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This foot note contained in document ADMS-05-02-02-0008-0003-0003

6. 1 Domat, *Civil Law*
415:

“It may be gathered from these Remarks, that there are two sorts of Presumptions:
Some of which are drawn by a necessary consequence from a Principle that is certain;
and when these sorts of Presumptions are so strong, that one may gather from them
the certainty of the Fact that is to be proved, without leaving any room for doubt,
we give them the name of Proofs, because they have the same effect, and do establish
the truth of the Fact which was in dispute. The other Presumptions are all those which
form only Conjectures, without certainty; whether it be that they are drawn only from
an uncertain Foundation, or that the consequence which is drawn from a certain Truth
is not very sure.

“It is because of the difference between these two sorts of Presumptions, that the
Laws have appointed some of them to have the force of Proofs, and have not left the
Judges at liberty to consider them only as bare Conjectures, because in effect these
sorts of Presumptions are such, that one sees in them a necessary connexion between
the truth of the Fact that is to be proved, and the certainty of the Facts from whence
it follows.”