County—particularly those in the Braintree area—who year in and year out were constantly bringing one another into court to resolve petty differences. A number of his relatives, of whom he had many, appear regularly as clients. As his reputation increased, however, Adams began more and more to draw his business from the upper ranges of the social and financial order. In his diary for 30 June 1772 he catalogued some of the leading citizens who had been his clients: Silvester Gardiner, James Bowdoin, James Pitts, John Hancock, John Rowe, Jeremiah Lee, Daniel Sargeant, Robert Hooper, and Elisha Doane—all men of great wealth, many of whom were engaged in politics as well.112
{p. R63}
Other clients of importance included Governor John Wentworth of New Hampshire; Harrison Gray, Treasurer of the Province; William Story, Deputy Register of the Vice Admiralty Court; Benjamin Hallowell, a commissioner of the customs; and, on at least one occasion, ex-Governor Sir Francis Bernard. The names of others known to history as well as to their contemporaries appear in his cases—for example, Paul Revere, Joseph Warren, and Benjamin Church. There was also the Kennebec Company, consisting of Gardiner, Bowdoin, Pitts, and Hallowell, proprietors of a vast tract in the Kennebec Valley in Maine, whose interests Adams served for many years. In addition, Adams acted in behalf of many towns, including Boston, a name appearing frequently in his accounts.
Many of Adams' cases are important today because of their connection with the dynamic political forces at work in pre-Revolutionary Boston. Among such cases printed in the present edition are the trials in which Adams and others braved public opinion to defend the British officer and soldiers charged with the killings known as the Boston Massacre Nos. (63, 64); the argument of James Otis against writs of assistance, which was later much circulated as reported by Adams (No. 44); numerous suits for violation of the British Acts of Trade, including the prosecution of John Hancock for the alleged smuggling of prohibited wine in his sloop Liberty (No. 46); the suits brought by Hancock on behalf of certain London creditors of tory printer John Mein, an effective opponent of the nonimportation movement (No. 12); and the trial of Michael Corbet and other seamen before a special court of admiralty for the killing of a British naval officer who had boarded their merchant vessel at sea allegedly to impress them (No. 56). In cases not reported in these volumes, Adams represented James Otis in his suit against John Robinson, a customs commissioner who had seriously injured Otis in a tavern brawl,113 and took the case of two county officers sued by merchant Ebenezer Cutler for assisting a mob to harass him when he had transported British goods in defiance of the nonimportation agreement.114
Without a more elaborate analysis of the substantive law of 18th-century Massachusetts than the editors have been able to undertake, {p. R64} it is not possible to define fully or accurately Adams' contribution to legal development. Isolated instances of influence may be found, however. His cases in the field of administrative law, for example, helped to define the Superior Court's scope of review over the courts of sessions, one decision in his favor even leading to a legislative change (No. 27). In two of Adams' cases the opinions of Judge Edmund Trowbridge on questions having to do with levy of execution were considered significant enough to be printed in the 19th-century Massachusetts reports.115 Certain of the forms copied into his Pleadings Book, printed elsewhere in this volume,116 were included in a form book published in successive editions between 1802 and 1905.
Some of Adams' cases also had a bearing on later developments in constitutional law. Several suits in which slaves sued for their freedom were decided on technical rather than humanitarian considerations, but they mark the first stirrings of a later movement (Nos. 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42 38–42 ). Adams was of counsel in a number of cases arising out of the struggles of Baptists and other dissenters against the Congregational religious “establishment.” The concessions won by the dissenters in these suits surely prepared the ground for the intensified battles over religious liberty which followed the Revolution (No. 37). One of Adams' last cases, a prize suit in the New Hampshire state admiralty court, went through a series of appeals and countersuits that finally brought it before the United States Supreme Court in 1795 (No. 58). The decision there, long after Adams had severed all connection with the case, treated important questions of federal and state power that were but dimly perceived in 1777.
The Mechanics of Practice
Adams and his contemporaries at the bar were sole practitioners, partnerships in the modern sense being unknown. The informality and closeness of the bar supplied many of the advantages of partnership, however. For instance, lawyers freely loaned books to those who lacked them.117 They also seem commonly to have assisted one another in such matters as court appearances. Adams wrote to Samuel Quincy, asking him to enter some forty actions at the current Suffolk Inferior {p. R65} Court, “and answer for me in all things once more, and to write me one Line to let me know my Fate, as usual.”118 Adams' dockets in later years show that he would on occasion divide up his entries at a particular term among several lawyers when he was unable to attend.119
It was usual for two lawyers to argue on each side in a case, but we do not know whether such arrangements represented the choice of the client or of the lawyers. In any event these pairings were too fluid to be called partnerships. The Superior Court Minute Books show that Adams more frequently appeared alone than with co-counsel. When he was not alone, Jonathan Sewall, Robert Treat Paine, Josiah Quincy Jr., and three or four others were the lawyers most often paired with him. But he appeared in one or more cases with at least thirty lawyers between 1762 and 1774 and was opposed even to Sewall, Paine, and Quincy far more often than he was joined with them.120
Adams established his office in Braintree at the beginning of his career and remained there until 1768.121 In the latter year, finding that he was spending more time traveling than in court, he moved with his family to Boston, where both the bulk of his practice and the political events which were demanding more and more of his time were concentrated. Between 1768 and 1771 he changed his Boston residence three times. He may have had an office in his first house at Brattle Square not far from the Court House. In the spring of 1769 he moved his family to Cole Lane, some distance away. He then probably took the office “near the steps of the Town house Stairs” where, according to his Autobiography, he was sitting on the morning after the Boston Massacre in 1770 when approached by Captain Preston's representative.122
In 1771, Wearied by the pace of life in town, Adams brought his family back to Braintree to live, becoming for a while virtually a commuter. He then took an office in Queen (now Court) Street, at {p. R66} which he was in steady attendance while the court was in session. Sometimes he traveled back and forth between Boston and Braintree in the same day; at other times he stayed with friends or relatives.123 In this routine he apparently found some relief for a while, but business-public and private—soon called him back to Boston. In the fall of 1772 he bought a house in Queen Street, “near the Scaene of my Business, opposite the Court house ... and inconvenient and contracted as it was I made it answer both for a Dwelling and an Office, till a few Weeks before the 19th of Appril 1775 when the War commenced.”124
As the account of his practice suggests, Adams must have spent nearly as much time in the saddle, riding circuit, as he did at his desk. These trips to Taunton, Plymouth, Worcester, Salem, Falmouth (now Portland), and other places were often unproductive and always arduous. In his diary and letters Adams spoke frequently of the expense of travel and the potentially more rewarding practice which he was missing at Boston. He spoke too of the boredom and discomfort of his trips and of his ardent longings for familiar scenes and faces. The long eastern circuit to Ipswich and down to Maine which the Superior Court made each June seemed particularly painful, doubtless not only because it entailed a two or three-week separation from his family but because of the long distances and rude living conditions involved.
Adams' trip on the eastern circuit in 1771 is typical.125 On 17 June he set out from Braintree “in a Cloth Coat and Waiscoat, but was much pinched with a cold, raw, harsh, N.E. Wind. At Boston I put on a thick Flannel Shirt, and that made me comfortable, and no more—So cold am I or so cold is the Weather.” After the stop in Boston and dinner in Maiden, he pressed on, riding for a while in company with Judge Cushing of the Superior Court. The two stopped briefly in Lynn, but Adams went on to spend the night in Salem, complaining that “I have hurt myself today, by taking cold in the forenoon, and by drinking too much Wine” at his various way stops. No relief was immediately at hand, however. A friend, grief-stricken at the recent loss of his wife, shared Adams' chamber, keeping him awake for hours with his woes.
{p. R67}
The next day Adams arrived at Ipswich, where he remained in reasonably comfortable surroundings for the week that the court sat there. Then came a day's ride to York, with a lengthy stop on the way in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. After four days in York, Adams and several other lawyers departed for Falmouth, spending the night at Biddeford. Rain delayed the party for a day, but on Sunday they went on to Scarborough, and, after going “to meeting forenoon and afternoon,” proceeded to Falmouth. There, on 2 July, Adams expressed his disgust in his diary: “This has been the most flat, insipid, spiritless, tasteless Journey that ever I took, especially from Ipswich. I have neither had Business nor Amusement, nor Conversation. It has been a moping, melancholly Journey upon the whole.” Yet he was still there on 5 July, having argued at least one case in a manner which brought him what he felt to be ill-deserved compliments. His diary breaks off at this point, but presumably he then began the homeward trip, which would have taken him at least three more days of riding—a total elapsed time of over three weeks.
Despite their inconveniences these trips had certain advantages. In the first place, they must have produced a favorable financial balance. The trips to Bristol and Plymouth always resulted in much business, and the journeys to the eastward usually concerned the affairs of the Kennebec Company, one of Adams' most lucrative connections. Riding circuit must have had a major effect on the atmosphere in which practice was conducted. As Adams' 1771 trip shows, judges and lawyers often traveled together, finding lodgings at the same inn and frequently spending the evenings in mild conviviality. There were also chances for more serious discussion. On the trip just described, for example, Adams spent two evenings in conversation with Judge Trowbridge, one of the foremost legal minds in the province.126 Men thus thrust together in common discomfort must inevitably have developed an easy familiarity that made their professional relations closer and more relaxed.
The routine of litigation varied with Adams' location. In Suffolk County the practice centered on the paperwork of an action in the Inferior Court. Adams apparently obtained blank writ forms from the clerk prior to the beginning of each term of court. A client would request that Adams draw a writ as the first step in what was, for many simple notes and accounts, just another coercive measure in the collection process, intended to force payment from a reluctant debtor. The small number of writs which actually led to litigation attests this fact. Often a settlement satisfactory to the plaintiff occurred before {p. R68} the defendant was served. Where more pressure was necessary, Adams or his client delivered the writ to the sheriff; service on the defendant had to be accomplished at least fourteen days before the court sat.127 Service led to a few more settlements. If the action was to proceed, Adams entered it on the docket of the court, a step which had to be taken on or before the first day of the term.128 The clerk of the court prepared lists of all the entries and distributed them to the lawyers. But many cases on these lists were never tried, either because the writ could not be served or because of a late compromise by the parties.
Adams was retained by defendants in relatively few cases, but a far greater proportion of these matters was actually tried than was true of cases in which he represented plaintiffs. This fact suggests that, unlike his modern counterpart, the 18th-century defendant did not obtain counsel until just before trial. Once a case reached the trial stage, it no longer fitted into the paperwork routine. It might be continued (that is, put over) for several terms, demurred, or tried to a jury. If there was a judgment, execution would issue, or an appeal might be taken to the Superior Court. The appeal itself might be dropped, in which case a complaint for affirmation had to be filed; or it might be continued or tried. At these later stages, Adams might be engaged to try or argue a case with which he had not been previously connected.129
On circuit, the routine was like that after entry in Suffolk. The drawing of writs and entering of actions in the Inferior Court seems to have been accomplished by local counsel; when Adams took a case, it was usually either to replace the local man or to join with him.130 He tried some of his circuit cases by prearrangement with Boston {p. R69} clients who had business in the outlying counties. Other cases came to him after his arrival in the shire town—virtually at the courthouse door. This feature of ambulatory law practice is perhaps best illustrated by Adams' comment in a letter written during a halt en route to Falmouth from York in July 1774, that Josiah Quincy Jr. “would not stop, but drove forward, I suppose that he might get upon the Fishing Ground before his Brother Sam, and me.”131
The account books necessary for an estimate of Adams' income from the practice of law are missing, and there are no other comparable sources. If we are to take him at his word, we must conclude that he made no fortune at the bar. But he was able to purchase modest realestate holdings in Braintree and a house in Boston, as well as to spend “an Estate in Books [and] a Sum of Money indiscreetly in a Lighter, another in a Pew.”132 It was not from such modest investments, or his conservative speculations in mortgages, that wealth came in 18th-century Boston, however. Adams recognized this in his Autobiography: “I was too much enamoured with Books, to spend many thoughts upon Speculation on Money.... I was more intent on my Business than on my Profits, or I should have laid the foundation of a better Estate.”133
Even at the peak of his career, Adams owed any financial success more to quantity of business than to high fees. His charges seem to have been standard for nearly all clients and in many cases were governed by statute. The minimum for drawing a writ was seven shillings, but in cases where a complex declaration was required the figure might go as high as eighteen shillings. The average seems to have been about twelve shillings. Adams often bore the cost of service (usually three or four shillings) in the first instance, as existing accounts with sheriffs for their labors show.134 When an action was entered in the Inferior Court, there were clerk's, justices', and other fees totaling 9s. 8d.135 In many cases Adams received twelve shillings from the client for entry, treating the difference as an advance to be {p. R70} credited later. If Adams obtained judgment in his client's favor, charges for service and entry were taxed as costs against the losing defendant. These charges were often also paid by the defendant when an action was settled, although it seems to have been more common for the plaintiff to bear his own costs in such cases, as is usual today.
Once the case was entered, most of the fees were limited by statute. A lawyer could charge twelve shillings for a trial in the Superior Court and six shillings for an Inferior Court trial. In addition, whether or not the case came to trial, Adams charged his clients 1s. 6d. per day for “attendance,” that is, presence in court until the case was disposed of. These sums were also taxed as costs.136 In cases where points of law were argued separately from the trial, a matter not covered by statute, Adams, at least later in his career, charged an extra five-shilling “arguing fee.” The usual charge for “advice,” when distinct from litigation, seems to have been about twelve shillings.
Most of Adams' income seems to have come to him through these small increments—a great many twelve-shilling writs and a substantial number of litigated matters that brought him no more than a pound or two. More rarely a single case might be complicated enough to bring a larger fee, but usually the figure would have been earned shilling-by-shilling through the same painstaking series of small steps that made up the lesser business.
John Hancock's account with Adams, rendered and paid in December 1771, is a good demonstration of the economics of practice.137 It covers the period March 1769 to December 1771 (the month in which writs for the January 1772 Inferior Court were drawn) and contains twenty-five items in nineteen different matters, amounting to a total charge of some £55. Of these twenty-five items, seventeen are under a pound, and only two exceed £2 10s. Of the nineteen matters, twelve produced fees amounting to less than a pound. The cases producing higher fees had been entered on the docket and involved one or more trial fees and numerous days' attendance. The only two really substantial sums were fees in the two suits against John Mein which Hancock had managed; these came to £34. The Mein actions, as the discussion of them in this volume shows, were continued several times in both the Inferior and Superior Courts. Lengthy accounts had to be procured and annexed to the writs, and elaborate {p. R71} new pleadings were filed on appeal. The fees here too were undoubtedly made up of a multitude of small items.138
Adams' fees were not always measured by this scale, however, and there were occasionally other sources of income. The Kennebec Company paid him a flat sum of £30 annually to cover fees and expenses on each of his trips to Falmouth from 1769 to 1771; his account with the company, receipted in February 1774, shows an item in June 1772 for “a Journey to Falmouth in Casco Bay and Fees in your Causes and Concerns at that Court by agreement for” £15.139 In January 1778, just before Adams' departure for France, the grateful proprietors voted that the Treasurer give him “a Fee of One hundred Dollars for carrying on the Company's Cause with Coll. Tyng.” This was a case for which Adams had billed earlier at the usual rates. He had apparently participated only in the preparation for trial in 1778, so that the size of the figure (inflation aside) indicates that the tales of prosperity which drew him back to practice at the end of 1777 were not unfounded.140
There are occasional records of other lump-sum fees which do not seem directly based on item-by-item charges for the services involved. For example, in his suit with John Robinson, James Otis made it a condition of the settlement which finally resulted that Robinson would provide a fee of £30 for each of Otis' lawyers—a sum which Adams described in a docket note as “a genteel Fee.”141 In the Boston Massacre trials, the total fees of £136 10s. to be divided among four lawyers for the two trials suggest something more than the usual charges.142 Fees in Admiralty also seem to have been computed on a different scale. In the fall of 1772 Adams received a total of £12 for his services in the preliminary stages of the Kennebec Company's defense of its logs against Surveyor General John Wentworth (No. 55).143 For the defense of Ansell Nickerson in a special court of admiralty, Adams received a note (never paid) for £6 13s.144 Retaining {p. R72} fees were also a fairly frequent source of income not regulated by statute. Sums of a pound or more might be paid to a lawyer, as much to prevent the other side from obtaining his services as anything else.145
It is possible to reconstruct the methods by which Adams kept his financial records. In his earliest years at the bar, he kept a single record in which he entered under the appropriate term of court each writ drawn and each suit in which he represented the defendant. Under each such entry he thereafter made a minute of his fee and of all subsequent phases of the case involving money, his receipts, and his own dealings with any funds of his clients that came into his hands.146
As his practice became more extensive, Adams' accounting techniques grew correspondingly more sophisticated. At first he seems to have operated entirely on a cash (or at least negotiable instrument) basis, and in the counties to which he traveled on circuit he apparently continued to use this method with all but a few major clients. After about 1768, however, the notation “posted” begins to appear beside certain entries in his lists of Suffolk County actions, indicating that his fees and other charges for those suits were being entered in an account ledger of some sort against the name of his client.147 Surviving materials for the years after 1770 show that there were at least three accounting tools in Adams' bookkeeping system.
The basic device was the “Office Book” or “Writ Book,” a term-by-term listing of writs drawn for the Suffolk County Inferior Court, in which all fees and charges for drawing, entering, and serving each writ appeared, as well as the terms of any pretrial settlement of the action or direct payment of cash to Adams by or on behalf of the client.148 If the disposition of the case was such that no execution was to issue, then the notation “finished” would appear beside the entry if {p. R73} Adams had been paid in cash or by note; “posted” would appear if any unpaid balance was being transferred to the client's account; or “not to be posted” might be written, indicating that for some reason Adams was not charging for his services. Sometimes the notation would be “posted to Mr.——,” a third party who apparently was bearing the charges of a particular action.
If execution was to be levied in behalf of Adams' client, the entry “posted E.B.” would appear in the Writ Book, meaning that the case had been entered in the second bookkeeping device, the “Execution Book.”149 There the amounts of the judgment, costs, and fee for the execution were entered. Upon satisfaction, Adams either received the amount of the costs (his fees and outlays) in cash, in which case the notation “finished” appears, or the balance of costs outstanding was “posted” to the client's account.
Debtor and creditor ledgers in which each client had a separate account were the third device. Here were posted entries from the writ and execution books. Other fees and charges, such as those for attendance at court, arguing and trying cases, and obtaining copies of the record and papers in appealed cases, were entered separately in the ledgers when the matter was such that no bill of costs embodying these charges could be taxed against the other party. Credits, such as payments on account, were also entered.150 The means which Adams used for keeping track of these last billable items is not entirely clear. He was charged for copies of records by the court clerk who prepared them, and he posted such charges from the bill to the appropriate accounts.151 The other matters are occasionally noted in the docket lists supplied by the clerk each term, which Adams used as a kind of running register of the disposition of his cases. Inconsistency in such entries suggests the existence of still a fourth bookkeeping tool, a case-by-case record in which attendance and like matters were recorded systematically. Occasional mentions of “minute books” in the docket lists may refer to such a device.152
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Since Adams' receipts tended to take the form of promissory notes or accounts receivable, collection was a serious problem. Part of the difficulty lay in Adams' extreme slowness about calling his debtors to book, a trait probably resulting from press of business, rather than generosity. For example, Hancock's account, already described, covered a period of over two years when rendered, and in the Adams Papers there are still a number of unreceipted notes for legal fees given by various impoverished clients.153 In 1790, when he was serving in Philadelphia as the nation's first Vice President, accounts both for and against him, dating from his pre-Revolutionary law practice, were still outstanding.154 Adams was not always so slow, however, and was, in fact, one of his own best clients. Nearly forty actions in which he was plaintiff have been identified in the court files. Although many of them are suits on notes or bonds which could have arisen in other ways, several are on accounts which clearly show that the defendant was a defaulting client.155
The Intellectual Side
Amidst the confusion and detail of his extensive practice, Adams never lost sight of the one element in his professional make-up which raised him above so many of his contemporaries at the bar. His questing, Harvard-opened mind, stimulated by the example of Putnam, and to a far greater extent by Gridley, always approached the law on the highest possible plane as an intellectual discipline—one of the humanities. As he read the dry and endlessly annotated texts of the civil law and the ancient common-law classics urged upon him by Gridley, he also worked his way through the philosophers of the Enlightenment, who spoke so much in jurisprudential terms. Justinian, Vinnius, Bracton, Coke, Bolingbroke, Montesquieu, and Rousseau mingle in the early diary entries that record his reading. From this course of study came the appreciation of law as politics, law as philosophy, and law as jurisprudence which so colored Adams' later approach to the problems of his time and was so much a part of his contribution to their solution.
Gridley's original inspiration had been a critical factor in the {p. R75} formation of this intellectual interest, and Gridley was to be instrumental in reviving it and directing it at its maturity. In January 1765 the older lawyer brought Adams and two or three contemporaries together in a legal study and discussion group, which Adams called the “sodality,” or “Sodalitas, A Clubb of Friends.”156 The group does not seem to have lasted long, but while it flourished, Adams found it highly stimulating and rewarding. The readings in the ancient English and Roman law were such as he might have pored over alone, but the sodality changed what had been dutiful labor into a source of heightened comprehension, as the “Friends” explored thoroughly the philosophical and historical roots of their legal system. Out of this exploration came Adams' first major piece of writing, later called “A Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law,” which is discussed more fully below.
An important manifestation of Adams' intellectual approach to the law was the size and breadth of his law library. Naturally, a busy and prosperous lawyer would require a full collection of reports, treatises, abridgments, collections of precedents, and statute books. These were stock in trade, but the expansion of Adams' library into what he later described as “the best Library of Law in the State”157 was in great measure a part of his broader intellectual development.
As early as 1761 Adams could report that he had “bought some Books &c.,” and there is evidence of sporadic purchases after that, but for many years he could satisfy his appetite only through borrowing from others. Harvard College, Gridley, Otis, and Samuel Quincy were among those who lent him books too esoteric and expensive for a young lawyer to buy, even if he could have found them in the bookstalls of Boston.158 He apparently bought many of Gridley's books at auction after the latter's death, a solid start for a substantial collection.159 In 1768, when his practice had begun to bring him significant returns, he wrote in his diary on the eve of the Gridley sale that he was “mostly intent at present, upon collecting a Library,” a project which he found took “a great deal of Thought, and Care, as well as Money.”160 The source of his later complaints that he had “spent an {p. R76} Estate in Books” is apparent in his efforts in 1771 to open a “Correspondence” with Messrs. Dilly, London booksellers. He expected to spend £20 or £30 a year on books and wanted sent to him “every Book and Pamphlet, of Reputation, upon the subjects of Law and Government as soon as it comes out—for I have hitherto been such an old fashiond Fellow, as to waste my Time upon Books, which noBody else ever opened here, to the total Neglect of spick and span.”161
The editors have not attempted to produce a detailed bibliography of Adams' law books, or even to identify them consistently in footnotes. The sources for a bibliographical study exist, and it is to be hoped that one may be forthcoming, either as part of a larger study of the successive and cumulative Adams family libraries to be prepared by the Adams Papers editors, or as a separate essay. The best existing source is the printed Catalogue of John Adams' books as they now stand in the Boston Public Library.162 This work shows, for example, that he owned at least nineteen volumes of reports, including Barnardiston, Burrow, Coke, Croke, Hobart, Kelyng, Lord Raymond, Salkeld, Saunders, and Vernon; Bacon's and Viner's Abridgments; Ruffhead's English Statutes at Large; Rastell's, Coke's, and Lilly's books of entries; and a large number of treatises and general works on common law, civil law, the law of nations, and more general jurisprudential topics. Among the treatises were Gilbert's works on the Exchequer, the Court of Chancery, and feudal tenures; Barrington, Observations on the Statutes; Godolphin, Orphans' Legacy and Repertorium Canonicum; Foley, Poor Laws; Fortescue, De Laudibus Angliae; Calvinus, Lexicon Juridicum; Gardiner, Instructor Clericalis ; Hale, History of the Pleas of the Crown ; Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown ; the State Trials ; Selden, Opera Omnia; Malynes, Lex Mercatoria; Swinburne, Testaments and Last Wills; Blackstone, Commentaries , in English and American editions (to the latter of which Adams was a subscriber);163 and many other 18th-century legal works.
The Catalogue cannot be relied upon as accurate for two reasons. First, it does not represent the entire Adams family library by any means. Among John Quincy Adams' books in the Stone Library at Quincy are undoubtedly books once belonging to the elder Adams {p. R77} that were appropriated by the younger, who also had a brief legal career.164 Secondly, Adams remained interested in the law for nearly fifty years after he left active practice, and in many cases it cannot be determined when a given book in the Catalogue was purchased. There are specific references to a few books in Adams' diary and correspondence which permit such a dating,165 and occasionally a book itself bears a date of acquisition. There are also countless citations of legal works, not only in the present edition, but throughout the diary as well. Although these citations are a great aid in determining the content of Adams' library, they present certain pitfalls. Since lawyers frequently lent one another books, a particular citation may mean only that the cited work was owned by someone in Boston. It may not mean even that much. Careful scrutiny will reveal that citations have often been lifted bodily from another source, such as a treatise or abridgment. This is especially true of references to the more obscure English reports. The final compilation of an Adams legal bibliography will thus involve a careful process of study of the available books themselves and contemporary references to them, combined with a weighing of the probabilities that Adams used a given work.
The Legal Profession
Adams' awe before the leaders of the bar at the time of his admission in 1758 has been described. His own professional maturing can perhaps be measured in the speed with which awe and the desire to attract and please turned into critical evaluation. His keen eye soon caught their foibles: Gridley's “great Learning, his great Parts and his majestic Manner ... diminished by stiffness and affectation”; Prat, with “a strong, elastic Spring, or what we call Smartness, and Strength in his Mind” Otis, “extremely quick and elastic,” who “springs, and twitches his Muscles about in thinking”; Thatcher, lacking “this same Strength and Elasticity ... sensible, but slow of Conception and Communication ... queer, and affected.”166 Kent, “for fun, Drollery, Humour, flouts, Jeers, Contempt ... an irregular {p. R78} immethodical Head, but his Thoughts are often good and his Expressions happy.”167 Younger men, too, came under his critical gaze. Fitch was “not Steady,” with “a look of Conceit, affectation, Suspicion, and Diffidence. His swell. His Puff.”168 Auchmuty argued with “voluble Repetition and repeated Volubility.” How was “this Man conspicuous? in Reasoning? in Imagination? in Painting? in the Pathetic? or what? In Confidence, in Dogmatism, &c.” To call him a leader of the bar was “a Libel upon it—a Reproach and disgrace to it.”169 And through all runs the tragic decline of Otis, once “Nervous, Concise, and pithy,” now (in 1770) “verbose, roundabout and rambling, and long winded ... an Object of Admiration, Reverence, Contempt and Compassion all at once.”170
As his personal evaluations of the bar sharpened, his collective judgment of his colleagues grew more dispassionate. In 1766, he could, without comment, rank himself and two contemporaries among the leaders and calmly wonder which of them would be gone four years later.171 That he had taken his colleagues' measure is perhaps most clearly expressed in his description of them in 1769: “I don't think the World can furnish a more curious Collection of Characters” than Otis, Kent, Dana, Gridley, Fitch, and the others.172
The informal manner in which Adams was examined and recommended for admission to the bar in 1758 suggests that this “curious Collection of Characters” was at that time very loosely organized, with rather ill-defined requirements of study and apprenticeship. The beginnings of a more formal organization may stem from Hutchinson's creation of the grade of barrister and the formalities of gown and wig in 1762. In any event, an actual bar association is known to have met thereafter. In February 1763 the bar agreed upon rules limiting practice in the Inferior Court to a “sworn attorney,” only to see the court reject the proposals when Otis, who had apparently kept silent before, opposed them on presentation. “Thus,” reported Adams, no doubt particularly aroused because of his long campaign against {p. R79} pettifoggers, “with a whiff of Otis's pestilential Breath, was this whole system blown away.”173
At another meeting described by Adams in July 1766, the bar met formally to vote upon the admission of “3 young Gentlemen”—a significant advance over the private consultations with which Adams was ushered into practice. Still more important, at this meeting “the Bar has at last introduced a regular Progress, to the Gown, and seven Years must be the State of Probation.”174 The new rule seems to have meant three years of study, two years as an Inferior Court attorney, and two years as an attorney in the Superior Court—a “Progress” slow enough to meet the twin aims of assuring adequate preparation and hindering the development of competition.
In January 1770, for reasons that are obscure, a number of Suffolk County barristers and attorneys formed a new bar association in which Adams was to play a leading part. At the first meeting he was elected secretary and directed to “wait on Judge Auchmuty, and request of him, the records of a former Society of the Bar in this County.”175 The new group continued to meet regularly thereafter until July 1774, when the closing of the courts and the departure of many members (including the secretary) for other concerns brought a temporary halt. By 1778 the Society had begun to meet again, and, as the first Boston Bar Association, continued in existence until 1835.176
Like its predecessor, the new association concerned itself with rules of practice, but most of its deliberations were devoted to the regulation of law study and admission to the bar. At the start, prior practices were followed. For example, in October 1770 it was voted that Josiah Quincy Jr., Sampson Salter Blowers (two of the “3 young Gentlemen” admitted in 1766), and Francis Dana “be admitted as barristers, they having studied and practised the usual time.”177 In {p. R80} February 1771 the bar accepted the report of a committee of which Adams was a member, recommending adoption, with amendments, of certain rules of the Essex County bar. The new Suffolk rules embodied the requirement of a total of seven years' “Progress to the Gown,” but added certain qualifications. No member was to take a student without consent of the bar, nor was anyone to be recommended for admission to the Inferior Court who had not studied with a barrister for at least three years. The consent of the bar was to be given only at a general meeting, and was not to be given to one who had “not had an education at college, or a liberal education equivalent in the judgment of the bar.”178
Adams had more than a casual interest in the rules he helped to formulate, for one of his own significant contributions to the development of the legal profession was his role as teacher of the students who served as clerks in his office. When the new rules were adopted he already had two clerks and had seen at least one earlier student enter upon a successful career at the bar. He considered preceptorship a serious responsibility, for, he said on taking two clerks in 1769, “[M]y own Honour, Reputation and Conscience, are concerned in doing my best for their Education, and Advancement in the World. For their Advancement I can do little, for their Education, much, if I am not wanting to myself and them.”179 That he found it a responsibility worth bearing, however, appears in his comment in 1778 that “Few Things ever have given me greater Pleasure than the Tuition of Youth to the Bar, and the Advancement of Merit.”180
In his Autobiography, Adams recalled that, from 1769 until the {p. R81} Revolution, he “had never been without three Clerks in my Office.”181 The following chronological listing of the ten men known to have clerked for him shows that this recollection is substantially correct:
Oakes Angier   ca. 1766–1768  
Jonathan Williams Austin   August 1769–July 1772  
William Tudor   August 1769–July 1772  
Elisha Thayer   May 1771–February 1773  
Jonathan Williams   September 1772–ca. October 1774  
Edward Hill   October 1772–ca. January 1775  
John Trumbull   December 1773–September 1774  
Nathan Rice   July 1774–May 1775  
John Thaxter   July 1774–July 1777  
Jonathan Mason   September 1775–August 1776  
There may possibly have been others who entered his office, but it seems probable that this list is nearly complete. Because in 1769 Adams had been reluctant to take even two clerks, it is unlikely that he would have carried any greater number than that appearing here in later years. As to the period before 1769, it seems probable that Angier, who was subsequently admitted in Plymouth County, was Adams' only student before he moved his office to Boston in 1768.182
Biographical details on Adams' clerks appear under their names in the Register of Bench and Bar. In summary, they were a group of young men of brilliant promise which most of those who survived the Revolutionary decade went on to fulfill in public service. Eight {p. R82} were Harvard graduates, one was a Yale man, and one came from Princeton. Austin, Thayer, Williams, and Hill had all died by 1780, Hill while in the army, and Austin after two years of service. Angier, before his death in 1786, had amassed a considerable fortune in practice and had served in the first General Court elected after Independence. Trumbull, early American poet and wit, became a successful lawyer and judge in Connecticut. Tudor and Mason went on to long and productive careers in private practice and in state and federal government. Thaxter, who became an intimate of the whole family, was Adams' private secretary in Europe from 1779 to 1783. Rice served ably in the Continental Army through the Revolution and was a lieutenant colonel in the Provisional Army from 1799 to 1800.
The documentary remains of Adams' practice show that his students, like many others before and since on both sides of the Atlantic, did their share of “raking amidst the rubbish of Writs.” The writs filed in his cases, notations in his dockets and account books, forms copied into his Pleadings Book, are more often than not in the handwriting of one or another of his “young Gentlemen.” Perhaps remembering the dissatisfactions of his own student days, Adams gave his clerks much more than this fundamental 18th-century course of law study. In the first place, he expressed great personal warmth toward them, bringing some of them into his family and developing lifelong personal friendships with them.183 Secondly, he gave them much responsibility for the conduct of the lesser phases of his practice—drawing writs, entering actions, keeping track of the court docket, and collecting fees from clients.184
Most important was the intellectual approach to the law, learned from Gridley and painstakingly developed further on his own initiative, which Adams sought to instill in his students. By personal example and teaching, he undoubtedly encouraged them to make constant use of his ample library. His diary and letters contain many references to the need for steady application to study. His views appear most strongly in two letters to Jonathan Mason written in 1776 when {p. R83} Mason had nearly completed a frustrating year in what was left of Adams' office and was contemplating abandoning study for more worldly pursuits. Adams advised his student against going into practice.
[I]t is of more Importance that you read much, than that you draw many Writts. The common Writts upon Notes, Bonds and Accounts, are mastered in half an Hour. Common Declarations for Rent, and Ejectment and Trespass, both of Assault and Battery and Quare Clausum fregit, are learn'd in very near as short a Time. The more difficult special Declarations, and especially the Refinements of Special Pleadings, are never learnd in an office. They are the Result of Experience, and long Habits of Thinking.
To learn the art of pleading, Mason was advised to read Plowden, Instructor Clericalis, Mallory, Lilly, Rastall, and Coke. “Your time will be better spent upon these authors than in dancing attendance upon a Lawyer's office and his Clients.”185 But this was only a beginning. The student must read all of the amassed wisdom of the common law to be found in Coke's Institutes, Entries, and Reports; in Horne, Bracton, Britton, Fleta, Glanville, and other ancient masters; and in the yearbooks, the earliest common-law reports. In addition, the great works of the civil law should be studied—not only Justinian and his commentators, but Wood, Domat, Ayliffe, and Taylor—because this was a study “so interspersed with History, Oratory, Law, politics, and Warr, and Commerce, that you will find Advantages in it, every day.”186
If this was a course of study which might have caused the hardiest enthusiast to wonder when he would have time to eat and sleep, it was no more than Adams had set for himself and largely accomplished in the years since Worcester. If, as a practical matter, even Adams could not have allowed a clerk the time to get through such a curriculum, nevertheless, the very fact that such a challenge could be made must have opened the minds of his students to the broader meaning of the law.
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Law and Public Life
John Adams brought two great qualities to public life from his legal training and experience. The first was a lawyer's natural aptitude for the business of government. The analytical and organizational abilities, the knowledge of the workings of daily affairs, which the study and practice of law develop in a lawyer, make him an instinctive specialist in administration and legislation. The second, perhaps more peculiarly Adams' own, was a broad understanding of the law as political philosophy. His extensive knowledge of comparative law and constitutional theory, a product of his years of reading, was an ideal background for the political crises of the times.
Adams put the first of these qualities into practice early in his career. After attracting attention in Braintree with his campaigns against alehouses and pettifoggers, he found as early as 1761 that he was being consulted on the town's highway problems. For several years thereafter, he served on committees having to do with such matters, as well as with the sale of town lands, and in March 1765 he was chosen surveyor of highways.187 The “Abstract” of the writs of assistance argument which Adams prepared in 1761 (No. 44, Document II) was his first significant demonstration of the second quality. In 1765 the fortunate coincidence of developments in his private intellectual life and the passage of the Stamp Act by Parliament gave him an opportunity to bring the broader resources of his legal background directly to bear in a matter of great public importance. From that point on, the roles of lawyer, public servant, publicist, and political philosopher were inextricably mixed.
In January 1765 Adams' participation in Gridley's “sodality” had led him to contemplate, through the medium of legal history, the oppressive nature of the basic institutions of English government. His paper on the canon and feudal law, apparently first prepared for a meeting of the group sometime in the spring, described those oppressions at length and compared them most unfavorably with the efforts of the Puritan settlers of Massachusetts to escape the old ways and establish their own form of government in the New World.188 Late in the spring came news of the Stamp Act, which Adams, bemoaning the damage it had done to his practice, called “this execrable Project ... set on foot for my Ruin as well as that of America in General, and of Great Britain.”189
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But, as Bernard Bailyn has pointed out, far from bringing him to “Ruin,” the Stamp Act brought Adams for the first time into the affairs of province and empire.190 His essay on the canon and feudal law now took on new meaning as he revised and expanded it for publication in the Boston Gazette. It appeared there in four installments between August and October 1765, with a conclusion characterizing the Stamp Act as a measure born of the old feudal tyranny and intended to aid in the suppression of hard-won colonial liberties.191
At about the same time Adams made his first official pronouncement on public issues. As a member of a town committee, he drafted Braintree's Instructions to its Representatives in the General Court, attacking a vice in the Act of particular concern to a lawyer—trial of offenses in admiralty without a jury—with supporting authority from Magna Charta.192
In December, Adams brought his legal talents directly into play when he argued before the Governor and Council in behalf of the town of Boston that the courts should be opened for business despite the lack of stamps. Adams' notes show that although his speech, like a courtroom argument, was narrowly phrased, it called for action in the broadest language, citing Coke and other authorities which supposedly demonstrated the limited power of Parliament.193 His “Clarendon” letters, published in the Boston Gazette in January 1766, with their elaborate description of the British constitution, relied heavily on Coke, both as authority and inspiration.194
Riding the crest of the notoriety which the Stamp Act had brought him, Adams was elected a Braintree selectman in March 1766, defeating a candidate supported by the pro-government faction.195 He then apparently campaigned for the General Court in May, but, while the rest of the Province rewarded the recent opponents of Parliamentary rule, Braintree, “insensible to the Common Joy” at repeal of the Stamp Act, returned a Crown supporter to the legislature.196 Adams consoled himself in the office of selectman, where for two years he served the public in a more workaday fashion, becoming immersed in the perennial problems of local government—schools, poor relief, taxes, {p. R86} and roads. In later years, when he tried many cases under the poor and tax laws, he was undoubtedly grateful for this exposure to local problems from the administrative viewpoint.197
In 1768 Adams declined to run for selectman again and moved to Boston, where he at once became involved in the clubs and caucuses of urban politics. Events soon brought his law practice and his political activities into phase. In the turmoil after the seizure of John Hancock's Liberty in June 1768, he drafted Boston's Instructions to its representatives, putting forward legal arguments against the presence of H.M.S. Romney in Boston Harbor and the impressment activities of her captain. His defense of Hancock in suits for penalties for alleged smuggling in the Liberty was the source for a second set of Boston Instructions in March 1769 and several contributions to “A Journal of the Times,” a patriotic propaganda column which appeared in both Boston and other colonial newspapers. These writings again drew heavily on Coke and his interpretation of Magna Charta, as well as on a number of civil-law authorities.198 At about this time Adams achieved enough prominence to lead various Crown adherents into unsuccessful efforts to draw him to the royal side.199
Adams was elected to the House of Representatives from Boston in June 1770,200 despite his having agreed to defend Preston and the British troops after the Massacre (Nos. 63, 64). There he served with great industry for a year, apparently acting as legal adviser to the patriot faction in its clashes with Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson. He was a member of several committees formed to protest Hutchinson's order that the House sit in Cambridge, and he helped to prepare the final resolution which the House defeated in preference to dissolution.201 Hutchinson reported that “the members of the first character for knowledge in the law were much engaged in” a subsequent controversy over the form of the enacting clause in legislation regulating provincial salaries. Adams, Joseph Hawley, and Daniel Leonard were members of a committee appointed to report on the matter.202
{p. R87}
A number of nonpolitical measures dealt with matters of importance to Adams then or later in his legal career. Among several new towns which the House carved out of hitherto unincorporated districts were four within the propriety of the Kennebec Company along the Kennebec River in Maine.203 Because Adams had been active in litigation for the Company since 1769, it seems probable that he had a part in the passage of these acts. In November 1770 a committee of which he was a member brought in a bill, ultimately enacted, for a new statute of limitations, ending a twenty-year suspension of the limitations on certain actions. Adams must have found his acquaintance with this act useful when its construction became an issue in a case which he argued the next June.204 Another measure arose out of a matter in which he had been concerned as counsel—the efforts of Baptists and Quakers to avoid taxation for support of the ministry. An act renewing exemptions for the dissenters, with “some small alteration in favour to the Baptists,” included a provision of former acts, missing in the immediately previous one, that those exempted from taxation could not vote in town meeting on church matters. An election case which Adams had argued in 1769 demonstrated this gap in the existing statute.205
The combination of a hectic legislative term and a busy law practice, which had included the Boston Massacre trials, led Adams to leave not only the House but the town in April 1771, complaining that both his health and his business had suffered in the public service. When he brought his family back to Boston in the fall of 1772, it was with a firm resolve to stay out of politics altogether.206 In this effort he was for a time successful, at least as far as elective office was concerned. The House chose him to sit on the Council in 1773 and {p. R88} again in 1774, but he was negatived on both occasions by the Governor.207
Adams did engage in one piece of public service of at least superficially a nonpolitical character. On 1 March 1774 the General Court appointed him, with James Bowdoin, a committee to prepare a statement of Massachusetts' claim to the “western lands,” territory extending westward to the Pacific Ocean, which the province claimed under the terms of the old Bay Colony charters. According to his later account, Adams produced a brief supporting the Massachusetts position, which was not acted upon in 1774 because of sudden changes in the political scene, but which was rediscovered and used by the Massachusetts representatives in boundary negotiations with New York after the Revolution. A copy of this document, as supplemented by a committee in 1783, has survived, together with Adams' notes for it and materials he assembled to refute the New York claims.208 Since the arguments seem to have been based on the terms of the various royal charters and confirmatory legislation, he must have found his work of the preceding year on the Kennebec Company's claim to mast trees cut on its lands (No. 55) a useful preparation.
In matters of more immediate political importance, Adams' resolve to avoid involvement soon weakened, but his role was to be unofficial. When Governor Hutchinson, addressing the House in January 1773, announced that Parliament could bind the colonies by legislation “in all cases whatsoever,” the House felt obliged to reply. Adams supplied the authorities and reasoning underlying the paper delivered to the Governor on 26 January.209
More critical were questions concerning the judiciary. Since Thomas Hutchinson's appointment as Chief Justice in 1760 at the expense of the elder James Otis' claims to the post, the Superior Court bench had been involved in controversy. Hutchinson's plural officeholding, the appointment of his brother Foster to the bench after the {p. R89} Governor resigned, the appointment as Chief Justice of Judge Peter Oliver (a relative by marriage of the Hutchinsons and brother of Andrew Oliver, Secretary of the Province), the fact that neither Oliver nor the Hutchinsons had received formal legal training, had all aroused criticism from the patriot side for years. Crisis finally came with the proposal of the Crown to make the judges of the Superior Court independent of the provincial legislature by paying them salaries out of revenues collected in the colonies.210 At a Cambridge town meeting in December 1772, William Brattle, a member of the Council, had argued that the proposal was harmless, because the judges, having life tenure during good behavior, would not be influenced by the source of their salaries. Brattle then challenged Adams by name to debate the point and proceeded to have his argument published in the Boston News Letter.
Adams, fearful that, as a result of “These vain and frothy Harrangues and Scribblings,” Brattle's “Ignorant Doctrines were taking Root in the Minds of the People,” wrote a series of seven articles in reply, evoking a single rebuttal from Brattle. Adams contended that, unless a statute altered the common law, judges held office only at the King's pleasure, arguing that this was the rule in England until the Act of Settlement in 1701 gave judges life tenure. The authority which he cited to support this position is a good demonstration of his weapons for such a controversy. Besides citations from numerous reporters and the State Trials, he brought to bear not only such common-law authorities as Bracton, Coke, Fortescue, Bacon, Gilbert, Hawkins, and Blackstone, but also historians Hume, Rapin, Rushworth, and Stryk.211
These articles did not themselves end the controversy over judges' salaries, but they put Adams in a position to prepare the measure which did. According to his Autobiography, to avoid mob violence against the judiciary, he proposed that judges taking royal grants be impeached by the House and tried by the Council. He recalled that {p. R90} he had supplied the authorities on which the proceedings were based, had developed arguments based on those authorities to convince the waverers that the power thus claimed existed, and had advised the committee of the House finally chosen to draft articles of impeachment against Peter Oliver, the Chief Justice, who alone had not renounced the royal salary. At the end of February the House adopted the articles and the matter went to the Council. There it remained unacted upon, despite further encouragement from Adams, because Hutchinson refused to preside.212
Although impeachment failed, its real purposes were ultimately achieved. Refusals of juries to serve if Oliver appeared, and threats of violence in the shire towns, had kept him from the bench through the spring of 1774. At the August term of the Superior Court in Boston he determined to face the issue and took his place with the court. As the mob, held back only by the fear of troops, roamed Boston, the jurors to a man refused to take the oath while Oliver, under impeachment, sat as Chief Justice. The court therefore heard only non-jury business for the brief remainder of the term. When it sat again in February 1775, with Oliver presiding in a now safely loyalist Boston, only a single case was called, and the history of royal justice in Massachusetts came to an end.213 The courts in effect were closed, and the breakdown of civil order which could end only in Revolution had begun.
Adams characteristically bemoaned the effects upon his practice of these events and the passage by Parliament of the Coercive Acts,214 but he had little time to spare in regrets. In June 1774 he was appointed to what became known as the First Continental Congress, and he left for its meeting at Philadelphia early in August. There he {p. R91} found that nearly half the delegates were lawyers.215 Like him they were experienced in public service of the conventional sort, and many of them had also spent the last decade advocating opposition to the Crown on grounds in large measure drawn from the knowledge of legal history and constitutional theory that was part of the learning of their profession. With these arguments the lawyers had made a revolution. Now they were faced with the tasks of turning arguments into the constitutional basis of a new government and applying their talents for public service to make that government work.
Accordingly, after August 1774 Adams devoted his legal knowledge and abilities very largely to the development and operation of the governments of Massachusetts and the United States. In Massachusetts he sat in the Provincial Congress and on the Council, but his most important role was in the judiciary. He was made a justice of the peace for Suffolk County in September 1775, presumably the same kind of courtesy appointment that had been one of the old regime's major sources of patronage. On 28 October 1775 the Council notified him that he had been appointed Chief Justice.216 This position might have seemed to him the peak of achievement in other times, but, with his constant absences to attend Congress, it proved a source of more vexation than pleasure. After much soul-searching Adams finally resigned the office in February 1777 on the grounds that he was unable to perform his duties and that he was being charged with the same kind of plural office-holding that he had found so obnoxious in the Hutchinsons and the Olivers before the Revolution.217
While he held judicial office, Adams worked steadily for the restoration of the judiciary and regular court sessions. He viewed these as essential to the establishment of a stable state government, not only because the judicial system was the part of government with which he was most familiar, but because he knew that it was through the {p. R92} courts that most people, especially in the remote parts of the state, received their principal contact with the central authority. His letters written from Philadelphia to his friends and judicial colleagues at home were filled with urgings and questions about the preparations for reopening the courts. On a brief visit to Massachusetts in the winter of 1775–1776, he drafted a proclamation for the General Court which was to be read in town meetings and at the opening of the courts—perhaps as part of the charge to the grand jury, a common vehicle for political pronouncements at this time.218 In this document Adams set forth briefly the justifications for independence and for the establishment of a state government and called upon all to support the new institutions. He gave particular emphasis to the “magistrates and courts of justice,” who were “to see those laws enforced, which are necessary for the preservation of peace, virtue, and good order.”219
Adams' only direct participation in the return of justice to Massachusetts was literally nominal: his name was “tested” (i.e. signed) as Chief Justice by the clerk on the venires for each county. When the courts finally did reopen in June 1776, however, his spirit was behind the careful dignity with which the judges proceeded, and his eager queries as to their success were in their hands almost as soon as the terms were over. Only after he was satisfied that the people had accepted the new system did he feel that he had sufficiently discharged his trust to be able to resign his office.220
Countless legislative and administrative labors which cannot be detailed here occupied Adams in the Continental Congress. Two in particular seem directly related to his previous career at the bar. He was on committees assigned to draft rules for the government of the navy in 1775 and to revise the articles of war in 1776. These military codes were largely based on the British articles of war and certain provisions of the Mutiny Acts, with which he must have been familiar {p. R93} from his experiences with the British forces in Boston, not only at the time of the Boston Massacre, but during the months of occupation that preceded Lexington and Concord.221 Adams' other service of a distinctly legal nature was his membership from March 1777 until his retirement in November of that year on the congressional committee formed to decide appeals from the newly formed state admiralty courts in cases of prize. In this role he sat on what was essentially a judicial body, clearly bringing to bear all his long courtroom experience.222
Adams' most significant services on the national level are beyond the scope of this essay. As a framer of and apologist for the constitutional basis of revolution, he put his broad understanding of law and politics and his personal experience with many of the critical issues to constant use in the congressional debates which formulated the theoretical consensus leading to the Continental Association in 1774 and the Declaration of Independence in 1776. The consensus was supported by his “Novanglus” papers (1775), a definitive statement of the colonial position, in which he cited an array of common-law and civil-law authorities, as well as writings in political philosophy.223 Adams made another important contribution to the growth of the new nation with his works on the constitutions of the state governments formed as a necessary part of national development. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, which he drafted, was a vivid example for other states of theory being put into practice.224 All of these activities, as well as his diplomatic career and his subsequent service as Vice President and President, drew to a greater or lesser extent on his background as a lawyer and student of law.
Detailed discussion of the relation between Adams' legal back• {p. R94} ground and his life in public service must await publication of his political and philosophical writings and public papers in later volumes of The Adams Papers. From even this bare summary, however, we may conclude that, in the practice of law and, most of all, in his own profoundly intellectual approach to the law, Adams found the great sources of inspiration which shaped and directed his contribution to the founding of this nation. In translating the residue of so many centuries of legal development into new ideas and forms of government that were to alter the course of world history, Adams stands as a classic demonstration of the wisdom of his guiding genius, Coke, who urged modern readers not to neglect the ancient yearbooks, because, “Out of the old fields must spring and grow the new corn.”225
[signed] L. Kinvin Wroth
[signed] Hiller B. Zobel
 
1. In Part III of Microfilms of The Adams Papers, published by the Massachusetts Historical Society, 1954–1959, available in many libraries. Location references for materials in the Adams Papers in the present letterpress edition are normally to the microfilm edition by reel number, except for letters and documents that can readily be found by date alone, in Part IV, Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, arranged chronologically.
 
2. Robert Treat Paine's court jottings, already titled by Paine himself or by one of his descendants (see p. xxxv below), and William Wetmore's accounts of trial matters, which do not appear to have been courtroom-written (see p. xxxv below), have been given the collective titles of Paine Law Notes, Paine Massacre Notes, and Wetmore Notes. The distinction between “notes” and “minutes” has been preserved in the description of individual documents from these sources, however.
 
3. Noble himself told the story in two authoritative articles: “The Early Court Files of Suffolk County,” 3 Col. Soc. Mass., Pubns. 317 (1900); “The Records and Files of the Superior Court of Judicature, and of the Supreme Judicial Court, Their History and Places of Deposit,” 5 Col. Soc. Mass., Pubns. 5 (1902).
 
4. The Records of the Court of Vice Admiralty from 1718 to 1733, as well as its Minute Book for 1765–1772 and other papers; the Records and files of the Governor and Council sitting in Divorce, for 1760 to 1786; and the Records of the Supreme Court of Probate from 1760 to 1830 are also in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County, as are the minute books of the Court of General Sessions of the Peace for Suffolk County.
 
5. There are also Inferior Court papers in the offices of the respective Clerks of Courts, Middlesex, Plymouth, Barnstable, and Worcester counties, Massachusetts, and York, Cumberland, and Lincoln counties, Maine. Hopefully, time and funds will some day be available to permit a thorough cataloguing and (where necessary) preservation of these untapped sources.
 
6. For a fuller description, see Vol. 3:42–43 below.
 
7. In order to permit inclusion of the Boston Massacre materials, Nos. 63, 64, in a single volume, cases in the “Criminal Law” section are presented out of chronological order.
 
9. A Uniform System of Citation (Cambridge, 10th edn., 1958).
 
10. Act of 18 June 1697, 1 A&R 282.
 
11. Act of 1 Nov. 1692, 1 A&R 51–55; Act of 22 Oct. 1692, 1 A&R 58–59; Act of 14 July 1693, 1 A&R 122–123. For a full summary, see Joseph H. Smith, ed., Colonial Justice in Western Massachusetts (1639–1702) 82–88 (Cambridge, Mass., 1961).
 
12. Act of 16 June 1699, 1 A&R 367, 368.
 
13. Act of 16 June 1699, 1 A&R 367. See 5 Province and Court Records of Maine xii–xvi (Portland, Maine, ed. Neal W. Allen Jr., 1964). The commission of the peace for each county provided that the Court of General Sessions was to be held by three or more justices, including at least one from a specially designated list. Those specially designated were known as “justices of the quorum” from the language of the traditional Latin form of the commission used in England, which may be translated, “Of whom [quorum] we wish some one of you, A, B, C, D, &c., to be one.” See, for example, 4 id. at 21–23, 245–246. By the 18th century in England, it had become customary to name virtually all the justices in the commission as of the quorum. See 1 Blackstone, Commentaries *351; 1 Holdsworth, History of English Law 290. In Massachusetts, however, only a small proportion of those commissioned were of the quorum. See, for example, Whitmore, Mass. Civil List 130–131. It was also customary in Massachusetts for certain leading civil officers to be appointed justices of the peace with powers running throughout the Province. This was accomplished by naming them in the commission of the peace for each county. See Book of Commissions, Proclamations, Pardons, &c., 1756–1767, fols. 264–285, M-Ar.
 
14. Act of 16 June 1699, 1 A&R 367, 368. The Inferior Court and the Sessions drew jurors from a common venire. Act of 23 April 1742, 2 A&R 1090 (and extended — see Act of 22 April 1749, 3 A&R 447; Act of 26 April 1770, 5 A&R 39).
 
15. Act of 16 June 1699, 1 A&R 367, 368. See also No. 24.
 
16. See Min. Bk., Suff. Sess. 1764–1766, passim. See generally, Nos. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30 24–30 .
 
17. Act of 15 June 1699, 1 A&R 369.
 
18. Act of 3 June 1707, 1 A&R 459–460.
 
19. Act of 15 June 1699, 1 A&R 369, 370; Act of 29 Dec. 1749, 3 A&R 481. The exceptions were trespass vi et armis and debts due by bond, which could be brought only in the county where the trespass had been committed or the bond had been given. Nonresidents could be sued in any county.
 
20. Act of 12 June 1701, 1 A&R 464, 465–466. The appellant originally had to file written “reasons of his appeal,” ibid.; but by JA's time this requirement had been abolished. Act of 18 Jan. 1742, 2 A&R 1086.
 
21. For an excellent example, see Bicknell v. Draper, SF 84512. SCJ Rec. 1764–1765, fols. 304–306; Resolve of 23 Feb. 1763, c. 306, 17 A&R 360.
 
22. SF 84623. The justices of the Inferior Courts, like those of the Superior Court, were statutorily authorized “to make necessary rules for the more orderly practising” in each court. Act of 12 June 1701, 1 A&R 464.
 
23. Charter of 1691, 1 A&R 12.
 
24. Hutchinson to John Sullivan, 29 March 1771, 27 Mass. Arch. 136. JA's comment on Oliver: “Our Judge Oliver is the best bred Gentleman of all the Judges, by far. There is something in every one of the others indecent and disagreable, at Times in Company—affected Witticisms, unpolished fleers, coarse Jests, and some-times rough, rude Attacks, but these you dont see escape Judge Oliver.” 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 51.
 
25. See SF 152575.
 
27. Act of 26 June 1699, 1 A&R 370.
 
28. See text at note 18 above.
 
29. See text at note 20 above. This proceeding was technically an “appeal” as that term was used in the English civil-law courts, where evidence not heard below was admissible on review. By contrast, on writ of error, the usual form of review at common law in England, the reviewing court was limited to questions of law arising on the formal record, or set forth in a bill of exceptions. See Arthur Browne, A Compendious View of the Civil Law, 1:494–501 (N.Y., 1st Amer. edn., 1840); Sutton, Personal Actions 125–127, 136–144. The Massachusetts Superior Court occasionally allowed a writ of error in cases where the time for appeal had run. See, for example, Godfrey v. Macomber, Min. Bk. 82, SCJ Plymouth, May 1768; Min. Bk. 89, SCJ Suffolk, Aug. 1769, C–26; SF 101501.
 
30. Act of 18 June 1701, 1 A&R 466; Act of 23 April 1754, 3 A&R 738.
 
31. Charter of 1691, 1 A&R 15; see Opinion of the Lords of Trade to the King in Council, 10 Dec. 1696, 1 A&R 145 note: “in your Majesty's Charter to that Province there is no such exclusion,” i.e. of appeals to the Privy Council in real actions. See Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council 76–77, 162–165.
 
32. See, for example, Nos. 24, 27, 28.
 
33. See Wroth, “The Massachusetts Vice Admiralty Court,” in George A. Billias, ed., Law and Authority in Colonial America: Selected Essays (Barre, Mass., in press).
 
34. See Governor Thomas Pownall's “Observations” on the Bankruptcy Act, dated 11 Oct. 1757 and printed in 4 A&R 110.
 
35. The Suffolk Files are full of orders of reference and referees' reports. The mode of selecting the referees is obscure, but one document dating from 1770 suggests that one party proposed a slate of names from which the other party chose the referees. See SF 101863c. And for a case from the same period indicating that the General Court could control mistakes by referees, see SF 139436. Perjury before referees was a criminal offense. See SF 152019, SF 152216, and SF 152255.
 
36. For an auditors' report, see SF 27832. John Rowe served as an auditor frequently. See Rowe, Letters and Diary , passim. Arbitration, or an agreement by the parties to submit their difference to a panel of nonjudicial arbiters and to abide by its decision, was another dispute-resolving technique. See No. 10. Rendering a false account to arbitrators was apparently a criminal offense. See SF 157320. The Act of 22 March 1744, 3 A&R 132, authorized the summonsing of witnesses.
 
37. SF 89970.
 
38. A chancery court had been set up by the Act of 5 Dec. 1693, 1 A&R 144, which had been disallowed by the Privy Council. The only subsequent statutes treating equity jurisdiction dealt with chancering penalties and the equity of redemption. Act of 10 Dec. 1698, 1 A&R 356; Act of 3 July 1735, 2 A&R 755; Act of 3 July 1735, 2 A&R 762. See No. 13.
 
39. See SF 137037.
 
40. Act of 1 Nov. 1692, 1 A&R 43, 45. See Nos. 14 and 15. See also Charter of 1691, 1 A&R 15.
 
41. Act of 3 Nov. 1692, 1 A&R 61.
 
42. Min. Bk. 98, SCJ Suffolk, Aug. 1773, N-74. The matter was continued to the next term, “that the adverse party may be cited.” See the petition itself in SF 91716. The disposition has not been traced. Many of the papers in divorce cases have been preserved, as well as the Records of the Court of Divorce (i.e. the Governor and Council in that capacity). But the Records contain only those matters in which a divorce was granted. See Nos. 22 and 23.
 
43. Charter of 1691, 1 A&R 19.
 
44. See Nos. 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, and 55 43–55 . A special Admiralty court was occasionally convened pursuant to statute for trial of cases of piracy and quasi-piracy. See Nos. 56 and 57.
 
45. See p. 27–30 below.
 
46. Act of 3 March 1700, 1 A&R 446; Act of 12 June 1701, 1 A&R 465.
 
47. Act of 12 Dec. 1695, 1 A&R 225.
 
48. For an example of a special verdict, see No. 32.
 
49. See the diorama of Cambridge in 1775 in Widener Library, Harvard; see also Bolster, “Cambridge Court Houses,” 39 Cambridge Hist. Soc., Procs. 55 (1964). On the Falmouth (Maine) court, see JA to AA, 6 July 1774, 1 Adams Family Correspondence 128.
 
50. See Noble, “The Records and Files of the Superior Court of Judicature, &c.,” 5 Col. Soc. Mass., Pubns. 5, 22 (1902).
 
51. See John Mein and John Fleeming, Register for New England and Nova Scotia ... 1768 51 (Boston, n.d.); Boston Gazette, 29 March 1773, p. 3, col. 1.
 
52. See SF 87365.
 
53. Quincy, Reports 383 note.
 
54. SF 100432; SCJ Rec. 1763–1764, fols. 43b–44a.
 
55. Min. Bk., Inf. Ct. Suffolk, July 1771, No. 239.
 
56. See Act of 22 June 1698, 1 A&R 335; see also SF 148024. The documents indicate that even in the 18th century, prospective jurors sometimes sought to escape service. One man gave as his excuse that he was warden of Trinity Church and also sole proprietor of a warehouse. SF 100599. Another protested that “I have not had the mesels nor none of my famaly and I am informed that they are very much in Boston.” SF 79404.
 
57. Nos. 12 and 59.
 
58. But see SF 157569, where a new trial was ordered after six jurors reported that they had agreed to a verdict for defendant on the erroneous assumption that, even if the jury had reported itself unable to agree, defendant would still have been awarded costs. See also No. 37, note 8.
 
59. See opinion of Trowbridge, J., in No. 17; see also No. 28, Doc. IV.
 
60. SF 26290. And see also SF 27639, the famous case of Erving v. Craddock, Quincy, Reports 553, where defendant, seeking to justify a customs seizure, offered unsuccessfully to prove that it was a common practice of the illicit trade with Holland to clear for St. John's in the West Indies, and that this was plaintiff's practice too. The memorandum, apparently in Edmund Trowbridge's hand, is attested by Clerk Samuel Winthrop. For a similar example, see SF 100949.
 
62. See Nos. 17 and 27, notes 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 4–9 .
 
63. Possible personal injury, SF 85987, SF 101586, SF 132065; medical malpractice, SF 26202, SF 157569; unlawful taking of property by a provincial military officer, SF 100627; selectmen's placing persons diseased with smallpox in plaintiff's house, SF 145568; collision between a cart and a cow, SF 145768; knowingly keeping a dangerous cow which gored plaintiff's horse, SF 157396.
 
64. Aggravated trespass, SF 83625; the “buried treasure” swindle, SF 83626; deer-shooting, SF 84551, SF 131268; challenge to a duel, SF 84643, SF 172086; being a “common drunkard,” SF 84945; attempting to spread smallpox, SF 85237; cruelty to apprentice, SF 172740, SF 173312; fornication with fiancée, SF 173878; slander, SF 26306; libel, SF 28837; tarring and feathering, SF 131971; mobbing, SF 147775; seeking to procure a soldier's desertion, SF 101238; improper imprisonment, SF 102458a; assisting a jailbreak, SF 157386; town's failure to maintain a school, SF 152521, SF 157337; sale of inferior grade of shoes (the goods being seized, examined by experts, and condemned), SF 79445; sale of a “putrid and corrupted Hog” which had “dyed of a mortifying Distemper,” SF 83205.
 
65. SF 80864.
 
66. SF 100579. This dates from 1765 and is particularly significant, because the Massachusetts Habeas Corpus Act, enacted 14 Dec. 1692 on the model of the English act, 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (1679), was disallowed (because “the privilege has not as yet been granted in any of His Ma[jes]ty's Plantations,” see 1 A&R 95, 99) and never reenacted.
 
67. SF 25115.
 
68. SF 173884. Hirsst's crime is not specified.
 
69. 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 353. See Min. Bk. 83, Worcester SCJ, Sept. 1768; SF 152338. Obtaining counsel was not always so easy. See No. 59.
 
70. Boston Gazette, 10 Mar. 1772, p. 3, col. 1 (sale of thief); Boston Gazette, 10 May 1773, p. 2, col. 3 (ear-removal). See also Rex. v. Moyse and Reader, No. 61. But note the vote of the Suffolk Court of General Sessions of the Peace in Jan. 1769 discharging from jail those prisoners too poor to pay their fines. The statute regulating the involuntary servitude was the Act of 1 Nov. 1692, 1 A&R 51, 52.
 
71. JA to Charles Cushing, 1 April 1756. MS not located; facsimile in The Month at Goodspeed's, vol. 19, no. 5 (Feb.1948) frontispiece. Printed in 46 MHS, Procs. 410–412 (1912–1913).
 
72. See 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 355 note; 3 id. at 263.
 
73. 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 10 (24 Feb. 1756). JA's activities at Worcester from Jan. through Aug. 1756 are chronicled in id. at 1–44.
 
74. 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography 262–263. For references to letters from classmates, see JA to Cushing, 1 April 1756, 19 Oct. 1756 (sources in note 71 above). See also Richard Cranch to JA, Oct. 1756, Adams Papers. On seeing his letters to Cushing in print sixty years later, JA wrote to Cushing's son, “I was like a boy in a country fair, in a wilderness, in a strange country, with half a dozen roads before him, groping in a dark night to find which he ought to take. Had I been obliged to tell your father the whole truth, I should have mentioned several other pursuits. Farming, merchandise, law, and above all, war. Nothing but want of interest [i.e. influence] and patronage prevented me from enlisting in the army.” JA to Cushing, 13 March 1817, Adams Papers, printed in 1 JA, Works 38 note. JA similarly spoke of the attractions of military life in his letter to Jonathan Mason in 1776, note 185 below.
 
75. See, for example, 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 2, 7, 11, 16, 18, 20, 22, 31. JA's later recollection that he had thought also of becoming a physician (3 JA, Diary and Autobiography 264) is supported by a brief discussion of the possibility in JA to Cushing, 1 April 1756, note 71 above.
 
76. 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 27. Compare 3 id. at 264.
 
77. 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 42, 44. See also JA to Richard Cranch, 29 Aug. 1756, Adams Papers; JA to John Wentworth, Sept. 1756 (original owned by Gilbert H. Montague, 1960). For Cranch's disapproval of Adams' decision, see Cranch to JA, Oct. 1756, Adams Papers.
 
78. 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 173. Although JA may have labored for Putnam “amidst the rubbish of Writs,” only one such document has come to light. SF 26778.
 
80. 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 54. See 3 id. at 270.
 
81. 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 54–55. Compare the account of the interview in 3 id. at 271–272.
 
83. Min. Bk., Inf. Ct. Suffolk, Oct. 1758, following No. 221. See 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 58–59. Compare 2 id. at 12; 3 id. at 273. For the oath which JA took, see Act of 20 June 1702, c. 7, §2, 1 A&R 467. The present oath is in Mass. G.L., c. 221, §38 (Ter. edn., 1932).
 
84. 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 173–174. This course of study has been said to have exceeded “that of any other law student of the time.” Charles Warren, A History of the American Bar 171 (Cambridge, Mass., 1912). As to colonial law study generally, see id. at 157–187.
 
85. P. 4–25 below.
 
90. See JA to Peter Chardon, Jan. 1761, 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 196–197; Jonathan Sewall to JA, 29 Sept. 1759, Adams Papers; JA to Sewall, Feb. 1760, Adams Papers; Sewall to JA, 13 Feb. 1760, Adams Papers. Compare 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography 278.
 
91. 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 64. See id. at 48–50, 57–58, 62–63, 65. After the present edition was in page proof, JA's draft of the defective writ and his thoughts on the case were found in the Royall Tyler Collection, Gift of Helen Tyler Brown, VtHi.
 
92. Field v. Thayer, Min. Bk., Inf. Ct., Suffolk, July 1759, No. 163. For the appearance before the justice, see 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 69–71. JA drew at least one other writ for the July 1759 court. See Spear v. Hayward, SF 79783.
 
94. See 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 135–138 135–136, 136–138, 138 , 159, 205–206. As part of this campaign, JA obtained an appointment for his brother, Peter Boylston Adams, as deputy sheriff, thus ending the need to rely on “pettyfoggers” for the service of writs. See id. at 216–217; 3 id. at 277.
 
95. 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography  135 ||(16 and 17 June 1760)||.
 
96. See text at note 146 below. See also 2 JA, Works 237 note.
 
98. 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography 276. See Min. Bk. 79, SCJ Suffolk, Aug. 1762; Quincy, Reports 35. Actually, JA's first appearance in the Superior Court was in Feb. 1761, when he filed a prayer for affirmation, a privilege apparently allowed to Inferior Court attorneys. See Lambard v. Tirrell, SF 172280.
 
99. JA, Docket, Inf. Ct. Suffolk, Jan. 1763. Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 182.
 
100. 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 227. He had prepared at least one writ for the July 1761 Plymouth Inferior Court, but there is no evidence that he attended the court. See JA's record book, described in note 146 below.
 
101. 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 258–259; 3 id. at 281–282. The dockets referred to in the text are in Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 184.
 
102. See Nos. 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49 45–49 . The continuing increase in JA's practice the following year brought the unhappy comment from James Otis that he had “become the Sport of the young Gentlemen of the Bar, and he was greatly mortified on looking over the Entries this present term of the superior Court [Aug. 1769] to find he had but 4 when the youngest Quincy had 9 and John Adams had 60.” Andrew Oliver to Governor Bernard, 3 Dec. 1769, 12 Bernard Papers 163–164, MH, printed in Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 464. The Minute Book and JA's docket for this term (Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 184) show that he was indeed engaged in sixty civil actions, as well as in three criminal cases.
 
104. His court appearance was in Penhallow v. The Lusanna, No. 58. For further details of his homecoming and departure, see id., text at notes 11, 45, 64–66. As to lawyers' prosperity, see also AA to JA, 1 June 1777, 2 Adams Family Correspondence 251. Two cases in which JA is known to have been engaged for the Feb. 1778 term of the Superior Court are discussed in No. 58, note 66. See also 2 Adams Family Correspondence 395 note. The Suffolk Inferior Court Minute Book for January 1778 reveals that he entered no actions at that term. No other court sessions were scheduled during his brief stay in Massachusetts.
 
105. 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 88, 98, 143, 145, 175. For an instance of drafting by a non-lawyer, see Rowe, Diary 64.
 
106. Reproduced as an illustration in the present edition. Discussed further, text at note 137 below. JA's account with the Kennebec Co., note 139 below, contains similar entries.
 
107. Vol. 2:105 below.
 
108. W. L. Morgan to JA, 4 March 1773, Adams Papers. For other examples, see Jacob Rowe to JA, 24 Dec. 1773, Adams Papers; JA to Samuel Tufts, 8 Feb. 1773, Adams Papers. The statute referred to by Morgan was the Act of 11 April 1750, c. 24, 3 A&R 500, providing penalties of £20 against anyone who established a theater for “stage-plays, interludes or other theatrical entertainments,” and £5 for any actor or spectator in any such event where the audience exceeded twenty. It had been renewed until 1 Nov. 1775 by Act of 15 Nov. 1770, c. 5, 5 A&R 86, provoking from Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson the comment that, although the act had “been complained of as unnecessarily restraining the use of innocent amusements,” he felt it wiser to consent in its passage and not “thereby increase the ill humors among the People.” Id. at 141. See also id. at 62.
 
109. Letters of administration for the estate of Benjamin Hunt Jr., Braintree, granted 23 July 1762. For a case in which JA acted as a referee, see Ingersole v. Viscount, Min. Bk. 81, SCJ Suffolk, March 1765, C–34; Min. Bk. 89, SCJ Suffolk, March 1769, C–1. SF 101329.
 
110. JA to Cranch, 5 Jan. 1767, Adams Papers. For another example, see 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 182–183.
 
111. JA to Hayley, 1 April 1770, Adams Papers.
 
112. 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 61. Through politics JA was to lose the business of Gardiner and Harrison Gray. See JA to AA, 6 July 1774, 1 Adams Family Correspondence 128–129; 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 11. In Dec. 1772 he said “Farewell” to Hancock also. Id. at 72. The breach seems to have been healed by 1774, when JA again began representing Hancock. See SF 92302; Min. Bk. 98, SCJ Suffolk, Aug. 1774, N–65.
 
113. See Otis v. Robinson, 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 47–48 (2527 July 1771); Zobel, “Law under Pressure: Boston 1769–1771,” paper given at the Conference on Colonial History, Worcester, Mass., April 1964, to be published in George A. Billias, ed., Law and Authority in Colonial America: Selected Essays (Barre, Mass., in press).
 
114. See Pierpont v. Cutler, 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 8–9.
 
115. Richmond v. Davis, Quincy, Reports 279 (Suffolk SCJ, 1769); Hooton v. Grout, id, at 343, 368–369 (Worcester SCJ, 1772). See 8 Mass. 554; 14 Mass. 473.
 
116. P. 26–86 below.
 
117. See, for example, 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 52, 56, 169, 199, 251. Compare Boston Gazette, 24 Oct. 1768, p. 3, col. 3: “Any person possessed of Jacob's Law Dictionary, or any other books belonging to the subscriber is desired to return the same. James Otis.”
 
118. JA to Samuel Quincy, 2 Jan. 1764, MHi:Misc. Bound MSS.
 
119. See JA, Docket, Inf. Ct. Suffolk, Oct. 1769; SCJ Suffolk, Feb. 1774. Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel Nos. 182, 183.
 
120. In addition to Sewall, Paine, and Quincy, the lawyers with whom JA was most frequently joined were James Otis, Benjamin Kent, James Putnam, and Daniel Leonard. Others with whom he was paired at least once include Robert Auchmuty, Jeremiah Gridley, Richard Dana, Francis Dana, Samuel Quincy, James Hovey, John Worthington, Simeon Strong, Samuel Fitch, Andrew Cazneau, Daniel Farnham, John Lowell, William Cushing, David Wyer, Sampson Salter Blowers, Samuel Swift, Pelham Winslow, Theophilus Bradbury, William Pynchon, Oakes Angier, James Sullivan, Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant, and Jeremiah Dummer Rogers.
 
122. 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography 292. The move in 1768 and those thereafter until 1771 are described in id. at 286–287, 291; 2 id, at 68.
 
123. For the move in 1771 and the life of a commuter, see 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 6–11 ||(16, 17, 20, and 21 April, and 1 and 2 May)||, 45–50 ||(22 July, 8 and 14 Aug.)||. The office in Queen Street is described in a notice in the Boston Gazette, 22 April 1771, p. 3, col. 2: “John Adams Notifies the Removal of his Office to a Room in Queen-Street, in the House of Mr. John Gill, within a few Steps of the New Court-House, but on the opposite Side of the Street.”
 
124. 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography 296–297. For the move, see 2 id. at 63, 6768.
 
125. The following account is based on diary entries from 17 June to 5 July for 17, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 28 June and 2, 4, and 5 July in 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 35–45.
 
127. Act of 26 June 1699, c. 3, §4, 1 A&R 370.
 
128. Act of 15 Jan. 1743, c. 13, §2, 3 A&R 29. A lawyer with a substantial number of cases entered them all at once by submitting a list of them to the clerk. See JA to Samuel Quincy, note 118 above. See several lists of JA's entries in SF 26254, SF 26478, SF 26958, SF 175190, SF 175257, SF 175289.
 
129. The sheer number of cases sometimes led to error. In June 1765 the General Court granted the petition of Thomas Torrey of Plymouth for a stay of execution on a judgment recovered against him at the July 1764 Suffolk Inferior Court, where he had been unable to appear on account of the smallpox, “but employed Mr. Adams to appear as his Attorney, [but] the petitioner ... was called out [i.e. the case was called for trial] before Mr. Adams got to Boston.” Resolve of 13 June 1765, c. 25, 18 A&R 17.
 
130. On rare occasions the situation might be reversed. In April 1773 Adams drew a “Writ of Ejectment” for one of the Kennebec Company's actions at Pownal-borough Inferior Court. JA's account with Kennebec Co., 5 Feb. 1774, MeHi:Kennebec Papers. JA did not attend the court, however. Occasionally, he did draw writs for the Plymouth Inferior Court. See JA, Dockets, Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 184.
 
134. See JA's account with Moses French, 1763–1764. Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 185. JA's account with his brother, Peter Boylston Adams, 26–27 Sept. 1766, Adams Papers. Some sheriffs' accounts remained unpaid as late as 1790. See Cotton Tufts to JA, 18 Sept. 1790, Adams Papers. Figures in this and the next paragraph are based on a study of the accounting devices described in text at notes 146–151 below.
 
135. Act of 5 March 1765, c. 26, §2, 4 A&R 746; Act of 26 Feb. 1773, c. 42, §2, 5 A&R 243.
 
136. Act of 5 March 1765, c. 26, §2, 4 A&R 747; Act of 26 Feb. 1773, c. 42, §2, 5 A&R 243.
 
137. This John Hancock's Account with John Adams facing page 63account, a MS owned by Nathaniel E. Stein of New York City, 1964, is reproduced as an illustration in the present edition.
 
138. See No. 12.
 
139. Account with Kennebec Co., 5 Feb. 1774, MeHi:Kennebec Papers. The payments from 1769 to 1771 were made in cash. See Accounts of Henry Alline (Secretary of the Company), 1770, 1771; Waste Book, p. 147. MeHi:Kennebec Papers. For a summary of these trips, see Williamson, “The Professional Tours of John Adams in Maine,” 1 Maine Hist. Soc., Colls, (2d ser.) 301–308 (1890).
 
140. The 1778 vote is in 3 Kennebec Purchase Records 172, MeHi:Kennebec Papers. Adams' previous billing is in his account of 5 Feb. 1774 with the Company, note 139 above. For further discussion see No. 58, note 66.
 
141. JA, Docket, SCJ Suffolk, Aug. 1772, Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No.183.
 
142. See editorial note to Nos. 63, 64, note 108.
 
143. See vol. 2:257, note 39.
 
144. See No. 57, text at note 25.
 
145. See 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 223, 319; JA, Docket, SCJ Suffolk, Aug. 1770, Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 184; JA, Docket, SCJ Suffolk, Feb. 1774, Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 183. Compare No. 58, note 44; editorial note to Nos. 63, 64, note 108.
 
146. This early journal was broken up for souvenirs by a granddaughter, Elizabeth Coombs Adams, sometime in the 19th century. Three fragments survive today. One fragment, of two leaves, was in the possession of Goodspeed's Book Shop, Boston, which in August 1963 offered a single leaf for sale. The Flying Quill, Aug. 1963. A second, of ten pages, is in MQHi. A third single leaf is owned by the Bostonian Society. The three together form more or less consecutive parts of a single journal covering the period Jan. 1761 to Jan. 1763.
 
147. The first such notation is in JA, Docket, Inf. Ct. Suffolk, July 1768, Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 182. See also 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 264, 344.
 
148. JA's Office Book for Jan. 1770 through April 1774 is in MQA. For descriptions of it in use, see Edward Hill to JA, 29 July 1774, Adams Papers; Cotton Tufts to JA, 18 Sept. 1790, Adams Papers. JA called this document the “Writ Book,” but it has also been described as the “Office Book” when cited in the present edition.
 
149. No copy of an “Execution Book” has survived. The description which follows in the text is based on several leaves found in the Writ Book, note 148 above, which had evidently served as an overflow execution book.
 
150. None of these ledgers has survived. The description which follows in the text is based on copies of accounts rendered to clients by JA which were evidently drawn from such ledgers. See materials cited in notes 137, 139, above. See also JA's account with the estate of John Ruddock, 1770–1772, Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 185.
 
151. See Middlecott Cooke's account with JA, March 1770, Adams Papers. See 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 350 note.
 
152. See JA, Docket, Inf. Ct. Suffolk, Jan. 1772; SCJ Suffolk, Feb. 1774, Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 183.
 
153. See text at note 144 above. These notes are filed under date in the Adams Papers.
 
154. Cotton Tufts to JA, 18 Sept. 1790, Adams Papers.
 
155. See, for example, Adams v. Bowditch, Inf. Ct. Suffolk, Jan. 1773, SF 91541; Adams v. Brown, Inf. Ct. Suffolk, Jan. 1773, SF 91520; Adams v. Eddy, Inf. Ct. Suffolk, July 1770, SF 89715; Adams v. Whitmarsh, Inf. Ct. Suffolk, April 1771, SF 90271, reproduced as an illustration in this volume.
 
156. See 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 251–258 ||(first and second entry for 24 Jan., 31 Jan., and 21 Feb.)||; compare 3 id. at 285–286.
 
158. See 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 224, 317; see also note 117 above.
 
159. See the large number of books bearing Gridley's autograph in Catalogue of JA's Library , passim. See, for example, 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 57 note, 199 note. Gridley's library, “consisting of Law, History, Divinity, &c.,” was sold on 2 Feb. 1768 with a printed catalogue. See Boston Gazette, 25 Jan. 1768, p. 4, col. 2; 1 Feb. 1768, p. 3, col. 2.
 
160. 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 337. For law books on sale in Boston at this time, see bookseller John Mein's advertisement of Burrow's Reports, Blackstone's Commentaries , and other legal works. Boston Chronicle, 2 May 1768, Supplement, p. 183.
 
161. 1 Adams Family Correspondence 74–75; see also id. at 72–73, 80.
 
162. Catalogue of the John Adams Library in the Public Library of the City of Boston (Boston, 1917).
 
163. Catalogue of JA's Library 28; see Charles Warren, A History of the American Bar 178 (Cambridge, 1912).
 
164. As to the Adams' libraries generally, see 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography xxxvii note.
 
165. For example, on 23 Sept. 1775 Joseph Hawley wrote to AA that “The Publick have great Need of two Vols. of Mr. Adams English Statutes at large. The edition which Mr. Adams owns is (if I don't mistake) Ruffhead's.” 1 Adams Family Correspondence 283. See also the memo in JA's account with John Hancock of Dec. 1771, note 137 above, indicating that Hancock had procured for JA a set of the State Trials.
 
170. 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 348–349. In May 1771 JA recorded his pleasure at being able to repay the favor which Otis had done him years ago in recommending him for admission to the bar. JA “strongly recommended 14 clients from Wrentham and 3 or 4 in Boston to him, and they have accordingly by my Perswasion engaged him in their Causes, and he has come out to Court And behaved very well, so that I have now introduced him to Practice.” 2 id. at 12. Compare note 102 above.
 
173. 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 235–236. See, generally, 3 id. at 274.
 
175. Suffolk County Bar Book, MHi, printed in 19 MHS, Procs. (1st ser.) 147 (1881–1882). The first sixteen pages of the MS (covering 3 Jan. 1770–26 July 1774) are in JA's hand.
 
176. Hollis R. Bailey, Attorneys and Their Admission to the Bar in Massachusetts 58, 65 (Boston, 1907). JA attended meetings of the bar in other counties as well. See 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 44 (Cumberland Co.), 94 (Essex Co.).
 
177. Suffolk County Bar Book, 19 MHS, Procs. 148. Blowers and Dana were not called by the court until Sept. 1772. Min. Bk. 79, SCJ Suffolk. Quincy was never called, perhaps because of his political views, but this did not hinder him in the development of an active practice. As early as April 1769 he had tried a case to the jury, and at the Aug. 1769 Suffolk Superior Court he began “to manage all [his] own Business ... though unsanctified and uninspired by the Pomp and Magic of—the Long Robe.” Quincy, Reports 317. The intent of the distinction between attorneys and barristers seems to have been that only barristers should manage litigation and argue to court or jury. See Alger, “Barristers at Law in Massachusetts,” 30 NEHGR 206 (1877). In general this seems to have been the practice, but the Minute Books show that occasionally attorneys joined barristers as co-counsel and more rarely emulated Quincy by appearing alone in a case. Lack of statutory authority for the distinction may have prevented both bench and bar from objecting or seeking to apply sanctions.
 
178. Suffolk County Bar Book, 19 MHS, Procs. 149–150. A further rule provided that students of those whom the association had recommended as barristers would have the same status as students of those whom the court had called to the bar. Id. at 150. This provision seems to have been aimed at the situation of Quincy, Blowers, and Dana, note 177 above, who had been recommended but not called.
 
179. 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 338. JA charged William Tudor, one of the two, £10 sterling as a fee. Id, at 339–340.
 
180. 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 273. Compare JA to Jonathan Mason, 18 July 1776, Adams Papers, printed in 9 JA, Works 424. When his own sons were contemplating law study, JA wrote that he ought to come home and take them into his office, for he “was once thought to have a tolerable Knack at making Lawyers, and now would save a large sum by it.” JA to Cotton Tufts, 2 June 1786, LbC, Adams Papers, printed in 9 JA, Works 549.
 
182. Among those who have been suggested as possibly having studied with JA is Royall Tyler, later Chief Justice of Vermont. See Tyler, “Royal Tyler,” 1 Vt. Bar Assoc., Procs. 44 (1876). This is an evident error, probably based on the fact that Tyler, Harvard 1776, lived briefly in Braintree toward the close of the Revolution. He had already been admitted to the Inferior Court in 1780 on motion of Benjamin Hichborn, who was probably his preceptor. Suffolk County Bar Book, 19 MHS, Procs. 154. Moreover, his subsequent relations with the Adams family, arising out of his unsuccessful courtship of AA2, give no hint that he had formerly been in the intimate position of a clerk. See 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography 160–161, 192–193; Mayo, “Miss Adams in Love,” 16 American Heritage 36 (1965). Another candidate is Israel Keith, Harvard 1771, who possessed a commonplace book containing notes directly attributable to JA, including a copy of the “Abstract” on writs of assistance. See No. 44, note 103 1 ; Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 478. Since Keith was admitted to the Superior Court as an attorney in 1780, the timing makes it possible that he clerked for JA, but there is no direct evidence. He probably was a student of one of JA's former clerks. JA refused to accept one William Lithgow in 1771 as not having been to college. 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 19; compare Suffolk County Bar Book, 19 MHS, Procs. 150–151. JA also successfully recommended Levi Lincoln to Joseph Hawley as a student in 1773, indicating that perhaps Lincoln had wished to study with JA. Hawley to JA, 30 June 1773, Adams Papers.
 
183. See, for example, 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 9; 1 Adams Family Correspondence 145–146; JA to John Tudor (father of JA's student William Tudor), 23 July 1774, Tudor Papers, MHi, printed in 9 JA, Works 340–342. This personal relationship appears most clearly in the case of John Thaxter, Nathan Rice, and Jonathan Mason, who tutored the Adams children and were full members of the household during the trying days at the beginning of the Revolution. See 1, 2 Adams Family Correspondence , passim.
 
184. See Jonathan Williams to JA, 28 June 1774; William Tudor to JA, 3 Sept. 1774; Edward Hill to JA, 4 Sept. 1774, all in Adams Papers. JA's dockets, cited in note 119 above, seem to contain instructions to a clerk, or clerks, for the management of litigation in his absence.
 
185. JA to Jonathan Mason, 18 July 1776, LbC, Adams Papers, printed in 9 JA, Works 423–424.
 
186. JA to Jonathan Mason, 21 Aug. 1776, LbC, Adams Papers, printed in 9 JA, Works 432–433. There is little evidence that JA was familiar with the yearbooks. They were seldom cited in his cases and then probably only from secondary sources. In conversation with James Duane of New York in Philadelphia during Oct. 1775, however, he had learned that New York lawyers studied law by translating yearbooks. 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 217–218. For details of clerkship under a regime similar to JA's, see JQA's account of his studies with Theophilus Parsons in 1787–1788. “Diary of John Quincy Adams,” 16 MHS, Procs. (2d ser.) 295–464 passim, but especially 349, 351, 358 (1902).
 
187. See 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 201, 203, 226, 252 note, 261 note, 263; 3 id. at 278–280.
 
190. Bailyn, “Butterfield's Adams: Notes for a Sketch,” 19 WMQ (3d ser.) 250 (1962).
 
191. Printed under its later title, “Dissertation on the Canon and Feudal Law,” with CFA's comment, in 3 JA, Works 447–464.
 
192. Printed in 3 JA, Works 465–468. See 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 265 note.
 
193. See 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 265–268; 2 JA, Works 159 note; No. 44, text at note 48; No. 46, text at note 68; Quincy, Reports 202–214.
 
194. Printed, with CFA's comment, in 3 JA, Works 469–483. See also 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 272–277, 281–282, 286–292, 296–299; No. 46, notes 76, 102 25 .
 
197. 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 304–305, 332–333. See warnings under the poor laws signed by JA and other selectmen in SF 87296, SF 87538, SF 87540. For his involvement as counsel in such local matters, see Nos. 24–33, 37. JA's client John Ruddock, note 150 above, was a Boston tax collector.
 
198. See No. 46.
 
199. See vol. 2:102–103 below.
 
201. See 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography 295; 2 JA, Works 233–235 note; 5 A&R 138–139.
 
202. See 2 JA, Works 235 note; 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography 295; 5 A&R 139–140. Hutchinson's comment appears in 3 Hutchinson, Massachusetts Bay, ed. Mayo, 227. For other public matters in which JA was involved at this session, see 2 JA, Works 235 note; 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 2.
 
203. See Acts of 26 April 1771, cc. 27, 30, 33, 34, 5 A&R 129, 132, 135–136. See also vol. 2:258, note 41, below.
 
204. See Act of 20 Nov. 1770, c. 9, 5 A&R 109–111, 143; Smith v. Fuller, No. 21, note 21 4 . For the activities of the committee, see Mass. House Jour. , 1770–1771 98, 133, 140, 141, 157 (Boston, 1770–1771).
 
205. See Act of 20 Nov. 1770, c. 10, §5, 5 A&R 113; Pingry v. Thurston, No. 31, note 11 5 . For JA's other cases on this point, see No. 37, note 8. In April 1771 a resolve was passed having to do with the statute levying ministerial taxes in the town of Ashfield, an important controversy which reached the Privy Council and had ramifications in Philadelphia in 1774. Id., notes 9–14; Resolve of 12 April 1771, c. 62, 18 A&R 495. The statute concerning theatrical entertainments, about which JA was called upon to give advice in 1773, had also been renewed while he was in the House. See note 108 above.
 
206. For the moves see notes 123, 124, above.
 
208. See 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography 302–304; 2 id., at 95–96; 1 The Law Practice of Alexander Hamilton 553–561, 564–565 (N.Y., ed. Julius Goebel Jr. et al., 1964). The copy of JA's brief, in MHi, is printed in id. at 631–650. It has been asserted that this was not a partisan question. At the meeting of the joint boundary commission at Hartford in May 1773, however, it was patriot Joseph Hawley who sought to advance Massachusetts' western claims, and Governor Thomas Hutchinson who brought about an agreement that avoided the issue. The appointment of Adams and Bowdoin in 1774 thus may have been one more effort to embarrass the Governor. Compare 8 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 200, with 1 Hamilton, Law Practice, ed. Goebel, 559–560.
 
210. See vol. 2:101, 104; 8 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 198–199; 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 65–66. For examples of JA's feelings on the questions of nepotism and lack of law training among the Hutchinsons and Olivers, see 1 id. at 167–168, 259–261, 332; 2 id. at 90. As to Otis, see No. 44, note 21.
 
211. Printed, with the Cambridge Instructions and Brattle's articles, in 3 JA, Works 513–574; see 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 77–79. Samuel Stryk's Examen Juris Feudalis had been part of the reading of the sodality in Jan. 1765. Id. at 252–255. The provision of the Act of Settlement, 12 June 1701, was 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, §3. On the question of judicial tenure in the colonies, see Edward Dumbauld, The Declaration of Independence and What It Means Today 112–115 (Norman, Okla., 1950)
 
212. See 8 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 518, 748–751. For JA's role, see 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 88–89, 3 id. at 298–302. The idea of impeachment was suggested and some of the same authority cited in an attack on Hutchinson published in the Boston Gazette, 4 Jan. 1768, attributed to Josiah Quincy Jr. It is reprinted in Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 580–584.
 
213. SCJ Rec., Aug. 1774, fols. 238–244; Feb. 1775, fol. 1. See 8 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 751–754; JA to AA, 29 June 1774, 1 Adams Family Correspondence 109–110; same to same, 29 June 1774, id. at 111–112: William Tudor to JA, 3 Sept. 1774; Edward Hill to JA, 4 Sept. 1774, both in Adams Papers; Catalogue of Early Court Files 93–94 (Boston, 1897). The case in Feb. 1775 was Walker v. Parker, SCJ Rec. 1775–1778, fol. 1, formerly a JA case. See SF 92367. A referees' report for Walker was entered. In Aug. 1777, however, the case, still on the docket, was dismissed, the appellant being dead. Min. Bk. 103, SCJ Suffolk, Aug. 1777, C–6o. Apparently no judgment had been entered on the report in 1775.
 
214. JA to AA, 29 June 1774, 1 Adams Family Correspondence 113–114; see also id. at 117, 123. For the Coercive Acts, see vol. 2:105–106 below; Ross' Case, No. 53.
 
215. 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 9697, 115. JA's conversations with his colleagues from other provinces are an interesting combination of mutual education and feeling-out. See id. at 98–127, passim.
 
216. 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 161 note, 166 note. See JA's commissions as justice of the peace and of the quorum, 6 Sept. 1775, and as justice of the peace throughout the Province, 8 Nov. 1775, both in the Adams Papers. See also AA to JA, 25 Oct. 1775, 1 Adams Family Correspondence 314. As to the patronage aspects of such appointments under the Crown, see JA to AA, 30 June 1774, id. at 116–117. The notification from the Council, 28 Oct. 1775, is in the Adams Papers.
 
217. For JA's doubts about holding the office, see JA to AA, 18 Nov. 1775, 1 Adams Family Correspondence 327–328; same to same, 12 May 1776, id. at 406; same to same, 3 July 1776, 2 id. at 27; same to same, 18 Aug. 1776, id. at 99–100. For his resignation, see same to same, 10 Feb. 1777, id, at 159. See 3 JA, Works 23–25; 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography 359–360. JA had earlier resigned from the Council for similar reasons. See 1 Adams Family Correspondence 421 note.
 
218. See Cushing, “The Massachusetts Judiciary and Public Opinion,” paper given at the Conference on Colonial History, Worcester, Mass., April 1964, to be published in George A. Billias, ed., Law and Authority in Colonial America: Selected Essays (Barre, Mass., in press). As to JA's concern for the opening of the courts, see JA to AA, 27 May 1776, 1 Adams Family Correspondence 420–421; same to same, 7 July 1776, 2 id. at 38; JA to William Cushing, 9 June 1776, Adams Papers, printed in 9 JA, Works 390.
 
219. See facsimile of the proclamation, 23 Jan. 1776, in Worthington C. Ford, comp., Broadsides, Ballads, &c. Printed in Massachusetts, 1639–1800 (75 MHS, Colls. ), No. 1973 (Boston, 1922). The passage in text is quoted from the version printed in 1 JA, Works 193–196, from a MS in JA's hand then in M-Ar. See generally 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 226 note; 1 Adams Family Correspondence 360 note.
 
220. See AA to JA, 15 Sept. 1776, 2 Adams Family Correspondence 125; 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography 363. See, generally, Quincy, Reports 340–342. For the venire for the June 1776 Essex Superior Court, bearing JA's name, see SF 132468.
 
221. See 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography 346, 409–412; Nos. 60, 61, 63, 64; AA to Mercy Otis Warren, 25 Jan. 1775, 1 Adams Family Correspondence 179–181. JA also may have gained some knowledge of naval justice from the proceedings of the special courts of admiralty before which he had appeared, since these bodies followed substantially the procedure of a naval court-martial. See No. 56, note 17. See, generally, William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 21–22, 929–971 (Washington, 2d edn., 1920).
 
222. See No. 58, text at notes 4–10.
 
223. Reprinted in 4 JA, Works 1–177. See JA's notes of the debates in Congress in 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 122–250, passim. For a discussion of the relation between the text of the Declaration of Independence and the political crises of the preceding decade, see Dumbauld, Declaration of Independence, passim. The link between JA's role as lawyer, legislator, and polemicist in many of these crises, and his service on the committee which drafted the Declaration, is a particularly fruitful subject for further study.
 
224. See JA, Thoughts on Government (1776), reprinted in 4 JA, Works 193–201; JA, Report of a Constitution (1779), reprinted, with extensive commentary by CFA, in 4 JA, Works 213–267; JA, Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America (1787–1788), reprinted, with a preface by CFA, in 4 JA, Works 273–588; 5 id. at 1–490; 6 id. at 1–220.
 
225. Preface, 1 Co. Rep.[ix] (Dublin, ed. George Wilson, 1793).

The Massachusetts Bench and Bar: A Biographical Register of John Adams' Contemporaries

Here follow brief biographical sketches of seventy-two judges, lawyers, and law students who were active during the period of John Adams' career as a practicing lawyer. The list includes: (1) all justices who sat on the royal Superior Court of the Province between 1758 and the closing of the courts in 1774; (2) all lawyers called to the Superior Court as barristers from 1762, when the degree was first adopted, until 1774; (3) a few important figures among the many lawyers who were admitted as attorneys in the Inferior or Superior Court from 1758 to 1774, but either were never barristers, or were called later; (4) the ten men who are known to have clerked for Adams from 1766 to 1777, regardless of when, where, or whether they were admitted to practice. It should be assumed that a lawyer practiced primarily in Suffolk County unless another county is mentioned in the sketch.
Since these sketches are intended primarily for identification, there has been no attempt at either bibliographical or factual completeness. In many cases the only reference given is to a standard source, such as the DAB or Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates , where the reader will find citations to full-length biographies and other biographical works, as well as listings of the subject's own writings and manuscripts. Fuller references have been supplied only when there is no standard source on a subject, or important information does not appear in the standard source. It should go without saying that a great many of the sketches could be amplified by consulting the indexes to the present and preceding volumes of The Adams Papers.
In many of the sketches factual data, such as dates of admission to the bar, appointment to judicial or other civil office, and service in the legislature, have been supplied without citation from a variety of additional sources, including the Minute Books of the Superior Court; Whitmore, Mass. Civil List ; the legislative lists contained in A&R; the Suffolk County Bar Book, MHi, printed in 19 MHS, Procs. (1st ser.) 147 (1881–1882); and the civil, legal, and legislative lists appearing in a series of almanacs published at Boston and variously titled, A Pocket Almanack (1780–1787), Fleets Pocket Almanack [and] Massachusetts Register (1788–1797), Fleets' Register, and Pocket Almanack (1798–1800), and The Massachusetts Register and United States Calendar (1801–1821). Many {p. R96} of these references, particularly those to the Minute Books, came from the Adams Papers Editorial Files.
Each of the sketches has been indexed under the subject's name, where it appears first among the entries, with the rubric “sketch of.”
Oakes Angier (1745–1786). Harvard 1764. Studied law with JA, ca. 1766–1768. Admitted attorney, SCJ, May 1771; barrister, Aug. 1773.
Practiced in Plymouth Co. Represented Bridgewater in the House, 1776, 1778, 1779, despite his somewhat equivocal political stance. Amassed a sizable fortune in practice before his death. See 1 Adams Family Correspondence 84 note, 140–141; 2 id. at 4, 13.
Robert Auchmuty (ca. 1723–1788). Admitted to Harvard, class of 1746, but never matriculated. Admitted attorney, SCJ, Feb. 1752; barrister, Aug. 1762.
Advocate General in Admiralty, 1762–1767. Judge of the Massachusetts Vice Admiralty Court, 1767–1776, a post held by his father, Robert Auchmuty (d. 1750), from 1733 to 1747. Judge of the new District Court of Vice Admiralty at Boston from its creation in 1768 until 1776. Appointed Justice of the Peace and of the Quorum, 1769. Counsel with JA and Josiah Quincy Jr., q.v., in the trial of Captain Preston after the Boston Massacre, 1770 (No. 63). A leading loyalist; one of his letters to officials in England was among those published in Boston by the patriots in 1773. An addresser of Hutchinson, 1774. Sailed to Halifax and then England in 1776. Proscribed, 1778. 12 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 12–16.
Jonathan Williams Austin (1751–1779). Harvard 1769. Studied law with JA, 1769–1772. Admitted attorney, Suffolk Inferior Court, July 1772; attorney, SCJ, Aug. 1778.
Witness in Boston Massacre trials, 1770 (Nos. 63, 64). Major in the Massachusetts forces and in the Continental infantry, 1775–1776. See 1 Adams Family Correspondence 81 note.
Daniel Bliss (1740–1806). Harvard 1760. Admitted attorney, SCJ, Sept. 1768; barrister, Sept. 1772.
Brother of Jonathan Bliss, q.v. Practiced in Middlesex Co. Appointed Justice of the Peace, Worcester, 1767; Middlesex, 1773. An addresser of Hutchinson, 1774. Proscribed, 1778. Commissary in the British army during the Revolution. Thereafter member of the Council and Judge of the Court of Common Pleas in New Brunswick, where he remained until his death. Jones, Loyalists of Mass. 35–36.
Jonathan Bliss (1742–1822). Harvard 1763. Said to have studied law with Thomas Hutchinson, q.v. Admitted attorney, SCJ, Sept. 1768; barrister, Sept. 1772.
{p. R97}
Brother of Daniel Bliss, q.v. Practiced in western Massachusetts. Represented Springfield and Wilbraham in the House, 1768, 1769. One of the 17 “Rescinders” who voted to withdraw resolutions protesting the Townshend Acts, 1768. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1770. Departed for England at the start of the Revolution and was proscribed in 1778. In 1785 appointed Attorney General of the newly formed province of New Brunswick. Served in the assembly there and was Chief Justice from 1809 to 1822. DAB .
Moses Bliss (1736–1814). Yale 1755. Studied law with John Worthington, q.v. Admitted attorney, Hampshire Inferior Court, Nov. 1761; attorney, SCJ, Sept. 1763. Listed as a barrister in A Pocket Almanack ... 1780 (Boston, no date).
Began study of theology, being licensed to preach, 1757. Practiced in Hampshire Co. until 1793. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1769; of the Quorum, 1771. Prominent in town affairs until the Revolution, when he withdrew, lacking sympathy for the popular cause. Represented Spring-field in the House, 1796, 1797. Served as Judge, Hampshire Inferior Court, 1798–1810. 2 Dexter, Yale Graduates 365–366.
Sampson Salter Blowers (1742–1842). Harvard 1763. Said to have studied law with Thomas Hutchinson, q.v. Admitted attorney, Suffolk Inferior Court, July 1766; attorney, SCJ, Aug. 1768; barrister, Sept. 1772.
Married daughter of Benjamin Kent, q.v. Associated with JA and Josiah Quincy Jr., q.v., in the trial of the soldiers after the Boston Massacre, 1770 (No. 64). Loyalist. An addresser of Hutchinson, 1774. Went to England in 1774. Proscribed in 1778 and imprisoned briefly (by Kent) on his return to Boston. Served as judge of the royal Court of Vice Admiralty at Newport, Rhode Island, in 1779 and as Solicitor General of New York, 1780–1783. Moved permanently to Halifax in 1784, where he was Attorney General, Speaker of the House, Councilor, and, from 1797 to 1833, Chief Justice and President of the Council. DAB .
Shearjashub Bourne (1746–1806). Harvard 1764. Admitted attorney, SCJ, May 1767; barrister, Sept. 1772.
Practiced in Barnstable Co. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1773. Addresser of Hutchinson, 1774. Recanted. Involved in the affair of the Lusanna, 1775–1802 (No. 58). Represented Barnstable in the House, 1782–1785, 1788–1790. Member of the Massachusetts Ratification Convention, 1788. Served in Congress, 1791–1795. Chief Justice, Suffolk Inferior Court, 1799–1806. Biog. Dir. Cong.
Theophilus Bradbury (1739–1803). Harvard 1757. Admitted attorney, Cumberland Inferior Court, May 1762; attorney, SCJ, June 1765; barrister, June 1767.
{p. R98}
Practiced in Falmouth (now Portland, Maine) until 1779, thereafter in Newburyport. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1768. Attorney General, Cumberland Co., 1777–1779. Served in the Massachusetts Senate, 1791– 1792. Elected to Congress in 1795–1796. Sat on the Supreme Judicial Court from 1797 until his removal by legislative address in 1803 after a paralytic stroke. DAB .
William Browne (1737–1802). Harvard 1755. Studied law with Edmund Trowbridge, q.v., but never practiced.
Appointed Justice of the Peace and of the Quorum, 1761. Briefly Collector of the Port of Salem, 1764, but dismissed, apparently in scandal over counterfeit clearances. Represented Salem in the House, 1762–1768. One of the seventeen “Rescinders” who voted to withdraw resolutions protesting the Townshend Acts, 1768. Judge, Essex Inferior Court, 1770–1774. Addresser of Gage, 1774. Appointed Judge of the Superior Court and a Mandamus Councilor, 1774. Took refuge in Boston. In 1776 sailed for England. Proscribed, 1778. Governor of Bermuda, 1781–1788. 13 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 551–560.
Andrew Cazneau (d. 1792). Admitted attorney, SCJ, May 1765; barrister, June 1767.
Brother-in-law of Daniel Leonard, q.v. Addresser of Hutchinson, 1774, and Gage, 1775. Sailed for Halifax, 1776, and thence to New York, where he fought in defense of the city. Proscribed, 1778. Marshal of the Rhode Island Vice Admiralty Court, Newport, 1780. Judge of the Vice Admiralty Court and member of the Council, Bermuda, 1780–1783. Returned to Boston, 1788. Died at Roxbury. Jones, Loyalists of Mass. 78–79.
Peter Chardon JR. (d. 1766). Harvard 1757. Admitted attorney and barrister, SCJ, March 1763.
Early friend and correspondent of JA. Son of prominent Boston merchant. A namesake was Peter Chardon Brooks (1767–1849), leading Massachusetts capitalist and father-in-law of CFA. See “Memoir of Peter Chardon Brooks,” 8 NEHGR 298 (1854); 1 JA Diary and Autobiography 47–48, 196–197.
John Chipman (1722–1768). Harvard 1738. Admitted attorney, SCJ, Oct. 1751; barrister, Aug. 1762.
Practiced in Essex Co. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1761. Member of committee to instruct the representatives of Marblehead on the Stamp Act, 1765. While arguing in the Superior Court, Falmouth (now Portland, Maine), 1 July 1768, seized with an “Apoplectic Fit” and died a few hours later. 10 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 276–277.
John Cushing (1695–1778). Had no formal legal training.
{p. R99}
Resident of Scituate. Representative in the House frequently after 1721. Councilor, 1746–1763. Plymouth Co. Judge of Probate and Inferior Court Judge, 1738nd;1746. Justice of the Superior Court, 1748–1771, a post held previously by his father, John Cushing (1662–1737), and subsequently by his son William Cushing, q.v. Washburn, Judicial History of Mass. 298–299.
William Cushing (1732–1810). Harvard 1751. Studied law with Jeremiah Gridley, q.v. Admitted attorney, SCJ, Feb. 1758; barrister, Aug. 1762.
Practiced in Scituate from 1755 to 1760 and in Pownalborough (now Dresden, Maine) from 1760 to 1772, serving not only as Justice of the Peace and of the Quorum, Register of Deeds, and Judge of Probate, but as general counsel of the Kennebec Company during the latter period. In 1772 appointed Judge of the Superior Court, a post held by his father (John Cushing, q.v.) and grandfather (John Cushing, 1662–1737) before him. Only royal judge to be appointed to the Superior Court established by the Revolutionary Council in 1775. Presided at its first sessions and succeeded JA as Chief Justice of Massachusetts in 1777, serving until 1789. A member of the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1779 and vice president of the state Ratification Convention in 1788. Appointed first Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States in 1789, serving until his death. Appointed Chief Justice in 1796, but resigned the commission after a week for reasons of health. 13 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 26–39. His MS Reports (MH-L) and other papers pertaining to his judicial service in Massachusetts are being edited for publication by John D. Cushing of the Massachusetts Historical Society.
Francis Dana (1743–1811). Harvard 1762. Studied law with his maternal uncle, Edmund Trowbridge, q.v. Admitted attorney, SCJ, Aug. 1768; barrister, Sept. 1772.
Son of Richard Dana, q.v. After an unsuccessful private reconciliation mission in England, 1775–1776, served as a member of the Massachusetts Council, 1776–1780, and a delegate to the Continental Congress, 1777–1779. Secretary to JA's legation in France, 1779–1780. Minister (unrecognized) to Russia, 1781–1783, with JQA as his private secretary. Appointed to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1785. Chief Justice, 1791–1806. DAB . For a more detailed biography, see W. P. Cresson, Francis Dana (N.Y., 1930). His papers are in MHi.
Richard Dana (1700–1772). Harvard 1718. Admitted attorney, SCJ, May 1734; barrister, Aug. 1762.
Married a sister of Edmund Trowbridge, q.v. Practiced in Essex and Middlesex cos. before moving to Boston. Represented Marblehead in the House, 1738. Active in the affairs of the town of Boston, serving in {p. R100} various offices and as counsel. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1756; of the Quorum, 1757. An active Son of Liberty, especially during the Stamp Act and Boston Massacre crises. Father of Francis Dana, q.v. 6 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 236–239.
Joseph Dudley (1732–1767). Harvard 1751. Apparently studied with Jeremiah Gridley, q.v. Admitted attorney and barrister, SCJ, Aug. 1762.
Married Gridley's daughter. Participant with JA in Gridley's “sodality,” 1765. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1761. 13 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 39–40.
Daniel Farnham (1719–1776). Harvard 1739. Studied law with Edmund Trowbridge, q.v. Admitted attorney, SCJ, Nov. 1745; barrister, Aug. 1762.
Practiced in Newburyport. Appointed Attorney General for York Co., 1744; Justice of the Peace, Essex Co., 1752. Loyalist in sympathy, but did not go into exile. 10 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 364–366.
Samuel Fitch (1724–1799). Yale 1742. Admitted attorney, SCJ, Aug. 1754; barrister, Aug. 1762.
Participant with JA in Jeremiah Gridley's “sodality,” 1765. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1762. Advocate General in Admiralty, 1770–1776. Appointed Deputy Judge, 1768. Solicitor to the American Board of Customs Commissioners, he was an Addresser of Hutchinson in 1774, and Gage in 1775, and left for Halifax and England in 1776. Proscribed, 1778. 1 Dexter, Yale Graduates 706–707; 11 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 144–147; DAB .
Edmund Goffe. See Edmund Trowbridge.
David Gorham (1712–1786). Harvard 1733. Admitted attorney, SCJ, May 1766.
Practiced in Barnstable Co., but concentrated on office-holding. Appointed Register of Probate, 1740, and Justice of the Peace and of the Quorum, 1753. Addresser of Hutchinson, 1774, but recanted with Shearjashub Bourne, q.v. Continued practice and held minor offices after the Revolution, but denied commission as Justice of the Peace. 9 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 300–303.
Benjamin Gridley (1732–before 1800). Harvard 1751. Admitted attorney and barrister, SCJ, Aug. 1762.
Nephew of Jeremiah Gridley, q.v. Did not practice law extensively. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1774. Addresser of Hutchinson, 1774, and Gage in 1775. Appointed judge of Suffolk Inferior Court by Gage, June 1775. Sailed to Halifax in 1776, and then to England. 13 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 90–94.
{p. R101}
Jeremiah Gridley (1702–1767). Harvard 1725. Admitted attorney, SCJ, Feb. 1732; barrister, Aug. 1762. (Sometimes called Jeremy.)
The leading lawyer of his time. Many of the outstanding lawyers of the next generation studied under him, including William Cushing, James Otis, Benjamin Prat, and Oxenbridge Thacher, qq.v. Others, notably JA, were deeply influenced by his knowledge of the law. Founder of the “sodality,” a legal discussion group in which JA participated, 1765. Broadly interested in literary matters as well, founding the Weekly Rehearsal (1731) and (with others) the American Magazine (1743). Appointed Justice of the Peace and of the Quorum, 1746. Represented Brookline in the House frequently, 1755–1767. Appointed Attorney General, 1767. Represented the Crown in the argument on writs of assistance in 1761 (No. 44), but appeared with JA before the Council in 1765 to argue on behalf of the merchants of Boston that the courts be opened during the Stamp Act crisis. 7 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 518–530.
Joseph Hawley (1723–1788). Yale 1742. Studied law with Phineas Lyman, Yale 1738, of Suffield, Massachusetts (now Connecticut). Admitted attorney, SCJ, Sept. 1751; barrister, Aug. 1762. “Silenced” (disbarred) Oct. 1767 for newspaper publications “containing divers injurious and scandalous Reflections on several of the Justices of this Court, for what they did in Court, and as Justices thereof.” Restored on his petition and promise of future good behavior, Oct. 1769. SCJ Rec. 1767–1768, fol. 46; Min. Bk. 90, SCJ Hampshire, Oct. 1769; SF 157477, 157559
Practiced in Hampshire Co. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1749; of the Quorum, 1762. Principal spokesman of patriot party in western Massachusetts. Frequently represented Northampton in the House, participating with JA and others in many of the legislative battles preceding the Revolution. Elected to the Council in 1769. Declined to serve in Continental Congress, 1774, but maintained an active correspondence with JA and other members, urging independence. Elected to the House, 1775–1777. Developing mental illness caused him gradually to withdraw from public life after 1776. Critic of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, declining to serve in the state Senate because of the religious test imposed. DAB ; 1 Dexter, Yale Graduates 709–712. For a more recent biography, see E. Francis Brown, Joseph Hawley, Colonial Radical (N.Y., 1931). Portions of his papers are in NN.
Edward Hill (1755–1775). Harvard 1772. Studied law with JA, 1772–1775.
Son of Alexander Hill, Boston merchant. Took a sum of money from JA's office, July 1774, in course of departure from Boston for personal reasons. JA apparently accepted his apology, because he is mentioned as in the office as late as Oct. 1774. Enlisted in the army and died of “camp fever,” March 1775. 1 Adams Family Correspondence 146 note, 173; see letters of Hill to JA, July–Sept. 1774, Adams Papers.
{p. R102}
James Hovey (1712–1781). Admitted attorney, SCJ, May 1752; barrister, Aug. 1762.
Practiced in Plymouth Co. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1760; of the Quorum, 1764. See Washburn, Judicial History of Mass. 238; The Hovey Book 76–78 (Haverhill, 1913).
Foster Hutchinson (1724–1799). Harvard 1743. Had no formal legal training.
Brother of Thomas Hutchinson, q.v. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1752; of the Quorum, 1761. Judge, Suffolk Inferior Court, 1758–1771. Justice, Superior Court, 1771–1775. Deputy Judge of Probate, Suffolk Co., 1765–1769; Judge, 1769–1775. Rejected the royal salary grant, but accepted appointment as Mandamus Councilor, 1774. Sailed for Halifax, 1776, remaining there until his death. Proscribed, 1778. Took no part in public life in Halifax, but claimed that he was still Suffolk Co. Judge of Probate and retained custody of the probate records until 1784, when Benjamin Kent, q.v., was able to procure their surrender. His son, Foster Jr. (d. 1815), was a Judge of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court. 11 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 237–243.
Thomas Hutchinson (1711–1780). Harvard 1727. Had no formal legal training.
The most important figure on the loyalist side in pre-Revolutionary Massachusetts. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1740. Served in the House, 1739–1749, and on the Council, 1749–1766. Expert on provincial currency and credit. Lieutenant Governor, 1758–1771, serving as acting Governor from 1769 until his appointment as Governor in 1771. Chief Justice, 1760–1771 (did not sit after 1769). Also served as judge of the Suffolk Inferior Court, 1752–1758, and as Suffolk County Judge of Probate, 1752–1769. As judge and Governor, involved in the major political events of the period, including the arguments on writs of assistance (No. 44), the Stamp Act crisis, the Boston Massacre (Nos. 63, 64), the burning of the Gaspee, and the Boston Tea Party. Called to England in 1774 and relieved as Governor; never returned to Massachusetts. Author of History of the Colony and Province of Massachusetts Bay, a thoughtful and scholarly work, of principal value for its account of his own administration (first published in 3 Vols., 1764–1828; ed. Lawrence Shaw Mayo, Cambridge, Mass., 1936, 3 Vols.). 8 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 149–215.
Benjamin Kent (1708–1788). Harvard 1727. Admitted attorney, SCJ, ca. 1739; barrister, Aug. 1762.
Began career as a Congregational minister. Dismissed by an ecclesiastical council after a heresy trial in 1735, but won a lengthy civil suit for his back salary in 1737. A Son of Liberty and correspondent of John Wilkes. Appointed state Attorney General, 1776. Served as Attorney {p. R103} General for Suffolk Co., 1777–1785. Under the influence of his loyalist son-in-law, Sampson Salter Blowers, q.v., joined family in Halifax in 1785. 8 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 220–230.
Daniel Leonard (1740–1829). Harvard 1760. Studied law with Samuel White, q.v. Admitted attorney, SCJ, May 1765; barrister, Aug. 1767.
Married White's daughter and succeeded to his practice in Bristol Co. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1767; King's attorney for Bristol Co., 1769. Represented Taunton in the House, 1769–1772, 1773–1774. Addresser of Hutchinson and Mandamus Councilor, 1774. Author of “Massachusettensis” papers, seventeen pseudonymous newspaper essays defending the Crown, to which JA replied as “Novanglus,” 1774–1775. Took shelter in Boston, 1774, where he was appointed solicitor to the Customs Commissioners in 1775. Sailed to Halifax in 1776, giving his legal services to the Crown there and in England, where he continued to act for the Commissioners. Proscribed, 1778. Admitted to the Inner Temple, 1779. Chief Justice of Bermuda, 1782–1806. Returned to practice in England, where he was a leading barrister until his death. DAB .
John Lowell (1743–1802). Harvard 1760. Studied law with Oxen-bridge Thacher, q.v. Admitted attorney, SCJ, May 1765; barrister, June 1767.
Practiced in Newburyport until 1777, thereafter in Boston. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1769. Addresser of Hutchinson, 1774, recanting several months later. Represented Newburyport in the House, 1776; Boston, 1778, 1780. Delegate to Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, 1779–1780. Served in Continental Congress, 1782–1783. Appointed to federal Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture, 1782. Judge, United States District Court, Massachusetts, 1789. Appointed Chief Judge of the First Circuit in Feb. 1801 by JA — one of the “midnight judges.” DAB ; 1 Adams Family Correspondence 405–406. His papers are in MHi.
Benjamin Lynde (1700–1782). Harvard 1718. Studied law with Judge Samuel Browne, Essex Inferior Court, his uncle.
Son of Chief Justice Benjamin Lynde (1666–1745), who had studied at the Inns of Court. Naval Officer, Port of Salem, 1721–1729. Represented Salem in the House, 1728–1731. Served on the Council, 1737–1741, 1743–1766, declining to run thereafter because his efforts in favor of the Stamp Act meant certain defeat. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1729. Judge, Essex Inferior Court, 1739–1746. Justice, Superior Court, 1746–1771; Chief Justice, 1771–1772. Presided at the Boston Massacre trials, 1770 (Nos. 63, 64). Essex Co. Judge of Probate, 1772–1775. Loyalist in sympathy (addresser of Gage, 1774), but managed to maintain a neutral position. 6 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 250–257. {p. R104} His diary is a most useful account of his activities on the Bench. See Vol. 3:39 below.
Jonathan Mason (1756–1831). College of New Jersey (Princeton) 1774. Studied law with Josiah Quincy Jr., q.v., 1774–1775; with JA, 1775–1776; with Perez Morton, 1776. Admitted attorney, SCJ, 1779.
Son of Jonathan Mason, who was a prominent Boston merchant, Son of Liberty, and witness in the Boston Massacre trials (Nos. 63, 64). Federalist. Served in the Massachusetts House and Senate periodically, 1786–1800, 1803–1808, and as interim U.S. Senator, 1800–1803. Thereafter withdrew from politics, but was elected to Congress, 1816, 1818. DAB .
Daniel Oliver (1743–1826). Harvard 1762. Admitted attorney, Suffolk Inferior Court, July 1766; attorney, SCJ, Aug. 1768; barrister, Sept. 1772.
Nephew of Chief Justice Peter Oliver, q.v. Practiced in Worcester Co. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1768. Represented Hardwick in the House, 1770–1771. Addresser of Hutchinson, 1774. Sailed to Halifax, 1776, then to England, where he remained until his death. Proscribed, 1778. Jones, Loyalists of Mass. 222.
Peter Oliver (1713–1791). Harvard 1730. Had no formal legal training.
Early Plymouth Co. industrialist, with poetic talent. Leading loyalist. Related to the Hutchinsons by marriage. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1744. Judge, Plymouth Inferior Court, 1747–1756. Justice, Superior Court, 1756–1772; Chief Justice, 1772–1775. Represented Middleboro in the House, 1749, 1751, and sat on the Council, 1759–1766, upholding the Crown position. Impeached as Chief Justice by the House, 1774, for refusing to reject the royal salary grant. Jurors refused to serve under him thereafter. Appointed a Mandamus Councilor, 1774, and served on that body, taking refuge in Boston. Sailed to Halifax, 1776, and then to London. Proscribed, 1778. In retirement wrote Origin and Progress of the American Rebellion, a lengthy and very partisan account of the political events which he had witnessed (ed. Douglass Adair and John A. Schutz, San Marino, Calif., 1963). 8 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 737–763.
James Otis SR. (1702–1778). Admitted attorney, SCJ, April 1731; barrister, Aug. 1762.
Father of James Otis Jr., q.v. Practiced in Barnstable and Plymouth cos. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1734; of the Quorum, 1748. Attorney General, 1748. Disappointed in his aspirations to the Chief Justiceship by the appointment in 1760 of Thomas Hutchinson, q.v.— supposedly a cause of the younger Otis' enmity toward the Crown. Represented Barnstable in the House, 1745–1756; Speaker, 1760–1761. Councilor, {p. R105} 1762–1774 (negatived, 1767–1769). On the first Revolutionary Council, 1775–1776. Appointed Chief Justice, Barnstable Inferior Court, and Judge of Probate, 1764. Washburn, Judicial History of Mass. 212–213; see 11 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 250–252.
James Otis Jr. (1725–1783). Harvard 1743. Studied law with Jeremiah Gridley, q.v. Admitted attorney, SCJ, May 1750; barrister, Aug. 1762.
Leading pamphleteer, politician, and lawyer for the patriot side in the 1760's. Son of Col. James Otis Sr., q.v. Practiced first in Plymouth, but in 1749 moved to Boston. One of the most learned and successful lawyers of the period, with serious literary pretensions as well. Appointed Justice of the Peace in 1756, and at about the same time Advocate General in Admiralty. Turned against the Crown in 1760, allegedly because Thomas Hutchinson, q.v., was appointed Chief Justice in preference to James Otis Sr. at the death of Stephen Sewall, q.v. Resigned as Advocate General and in 1761 argued against the application of the customs officers for writs of assistance (No. 44). His argument, as recorded and circulated by JA, became an important piece of patriot propaganda and may have inspired Otis' Rights of the British Colonies (1764) and later pamphlets, which were of major significance in the Revolutionary movement. Represented Boston in the House, 1761–1769, despite growing doubts of his sincerity in the patriot cause, arising from the tortured course both of his political dealings and of the logic of his pamphlets. With Samuel Adams and Joseph Hawley, q.v., acted as a leader of the patriot majority of the House, attending the Stamp Act Congress in 1765. In Sept. 1769, struck on the head in a scuffle with Customs Commissioner John Robinson, an incident leading to protracted litigation, in which JA represented Otis. Thereafter, madness, occasionally apparent earlier, overtook him. Elected in 1771 to the House, but spent the greater part of his remaining years in confinement, or at least retirement, reappearing for brief lucid intervals succeeded by displays of obvious insanity. Killed by a bolt of lightning as he stood in his doorway watching a storm. DAB ; 11 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 247–287. See also Bernard Bailyn, Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1:410–417, 546–552 (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).
Robert Treat Paine (1731–1814). Harvard 1749. Studied law with Benjamin Prat, q.v. Admitted attorney, Suffolk Inferior Court, May 1757; attorney, SCJ, Feb. 1758; barrister, Aug. 1762.
From 1749 until 1757, variously schoolteacher, merchant, whaler, preacher, and law student. Practiced in Boston until 1761, thereafter primarily in Taunton until 1781, when he returned to Boston. Appeared for the prosecution in the Boston Massacre trials, 1770. (Nos. 63, 64). Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1763. Represented Taunton in the House, 1773–1775, 1779 Speaker, 1777–1778. Declined seat on the Superior Court, 1775. Elected a delegate with JA to the Continental Congress, {p. R106} 1774; signer of the Declaration of Independence. Declined re-election to Congress in 1777, and chosen Attorney General of Massachusetts, serving until 1790. Councilor, 1775, 1780. On drafting committees for the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. Sat on the Supreme Judicial Court, 1790–1804. 12 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 462–482. His diary, extensive law notes, and other papers are in MHi and are a principal source for the present work. His correspondence is being edited for publication by Stephen T. Riley, Director of the Massachusetts Historical Society.
Theophilus Parsons (1750–1813). Harvard 1769. Studied law with Theophilus Bradbury and Edmund Trowbridge, qq.v. Admitted attorney, Cumberland Inferior Court, July 1774; attorney, SCJ, June 1776; barrister, ca. 1784.
Practiced in Essex Co. Leading lawyer of the post-Revolutionary generation, having many later distinguished students, including JQA. Interested in science as well, producing essays on astronomy and geometry. Author of the Essex Result, report of the Essex Convention in opposition to the proposed Massachusetts Constitution of 1778. A leader in the Essex Junto at the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1779. Delegate to the Massachusetts Ratification Convention, 1788. Elected to the House, 1779, 1787–1791, 1805. Appointed Chief Justice of Massachusetts, 1806, serving until his death. DAB .
Samuel Porter (1743–1798). Harvard 1763. Studied law with Daniel Farnham, q.v. Admitted attorney, SCJ, Nov. 1768; barrister, Sept. 1772.
Practiced in Essex Co. Addresser of Hutchinson, 1774, and of Gage, 1774. Fled from Salem in May 1776 overland to New York and thence to England, where he remained until his death. Proscribed, 1778. Jones, Loyalists of Mass. 237–238.
Benjamin Prat (1711–1763). Harvard 1737. Studied with Jeremiah Gridley, q.v., and Robert Auchmuty Sr. Admitted attorney, SCJ, ca. 1746.
Leg amputated as result of accident, 1729. Married Auchmuty's daughter. Leading lawyer in Boston; minor poet. Moderator of the Town Meeting, 1757. Representative in the House, 1757–1759, but fell from favor with departure of Governor Pownall. Appointed Chief Justice and Councilor, province of New York, 1761. Returned briefly to Massachusetts during struggle over source of judges' salaries in New York, 1762. Went back to bench when struggle was resolved in Crown's favor. 10 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 226–239. His law library of 115 volumes is itemized in the inventory of his estate filed in Suffolk Co. Probate Court, 8 July 1763, printed in Abbott Lowell Cummings, ed., Rural Household Inventories 202–206 (Boston, 1964).
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James Putnam (1726–1789). Harvard 1746. Studied law with Edmund Trowbridge, q.v. Admitted attorney, SCJ, Sept. 1749; barrister, Aug. 1762.
Practiced in Worcester. JA studied law in his office, 1756–1758. Appointed Justice of the Peace and of the Quorum, 1762. Addresser of Hutchinson, 1774, and Gage, 1775. Took refuge in Boston, 1774, and appointed Attorney General, 1775. Sailed for Halifax, 1776, then to New York, where he held a military post. Proscribed, 1778. Lived in England, 1779–1784. Then moved to New Brunswick as Judge of the Supreme Court and member of the Council. 12 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 57–66.
William Pynchon (1723–1789). Harvard 1743. Studied law with Mitchell Sewall, Essex Co. Clerk of Courts and Register of Deeds. Admitted attorney, SCJ, June 1757; barrister, Aug. 1762.
Practiced in Essex Co. Had many students, including William Wetmore, q.v., later his son-in-law. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1761. Addresser of Hutchinson, 1774, but recanted. Addresser of Gage, 1774. Although remaining firmly loyalist in sympathy, he braved out the Revolution in Salem, continuing to practice law in partnership with Wetmore, and finally being appointed a Justice of the Peace and of the Quorum in 1786. 11 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 295–301.
Josiah Quincy Jr. (1744–1775). Harvard 1763. Studied law with Oxenbridge Thacher, q.v. Admitted attorney, Suffolk Inferior Court, July 1766; attorney, SCJ, Aug. 1768. Never called as a barrister, perhaps because of political beliefs, but practiced unhindered.
Radical leader, newspaper writer, pamphleteer, orator, and successful lawyer. Often called “the Patriot” to distinguish him from his father (“the Colonel”) and son (“the President”—of Harvard), both also named Josiah. Brother of Samuel Quincy, q.v. At Thacher's death, continued law studies, taking over the office and retaining much of his late mentor's practice. Counsel for the defense with JA in the second Boston Massacre trial, 1770 (No. 64). Also represented an unpopular defendant in Rex v. Richardson,No. 59. Always frail in health, he died of tuberculosis aboard ship in sight of Massachusetts, returning from a secret, high-level, and unsuccessful, reconciliation mission to England in April 1775. DAB . Selections from his courtroom notes, started during his student days and now with other family papers in MHi, were published in 1865 as Quincy, Reports.
Samuel Quincy (1734–1789). Harvard 1754. Studied law with Benjamin Prat, q.v. Admitted attorney, Suffolk Inferior Court, Nov. 1758; attorney, SCJ, Nov. 1761; barrister, Aug. 1762.
Early friend of JA. Brother of Josiah Quincy Jr., q.v. Counsel for the Crown in the Boston Massacre trials, 1770 (Nos. 63, 64). Appointed {p. R108} Justice of the Peace and Solicitor General, 1771. Addresser of Hutchinson and Gage, 1774. Sailed for England, May 1775. Proscribed, 1778. Customs officer and successful barrister in Antigua and elsewhere in the West Indies, 1779–1789. 13 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 478–488.
William Read (1710–1780). Admitted attorney, SCJ, Feb. 1759; barrister, Aug. 1762.
Son of “Father Read,” i.e., John Read (1680–1749), leading Massachusetts lawyer of the first half of the 18th century. Appointed Deputy Judge of the Vice Admiralty Court, 1766. Judge, Suffolk Inferior Court, 1770–1775. Appointed to state Superior Court, 1775, but declined. See 4 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 369–377; Washburn, Judicial History of Mass. 184, 319; 1 Adams Family Correspondence 404.
Nathan Rice (1754–1834). Harvard 1773. Studied law with JA, 1774–1775.
Joined Continental Army, 1775. Served during the war as aide to General Benjamin Lincoln and with Lafayette, attaining the rank of major. Settled in Hingham, which he represented in the House, 1801–1805. He seems never to have practiced law, but was active in town business. Colonel in the Provisional Army, 1799–1800, serving at Oxford, Massachusetts. Apointed Justice of the Peace, 1803; of the Quorum, 1810. Moved to Burlington, Vermont, 1811, where he remained as a leading citizen until his death. See 1 Adams Family Correspondence 142 note; Abby Maria Hemenway, ed., The Vermont Historical Gazetteer, 1:544 (Burlington, 1867).
Jeremiah Dummer Rogers (d. 1784). Harvard 1762. Studied law with Robert Auchmuty, q.v. Admitted attorney, SCJ, Oct. 1769; barrister, Oct. 1772.
Practiced in Middlesex Co. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1766. Addresser of Hutchinson, 1774. Took refuge in Boston, 1775. Sailed for Halifax, 1776, where he was a wine merchant until his death. Proscribed, 1778. Jones, Loyalists of Mass. 246.
Nathaniel Ropes (1726–1774). Harvard 1745. Had no formal legal training.
Represented Salem in the House, 1760–1761. Councilor, 1762–1769, supporting policies of Hutchinson. Appointed Justice of the Peace and of the Quorum, 1761. Judge, Essex Inferior Court, 1761–1772. Essex Co. Judge of Probate, 1766–1772. Justice, Superior Court, 1772–1774. His death was hastened by the agitation over the royal salary grant, which he renounced on his deathbed. 11 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 572–574.
Chambers Russell (1713–1766). Harvard 1731. Had no formal legal training.
{p. R109}
Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1740. Judge, Massachusetts Vice Admiralty Court, 1746–1766. Judge, Middlesex Inferior Court, 1747–1752. Justice, Superior Court, 1752–1766. Jonathan Sewall, q.v., studied in his office. Frequently elected to the House from Concord or Charlestown, 1740–1754. Founder of the town of Lincoln, 1754, and its Representative thereafter. Member of the Council, 1759–1761. Supported the Stamp Act as judge and legislator. Died in England while apparently on a mission concerning the New York—New Jersey boundary dispute. 9 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 81–87.
Nathaniel Peaslee Sargeant (1731–1791). Harvard 1750. Admitted attorney, SCJ, Oct. 1764; barrister, June 1767.
Practiced in Haverhill. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1767. Delegate to Second Provincial Congress, 1775. Represented Haverhill in the House, 1776. Declined appointment to the Superior Court, Oct. 1775, but accepted appointment, Sept. 1776. Delegate to the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1779. Appointed Chief Justice, 1790. 12 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 574–580.
David Sewall (1735–1825). Harvard 1755. Studied law with Judge William Parker, Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Admitted barrister, June 1763.
Married Judge Parker's daughter. Practiced in York Co., beginning 1760. Appointed Register of Probate, 1766; Justice of the Peace, 1767. Politically moderate, but reappointed to these offices, 1775, and served on Council, 1776–1778. Associate Justice, Superior Court and Supreme Judicial Court, 1777–1789. Member, Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, 1779. Judge, United States District Court for the District of Maine, 1789–1818. 13 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 638–645.
Jonathan Sewall (1729–1796). Harvard 1748. Studied law with Chambers Russell, q.v. Admitted attorney, SCJ, Jan. 1757; barrister, Aug. 1762.
Practiced primarily in Middlesex Co. Early correspondent and friend of JA. Gradually increasing political differences led to a dramatic parting at Falmouth (now Portland, Maine) in 1774, but they were reunited warmly, if briefly, in London in 1787. Said to have turned to the Crown side when a petition to clear the bankrupt estate of his uncle, late Chief Justice Stephen Sewall, q.v., was rejected by the General Court after the Otises, qq.v., had promised to secure its passage. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1762. As “Philanthrop,” participated in newspaper controversy with JA over attacks on Governor Bernard, 1766–1767. Appointed Solicitor General, Attorney General, and Advocate General in Admiralty, 1767. “Informer” and counsel for the Crown in Sewall v. Hancock, No. 46, suit for penalties arising out of alleged smuggling in John Hancock's sloop Liberty, 1768–1769. Appointed Judge of the new District Vice Ad• {p. R110} miralty Court to sit at Halifax in 1769. Drew the Boston Massacre indictments (Nos. 63, 64), but withdrew from the prosecution, 1770. Addresser of Hutchinson, 1774, and of Gage, 1775. Took refuge in Boston, 1774. Sailed for London, Aug. 1775. Proscribed, 1778. Sailed to New Brunswick, 1787, where he practiced law, the Halifax Vice Admiralty Court having been abolished. His son Jonathan (1766–1840) was Chief Justice of Lower Canada, 1808–1838. 12 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 306–324; see Stark, Loyalists of Mass. 456.
Stephen Sewall (1702–1760). Harvard 1721.
Nephew of Chief Justice Samuel Sewall (1652–1730). Librarian and tutor at Harvard, 1726–1739. Achieved such renown for knowledge of the law gained through private study that he was appointed a justice of the Superior Court in 1739. Chief Justice, 1752–1760. Councilor, 1752–1760. Uncle of Jonathan Sewall, q.v. 6 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 561–567.
Simeon Strong (1736–1805). Yale 1756. Studied law with John Worthington, q.v. Admitted attorney, SCJ, Sept. 1765. Listed as a barrister, A Pocket Almanack ... 1786. Not on similar lists as either attorney or barrister, 1780–1785, indicating temporary withdrawal from practice.
Practiced in Hampshire Co. Represented Hadley and South Hadley in the House, 1767–1768, 1769–1770. In Massachusetts Senate, 1793. Justice, Supreme Judicial Court, 1800–1805. 2 Dexter, Yale Graduates 437–439.
James Sullivan (1744–1808). Studied law with his brother, John Sullivan, q.v. Admitted attorney, SCJ, June 1770; barrister, Sept. 1772.
Practiced in York Co. until 1778; thereafter in Groton and Boston. King's attorney for York Co. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1774. Served in the Provincial Congress and in the House, periodically, 1775–1784. Justice, Superior Court and Supreme Judicial Court, 1776–1782. Elected to Continental Congress, 1783. Massachusetts Attorney General, 1790. Defeated by Federalist candidate in race for governor, 1797, but elected to the office in 1807 and, narrowly, in 1808. Author of several works on legal and historical topics. DAB .
John Sullivan (1740–1795). Studied law with Samuel Livermore. Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Admitted attorney, SCJ, June 1767.
Brother of James Sullivan, q.v. Practiced in New Hampshire. Delegate to First and Second Continental Congresses. Appointed Brigadier General, 1775, Major General, 1776, fighting in many of the major campaigns of the Revolution until his resignation in 1779 for health reasons. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 1782–1786. Served in state Assembly (Speaker, 1785). Elected “President” (governor) of New Hampshire, 1786, 1787, 1789. Judge, United States District Court, New Hampshire, 1789–1795. DAB .
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Samuel Swift (1715–1775). Harvard 1735. Studied law with Jeremiah Gridley, q.v. Admitted attorney, SCJ, Aug. 1761; barrister, Aug. 1762.
In office of Suffolk Co. Clerk of Courts, ca. 1736–1744; thereafter in practice in Boston. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1741. Not reappointed after accession of George III, 1760. Leading Son of Liberty. Said to have been a manager of the Boston Tea Party. Served on Committee of Correspondence and on a Committee appointed in 1773 to prepare a vindication of Boston. Moderator of the Town Meeting, April 1775. Caught in Boston by the British; died under house arrest, Aug. 1775. 9 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 580–583.
Oxenbridge Thacher (1719–1765). Harvard 1738. Said to have studied law with Jeremiah Gridley, q.v. Admitted attorney, SCJ, Feb. 1752; barrister, Aug. 1762.
Leading lawyer, whig politician, and pamphleteer. Served on numerous Boston committees. Argued with Otis in 1761 against the application of the customs officers for writs of assistance (No. 44). Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1761. Represented Boston in the House, 1763–1765, leading the opposition to the American Act of 1764 with his pamphlet, Sentiments of a British American. 10 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 322–328. See also Bernard Bailyn, Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1:484–488 (Cambridge, Mass., 1965).
John Thaxter (1755–1791). Harvard 1774. Studied law with JA, 1774–1777. Admitted attorney, Suffolk Inferior Court, July 1777; attorney, SCJ, ca. 1784.
First cousin of AA. During his clerkship, tutored JA's sons and became virtually a member of the family. Clerk in the office of the Secretary of the Continental Congress at York and Philadelphia, 1778. JA's private secretary in Europe, 1779–1783. Subsequently settled in Haverhill, where he practiced law. 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 402 note. A small group of his papers is in MHi, and his extensive correspondence with JA and other members of the family is in the Adams Papers.
Elisha Thayer (d. 1774). Harvard 1767. Studied law with JA, 1771–1773. Excused from third year of clerkship by the bar because of ill-health.
Son of JA's old Braintree rival, Capt. Ebenezer Thayer. 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 10.
Edmund Trowbridge (1709–1793). Harvard 1728. Used the name “Goffe” until well into middle life, after his uncle and guardian, Col. Edmund Goffe. Admitted attorney, SCJ, July 1732; barrister, Aug. 1762.
Practiced primarily in Middlesex Co. Considered the most scholarly lawyer and judge of the pre-Revolutionary period. Many of his students {p. R112} went on to great success at the bar. Appointed Justice of the Peace and of the Quorum, 1739. Attorney General, 1749–1767. Represented Cambridge in the House, 1750–1752, 1755, 1763. Member of the Council, 1764–1766, where he supported Crown policies. Justice of Superior Court, 1767–1775, bringing to the bench legal knowledge which many of his fellow judges lacked. Pleadings and opinions in the field of real property reprinted and cited by Massachusetts lawyers into the 19th century. Renounced the royal salary grant, 1774, and thereafter remained a neutral, withdrawing from public life to devote himself to legal research and study. 8 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 507–520; DAB .
John Trumbull (1750–1831). Yale 1767. Studied law with JA, 1773–1774. Admitted to practice in Connecticut, 1773.
Wit and jurist. Cousin of Jonathan Trumbull (1710–1785), who was Revolutionary governor of Connecticut, and John Trumbull (1756–1842), American painter. Began career as a poet while an undergraduate. Studied literature and law in Connecticut, 1767–1773, serving as a Yale tutor, 1772. His first major satirical work, The Progress of Dulness, was written and published at this time. In Aug. 1774 returned to New Haven to practice law, moving to Hartford in 1781. M'Fingal, satirical epic on the Revolution, published 1775–1782, was the basis of his later literary reputation. State's attorney, Hartford Co., 1789. Served in the legislature, 1792, 1800. Judge of the Connecticut Superior Court, 1801–1819, and of the Supreme Court of Errors, 1808–1819. Died at Detroit, Michigan Territory, where he had moved in 1825. DAB .
William Tudor (1750–1819). Harvard 1769. Studied law with JA, 1769–1772. Admitted attorney, Suffolk Inferior Court, July 1772; attorney, SCJ, Aug. 1778; barrister, Feb. 1784.
Son of Deacon John Tudor. Lifelong friend and correspondent of JA. Judge Advocate of the Continental Army, 1775–1778. Practiced law in Boston until 1796, when a substantial inheritance enabled him to retire. Thereafter he devoted his life to travel and civic enterprise. Many of his students became prominent lawyers and judges. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1781. Represented Boston in the House, 1779, 1791–1796; Senator from Suffolk Co., 1801–1803. Massachusetts Secretary of State, 1809–1810. Clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court, 1811–1819. “Memoir of Hon. William Tudor,” 8 MHS, Colls. (2 ser.) 285–325 (1819). His papers are in MHi.
Joshua Upham (1741–1808). Harvard 1763. Admitted attorney, SCJ, Sept. 1768; barrister, Sept. 1772.
Practiced in Worcester Co. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1769. Loyalist in sympathy, but recanted in May 1775. Nevertheless, proscribed in 1778. Appointed Advocate General of the Rhode Island Vice Admiralty Court, 1779, but never served, Newport being evacuated by the {p. R113} British. Served in loyalist forces around New York, 1781–1782. Judge, Supreme Court of New Brunswick, and Councilor, ca. 1785–1808. Jones, Loyalists of Mass. 281–283.
William Wetmore (1749–1830). Harvard 1770. Studied law with William Pynchon, q.v. Admitted attorney, Essex Inferior Court, April 1774; attorney, SCJ, June 1776; barrister, Feb. 1784.
Married Pynchon's daughter. Practiced with Pynchon in Salem until 1785, thereafter in Boston. Addresser of Gage, 1774. Represented Salem in the House, 1777. Succeeded Shearjashub Bourne, q.v., as Chief Justice, Suffolk Inferior Court, 1807, serving in that post and as an associate justice of the successor Middle Circuit Court of Common Pleas until 1821. One of his daughters, Sarah Waldo, married the future United States Supreme Court Justice, Joseph Story, in 1808. James C. Wetmore, The Wetmore Family of America 446–448 (Albany, 1861). See also 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 94. Wetmore's student notes, largely copied from Pynchon's law notes and now in the Adams Papers, are a principal source for the present work.
Samuel White (1710–1769). Harvard 1731. Admitted attorney, SCJ, May 1752; barrister, Aug. 1762.
Practiced in Bristol Co. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1744; of the Quorum, 1756. Appointed Judge, Bristol Inferior Court, 1756. Represented Taunton in the House, 1749–1759; Speaker, 1759. Elected and chosen Speaker again, 1764–1766; member of the Council, 1766–1769. 9 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 110–112.
Abel Willard (1732–1781). Harvard 1752. Studied law with Benjamin Prat, q.v. Admitted attorney, Worcester Inferior Court, Nov. 1755; attorney, SCJ, Sept. 1762.
Practiced in Worcester Co. Appointed Justice of the Peace and of the Quorum, 1769. Addresser of Hutchinson and Gage, 1774. Fled to Boston, 1775, and finally to England, where he died. Proscribed, 1778. 13 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 301–303.
Jonathan Williams (d. 1780). Harvard 1772. Studied law with JA, 1772–1774.
Son of John Williams, Inspector General of the Customs, and cousin of Jonathan Williams (1750–1815), who later became first superintendent of the military academy at West Point. Moved to Worcester, 1774, exchanging houses with James Putnam, q.v. Traveled to Europe for his health, 1779, meeting JA there. 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography 227–228, 356; see 12 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 60–61; (Boston) Continental Journal, 4 May 1780.
Pelham Winslow (1737–1783). Harvard 1753. Studied law with {p. R114} James Otis Jr., q.v. Admitted attorney, SCJ, April 1764; barrister, May 1767.
Practiced in Plymouth Co. Appointed Justice of the Peace, 1771. Took refuge in Boston, 1774. Sailed for Halifax, 1776, then to New York, where he served the Crown as paymaster and commissary. He saw some naval service with a loyalist fleet out of Newport in 1779, but returned to New York, where he died. 13 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 374–377.
John Worthington (1719–1800). Yale 1740. Studied law with Phineas Lyman, Suffield, Massachusetts (now Connecticut). Admitted attorney, SCJ, Sept. 1749; barrister, Aug. 1762.
Practiced in Springfield. King's attorney. Represented Springfield in the House, 1747–1768, 1770–1774. Commissioner, Albany Congress, 1754. Approved of the Stamp Act Congress, 1765, but declined to be a delegate. Member of the Council, 1767–1768, favoring Crown policies. Appointed Mandamus Councilor, 1774, but declined to serve. Reconciled by 1778 and active again in politics and practice. DAB .
David Wyer Jr. (1741–1776). Harvard 1758. Admitted attorney, SCJ, June 1765; barrister, June 1767.
Practiced in Falmouth (now Portland, Maine). Occasionally acted as King's attorney. Died in epidemic following the burning of Falmouth. Others of his family were loyalists. Stark, Loyalists of Mass. 466.