5. This passage indicates clearly enough that when
JA left Paris, as he did with his two sons on 27 July on a journey to Brussels, The
Hague, and Amsterdam, he did not intend to be gone long. But as things turned out
he did not come back to Paris until the following July. The motives for his trip and
its prolongation to almost a year's stay in the Netherlands require explanation.
Soon after his arrival in France with powers to negotiate treaties of peace and commerce
with Great Britain,
JA discerned from Vergennes' aloofness that neither negotiation was likely to be put
{ 391 } in train for some time. On
16 March he wrote to James Lovell in Congress:
“I wish to know your private Opinion whether Congress will continue Mr. Dana and me
here, at so much Expense, with so little Prospect of any Thing to do, for a long time,
. . . or whether they will revoke our Powers and recall Us? or what they will do with
Us. A Situation so idle and inactive, is not agreable to my Genius, yet I can submit
to it, as well as any Man, if it is thought necessary for the public Good.—I will
do all the Service I can, by transcribing Intelligence and in every other Way” (
LbC,
Adams Papers).
In the role of intelligence gatherer and transmitter
JA was phenomenally industrious during the next several months, and he combined with
it another function, that of publicist and propagandist for the American cause, composing
and sending a steady stream of communications for publication in French, Dutch, and
(through a secret but efficient channel) British newspapers. The full story of his
activities as a propagandist in 1780, before going to the Netherlands where his work
of this kind is better documented, remains to be written from scattered hints in his
correspondence and from the files of the newspapers themselves, few if any of which
exist in adequate files in the United States.
He also furnished items of news from America to the French government. One such, which
reported Congress' measures to support its currency by buying up old emissions at
the rate of 40 to 1, led to questions from Vergennes; see above, Lovell to
AA,
21 March, and Cranch to
JA,
26 April, with notes and references under both; also
CFA's account in
JA, Works, 1:314 ff. A spirited correspondence ensued that led to a complete break in personal
relations between the two men. “
[J]e pense,” Vergennes wrote sharply on
30 June, “que toute discution ultérieure entre nous a cet égard serois superflüe” (
Adams Papers; translation of full text in
JA, Works, 7:212–213). Vergennes either forgot, or perhaps (as Professor Morris acutely observes)
was only too well aware, that he himself had started this quarrel. His questions about
American financial policy should have been directed to Franklin, the American plenipotentiary
to France, rather than to
JA. “Even a captious mood on the part of Vergennes came as the result of careful calculation”
(
Morris, Peacemakers, p. 196).
In July
JA took up other subjects in a manner that proved at least equally exasperating to the
French foreign minister, who at this moment was facing difficulties both in his own
government and with his uncooperative ally, Spain. The last thing he wished for was
pertinacious advice and questions from the American peace minister, who had little
to do in Paris except to write letters and newspaper pieces; but this is precisely
what he got. One series, beginning
13 July, related to the grand strategy of the war, in which
JA argued in detail and with cogency that a greater concentration of French naval power
on the North American coast could easily pen up the British armies in the port cities
they occupied and bring the war to a conclusion—if indeed, he had the temerity to
hint, France really desired such a conclusion. Vergennes replied on
20 July that this was the very reason the Chevalier de Ternay's fleet had been dispatched
to Rhode Island (where it arrived at just this time).
JA, however, was by no means ready to drop the subject. In a letter of
27 July he disputed some of Vergennes' language concerning French-American relations and
observed that Ternay's force was not large enough to gain the vital supremacy he had
been arguing for (as was shortly proved by Ternay's being bottled up by Admiral Graves'
larger fleet). Two days later Vergennes returned a short and crushing
rejoinder, informing
JA “que le Roi n'a pas eu besoin de vos Sollicitations pour s'occuper des intérêts des
Etats-unis.” See
JA to Vergennes,
13 July (Archives Aff. Etr., Paris, Corr. pol., Etats-Unis, vol. 13; printed in
JA, Works, 7:218–227, from
LbC,
Adams Papers, and in
Wharton, ed., Dipl. Corr. Amer. Rev., 3:848–855, from
PCC, No. 84, II). Vergennes to
JA,
20 July (
Adams Papers; translation printed in
JA, Works, 7:232–233; another translation printed in
Wharton, 3:870–871, from
PCC, No. 84, II).
JA to Vergennes,
27 July (Archives Aff. Etr., as above,
{ 392 } printed in
JA, Works, 7:241–243, from
LbC,
Adams Papers, and in
Wharton, 4:12–14, from
PCC, No. 84, II). Vergennes to
JA,
29 July (
Adams Papers; translation printed in
JA, Works, 7:243; another translation printed in
Wharton, 4:16–17, from
PCC, No. 84, II). It is of some significance that the actual recipient's copies of these
and of the other letters from
JA to Vergennes cited below in this note are those now filed in the Papers of the Continental
Congress, they having been sent by Vergennes to Franklin, and by Franklin at Vergennes'
request forwarded to Congress (
Wharton, 4:18–19, 22). Only copies and translations remain in the French Archives of Foreign
Affairs.
In the midst of these stinging exchanges
JA chose to raise again the question of announcing his missions to the British government,
a subject on which Vergennes had imposed a ban almost from the moment
JA had reappeared in Paris early in 1780. On
17 JulyJA proposed “a frank and decent Communication of my full Powers” as a means of stirring
up British popular sentiment in favor of peace and of offsetting the rumored secret
peace negotiations between England and Spain. Vergennes' answer of the
25th is a massive document in twenty
MS pages which was intended to refute every one of his correspondent's arguments and,
whether it did or not in
JA's mind, forbade any notice to the British government until Congress had seen the
exchange between
JA and Vergennes and furnished fresh instructions. In the life of his grandfather,
CFA correctly characterized Vergennes' letter as “rough and dictatorial. . . . The
tone is that of a master” (
JA, Works, 1:327).
JA, who had begun to suspect a certain insincerity if not duplicity on the part of the
hard-pressed foreign minister, replied temperately on the
26th and departed on the following day for the Low Countries. For his part, Vergennes
on the last day of July transmitted to Franklin the entire correspondence that had
passed between him and
JA during June and July. The covering letter emphasized Vergennes' confidence in Franklin's
principles and sentiments, but as for
JA,
“Vous trouverés, je pense, dans les lettres de ce plénipotentiare, des opinions et
une tournure qui ne répondent ni à la maniere avec laquelle je me suis expliqué avec
lui, ni avec la liaison intime qui subsiste entre le Roi et les Etats unis. . . .
[J]e desire que vous les fassiés passer au congrès afin qu'il sache la conduite que Mr.
Adams tient à notre égard, et qu'il puisse juger s'il est doué autant que le congrès
le desire sans doute, de 1'esprit de conciliation qui convient à besogne aussi importante
et aussi délicate que celle qui lui est confiée (
PCC, No. 84, II, printed in translation in Wharton, 4:18–19).
See
JA to Vergennes,
17 July (Archives Aff. Etr., as above; printed in
JA, Works, 7:228–230, from
LbC,
Adams Papers, and in Wharton, 3:861–863, from
PCC, No. 84, II). Vergennes to
JA,
25 July (
Adams Papers; printed in translation in
JA, Works, 7:235–240; another translation in
Wharton, 3:882–883, and 4:3–6, from
PCC, No. 84, II).
JA to Vergennes,
26 July (Archives Aff. Etr., as above; printed in
JA, Works, 1:322–327, from
LbC,
Adams Papers, and in
Wharton, 4:7–11, from
PCC, No. 84, II). The degree of Vergennes' success in endeavoring to obtain
JA's recall or at least a reduction of his powers will appear subsequently. Among many
comments
JA later made on this incident, perhaps the most incisive is in a letter of 18 Aug.
1809 (
Corr. in the Boston Patriot, p. 284–286).
As for the trip to the Netherlands, it was a “fishing expedition,” of the very kind
that both Vergennes and Franklin heartily disliked but could scarcely forbid. “I have
never yet chang'd the Opinion I gave in Congress,” Franklin told Arthur Lee in 1777,
“that a Virgin State should preserve the Virgin Character, and not go about suitoring
for Alliances, but wait with decent Dignity for the Applications of others” (21 March
1777,
Franklin, Writings, ed. Smyth, 7:35). The Lees did not subscribe to this view, nor did
JA. Hints of the possibility of Dutch support for America, or at least of marked antipathy
to Great Britain as arbitrary mistress of the seas, had reached the Continental Congress,
and
JA as a member, from various quarters for several years. (An example will be found
{ 393 } in
JA's letter to
AA,
3 April 1777, summarizing a letter written to Congress by William Carmichael from Amsterdam, 2
Nov. 1776; see above, vol.
2:198–199, and
references there.) Whether these were well or ill authenticated, it was natural and easy for
Americans to give them credence, for the Dutch Republic (in official language the
United Provinces of the Low Countries) was a confederation of states that had won
its freedom from a distant imperial power and was governed, at least in part, by a
representative body, the States General. In July 1777 Congress instructed its Committee
of Foreign Affairs to prepare a commission for an American representative to the United
Provinces, and this was done, but the whole matter was then laid on the table (
JCC, 8:523, 527, 531). The reason for postponing action was the very correct one that
the sentiments of their High Mightinesses the States General ought to be known first,
since “possibly their connections with England, might make the receiving an American
Minister, as yet inconvenient, and . . . a little embarrrassing” (American Commissioners
at Paris to C. W. F. Dumas,
10 April 1778,
JA, Diary and Autobiography,
4:44–45). Meanwhile
JA began reading Dutch history, particularly commending to
AA and the ten-year-old
JQA Cardinal Bentivoglio's
History of the Warrs in Flanders, in which they were to note the remarkable parallels between the Dutch and American
revolutions (
JA to
AA,
21 July, and to
JQA,
27 July 1777, above, vol. 2:286–287, 289–292). The first official but very tentative American
overtures to the Dutch were made in the spring of 1778, via C. W. F. Dumas, and
JA happily reported that “In Holland there is more Friendship for Us, than I was aware
before I came to France” (to Samuel Adams,
21 May 1778,
JA, Diary and Autobiography,
4:107). But nothing meaningful had resulted by early 1779, when
JA learned that he was to be relieved of his duties as a commissioner. That he yearned
to go to the Netherlands at this time is clear from his conversation with Marbois
on his return voyage to Boston. “My own Inclinations would have led me to Holland:
But I thought my Honour concerned to return directly home” (same,
2:390). In the very long letter—his diplomatic testament—that he wrote to Secretary Jay
immediately after reaching Braintree,
JA commented thoughtfully on a possible entente between the two republics. He supposed
this would be favored by the “Similitude of Manners, of Religion and in some Respects
of Constitution,” by “the Analogy, between the Means, by which the two Republicks
arrived at Independancy,” and, most of all, by “the Attractions of commercial Interests”
between the United Provinces and the United States. But these affinities,
JA felt in the summer of 1779, were unlikely to show themselves “in a public Manner
before a Peace, or a near Prospect of Peace. Too many Motives of Fear or Interest
place the Hollanders in a Dependance on England, to suffer her to connect herself
openly, with Us, at present.” Even so, on the basis of the inquiries the American
Commissioners in Paris had made and the information they had received,
JA felt that the prospects of obtaining loans and promoting trade between the two countries
were good enough to warrant Congress' sending a minister to The Hague. The minister
should be given “a discretionary Power, to produce his Commission, or not, as he shall
find it likely to succeed”; he should have full powers and clear instructions for
borrowing money; “and the Man himself, above all, should have consummate Prudence”
and “a Caution and Discretion that will be Proof against any Tryal” (
4 Aug. 1779, full text printed in
Wharton, ed., Dipl. Corr. Amer. Rev., 3: 278–286, from
PCC, No. 84, I, and in
JA, Works, 7:99–110, from
LbC,
Adams Papers).
It is perhaps not surprising that, having prescribed these exacting qualifications,
JA should have thought of himself as eligible for the post in question. At any rate,
having accepted his altogether unexpected and unsolicited mission as peace minister
in Europe, he intimated to a close friend in Congress that a commission to the Netherlands
might be attached to it without added pay (to Elbridge Gerry, “Secret as the Grave,”
18–19 Oct. 1779,
LbC,
Adams Papers). The idea had already occurred to his friends there, and he was in fact
{ 394 } nominated on 18 Oct. as agent to seek a loan, but Congress thought best “to make a
distinct Appointment” and on 21 Oct. chose Henry Laurens, who shortly afterward was
given further powers to negotiate a treaty of amity and commerce with the States General
(Lovell to
JA,
19 Oct. 1779,
Adams Papers;
JCC, 15:1186, 1198, 1230).
For one reason or another, Laurens did not sail for Europe during the winter and spring
of 1779–1780, and the surrender of Charleston (in which his son Col. John Laurens
was made prisoner) delayed his departure still longer. Ultimately, as we shall see,
Laurens never served in the Netherlands. Evidence meanwhile accumulated in both Paris
and Philadelphia showing that relations between the Dutch and British governments
were deteriorating—a theme recurrent in
JA's voluminous dispatches to Congress throughout the spring of 1780. Reporting on Sir
Joseph Yorke's latest memorial to the States General, invoking ancient Dutch treaty
obligations to England,
JA said, “
[I]t looks as if England would force the Dutch into the War: but if they take a Part
it will be certainly for Us.—Oh that Laurens was there.—Oh that Laurens was there!”
(to Lovell,
29 March,
LbC,
Adams Papers; see also
JA to Huntington,
3 April,
PCC, No. 84, I, printed in
Wharton, ed., Dipl. Corr. Amer. Rev., 3:588–592,
||(also printed in Papers of John Adams)||and a long series of long dispatches that followed on the subject of Anglo-Dutch relations
and the Armed Neutrality that Russia had initiated among the northern European powers
to curb British naval power). By mid-June Congress felt it must take some step, and
on the 20th it empowered
JA (or, alternatively, Francis Dana) to act in Laurens' place, until Laurens himself
arrived, with respect to obtaining a Dutch loan (
JCC, 17:534–537). Such a commission was precisely what
JA would have liked to have at just this time, but he had made his own plans to reconnoiter
Amsterdam and The Hague long before it reached him. (It was not sent until
11 July, in a letter from the Committee of Foreign Affairs,
Adams Papers). At the beginning of July he waited on Vergennes and told him “that I had an intention
of making a Journey to Amsterdam for a few weeks, as I flattered myself I might form
some Acquaintances or Correspondence there and collect some Intelligence that might
be useful
[to] the United States.” Vergennes asked him to wait for further news from the diplomatic
front but on the 16th informed him that since the current Anglo-Spanish negotiations
would be delayed until further instructions could be sent for from Madrid and received
back from London, which would take perhaps two months, there was time enough for
JA to pay his visit to the Netherlands (
JA to Huntington,
23 July, printed in
Wharton, 3:877–878, from
PCC, No. 84, I; also in
JA, Works, 7:233–235, from
LbC,
Adams Papers). Hence the entry of
27 July in
JA's diary: “Setting off on a Journey, with my two Sons to Amsterdam.—Lodged at Compiegne.
Fryday night lodged at Valenciennes. Saturday arrived at Brussells.—This Road is through
the finest Country, I have ever seen”—and the diarist went on to describe the topography
and crops with enthusiasm (
Diary and Autobiography, 2:442). This brief interval in the beautiful and fertile French countryside was
deeply refreshing to him after his labors and frustrations in Paris.
On 3 Aug. Franklin acknowledged Vergennes' letter of 31 July, quoted above, which
enclosed the entire correspondence Vergennes had had with
JA during June and July. Without particularizing, Franklin characterized
JA's “Sentiments therein expressed” as proceeding from his “Indiscretion alone, and
not from any Instructions received by him” from America; nor was it possible that
his conduct would be “approved” by Congress. “I am glad,” he went on, “he has not
admitted me to any Participation of those Writings” (
Franklin, Writings, ed. Smyth, 8:123–124)—a statement only partly true since at
JA's request Franklin had himself written Vergennes in June about the issue of Congress'
fiscal policy, and at the end of that month had received copies from
JA of all the correspondence that dealt with it (
JA to Franklin, 23 June, printed in
JA, Works, 7:193, from
LbC [dated
22 June],
Adams Papers; the original was enclosed in Franklin to Vergennes, 24 June, which, with its en•
{ 395 } closure, is in Archives Aff. Etr., Paris, Corr. pol., Etats-Unis, vol. 12;
JA to Franklin,
29 June, printed in
JA, Works, 7:211–212, from
LbC,
Adams Papers;
RC in
PPAmP:Franklin Papers, with postscript: “I have added Copies of the whole Correspondence”).
Dutifully but not very happily, Franklin on 9 Aug. forwarded to Congress the papers
Vergennes had sent him, and gave his view of
JA's conduct in Paris and his motives in traveling to the Netherlands:
“Mr. Adams has given Offence to the Court here, by some Sentiments and Expressions
contained in several of his Letters written to the Count de Vergennes. . . . Mr. Adams
did not show me his Letters before he sent them. I have . . . mentioned some of the
Inconveniencies, that attend the having more than one Minister at the same Court;
one of which Inconveniencies is, that they do not always hold the same Language, and
that the Impressions made by one, and intended for the Service of his Constituents,
may be effaced by the Discourse of the other. It is true, that Mr. Adams's proper
Business is elsewhere; but, the Time not being come for that Business, and having
nothing else wherewith to employ himself, he seems to have endeavoured to supply what
he may suppose my Negociations defective in. He thinks, as he tells me himself, that
America has been too free in Expressions of Gratitude to France; for that she is more
oblig'd to us than we to her; and that we should show Spirit in our Applications.
I apprehend, that he mistakes his Ground, and that this Court is to be treated with
Decency and Delicacy. . . . Mr. Adams, on the other hand, who at the same time means
our Welfare and Interest as much as I, or any man, can do, seems to think a little
apparent Stoutness, and greater air of Independence and Boldness in our Demands, will
procure us more ample Assistance. . . .
“He is gone to Holland to try, as he told me, whether something might not be done
to render us less dependent on France.” (
Franklin, Writings, ed. Smyth, 8:126–128.)
To
JA, on the next occasion he communicated with him, Franklin allowed himself, in touching
on this last topic, only the observation that “Our Credit and Weight in Europe depend
more on what we do than on what we say; And I have long been humiliated with the Idea
of our running about from Court to Court begging for Money and Friendship, which are
the more withheld the more eagerly they are sollicited, and would perhaps have been
offer'd if they had not been asked” (
2 Oct.,
Adams Papers;
Franklin, Writings, ed. Smyth, 8:146). Judged by ultimate results, Franklin's view proved correct in regard to
American relations with all the European powers, major and minor, except France, where,
at the outset, Franklin himself had participated in the “militia diplomacy” he now
so deprecated, and the Netherlands, where
JA in due time proved Franklin's view wrong and his own irregular tactics overwhelmingly
right.