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Browsing: Legal Papers of John Adams, Volume 2

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0005-0001-0005

Author: Adams, John
Author: Otis, James JR.
Date: 1768

Interrogatories for Gage1

Court of Vice Admiralty, Boston, 1768
Interrogatories In the Behalf of Lot Gage and Partners In the Case of Joseph Doane and others against him and Partners.
1st. Was you on a Whaling Voyage In the Streights of Bellisle on or about the 21st. of June 1765.
2. What Boat was you in and what Vessel did you belong to.
3. Do you remember that on or about that time there was a Whale Killed by Lot Gage and others the Property of which whale has Since been disputed by Joseph Doane and others.
4. Did you see Lot Gage Faste to said Whale.
5. Was there any other Boat fast to her when Lot Gage Struck her.
6. How Near was you to Said Whale when Gage Struck her.
7. Did you Sit down or stand up tell all you Know about it.
8. Did you see Asa Nickerson that day.
9. Did you See him or his harpooner Dart at said Whale.
10. Did he fasten to her or Not.
11. Did you See him hawling in his Iron and Warp before Gage Struck the Whale he fastned too. Tell all you Know about it.
12. Did you at that time Know Silas and Robert Newcomb.
13. Did you see them at the time Gage was fast to the Whale or before.
14. What was the Newcombs Conduct on that Voyage according to your observation.
15. Did you observe that when you fell in Chase of Whales with the Newcombs they were more Noisey then [than] Common.
16. Did that Boat the Newcombs was in go by the Name of the Crasey Newcombs that Voyage.
17. Did you hear that Silas Newcombs was Crasey since he got home from that Voyage at any time.
18. Did you hear Josiah Godfrey your Stearsman say (at the time Mentioned In your Deposition) any thing on Board your Vessel about this Whale and what he Said.
19. Was Josiah Godfrey your Stearsman present at the Conversation aboard your Vessel as mentioned in your Deposition. Tell what you Know about it.
20. Was Robert Homer a Whaling with you in the Year 1765 at the Streights of Bellisle about the 21st of June.
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21. Had you any Conversation with him about the Whale In Controversy and what was it.
22. What was the Capacity that he went in.
23. Was he Not Looked on as a very Raw hand by your Crew and one that had Little or No knowledge about Whaling.
24. Did he Ever Mention to you or the Crew you belonged to any Conversation that he had with John Whelden or his Crew about this Whale.
25. Did you hear any man on Board the Vessel that John Whelden was in say the Whale In Controversey between Joseph Doane and others and Lot Gage and others belonged to the Doanes.
26. Did you hear any Man say so on Board the Vessel you Belonged to.
27. What was the general opinion while you was on the Voyage of the people a Board your Vessel and John Weldens vessel who said Whale belonged to whether to Gage or to whom.
28. Was you a Whaling with Seth Baker in the Year 1765 at the Streights of Bellisle on or about the 21st of June that Year.
29. What did you hear him say when he Come on Board the Vessel you was in about the Whale In Controversy that Same day said Whale was Kill'd or Soon after. Tell what you Know about it.
30. Did you go in an End of a Boat and which End.
31. What was the General Talk of the People at the Streights of Bellisle about the Whale in Controversy that is who she Belonged to tell all you Know about it.
32. Did you hear Samuel Howes talking with John Whelden about the Whale In Controversy very soon after the Whale was Killed Relate The talk Whelden had about her at that time.
33. Had you ever any Conversation with Silas Newcomb about the Whale in Controversy, tell all you heard him Say about it and when and where it was.
34. Had you Ever any Conversation with Captn. Joseph Doane about the Whale In Controversy. Tell all you remember of it.
35. Are you Acquainted or do you Know Asa Nickerson.
36. Had you Ever any Conversation with him about the Whale In Controversy Between Captn. Joseph Doane and others and Captn. Lot Gage and others. Relate the Conversation and tell what you Remember of it.
37. Did you hear any person in Asa Nickerson Boate at the Time Lot Gage was fast to the Whale now in Controversy say that they the said Nickersons boate was not fast to said Whale and that they had { 97 } Better go on Board their Vessel and Get some Victuals and not Contend about her or words to that Effect. Tell all you know about it.
38. Can you tell how Near Seth Bakers Boate that you was in was to the Whale In Controversy when Lot Gage struck her.
39. Was you at one Oar with your Back Toward the Whale.
40. Was not Robert Homer In the same Boat at the same Time.
41. Did he stand up to Look at the Whale and Boats that you Observed.
42. Do you Know of any Boats Besides Gages that was Nearer to the Whale when he struck then your Boat.
43. Was you Near Enough to Gages Boat or the Whale to Know one man from another.
44. How long after you Perceivd the Whale to be fast before you Quitted the Chace.
45. Did you Ever hear it said on Board your Vessel that the Whale In Controversy Belonged to the Doanes.
46. Did you Ever tell any Body so.
47. Did you hear any of the Crew on Board your Vessel say so.
48. Was it not the General Voice of your Vessels Crew that she Belonged to Gage.
49. Did you Ever Suggest to Robert Homer or say any thing like it that you should or Could be an Evidence in Doans favour.
50. Did you Ever Say to Robt. Homer or in his hearing that said Whale Belonged to the Doanes.
51. Was you in the Boat with John Chase at the Streights of Bellisle on or about the 21st. of June 1765.
52. Did you see any thing of the Transactions of Asa Nickerson or Lot Gage at that time. Relate all you know about them.
53. Do you Know Seth Baker.
54. What is his Charecter as to Probity and Truth.
55. Do you Know John Cash.
56. What is his Charecter as to Probity and Truth.
57. Have you heard of any Contention or Quarrel Between Robert Homer and John Whelden or Family, tell all you Know about it.
1. In an unidentified hand, without date, SF 172906. Endorsed: “Interrogatorys on the Deft's side.” See answers of Samuel Howland to some similar interrogatories, note 3359 above.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0001

Editorial Note

The majority of John Adams' cases in the Court of Vice Admiralty involved breaches of the British Acts of Trade. The Acts were a coherent body of legislation, enacted between 1660 and the Revolution, which regulated the flow of colonial trade, laid duties on some aspects of it, and established a system of enforcement. The basic regulatory provisions were: that vessels engaged in the plantation trade had to be English- or colonial-built, owned, or manned; that certain enumerated goods produced in the colonies could be shipped only to England or to another colony; and that most European goods could be shipped to the colonies only from English ports.1
This system was designed primarily to aid the English merchant and shipbuilder by creating monopolies in the colonial trade, but it did benefit colonial shipbuilders, and at least some colonial merchants, by assuring them of markets. The system also was an indirect producer of revenue for the Crown, since goods flowing through English ports were subject to duties to be paid there by the importer or exporter. The only duties levied in the colonies before 1764 had their primary effect as measures to support or encourage trade with England, rather than as direct revenue-producers. Thus, although the Plantation Duties Act of 1673, laying duties upon enumerated goods shipped from one colony to another, had the effect of equalizing the tax burden between English and colonial consumers of colonial goods, its principal aim was to make shipment of these goods to England more economical for the exporter than intercolonial shipment. Similarly, the heavy duties laid upon the importation of foreign colonial sugar products by the Sugar Act of 1733 were designed to put British West Indian sugar producers in a favorable position.2
Enforcement of these measures was in the hands of customs officials in the colonies who were responsible to the Commissioners of the Customs in England.3 The colonial officers administered a complicated documentary control system designed to insure compliance with both regulatory and { 99 } revenue provisions. The basis of the system was the requirement that vessels arriving from or bound for parts beyond the seas enter and clear with the customs officers at each port.4 This practice permitted a constant check on each vessel's compliance with the Acts, as evidenced by certain required documents. For example, the nationality of vessels and crews was controlled through the ship's register, a certified copy of the master's or owner's oath that the vessel was English built, owned, and manned.5 A vessel carrying enumerated goods had to give bond on clearing that they would be landed only in an English or colonial port; if a certificate of compliance were not returned within a certain time, the bond was forfeit.6 To ensure that European goods had been shipped in England, the master was required to submit a manifest, showing the nature, amount, and origin of his cargo before his vessel could enter and unload. The payment of duties was also controlled through the manifest and through certificates of the officers on entry and clearance that duties had been paid.7
To prevent violations, the customs officers had broad powers to search vessels, as well as premises ashore, for contraband, and to seize such goods.8 Violators were subject to a variety of penalties, ranging from small fines for failure to comply with administrative rules to forfeiture of vessel and goods for breach of the substantive requirements of the Acts. Although in England such offenses were within the jurisdiction of the Court of Exchequer, in the colonies many of them could be sued upon in the Courts of Vice Admiralty, which had been established in 1697 primarily for this purpose. The customs officers were allowed to bring suit for penalties and forfeitures, receiving a share of the proceeds upon condemnation. Jurisdiction of these actions was concurrent at common law, but in Massachusetts at least, the officers preferred to proceed in Admiralty, where recovery was not subject to the whim of a jury friendly to the offender.9
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There was some opposition to this system at its inception, but after about 1725 the furor generally died down. Historians have seen this reaction as an indication that the colonists had come to accept the benefits which they received in trade with England as compensation for some of the disadvantages which regulation imposed. This was undoubtedly a factor, but it is clear that colonial acceptance was made easier by the fact that after 1725 English policy seemed to be one of deliberately ignoring violations of the system. Revenue collections from the colonies were small, in part because of the regulatory purpose of the revenue measures, but to an even greater extent because of a widespread laxity of enforcement that was known to and condoned by Parliament. Presumably a similar laxity pervaded the enforcement of other provisions of the Acts.10
Adams came upon the scene just as this policy of laxness was being abandoned. New England's trade with the enemy during the Seven Years' War had reached such heights that the Crown made determined efforts to control it through strict enforcement of the Acts of Trade. There was an immediate reaction among the Boston merchants against the Admiralty court and the customs officials, which manifested itself in several ways, including opposition to the officers' application for writs of assistance (general search warrants). Adams attended the first of two arguments on the question, held before the Superior Court at Boston in February 1761. Although he was not of counsel, he produced a report which was widely circulated and of some importance in later political struggles. Boston's resistance to the application, although unsuccessful, marked the first step in an opposition to the Acts which was to culminate in the American Revolution.11
At the conclusion of the war in 1763 England was both financially strained and sharply aware of the extent of colonial evasion of the Acts of Trade. The American Act of 1764 was directed at both problems. For the first time duties were levied on colonial imports for the express purpose of raising a revenue. To prevent violation of this and other Acts, various holes in the enforcement system were plugged with requirements for ad• { [facing 100] } { [facing 101] } { 101 } ditional bonds and certificates and a closer check by the customs officers. Heavy pecuniary penalties against offenders were set in addition to the previous system of forfeitures, and it was made clear that all violations of the Acts could be sued upon in colonial Admiralty courts. In these suits the prosecuting officers were given certain procedural advantages. Finally a new superior court of Admiralty was created to hear cases from any province.12
Before the effect of these new measures could be felt, Parliament passed the Stamp Act of 1765, a provision for further revenue to be levied by a tax upon a variety of documents and printed matter. Colonial objections to the American Act were submerged in a sudden rush to defy the Stamp Act. In Boston, violence and the threat of violence prevented the distribution of the stamps. One result was that the courts, which required stamped paper for their documents, were closed. Adams appeared before the Governor and Council in December 1765 for the Town of Boston to pray that the courts be opened without stamps. Although his arguments took account of the political nature of the body which he was addressing, his notes show that he backed up rhetoric with authority, relying upon the kind of argument that had earlier been made against writs of assistance. The petition was denied on the ground that the question was a judicial one, but the Inferior Court soon opened in acquiescence to popular pressures. The Superior Court was formally opened, but did only token business until news of the Stamp Act's repeal was received in May 1766.13
Along with repeal, most of the duties of 1764 were reduced to acceptable levels.14 The enforcement provisions were not repealed, however. Calm temporarily prevailed until a change of governments in England brought Charles Townshend, long a proponent of colonial taxation, to the post of Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Townshend Acts of 1767 again laid duties upon American imports, to be used in part to pay colonial officials independently of the legislatures. The Acts renewed the drive for strict enforcement by authorizing the appointment of an American Board of Customs Commissioners to sit at Boston and exercise the powers formerly { 102 } held by the English Commissioners.15 At the same time the superior court created in 1764 was superseded by four new district courts of Admiralty, to sit at Halifax, Boston, Philadelphia, and Charleston, and exercise both original and appellate jurisdiction over surrounding provinces.16
Adams does not seem to have tried a revenue case in the Court of Admiralty before 1768. In that year, however, the activities of the Commissioners inevitably drew him into such matters. Their immediate application of the new enforcement policy increased the number of actions in Admiralty to the point where there was need for additional lawyers. Further, the Commissioners' policy aroused an immediate opposition among the merchants who seemed determined to spare no effort in resistance. Accordingly, Adams' first such case, Folger v. The Cornelia, No. 45, which was a direct confrontation between the Commissioners and those who had found the previous administration more agreeable, marked the beginning of a busy year and a half in the Court of Admiralty.17
The seizure of John Hancock's sloop Liberty in June 1768 provided the focus for the attack upon the Commissioners. Adams was deeply involved in this affair, both as counsel for Hancock in an action brought against him for penalties, and as a draftsman of political manifestos for the Town of Boston.18 At the same time there was a steady stream of less important revenue litigation in which Adams participated, perhaps because he was in court on Hancock's business.19 Although Adams was politically committed to opposition to the Acts of Trade, he was of counsel for Crown officers in two cases in the spring and summer of 1769.20 As a lawyer, he had a right, if not a duty, to give his services to those who sought them. In view of the political situation, however, it is likely that he was under heavy pressure from the Crown to yield a more permanent allegiance. In his Autobiography, Adams wrote that sometime { 103 } during 1768 Jonathan Sewall had asked him to take over his position as advocate general in Admiralty. Adams reported that he had had no trouble in refusing this offer, since he wished to be under no obligation to those whose political principles he opposed. There is other evidence that some such episode took place. Perhaps Adams' legal activities for the Crown indicate that he gave Sewall's proposal more serious consideration than he was later willing to admit.21
The uproar over the Liberty led the Crown to send troops to Boston. The presence of soldiers and continued tension over the Commissioners' activities led at length to the Boston Massacre in March 1770 (Nos. 63, 64). In the aftermath of this episode the troops were withdrawn, and the Commissioners, who were accused of instigating both the Massacre and the earlier shooting of a small boy by their employee Ebenezer Richardson (No. 59), greatly moderated their tactics. The Boston merchants, feeling a revulsion against civil disobedience, in the fall abandoned the policy of nonimportation with which they had reacted to the Townshend Acts. Parliament had contributed to the atmosphere of conciliation in March by repealing all of the Townshend duties except the tax on tea.
So far as is known, Adams had no Admiralty cases for nearly three years after the summer of 1769. Although he may have withdrawn from practice in the court in disgust at the political ramifications, there are other possible explanations. In 1769 his business in the common-law courts drastically increased to the level where it was to remain until the Revolution. At the same time the atmosphere of conciliation following the Massacre had greatly reduced the number of customs cases and diminished the political tension which had surrounded such matters. A balance of interests in favor of the economics of the profession probably accounts for Adams' abandonment of the Admiralty.22
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Whatever the reason, he does not seem to have appeared there again until February 1772, when he was retained in the first appeal brought before the Boston District Court of Admiralty since its creation in 1768. Robert Auchmuty, previously judge for the Province, had been appointed to the new court, but he had apparently continued to sit in his former capacity also, thus rendering appeals of doubtful value in Massachusetts. The decision in this case had been given by Auchmuty's deputy in New Hampshire, however. In his diary Adams noted that “as it is a new Thing the Judge has directed an Argument, and a Search of Books concerning the Nature of Appeals by the civil Law. I found Time to look into Calvins Lexicon Title Appellatio and Provocatio, and into Maranta, who has treated largely of Appeals. Borrowed Ayliff, but there is no Table and could find nothing about the Subject. Domat I could not find.” The appeal and another from the condemnation of a vessel belonging to John Langdon of New Hampshire, were decided in favor of the Crown, presumably in spite of the efforts of Adams, who was probably on the side of the claimants.23
Adams did undertake at least two revenue cases in 1772 and 1773. Although the burning of the revenue cutter Gaspee in Rhode Island and the special tribunal appointed to investigate the incident had awakened political responses in him and in many others, his later cases had no particular political relevance, except as further evidence to the colonists of the oppressiveness of the system.24 The tax on tea, left unrepealed in 1770, finally led to the events which terminated whatever uneasy truce remained and took political dispute beyond the confines of the courtroom. In 1773 Parliament had saved the East India Company from collapse by an Act allowing it a full drawback of English duties on tea shipped to the colonies, and permitting it to ship directly to colonial consignees, instead of dealing through English tea merchants. With these advantages, the Company could now compete with the smugglers who had been evading the duty regularly since 1770. An increase in the sales of legally imported tea meant an increase in duties. More revenues meant more funds to be applied under the Townshend Acts to pay the salaries of royal officials. This threat aroused Boston, and other colonial ports, to action.25
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The first of the tea ships, the Dartmouth, arrived in Boston harbor on 28 November, and, apparently at the request of the Committee of Correspondence, came up to the town on the 30th, taking a berth at Griffin's Wharf the next day. There she was soon joined by other vessels. The ships had apparently entered at the Custom House soon after arrival, but none of the tea was unloaded. The “Body,” the ad hoc mass meeting which purported to speak for Boston, demanded that the ships be sent home with cargo still intact, but the owners were unable to comply. The customs officers refused to issue clearances until the tea had been unloaded, and Governor Hutchinson would not allow the province naval officer to give the vessels a pass to leave the port without a clearance.
In this state of things the owners of the Dartmouth sought counsel from Adams and Sampson Salter Blowers. The owners probably wanted both arguments to use before the customs officials and Hutchinson, and advice on the potential liability of the Dartmouth and her cargo for seizure. The account of the vessel's master shows that Adams and Blowers were paid a total of £7 4s. for “advice,” but no indication of its nature has survived.26 Under the applicable statutes duties were due upon “importation” and goods could be seized if duties remained unpaid twenty days after entry. The principal questions were probably whether there had been an “importation” within the Act when bulk had not been broken, and if there had, whether the customs officers could nevertheless clear out vessel and cargo without payment of duties.27 Before these questions could be raised in any legal proceeding, events made them moot. On 16 December Hutchinson refused a last request for a pass and an immortal band of Indians proceeded to dump the tea into Boston Harbor, in what Adams described in his diary as “the most magnificent Movement of all.”28
In reaction to this act of defiance, Parliament passed the Boston Port Act and other coercive measures designed to punish the Town and its supporters by terminating its trade and abridging provincial self-govern• { 106 } ment.29 Adams does not seem to have had further cases in the Vice Admiralty Court, but he was at least present to report a case in which the Port Act was put to the test there in the summer of 1774 (No. 53). In the meantime the colonies had begun to move toward union, revolution, and independence. The First Continental Congress sat at Philadelphia in September 1774, with Adams among its members.30 Before independence was formally declared, the British sought to bring the colonies to heel by Act of Parliament, extending the Port Act to other colonial ports. Finally Britain laid a total embargo on colonial commerce in a statute that was not an Act of Trade, but a measure regulating the taking and distribution of prizes. Adams' only contact with this later legislation was in the somewhat different context of prize litigation during the Revolution.31
1. These provisions were first enacted in the statutes, 12 Car. 2, c. 18, §§1, 18 (1660), and 15 Car. 2, c. 7, §6 (1663). For a summary of later statutory modifications, see Harper, Navigation Laws 388–390, 395–404. For provisions applicable to colonial manufacturing, see Knollenberg, Origin of the American Revolution 169–171.
2. See the Plantation Duties Act, 25 Car. 2, c. 7, §§2, 4 (1673); the Sugar Act, 6 Geo. 2, c. 13 (1733). For discussion of these Acts and the legislative purpose, see Barrow, Colonial Customs 26–32, 283–286.
3. Provision for a colonial customs service was first made in the Plantation Duties Act, 25 Car. 2, c. 7, §3 (1673). Its existence was confirmed and the officers' powers strengthened by 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22 (1696).
4. See 15 Car. 2, c. 7, §8 (1663); 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §§2, 3 (1662), made applicable in the colonies by 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §6 (1696). For cases involving the requirement of entry, see No. 46 and No. 48.
5. See 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §§17–21; No. 51; No. 45, note 334.
6. See 12 Car. 2, c. 18, §19 (1660); 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §13 (1696); Harper, Navigation Laws 161–165. For further discussion, see No. 45, note 334.
7. See 15 Car. 2, c. 7, §8 (1663); 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §§2, 3 (1662), made applicable in the colonies by 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §6 (1696); Instructions by the Commissioners for Managing and Causing to be levyed and collected His Majesty's Customs, Subsidies, and other Duties in England, to who is Established Collector of His Majesty's Customs at [] in America ([London], ca. 1733). For a case on European goods, see No. 52.
8. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §§4–11, 15–20, 32–34 (1662), made applicable in the colonies by 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §6 (1696). See No. 44, No. 45, No. 50.
9. As to the establishment of the Vice Admiralty Courts, see Barrow, Colonial Customs 124–127, 145–150; Wroth, “The Massachusetts Vice Admiralty Court,” in George A. Billias, ed., Law and Authority in Colonial America (Barre, Mass., in press). As to doubts about the scope of the jurisdiction before 1764, see Knollenberg, Origin of the American Revolution 266–268. The various penalties and forfeitures, and the mechanics of suit run through all the statutes and are discussed in most of the cases that follow. See especially No. 46. A search of the records of the Massachusetts Superior Court and the Suffolk County Inferior Court files has revealed no actions at law under the Acts of Trade after 1764. An incomplete search for the earlier period has produced only a few revenue suits, and these were matters in which the power of the Admiralty Court was being tested by writ of prohibition. See, for example, Robinson v. Patriarch, SCJ Rec. 1725–1730, fol. 59 (Suffolk, 1726) (Dismissed on exceptions); Robinson v. Patriarch, SCJ Rec. 1725–1729, fols. 97–99 (Essex, 1726) (Quashed because summons said “Suffolk SS” instead of “Essex SS”); Lambert v. Bardin, SCJ Rec. 1730–1733, fol. 202 (Suffolk, 1732) (Verdict for forfeiture. Vessel ordered sold, with seamen's wages also to be paid). As to distrust of the jury, see No. 46, note 61.
10. For the view that the system of duties and regulation prior to 1764 was agreeable to the colonists and that only changes made in that year and after (notes 12, 15, below) caused opposition, see Harper, Navigation Laws 365–378; Dickerson, Navigation Acts 208. These and earlier studies of the problem are admirably summarized in Barrow, Colonial Customs 1–17, 512–524, where the conclusion is reached that the entire system from 1660 on was inimical to colonial interests, and that lax enforcement between 1725 and 1764 was the key to colonial acceptance. The debt of the editors to this work here and elsewhere should be evident.
11. See No. 44.
12. The American Act, 4 Geo. 3, c. 15 (1764). For a summary of its provisions, see Knollenberg, Origin of the American Revolution 150–152, 176–181; compare Barrow, Colonial Customs 376–390. See also No. 46, No. 47, No. 52. Earlier a wartime practice had been extended by a measure providing for the seizure at sea by naval vessels of offenders against the Acts of Trade. 3 Geo. 3, c. 22, §4 (1763). See No. 51, note 1. As to the new Admiralty court, see Ubbelohde, Vice-Admiralty Courts 44–54. The court was given power to hear appeals from the provincial Admiralty courts by the Stamp Act, 5 Geo. 3, c. 12, §58 (1765).
13. JA's notes of his argument, now in the Adams Papers, are printed in 2 JA, Works 159 note. See also JA's diary entry for 20 Dec. 1765, 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography266–267. Compare Quincy's account of the argument, Quincy, Reports 200–214. For further discussion, see No. 44, note 48; No. 46, note 68. See also Edmund S. and Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis 139–143 (Chapel Hill, 1953).
14. 6 Geo. 3, c. 52 (1766). The Act did tighten enforcement regulations in other respects, and did not affect the duties on wines. See Barrow, Colonial Customs 443–444; No. 46, note 17; No. 47, note 1.
15. 7 Geo. 3, c. 41 (1767); id., c. 46. As to the Commissioners, see No. 45. The Acts also tightened the entry requirements and clarified the status of the writ of assistance. 7 Geo. 3, c. 46, §§9, 10. See No. 44, note 29.
16. 8 Geo. 3, c. 22 (1767). See Ubbelohde, Vice-Admiralty Courts 130–133. See also No. 46, notes 41–43.
17. In 1767 there had been 15 actions on the docket of the Vice Admiralty Court, of which one can be definitely identified as a revenue case and 2 are suits under the White Pine Acts (p. 247–253 below). The rest are presumably ordinary civil maritime actions. In 1768, out of 33 actions, 12 entries were in rem actions under the Acts of Trade, and 12 were in personam actions, the latter the Hancock and Malcom prosecutions (see No. 46, note 26). In 1769, out of 55 actions, 21 were under the White Pine Acts (see No. 54), 18 were in rem actions under the Acts of Trade and 10 were in personam prosecutions, including those arising out of Dowse v. 33 Hogsheads of Molasses, No. 47. See Vice Adm. Min. Bk. To the extent that the figures here and in notes 22, 24, below, differ from those in Wroth, “Massachusetts Vice Admiralty Court,” 6 Am. Jour. Legal Hist. 367, the latter are erroneous.
18. See No. 46.
19. See Nos. 47, 48, 49.
20. See Nos. 50, 54. At the same time JA was of counsel for the accused in Rex v. Corbet, No. 56, a trial before a Special Court of Admiralty for the killing of a naval officer at sea, which had political implications.
21. For the passage in the Autobiography, see 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography287–289. Hutchinson's statement that JA was offered the position of justice of the peace is discussed in id. at 289 note. In his diary for 22 Sept. 1772, JA noted that in the service of his “Country” he had sacrificed “Time, Peace, Health, Money, and Preferment, both of which last have courted my Acceptance, and been inexorably refused, least I should be laid under a Temptation to forsake the Sentiments of the Friends of this Country.” 2 id. at 63. That Sewall was dissatisfied with his post as early as the summer of 1768 seems clear from the story of his dealings with Samuel Venner. In Nov. 1768 he learned that he had been appointed Judge of the new Admiralty court at Halifax, which would have given him valid ground to look for a successor. See No. 46, notes 20, 27, 41–43. He was actually in Halifax on business at the time of the trial in Butler v. The Union, No. 50. Samuel Fitch was finally appointed to the post in March 1770. See No. 51, note 2. For the later relations between JA and Sewall, see 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography67–68, and 1 Adams Family Correspondence135–137.
22. In 1770 there were 13 actions in the Vice Admiralty Court, of which 5 were for breaches of the Acts of Trade and 2 were under the White Pine Acts. In 1771 out of 17 actions, 15 were for breaches of the Acts of Trade. See Vice Adm. Min. Bk. For the end of nonimportation, see Miller, Origins of the American Revolution 309–311. The Townshend Acts repeal was 10 Geo. 3, c. 17 (1770). As to JA's 1769 practice, see vol. 3:335–337 below. He had moved to Braintree in April 1771 after his exhausting defense of the Massacre defendants (Nos. 63, 64). See 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography6–7. Health is usually given as the reason for his departure. See id. at 7 note; 3 id. at 296. Compare 2 id. at 65–66. There is also reason to think, however, that he had had his fill of politics. Id. at 63.
23. See 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography56. As to these cases, see Ubbelohde, Vice-Admiralty Courts 157. See Cutt v. Meservey, Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 23 Jan. 1772; Baker v. Meservey, id., 9 March 1772.
24. For Adams' cases, see Nos. 51, 52. As to the Gaspee, and the reaction to the incident, see No. 46, note 22; Miller, Origins of the American Revolution 325–329. For JA's reactions see 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography73, 75–76. Although the records of the Vice Admiralty court are incomplete, there is some evidence that the Commissioners increased their activities in 1772. The existing docket of the court, through March 1772, shows 16 actions, of which at least 10 were customs cases. Vice Adm. Min. Bk. See also, Receipts from Seizures of Ships, 1772–1773, MBAt:Price Papers, which contains receipts of 19 forfeitures and one composition between May 1772 and Sept. 1773. A check of the Boston newspapers reveals at least 10 seizures between Sept. 1773 and Feb. 1776.
25. The Tea Act was 13 Geo. 3, c. 44 (1773). See generally Benjamin W. Labaree, The Boston Tea Party 58–109 (N.Y., 1964). See also Dickerson, “Use Made of the Revenue from the Tax on Tea,” 31 NEQ 232 (1958).
26. See account of James Hall, in Francis S. Drake, ed., Tea Leaves 352 (Boston, 1884). See generally, Labaree, Boston Tea Party 118–137. For Hutchinson's account, see 3 Hutchinson, Massachusetts Bay, ed. Mayo, 307–312.
27. The basic provision was the Sugar Act, 6 Geo. 2, c. 13, §§2, 3 (1733), incorporated by the Townshend Act, 7 Geo. 3, c. 46, §4 (1767). The High Court of Admiralty had held that under the Act prohibiting European goods “importation” occurred upon arrival. See No. 52, note 5. The Privy Council, however, had held in another case that “importation” did not occur until bulk had been broken. Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council 496. The practice was thus presumably not fixed in the colonies and varied from port to port. That the officers did not consider that they had power in the ordinary course to clear out a vessel in such circumstances appears in an episode in 1774 at Salem, where tea was permitted to be sent on to Halifax only after bond for the duties had been given. Salem Custom Officers to Commissioners, 5 Dec. 1774, Salem Custom House Letter Book Outwards, 1772–1775, Office of the U.S. Collector of Customs, Boston, Mass. For a full discussion of this phase of the question, see Labaree, Boston Tea Party 126–127.
28. For JA's comment, see 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography85. See generally Labaree, Boston Tea Party 137–145.
29. The Port Act was 14 Geo. 3, c. 19. As to the rest of the legislation, see Miller, Origins of the American Revolution 355–376. See also Labaree, Boston Tea Party 178–203.
30. See 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography97–160. Compare No. 53, note 5.
31. As to these Acts and JA's concern with them, see No. 58, notes 14, 23173.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0002-0001

Editorial Note

In February 1761 John Adams was present at an event which his later descriptions have firmly implanted in the mythology of the American Revolution. The arguments of James Otis before the Superior Court on the granting of writs of assistance to royal customs officials are generally known as one of the earliest statements of colonial opposition to parliamentary regulation. The scene itself, so vividly described by Adams in a letter to William Tudor nearly sixty years later, is surely part of the common vision of this period: In the Council Chamber of what is now the Old State House in Boston “near the Fire were seated five Judges, with Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson at their head, as Chief Justice, all in their new fresh Robes of Scarlet English Cloth in their Broad Bands, and immense judicial Wiggs. In this Chamber were seated at a long Table all the Barristers of Boston and its neighbouring County of Middlesex in their Gowns, Bands, and Tye Wiggs. They were not seated on ivory Chairs, but their dress was more solemn and more pompous than that of the Roman Senate, when the Gauls broke in upon them.”
There also sat Samuel Quincy and John Adams. “John was the youngest. He should be painted looking like a short, thick, fat Archbishop of Canterbury, seated at the Table with a pen in his hand, lost in Admiration, now and then minuting those despicable Notes which you know that Jonathan Williams Austin your fellow student in my office, stole from my desk and { 107 } printed in the Massachusetts Spy, with two or three bombastic expressions interpolated by himself; and which your Pupil, Judge Minot has printed in his history.”
Jeremiah Gridley, for the Crown, and Oxenbridge Thacher, for the merchants of Boston, argued well and eloquently, but it was Otis, also for the merchants, whom Adams hailed so many years later. “Otis was a flame of Fire! With the promptitude of Clasical Allusions, a depth of Research, a rapid Summary of Historical Events and dates, a profusion of legal Authorities, a prophetic glare [i.e. glance?] of his eyes into futurity, and a rapid Torrent of impetuous Eloquence, he hurried away all before him; American Independance was then and there born. The seeds of Patriots and Heroes to defend the non sine Diis animosus infans, to defend the vigorous Youth, were then and there sown. Every man of an [immense] crowded Audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to take up Arms against Writts of Assistants. Then and there was the first scene of the first Act of Opposition to the arbitrary Claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independance was born. In fifteen years, i.e. in 1776, he grew up to manhood, declared himself free.”1
By this and other letters to his old student, Adams sought to recreate a great moment of his youth. In the course of his efforts he put into Otis' mouth the entire body of arguments against the power of Parliament developed over the whole of the next decade. The inaccuracies and exaggerations of these letters have been ably summarized elsewhere; further comment on them must await The Adams Papers edition of that portion of Adams' correspondence.2 Here we deal only with the legal situation as it can be recreated from Adams' original notes of the argument and other sources.
The arguments which Adams heard turned on the nature of the writ and the construction of three Acts of Parliament and a Province statute. The term “writ of assistance” had originally been applied to process in favor of a particular litigant in the Exchequer or in Chancery, enabling him to obtain the sheriff's help in collecting a debt or gaining possession of property to which he was entitled.3 The writs sought by the Crown officials { 108 } in Boston in 1761, however, were general standing warrants, good from the date of issue until six months after the death of the issuing sovereign, which permitted the holder to enter any house by day, with a constable or other officer, and there search for smuggled goods without special application to a court.4
The earliest relevant statute, an Act of Parliament passed in 1660, authorized the issuance “to any person or persons” of a warrant to enter any house to search for specific goods, upon oath made of their illegal entry before “the lord treasurer, or any of the barons of the Exchequer, or chief magistrate of the port or place where the offense shall be committed, or the place next adjoining thereto.”5 Both the language and the legislative history of this enactment make reasonably clear that its purpose was to authorize a special search warrant of limited extent, under control of a higher authority.6 The statute central to the controversy was the Act of 1662, which, in setting up a comprehensive scheme of customs administration for the British Isles, first used “writ of assistance” to describe a customs search warrant. The act provided that “any person or persons, authorized by writ of assistance under the seal of his majesty's court of exchequer,” might enter any premises in the day time, with a constable or other officer, using force if necessary, and there seize any contraband goods found.7 It has been argued on the basis of the language and legislative history of this and other contemporary acts, that the Act of 1662 was intended to incorporate no more than the special warrant embodied in the Act of 1660.8 The language of the two statutes is open { 109 } to the contrary construction, however, and, since the parliamentary debates contain no affirmative statement on the precise point in question, contrary inferences may also be drawn from the legislative history.9 The actual intent of Parliament in the Act of 1662 thus cannot be determined.
Whatever the legislative intent, a course of practice under the statute soon developed which was a surer guide to construction in the courts than ambiguous language and incomplete history.10 There are some indications { 110 } that in the years after 1662 searches were carried out under special warrant, probably as a result of an attempt to follow the former practice under the Act of 1660.11 Apparently, however, the view prevailed that the Act of 1662 had created a new process, limited neither by the earlier statute nor by practice under the ancient equitable writ. There is no reported decision on the point prior to the argument at Boston in 1761, but before 1685 a form of the writ granting unlimited powers of general search seems to have been in use in the Exchequer.12 Other evidence indicates that from some time in the first half of the 18th century, the writ was established as a general standing warrant issued by the Exchequer on the application of the Commissioners of Customs, to be held by the principal customs officers for use by them or their subordinates as the occasion demanded. Abuses of the instrument were probably avoided by virtue of the fact that ordinarily the principal officers required the same showing of information and probable cause that a justice would have required for the issue of a special search warrant.13 Furthermore, even with probable { 111 } cause, the officer who searched and found nothing was liable in damages for the trespass.14
The use of the writ in the colonies depended upon a third statute, the Act of 1696, by which colonial customs control was generally strengthened and reorganized, and colonial customs officials were given the powers of their English counterparts, whatever those might be.15 In Massachusetts, both before and after the passage of this act, the powers of search granted to customs officers by statute and inherent in their commissions were exercised, but there is little affirmative evidence that general warrants were issued in support of these powers.16 According to Thomas Hutchinson, however, Governor Shirley, in office from 1741 until 1757, issued what were apparently general warrants to the customs officers. When Hutchinson himself pointed out the illegality of this practice, the Governor directed “the officers to apply for warrants from the superior court; and from that time, writs issued, not exactly in the form, but of the nature of writs of assistance issued from the court of exchequer in England.”17
{ 112 }
This development brought a fourth act into play—a Province law of 1699 which conveyed to the Superior Court the powers of the Exchequer. In 1754 the court had expressly refused to exercise the equitable branch of this jurisdiction, but it seemed to find no objection to the issuance of a writ ancillary to the Exchequer's revenue powers.18 On the application of Charles Paxton a writ of assistance issued in August 1755, and the files of the court reflect that thereafter until 1760 general writs of assistance were granted to seven other officers.19
The death of George II in October 1760 touched off the controversy which led to the argument in 1761. Since the existing writs survived the sovereign's death by only six months, it was necessary for the customs officers to procure new ones.20 The absence of records obscures the procedure by which the case came up, but probably Paxton and several other { 113 } officers applied in the form followed in the prior reign. This time, however, there was opposition, apparently as part of a general attack then being mounted on the customs and the Admiralty under the guidance of Benjamin Barons, disaffected collector of the port, and James Otis.21 Thomas Greene and other Boston merchants petitioned to be heard on the question. Thomas Lechmere, Surveyor General of the Customs, then stepped into the case both for the Crown and his men, petitioning the court “to be heard on the same subject: And that Writs of Assistants may be granted to himself and his officers as usual.” The proceeding seems to have gone forward as a hearing on these petitions, rather than on the application of any single officer.22
{ 114 }
The argument actually began on 24 February 1761, and, according to later accounts, lasted for several days. Whether these recollections are accurate, and if they are, how many hours per day were spent in oratory, cannot now be determined.23 Adams' on-the-spot report indicates that Gridley spoke first for the Crown, but whether through enthrallment, inattention, or nonattendance, Adams took virtually no notes of this portion of the argument. Thacher and Otis then appeared and Gridley gave what was apparently a rebuttal. It is these last three arguments which Adams preserved, at least in part. How much else was said we can only speculate, perhaps more misled than guided by Adams' later recollections.
Gridley's position was clear-cut. Parliament, he argued, had empowered the Exchequer to issue “writs of assistance”; authority showed these to be general writs. Parliament had given colonial customs officers the powers of the English customs; and the Superior Court had the powers of the Exchequer; thus the writ could issue. If the practice seemed to infringe upon individual liberties, there were ample English and colonial precedents for such infringement in the name of the exigencies of collecting the revenue. Thacher cast doubt upon the existence of a proper precedent for the writ and contended that the powers given by the Act of Parliament were too broad to be exercised under a general warrant. The bulk of his argument as recorded by Adams was addressed to the power of the Superior Court to act as the Court of Exchequer. Not only had this jurisdiction been renounced in a prior case, but the Massachusetts court lacked many of the powers with which the Exchequer could control English customs officers.
Otis alone seems to have raised broader questions. After a bombastic introduction, which may be a subsequent contribution by Adams,24 he insisted that, while special writs might be allowed by necessity, a general writ violated the fundamental principle that a man should be secure in { 115 } his own house. He disparaged the source of Gridley's authority, then argued that if it were valid, the courts did not have to follow a precedent offensive to fundamental principles. In an often-cited passage he urged that an Act of Parliament which sought to make the courts act in violation of these principles was void. He then went on to show various flaws in the writ contended for and to argue that on a proper construction the statutes cited authorized only special warrants. He closed with a reiteration of Thacher's attack on the Exchequer powers of the Superior Court.
The only question about which the court seems to have been in doubt was that of the nature of the warrants actually used in England. Accordingly, judgment was suspended pending an inquiry by Hutchinson into the Exchequer practice. The reply was that general writs were granted freely upon the application of the Commissioners of Customs to the clerk of the Exchequer,25 but the whole matter was reargued at Boston in November 1761 at an adjournment of the August term. After the second hearing, the court decided unanimously in favor of the writ.26 No record or minute book entry has been found. The decision seems to have been not an order allowing the issuance of a writ to a specific officer, but a kind of declaratory ruling, in effect granting the prayer of Lechmere's petition, that the writ might thereafter issue upon due application in accordance with the English practice. Thus, the first writ granted after the argument was given to Paxton on 2 December 1761, upon the application of the Surveyor General in his behalf. Similar procedure was followed for each writ subsequently issued in Massachusetts.27
{ 116 }
The importance which Adams attached to this case has been disputed. It has been suggested that oral argument delivered before a relatively small audience could not of itself have had the inspirational effects attributed to it.28 Certainly the efforts of Otis and Thacher did not change the orthodox view of what the law was. Writs were allowed to issue, and the practice was continued thereafter. Moreover, when in 1767 Parliament came to revise the statutes to effect the issuance of writs of assistance in all the colonies, the problem with which it was concerned was not the constitutionality of a general warrant, nor the power of the courts to deal with an unconstitutional Act, nor even the nature of the practice in the Exchequer, but merely an assurance to the high courts of judicature in the colonies that they could exercise Exchequer powers.29
The role of Otis' argument in the larger political and constitutional developments that were to follow is less easily dismissed. It is true that questions of Exchequer practice and Superior Court powers are not the stuff of revolution. As to the validity of general warrants, it is probably also true, as modern historians contend, that continuing colonial opposition to writs of assistance was not a direct response to Otis' oratory at Boston in 1761. Presumably the renewed efforts of customs officers to obtain writs after 1767 produced the widespread resistance to general warrants which led ultimately to the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.30 { 117 } Nevertheless, in this struggle Otis' ideas, published in the newspapers and circulated by the bar, continued to stimulate resistance.31
Otis' argument had its greatest significance in questions of legislative and judicial power. By 1761 the doctrine of absolute parliamentary sovereignty, which is today the foundation of the British constitution, had become generally accepted in England. As Blackstone said in 1765, “if the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know of no power that can control it.”32 In the latter year the doctrine was applied to writs of assistance. Litigation arising out of the problems of John Wilkes and the North Briton had led to a series of rulings in which the English courts held that general warrants were invalid as an intrusion on rights guaranteed by the common law. There had been no statutory authority for the warrants in those cases, however, and in the leading formulation of the position, Lord Mansfield was careful to distinguish writs of assistance as authorized by act of Parliament.33
In the 1761 argument, the theory of parliamentary sovereignty was implicit in the Crown's position.34 Otis, however, urged that acts of Parlia• { 118 } ment “against the Constitution” and “against natural Equity” were void, and that “the executive courts must pass such Acts into disuse.” Adams' notes show that in support of this position Otis cited the well-known language of Coke's opinion in Bonham's Case: “When an Act of Parliament is against Common Right and Reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the Common Law will controll it, and adjudge such Act to be Void.”35
Modern scholars have concluded that in context this passage states a familiar common law canon of construction, rather than a constitutional theory.36 Coke's view of the constitution was that a supreme Parliament (the “High Court”) and the courts of justice both participated in the process of declaring and applying the same body of unchangeable, preexisting law; a kind of sovereignty, the prerogative, resided in the Crown, subject to the limitations of that law. The issue to which constitutional arguments were directed was the clash between the powers of the Crown on the one hand and the powers of Parliament and the courts on the other.37 Since the power of the Crown was not in question in Bonham's Case, the issue there raised was procedural, not constitutional.
For Coke, Bonham's Case was thus a conflict between private interests regulated by a statute which had to be interpreted, rather than a direct challenge to the power of Parliament to make the statute.38 The standard by which the statute was to be measured was the basic reasonableness, the common sense, of the common law. This quality was not a “higher law” by which Parliament was to be kept in check, but a guide by which statutes, presumably intended by the makers to conform to the reason of the common law, were to be construed. If, in the process of construction, an act was adjudged “void,” the court was not acting as a separate branch of government with a power to control Parliament by declaring acts unconstitutional, but was only applying the law of Parliament, necessarily { 119 } general in effect, so as to do justice in the circumstances of a particular case.
Otis' argument in 1761, by contrast, was a constitutional one, addressed directly to the questions of the limits of legislative power and the power of the judiciary to enforce those limits. In the latter half of the 17th century, as Parliament increasingly acquired the sovereignty formerly attributed to the Crown, Bonham's Case, taken out of its private law context, had often been relied upon in political and constitutional argument to support the proposition that there was a higher law to which Parliament must bow.39 Other authorities cited by Otis indicate that he quoted Coke's words in this constitutional sense, rather than as a canon of construction. The contrast between construction and constitution is emphasized by the fact that Otis also argued in conventional fashion that the statute should be read narrowly to permit only the special search warrant known at common law. If, however, the court insisted on treating the act as “made in the very words of this petition,” that is, as embodying the language of the writ of assistance itself, then he argued that the act would be void not only under Bonham's Case, but by virtue of “natural equity” and “the Constitution.”40
These terms do not denote the “reason of the common law,” but instead refer to fundamental principles of equity and justice embodied in a British constitution that a century and a half of political development had made into a formal, if still invisible, instrument of government. They are thus “higher law” in something like the sense used by modern constitutional theorists. Otis drew these ideas from sources which demonstrate the breadth of his argument. His pamphlet, Rights of the British Colonies, published in 1764, invoked Locke's description of a government in which legislative sovereignty ultimately was a grant from the people and so could not be absolute. In a passage strongly reminiscent of his writs of assistance argument, Otis cited the Swiss publicist Emmerich de Vattel, as well as Bonham's Case and other common law precedents, for the proposition that Parliament could not make a statute against natural equity or the British constitution. In all probability he cited the same authorities and made the same appeal to higher law before the Superior Court in 1761.41
{ 120 }
Both the writs argument and Rights of the British Colonies also suggest that Otis saw the courts in a constitutional role not envisioned in Bonham's Case. The phrase, “the executive courts must pass such acts into disuse,” reported by Adams, contains a hint of a power that went beyond Coke's words. This hint is borne out by a passage in the pamphlet. Otis there argued the existence of two remedies when an act of Parliament clashed with equity and justice. Repeal might be sought, or, “If the reasons that can be given against an act plainly demonstrate that it is against natural equity, the executive courts will adjudge such act void. It may be questioned by some, though I make no doubt of it, whether they are not obliged by their oaths to adjudge such act void. If there is not a right of private judgment to be exercised, so far at least as to petition for a repeal, or to determine the expediency of risking a trial at law, the parliament might make itself arbitrary, which it is conceived it cannot by the constitution.”42 In voiding acts of Parliament, the courts were not merely interpreting statutes incident to the decision of private disputes. They were obligated by the nature of their office to pass judgment on legislation, and this function was itself a vital element of the constitution.
The power which Otis urged for the courts fell short of the later American doctrine of judicial review. His pamphlets show that he still saw Parliament as supreme, and so not bound to yield to a court's decision adverse to a statute. The point was that, although Parliament might err, it was benevolent and sought to act within the constitution; it would therefore accept the judicial determination, even though not compelled to.43 The courts thus did not occupy their modern position as a separate governmental branch of coordinate authority with the legislature, having express power to declare the law. Lacking this power, a court could not { 121 } totally annul an act, but could only decide the case before it. The modern court does no more in form, but its constitutional eminence gives its decisions an effective force beyond the confines of a particular case. Nevertheless, Otis' notion that the courts have some kind of constitutional function in controlling Parliament was surely one source of the modern concept of their power.44
In his argument, Otis was far from proclaiming revolution, and he did not singlehandedly create American constitutional law. He was, however, ahead of the revolutionary pamphleteers in confronting the orthodox idea of Parliamentary sovereignty with the notion that there might be a rule of law superior to Parliament;45 and he did suggest that it might be a function of the courts to enforce compliance with that rule. These ideas appeared in his later writings, but other problems, theoretical, political, and emotional, so obscured them, that Otis undoubtedly did not realize their full import, and certainly did little to argue them in a consistent and coherent manner.46 Nevertheless, he had put them into play. Other writers, more aware of political realities, carried his ideas to their logical extreme—the justification of the overthrow of parliamentary authority and the subsequent establishment of a new government in which the legislature was limited by an express fundamental law.47
The argument of 1761 did not of itself lead to these great ends, but if it marked for Otis a first opportunity to formulate and express ideas which were later to circulate throughout the colonies in his pamphlets, then it { 122 } cannot be said that his words stopped at the door of the Council Chamber. And if, when John Adams said sixty years later that “Then and there the child Independence was born,” he really meant that the suggestion that Parliament's power was not absolute started the intellectual process which was to lead him to the forefront of the revolutionary movement, then surely the argument of 1761 was a vital predecessor of those of 1776.48
The documentary history of the materials which follow is nearly as tortuous as their intellectual history. Document I is the booklet of “despicable notes” which Adams actually took down at the argument. They are hastily written and certainly do not touch all points covered in the course of a hearing of at least several hours' duration. Appended to them are Adams' extracts of the statutes involved and copies of the petition and writ issued to Paxton in 1755. These were apparently made by him for use in the more elaborate abstract of the argument which is reproduced as Document II.
It is this document which creates problems, since no copy of it in Adams' hand has been found. In his diary for 3 April 1761, he reported showing to Colonel Josiah Quincy “an Abstract of the Argument for and against Writts of Assistance.” Quincy cried, “did you take this from those Gentlemen as they delivered it? You can do any Thing! You can do as you please! Gridley did not use that Language. He never was Master of such a style! It is not in him—&c.”49 This description is ambiguous, the more so because it occurs in a passage in which Adams is dubious of the sincerity of the Colonel's flattery on this and other points. It seems, on balance, to refer not to the rough notes made in court but to a more careful treatment written out at a later date. Description of the piece as an “Abstract” seems to imply work of more finished quality than that of notes made on the spot; moreover, praise such as that given by Quincy would have seemed extravagant and suspect in the extreme if applied to the fragmentary jottings that are the notes.50
In his Autobiography, and in the passage from his letter to Tudor quoted at the beginning of this note, Adams spoke of his notes of the argument as having been printed in the Massachusetts Spy and in Minot's History of Massachusetts Bay.51 The material printed is not the rough notes, but a comparison of the texts shows that it was drawn from those notes. Other versions of the arguments, in virtually identical language, exist in { 123 } circumstances linking them to Adams. It therefore may be concluded that Adams composed a longer version of his notes and that it was this work which circulated among the bar and was preserved in the Spy and in Minot's History. On the basis of these conclusions, Document II is offered as the first collation of all known versions of Adams' “Abstract of the Argument.”52
In the “Abstract” Adams has made the remarks of Gridley the opening argument, although from their position in his notes they would seem to have been a rebuttal. This argument and that of Thacher, which follows it, are taken with almost literal exactness from the rough notes. It is in Otis' often reprinted argument that Adams seems to have exercised artistic license. No doubt Otis said all that is attributed to him and much more; but the “Abstract” seems to be a combination of Adams' notes and his impressions of the larger questions that is peculiarly his own. The bones of the legal arguments which appear in the notes are there, but in pruning legal complexities and in adding fervor, Adams created a minor work of political propaganda. Perhaps the inspiration that produced this epitome of a famous address is the best evidence we have of the birth of “the child Independence” in 1761.
Document III is Hutchinson's draft of the writ issued after the November argument.
1. JA to William Tudor, 29 March 1817. LbC, Adams Papers. Printed with some variations and omissions in 10 JA, Works 244–249. The letter had first appeared in 14 Niles' Weekly Register 137–140 (25 March 1818), and was printed again in Novanglus and Massachusettensis 244–247 (Boston, 1819). JA, in a contemporaneous report of the proceedings in Congress on the Declaration of Independence, referred to “the Argument concerning Writs of Assistance, in the Superiour Court, which I have hitherto considered as the Commencement of the Controversy, between Great Britain and America.” JA to AA, 3 July 1776, 2 Adams Family Correspondence 28.
2. As to the inaccuracies, see notes 20, 22, below; they are fully discussed in Horace Gray's appendix to Quincy's Reports [hereinafter to be cited as Quincy, Reports (Appendix)] at p. 408–411, 416–417, 469. See also Joseph R. Frese, Writs of Assistance in the American Colonies, 1660–1776, p. 1–19 (Harvard Univ. doctoral dissertation, 1951). The principal letters are in 10 JA, Works 244–362; see also id. at 362 note.
3. See Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 395–396. The examples cited by Thacher, note 456 below, are writs of this kind, in aid of Chancery decrees. The process is still known in England. See 16 Halsbury's Laws of England, tit. Execution, §100 (London, 3d edn., 1956). In the United States the equitable writ of assistance is found in a number of states and, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 70, is available after an order for the delivery of possession. See Note, 8 Arkansas Law Review 92–100 (1954); James W. Moore, Federal Practice, 7:2503 (Albany and N.Y., 2d edn., 1955).
4. See the examples, text at note 48100 below, and Doc. III.
5. 12 Car. 2, c. 19, §1 (1660). The warrant so issued enabled the holder
“with the assistance of a sheriff, justice of peace or constable, to enter into any house in the day-time where such goods are suspected to be concealed, and in case of resistance to break open such houses, and to seize and secure the same goods so concealed; and all officers and ministers of Justice are hereby required to be aiding and assisting thereunto.”
The Act limited entries under it to one month after the offense was supposed to have been committed and gave any party injured by a false information an action of trespass against the informer. Id. §§2, 4.
6. See Frese, “Early Parliamentary Legislation on Writs of Assistance,” 38 Col. Soc. Mass., Pubns. 318–326 (1959); Frese, Writs of Assistance (dissertation) 41–56.
7. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §5(2) (1662), set out in text at note 4092 below as JA copied it. For confusion introduced by variant spellings of “assistance,” see note 4093 below. §4 of the Act provided for search of vessels at any time without a warrant.
8. See Frese, “Legislation on Writs of Assistance,” 38 Col. Soc. Mass., Pubns. 327–352; Frese, Writs of Assistance (dissertation) 97–106. See also Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 530–532.
9. The language of 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §5(2) (1662), standing alone seems to envision a general warrant, if the term “writ of assistance” is not held to incorporate the ancient process. See note 12 below. The statute, 12 Car. 2, c. 19 (1660), was continued and confirmed long after 1662, however, leading to the conclusion that the Act of 1662 included only the special warrant of the 1660 Act. Frese, “Legislation on Writs of Assistance,” 38 Col. Soc. Mass., Pubns. 335; compare Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 531–532. It could nevertheless be argued that the Act of 1660, which provided for the issuance of warrants by officers other than the Barons of the Exchequer (who had the sole power under the 1662 Act), was retained as an additional weapon in the battle against illicit trade. The other Acts chiefly relied upon to support the special warrant theory are 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 3, §14 (1662), a provision of the Militia Act that general warrants might issue to search for illegal arms; and 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 33, §§15, 19 (1662), which provided such warrants for searches for unlicensed printed matter. See Frese, “Legislation on Writs of Assistance,” 38 Col. Soc. Mass., Pubns. 336–351. Father Frese points to the contrast between the battle required to pass even these measures, which were limited by numerous exclusions, and the ease with which the less limited writs of assistance provision was passed, as evidence that the latter embodied only special warrants. Id. at 351–352. This difference might also be accounted for by a difference in the nature of the evils sought to be remedied by the various acts. Insurrection and sedition are political crimes; measures designed to control them may affect the liberties of the entire populace. Smuggling is a crime with a financial motive; its suppression is more likely to be localized in effect, harming only those who habitually live close to or beyond a rule of law accepted by the majority. Other legislation of the same Parliament provided for search without special warrant. See 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 7, §§7, 14 (Search of London leather workers' shops for prohibited leather); 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 5, §8 (Search of Norfolk and Norwich shops and other locations for defective yarns); 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 32, §9 (Search of WestRiding shops and other locations for illegally imported cloth). Father Frese argues that the matters involved in these acts are too minor and local to be analogous to the Customs Act; moreover, they do not authorize use of force. Frese, Writs of Assistance (dissertation) 99–104. Although the latter objection has some merit, it could be argued that a customs measure bears greater resemblance to this last class of statutes than to the Militia and Printing Acts, thus accounting for a uniform silence as to the general search powers. In any event, it is clear that the 1662 Parliament did not hesitate to convey such powers when the occasion required.
10. For the general proposition that long-continued usage can control the construction of a statute, see Sir Peter B. Maxwell, The Interpretation of Statutes 308–314 (London, 9th edn., Sir G. H. B. Jackson, 1946). The printed Journals of the House of Commons and House of Lords, upon which Father Frese's legislative history (notes 8–9 above) is chiefly based were published in about 1742, but there is no evidence that they were known in Massachusetts. See L. A. Abraham and S. C. Hawtrey, A Parliamentary Dictionary 104 (London, 1956). Even if the Journals had been available, it is possible that the Massachusetts court might have refused to consider them in construing the statute. The familiar English doctrine barring legislative history as an aid in this process was not clearly formulated until 1769, however, and legislative materials were so used by Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P. 1765), a famous decision against general warrants, handed down in the course of the Wilkes controversy (text at note 33 below), cited in Plucknett, Concise History 335–336; see also Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes 27–30.
11. Frese, Writs of Assistance (dissertation) 160–161 note.
12. See the form of a writ dating from between 1676 and 1685, published in William Brown, Compendium of the Several Branches of Practice in the Court of the Exchequer 358–361 (London, 1688). It is more fully discussed in notes 557, 1668, below. This form bears little or no resemblance to the ancient writs of assistance (note 3 above). It has been suggested that the source may have been either the sheriff's “Patent of Assistance” (a general command to others to aid this officer), or, by analogy, the general warrants authorized by 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 33, §15 (note 9 above), which gave the bearers power, “with a constable, to take unto them such assistance as they shall think needful.” See Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 397–398, 530–531 note. “Writs of assistance” were known in the colonies before the Act of 1696 (note 15 below), but these were apparently special warrants. Frese, Writs of Assistance (dissertation) 127–177. In England, however, the evidence is ambiguous. The materials cited by Frese (note 11 above) indicate the use of special warrants, but there was a second edition of Brown's Compendium in 1699, containing the form of the general writ. Reissues of the first edition in 1689 and 1692 presumably were likewise unchanged. See 1 Sweet and Maxwell, Legal Bibliography 319. Since special warrants could still be obtained under 12 Car. 2, c. 19 (1660), note 5 above, it is possible that warrants of both kinds were used during this period.
13. See Hoon, English Customs 63, 272–273; Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 532 note; note 25 below. Writs of assistance were among those processes which would survive the death of the sovereign by six months under 1 Anne, stat. 1, c. 8, §5 (1702), cited in notes 2880, 3385, below. No English case has been found in which the validity of the writs was directly raised, but their existence as general warrants was recognized and seemingly approved in a series of cases after 1765. See text and note 33 below; Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 533–534 note. Gray suggests that the writ first came to the notice of the English judges through Hutchinson's application to the ministry in 1761. Ibid. See also cases cited, notes 759, 1062, below. The writ remained in use in England throughout the 19th century in substantially its earlier form. Wolkins, “Writs of Assistance in England,” 66 MHS, Procs. 357–360 (1936–1941). It is today authorized by the Customs and Excise Act of 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 44, §296, which permits entry with a writ by day or night on “reasonable grounds to suspect that anything liable to forfeiture under the customs or excise Acts” is concealed on the premises. The presence of a constable is required only when the entry is at night. The special search warrant is clearly distinguished, being covered in a separate paragraph. For an account of the practice in 1930, when writs were in the custody of principal customs officers for use when circumstances did not permit a special warrant, see Wolkins, “Writs of Assistance in England,” 66 MHS, Procs. 362; Ham's Year Book 1930 180 (London, 1930). In Canada the writ is still issued to officers charged with the enforcement of customs, excise, food and drug, and narcotics control acts. See Trasewick, “Search Warrants and Writs of Assistance,” 5 Crim. Law Quart. 341, 345–349, 356–363 (1962).
14. See note 1062 below.
15. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §6(2), set out as JA copied it in text at note 4294 below. The legislative history of this provision, while inconclusive, offers no affirmative evidence that Parliament intended to establish warrants in the colonies. See Frese, “Legislation on Writs of Assistance,” 38 Col. Soc. Mass., Pubns. 352–359. There were, however, several measures in the same Parliament which provided general search powers in commercial situations like those in note 9 above. Frese, Writs of Assistance (dissertation) 117–125.
16. See Frese, Writs of Assistance (dissertation) 127–179. It was later argued that the power to search was actually conveyed by 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §5(2) (1662), note 7 above, and that the writs were merely for identification purposes. Opinion of Attorney General DeGrey, 20 Aug. 1768, Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 454; compare Frese, Writs of Assistance (dissertation) 171 note. This theory is borne out by the fact that the form of the writ used after 1676 contained authority for searches aboard ship as well as ashore, although the 1662 Act did not require a writ for cases of the former class. See the writ at note 48100 below; compare Doc. III. For a copy of a commission, see Commission of Benjamin Hallowell as Comptroller of Boston, 9 March 1764, Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 433 note. One 18th-century colonial law book contains only a special search warrant for customs officers. Frese, Writs of Assistance (dissertation) 179 note; see Conductor Generalis: or the Office, Duty and Authority of Justices of the Peace 91–92 (Phila., 2d edn., 1749). The latter work, intended for justices of the peace, would not contain the form of the writ of assistance, which could issue only from the Exchequer or an equivalent.
17. 3 Hutchinson, Massachusetts Bay, ed. Mayo, 67. That the writs were general appears from Hutchinson's description of the event. This conclusion is supported by a phrase in Otis' argument at note 1567 below, as well as by Hutchinson's remarks in the second writs of assistance argument in Nov. 1761. Quincy, Reports 52. Shirley was probably acting under the authority given to the governor, or one delegated by him, to seize illegally entered goods under 6 Geo. 2, c. 13, §3 (1733). He may also have relied, as “chief magistrate,” on the provisions of 12 Car. 2, c. 19, §1 (1660), which permitted search of any premises for specific goods. See text at note 5 above.
18. The Province law was the Act of 26 June 1699, c. 3, § 1, 1 A&R 370, set out in note 4698 below. For the 1754 refusal to act, see note 961 below. The Superior Court could be said to have had a jurisdiction equivalent to that of the Exchequer over breaches of the Acts of Trade in England, because the acts applicable to the colonies gave concurrent jurisdiction of breaches there to the Courts of Vice Admiralty and the common-law courts. The Superior Court also had jurisdiction of breaches of provincial revenue acts. See 15 Car. 2, c. 7, §§6, 8 (1663); Act of 31 Jan. 1761, c. 20, §§14, 15, 20, 4 A&R 407. No evidence of a significant exercise of the jurisdiction under the English statutes has been found in the records or files of the Superior Court, however, and there seem to have been few actions under the Province acts. See p. 99, note 9, above; note 3082 below. For Parliament's later efforts to meet the problem of a general colonial lack of Exchequer jurisdiction, see note 29 below.
19. See Paxton's petition and writ in text at notes 4799, 48100, below. For the record references to the allowance of his and the other petitions, see Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 402–406. See also the petition of Francis Waldo, April 1758, SF 78370, and that of James Nevin, Jan. 1759, SF 79409.
20. By virtue of 1 Anne, stat. 1, c. 8, §5 (1702), note 13 above. Hutchinson stated that the argument which followed had been called for in part because Samuel Sewall, “the late chief justice, who was in high esteem, had doubts of the legality of such writs.” 3 Hutchinson, Massachusetts Bay, ed. Mayo, 68. JA later concurred as to Sewall's doubts and further stated that the February argument was before that Justice. JA to Tudor, 29 March 1817, 10 JA, Works 247. There is some question whether Sewall in fact had doubts. See Malcolm Freiberg, Prelude to Purgatory: Thomas Hutchinson in Provincial Massachusetts Politics, 1760–1770, p. 13 note (Brown Univ. doctoral dissertation, 1950). Whatever his views, he had died in Sept. 1760, so that he could not have heard the Feb. 1761 argument. See Whitmore, Mass. Civil List 70; Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 409. Since Hutchinson was commissioned as chief justice on 13 Nov. 1760 and took his seat on the bench on 30 Dec., only three days after George II's death was known in Boston, it would seem that JA was also in error in stating that Hutchinson was appointed expressly to decide the writs question in the Crown's favor. See Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 408–411 note.
21. Barons, appointed in 1759, had immediately begun to cause trouble, apparently because of a long-standing vendetta with Charles Paxton, surveyor and searcher at Boston. Barrow, Colonial Customs 261–262, 352–353. According to Paxton, Barons was behind not only the opposition to writs of assistance but also the efforts of the merchants to alter the practice whereby the charges of the informer in condemnations in the Court of Admiralty were paid out of the Province share of the proceeds. Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 425–426, 542. In the latter controversy James Otis represented the merchants at legislative hearings in Dec. 1760, which led the General Court to authorize Province Treasurer Harrison Gray to sue Paxton for specific sums he allegedly received in this fashion. Id. at 541–543. See note 28130 below. Gray, with Otis as counsel, first lost on a plea in abatement upheld because he had sued in his own person. See id. at 541–547; 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography210–212; SF 172289, 172353. In a new action in the name of the Province, Paxton obtained verdict and judgment at the Feb. 1762 term of the Superior Court. Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 548–552; SF 100183. At the Aug. 1761 Superior Court, John Erving, a Boston merchant and councilor, had obtained judgment against Collector George Cradock for money paid under a composition (consent decree) of a libel brought in Admiralty for duties—despite the court's instructions that the Admiralty decree was binding. Id. at 553–557. In the meantime, Barons had finally been removed from his post, in June 1761. See No. 45, note 644. Since he had brought three actions against those responsible for his removal which, with Gray v. Paxton and Erving v. Cradock, were all pending in the Suffolk Inferior Court in July 1761, it is little wonder that Governor Bernard saw the entire problem as the result of a plot fomented by Barons, Erving, and Otis. Bernard to Lords of Trade, 6 Aug. 1761, quoted in Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 426, 545, 555. It is more likely, however, that the opposition derived strong support from all the merchants because of their resentment toward a tightening of customs control insisted on by Pitt in Aug. 1760 as a means of halting illicit trade with the enemy. See id. at 407–408; Lawrence H. Gipson, The British Empire before the American Revolution, 10:111–131 (N.Y., 1961); King, “Judicial Flotsam in Massachusetts Bay,” 27 NEQ 366, 371–374 (1954); Freiberg, Prelude to Purgatory 9 note. Otis was allegedly involved against the Crown because of wrath at the appointment of Hutchinson to the Superior Court in lieu of Otis' father. See 11 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 252; note 20 above; note 26128 below.
22. JA's “Abstract,” at note 3105 below, reports that the case came up on the petition of James Cockle, Collector at Salem, at the Nov. 1760 term of the Essex Superior Court, an assertion which JA repeated in later writings. See, for example, JA to Tudor, 29 March 1817, 10 JA, Works 246–247. Cockle's petition has not been found, and there is no indication in the appropriate Minute Book that he, or any other officer, had applied for a writ in Nov. 1760. Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 409. Moreover, since the news of George II's death was not received in Boston until 27 Dec. 1760 (Id. at 411), the application certainly was made at a later date. That Paxton was first to apply is indicated by the facts that his was the first writ granted, and that Quincy's account is entitled “Paxton's Case.” See note 27 below. Hutchinson also says that an officer applied first. 3 Hutchinson, Massachusetts Bay, ed. Mayo, 68. There are no Minute Books for the 1761 terms of the Suffolk Superior Court, but the files and records support the conclusion that the petitions of Greene et al. and Lechmere were filed at the Feb. term 1761, and that the final decision reached at the Nov. adjournment of the Aug. term was on these petitions. See Petition of Greene et al., Petition of Lechmere, SF 100515b, printed in Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 412–414. See entries, “Greene et al. Petn.,” and “Lechmere, Survr. Genl. his petition,” on otherwise blank leaves, SCJ Rec. 1760–1761, fols. 225–226; and see, generally, Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 412–418.
23. Francis Bernard in 1765 said that the argument lasted three days, but it is unclear whether he referred to the Feb. or Nov. argument. Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 416. JA, in his Autobiography, characterized the argument as “several days” and in a letter in 1818 said that Otis' speech against the Acts of Trade alone lasted four or five hours. 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography276; JA to William Tudor, 1 June 1818, 2 JA, Works 314. The argument has been dated by virtue of the fact that it was held on the second Tuesday of the term. See note 2104 below. The term began on the third Tuesday of the month, 17 Feb. 1761.
24. This portion of Otis' remarks does not appear in JA's actual minutes (Doc. I), but is part of his later “Abstract” (Doc. II).
25. 3 Hutchinson, Massachusetts Bay, ed. Mayo, 68; Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 414–416; Freiberg, Prelude to Purgatory 15 note. The inquiry was apparently directed by Hutchinson to William Bollan, former Massachusetts agent in London. According to Bollan's memorial of 1766, seeking preferment from the Duke of Newcastle, Hutchinson desired “to know whether such writs of assistance ever issue from the exchequer, except upon special information, and confined either to particular houses, or to particular goods of which information is made.” Bollan replied by sending him a copy of the writ from the Exchequer, which was similar to that used in Massachusetts in 1755, reproduced in text at note 48100 below. Bollan also noted that “These writs upon any application of the commissioners of the customs to the proper officer of the court of Exchequer are made out of course by him, without any affidavit or order of the court.” Wolkins, “Bollan on Writs of Assistance,” 59 MHS, Procs. 415, 420 (1925–1926). See, as to the English practice, note 13 above.
26. See Quincy, Reports 51–57; compare Boston Gazette, 23 Nov. 1761, reprinted in Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 486–487. A summary of the arguments, apparently by Otis, appeared in the Boston Gazette for 4 Jan. 1762. It is reprinted in Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 488–494.
27. See the applications (1762–1769) in SF 1005150, printed in Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 416–434. Quincy styled the second argument “Paxton's Case of the Writs of Assistance,” but the evidence of the court records suggests that he, like JA in the first argument, simplified the nature of the proceedings. See Quincy, Reports 51; note 22 above. Hutchinson's draft of the writ which issued is printed as Doc. III. For the reaction and subsequent history of the writ in Massachusetts, see Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 416–468, 495–499; Wolkins, “Malcom and Writs of Assistance,” 58 MHS, Procs. 5 (1924–1925); Frese, “James Otis and Writs of Assistance,” 30 NEQ 496, 499–508 (1957); Frese, Writs of Assistance (dissertation) 202–235, 251–257, 273; Freiberg, Prelude to Purgatory 19–22. See also note 30 below.
28. See Dickerson, “Writs of Assistance as a Cause of Revolution,” in R.B. Morris, ed., The Era of the American Revolution 40 (N.Y., 1939). Compare Frese, Writs of Assistance (dissertation) 21–26; Frese, “Otis and Writs of Assistance,” 30 NEQ 496 (1957).
29. The Townshend Act, 7 Geo. 3, c. 46, §10 (1767), provided that, doubts having arisen about the legality of the use of writs of assistance in the colonies through the failure of the Act of 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, to authorize any particular court to issue them, “such writs of assistance . . . shall and may be granted by the said superior or supreme court of justice having jurisdiction within such colony or plantation respectively.” The doubts had been expressed in a series of opinions of the Attorney General in England, which did not squarely face the question presented by the Exchequer jurisdiction of the Massachusetts superior court. See Wolkins, “Malcom and Writs of Assistance,” 58 MHS, Procs. 5 (1924–1925); Frese, “Otis and Writs of Assistance,” 30 NEQ 496, 503–505. Compare Opinion of Attorney General DeGrey, 20 Aug. 1768, Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 452–454.
30. The passage of 7 Geo. 3, c. 46, note 29 above, and the creation of a new board of American Customs Commissioners to enforce it (No. 45, notes 10–14), marked the beginning of a concerted effort by the customs officials in all colonies to obtain and enforce writs of assistance. For the difficulties which they encountered, even with the new enactments, see Dickerson, “Writs of Assistance,” Era of the Revolution 49–75; Frese, Writs of Assistance (dissertation) 225–293. For earlier problems in Massachusetts, see sources and authorities cited in note 27 above. The 14th Article of the Declaration of Rights in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, substantially drafted by JA, is an early and explicit demonstration of the reaction:
“Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation, and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure; and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases and with the formalities prescribed by the laws.” 4 JA, Works 226–227.
As to JA's role in the framing, see id. at 215–217; 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography401 note. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is of similar purport:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
The first United States Customs Act provided that officers might search vessels upon reasonable suspicion at any time without warrant, but that premises ashore could be searched only with a warrant obtained on representation of suspicion to a Justice of the Peace. Act of 31 July 1789, c. 5, §24, 1 Stat. 43.
31. For newspaper publication in Boston after the Nov. 1761 argument and reaction there, see notes 26, 27, above. In many other colonies arguments similar to those of Otis were used; in 1773 JA's version of his argument as printed in the Massachusetts Spy (Doc. II and notes 1103, 20122, below) was sent to the Connecticut Committee of Correspondence. Frese, “Otis and Writs of Assistance,” 30 NEQ 506–508.
32. 1 Blackstone, Commentaries *91. As to the 18th-century position generally, see J. W. Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History 174–191 (Oxford, rev. edn., 1961); Plucknett, “Bonham's Case and Judicial Review,” 40 Harv. L. Rev. 58–60 (1926). Even Lord Camden, a friend to America, took the same position in 1768. Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 516–517. For the modern British view, see Edward McWhinney, Judicial Review in the English-Speaking World 31–48 (Toronto, 2d edn., 1960).
33. Money v. Leach, 3 Burr. 1742, 1766, 97 Eng. Rep. 1075, 1088 (K.B. 1765). See generally, 10 Holdsworth, History of English Law 659–672. The existence of the writ in England today (note 13 above) emphasizes the continuing force of the constitutional doctrine.
34. See Gridley's arguments, text following note 3183 below; compare his position in Nov. 1761. Quincy, Reports 56–57. Hutchinson expressly adopted this position at a later date. See his charge to the Grand Jury, March 1769, quoted in note 2072 below; Hutchinson to Richard Jackson, 12 Sept. 1765, 26 Mass. Arch. 153, quoted in Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 441 note.
35. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (C.P. 1610), quoted more fully, note 2173 below. For Otis' citation of the case and the other phrases quoted here, see text at notes 19-2171-73 below.
36. See Thorne, “Dr. Bonham's Case,” 54 L.Q. Rev. 543 (1938); MacKay, “Coke Parliamentary Sovereignty or the Supremacy of Law,” 22 Mich. L. Rev. 222–231 (1924); Gough, Fundamental Law 10–11, 31–40. It has also been argued that Coke intended to state a broader proposition of fundamental law. See Plucknett, “Bonham's Case,” 40 Harv. L. Rev. 31–48; Corwin, “The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law,” 42 Harv. L. Rev. 373 (1929).
37. See Gough, Fundamental Law 40–65.
38. In a sense, Bonham's Case involved the public interest, since it concerned the statutory powers of the London College of Physicians to license practitioners. However, the form of the proceeding was an action of trespass for false imprisonment brought by Dr. Bonham against the members of the Board of Censors of the College, who had imprisoned him for contempt of their orders; such actions were considered as ordinary civil actions, the concept of review of administrative action by certiorari not having been developed. See Jaffe and Henderson, “Judicial Review and the Rule of Law: Historical Origins,” 72 L.Q. Rev. 350–352 (1956); compare Gough, Fundamental Law 49. See also No. 24, note 4; No. 27, notes 4–9.
39. See Gough, Fundamental Law 104–105, 111; Plucknett, “Bonham's Case,” 40 Harv. L. Rev. 61–63.
40. See text at notes 19–2171–73 below. Compare Adams' “Abstract,” text at note 46148 below.
41. See James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved 72–73 (Boston, 1764), reprinted with the original pagination in Bernard Bailyn, Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1:419–482 (Cambridge, Mass., 1965):
“Tis hoped it will not be considered as a new doctrine that even the authority of the Parliament of Great Britain is circumscribed by certain bounds which if exceeded their acts become those of mere power without right, and consequently void. The judges of England have declared in favor of these sentiments when they expressly declare that acts of Parliament against natural equity are void. That acts against the fundamental principles of the British constitution are void. This doctrine is agreeable to the law of nature and nations, and to the divine dictates of natural and revealed religion.”
(See also id. at 1870.) In a footnote at the dagger Otis quoted a long passage on legislative power from Emmerich de Vattel, Law of Nations, bk. 1, c. 3, §34 (London, 1760), to the effect that the legislature could not change “the constitution of the state.” The footnote also cited Bonham's Case; Day v. Savadge, Hobart 85, 80 Eng. Rep. 235 (C.P. 1615) (possibly cited in argument; see note 1971 below); Thornby v. Fleetwood, 10 Mod. 113, 88 Eng. Rep. 651 (C.P. 1713); and City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 669, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592 (K.B. 1701). The last three were all cases which repeated the Bonham principle. For Otis' reliance on Locke, see, for example, Rights of the British Colonies 22–23; see also Corwin, “Higher Law,” 42 Harv. L. Rev. 399. JA, years later, asserted that Rights of the British Colonies did contain the authorities cited in the writs argument. JA to Tudor, 21 Aug. 1818, 10 JA, Works 351.
42. Otis, Rights of the British Colonies 41. For a passage in JA's “Abstract” which may also convey this idea, see text at note 47149. In a newspaper statement of the arguments, attributed to Otis, Bonham's Case was not cited, and it was merely argued that the English construction of the Act should not be followed in Massachusetts. Boston Gazette, 4 Jan. 1762, printed in Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 491–492.
43. See Otis, Rights of the British Colonies 60, citing Jeremiah Dummer, A Defence of the New England Charters 41 (Boston, 1745). See generally 1 Bailyn, Pamphlets 415–417. Otis' concept of a supreme Parliament complying with law of its own volition is related to Coke's ideas. Id. at 412–413; Gough, Fundamental Law 40–50. For Otis, however, it was the necessity for maintaining the constitution, rather than undefined moral obligation, which enjoined compliance.
44. See Charles G. Haines, The American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy 22–25 (Berkeley, 1932); Henry Rottschaefer, Handbook of American Constitutional Law 32–36 (St. Paul, Minn., 1939); Andrew C. McLaughlin, A Constitutional History of the United States 26–27 (N.Y., 1935); Corwin, “Higher Law,” 42 Harv. L. Rev. 375, 379, 408–409. Corwin seems to read too much into Adams' report of Otis' words when he says, “Then and there American constitutional law was born, for Otis' contention goes far beyond Coke's: an ordinary court may traverse the specifically enacted will of Parliament, and its condemnation is final.” Id. at 398. The history of judicial review in the colonies suggests many roots, including the activities of the colonial courts and the judicial functions of the Privy Council. See Haines, Judicial Supremacy 44–66; Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council 522–653. For references to the idea in Massachusetts, see Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 527–528 note; note 42 above; note 48 below. JA spoke of “telling the jury the nullity of acts of Parliament,” but this was after the British had left Boston. JA to William Cushing, 9 June 1776, 9 JA, Works 390–391.
45. 1 Bailyn, Pamphlets 121; Charles F. Mullet, Fundamental Law and the American Revolution 80–81 (N.Y., 1933).
46. Otis' writings contained much ambiguity, which gave rise to the correspondingly ambiguous reactions among his contemporaries. See 1 Bailyn, Pamphlets 121–123, 409–417. In Rights of the British Colonies 22–23, he quoted, apparently with approval, Locke's theory that revolution was justified when the sovereign arbitrarily assumed absolute power. He expressly rejected revolution as a solution to the existing problems of the colonies, however. Id. at 50–51. Later he retreated even further. 1 Bailyn, Pamphlets 122, 546–552.
47. See Corwin, “Higher Law,” 42 Harv. L. Rev. 394–409. The power of the courts to enforce the supremacy of the United States Constitution was not express, but was established by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137, 173–180 (1803). See also 1 Bailyn, Pamphlets 102–105.
48. See JA's comment of 3 July 1776 in note 1 above. For an example of his use of the fundamental law principle, see his argument before the Governor and Council on the closing of the courts during the Stamp Act crisis. Quincy, Reports 200–202. JA's own notes for this argument suggest that he was citing Bonham's Case in a narrow sense. 2 JA, Works 159 note. In another well-known case where the validity of an act denying jury trial was in question, JA argued for strict construction only. No. 46, text at notes 65–66.
50. See 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography 211 note; 10 Gipson, British Empire 122–123 note.
51. For the letter, see text at note 1 above. The passage in the Autobiography is in 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography276.
52. Details of the provenance of the materials printed are in note 1103 below. For one example of the “Abstract's” circulation, see note 31 above. Further evidence is provided by the existence of the Hawley and Keith versions, note 1103 below. It is worth noting that the brief accounts of the argument in 3 Hutchinson, Massachusetts Bay, ed. Mayo, 68, and 1 Gordon, History of Independence 141–142, suggest that their authors may have at least read the “Abstract,” probably in the Massachusetts Spy.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0002-0002

Author: Adams, John
Date: 1761-02-24

Adams' Minutes of the Argument1

Suffolk Superior Court, Boston, 24 February 1761
Writs of Assistance
Gridley. The Constables distraining for Rates.2 More inconsistent with English Rights and Liberties than Writts of assistance. And Necessity authorizes both.
Thatcher. I have searched, in all the ancient Repertories of Prece• { 124 } dents, in Fitzherberts Natura Brevium,3 and in the Register (Q. what the Register is) and have found no such Writt of assistance as this Petition prays. I have found two Writts of assistance in the Register but they are very different from the Writt pray'd for.4
In a Book, intituled the Modern Practice of the Court of Exchequer5 there is indeed one such Writt, and but one.
By the Act of Parliament any other private Person may as well as a Custom House Officer take an officer, a sherriff, or Constable &c. and go into any shop, store &c. and seize: any Person authorized by such a Writt, under the seal of the Court of Exchequer, may. Not Custom House officers only.6 Strange.7
Only a temporary Thing.
The most material Question is, whether the Practice of the Exchequer, will warrant this Court in granting the same.
The Act impowers all the officers of the Revenue to enter and seize in the Plantations, as well as in England. 7. & 8. Wm. 3, c. 22, §6. gives the same as 13. & 14. of C[harles]8 gives in England. The Ground of Mr. Gridleys argument is this, that this Court has the { 125 } Power of the Court of Exchequer. But This Court has renounced the Chancery Jurisdiction, which the Exchequer has in Cases where either Party is the Kings Debtor. Q. into that Case.9
In England all Informations of uncust[om]ed or prohibited Importations, are in the Exchequer. So that the Custom House officers are the officers of that Court. Under the Eye and Direction of the Barons.
The Writ of Assistance is not returnable. If such seisure were brot before your Honours, youd often find a wanton Exercise of their Power.
At home, the officers seise at their Peril even with Probable Cause.10
Otis. This Writ is against the fundamental Principles of Law. The Priviledge of House. A Man, who is quiet, is as secure in his House, as a Prince in his Castle, not with standing all his Debts, and civil Prossesses of any kind.—But
For flagrant Crimes, and in Cases of great public Necessity, the { 126 } Priviledge may be [encroached?]11 on. For Felonies an officer may break upon Prossess, and oath—i.e. by a Special Warrant to search such an House, sworn to be suspected, and good Grounds of suspicion appearing.
Make oath coram Ld. Treasurer, or Exchequer, in England or a Magistrate here, and get a special Warrant, for the public good, to infringe the Priviledge of House.12
General Warrant to search for Felonies, Hawk. Pleas Crown.13 Every petty officer from the highest to the lowest. And if some of em are <comm[issioned], others> uncom[missioned] others are uncomm[issioned].14 Gov[ernor and?] Justices used to issue such perpetual Edicts.15 (Q. with what particular Reference?)
But one Precedent, and that in the Reign of C. 2, when Star { 127 } Chamber Powers, and all Powers but lawful and useful Powers were pushd to Extremity.16
The Authority of this Modern Practice of the Court of Exchequer. It has an Imprimatur. But what may not have? It may be owing to some ignorant Clerk of the Exchequer.17
But all Precedents and this among the Rest are under the Control of the Principles of Law. Ld. Talbot. Better to observe the known Principles of Law than any one Precedent, tho in the House of Lords.18
As to Acts of Parliament. An Act against the Constitution is void: an Act against natural Equity is void: and if an Act of Parliament should be made, in the very Words of this Petition, it would be void.19 { 128 } The executive Courts must pass such Acts into disuse.20 8. Rep. 118. from Viner. Reason of the Common Law to control an Act of Parliament.21 Iron Manufacture. Noble Lord's Proposal, that we should send our Horses to England to be shod.22
If an officer will justify under a Writ he must return it. 12th. Mod. 396.23 Perpetual Writ.
{ 129 }
Stat. C. 2.24 We have all as good Right to inform as Custom House officers. And any Man may have a general, irreturnable <Writ> Commission to break Houses.
By 12. of C. on oath before Ld. Treasurer, Barons of Exchequer, or Chief Magistrate to break with an officer.25 14th. C. to issue a Warrant requiring sherriff &c. to assist the officers to search for Goods not enterd, or prohibited.26 7 & 8th. W. & M. gives officers in Plantation same Powers with officers in England.27
Continuance of Writts and Prossesses proves no more, nor so much as I grant a special Writ of assistance on special oath, for special Purpose.28
Pew indorsd Warrant to Ware. Justice Walley searchd House.29 Law Prov. Bill in Chancery. This Court confind their Chancery Power to Revenue, &c.30
Gridley. By the 7. & 8. of Wm. c. 22. §. 6th.31 This authority, of breaking and Entring ships, Warehouses Cellars &c. given to the Customs House officers in England by the statutes of the 12th. and 14th. of Charl. 2d.32 is extended to the Custom House officers in the Plantations: and by the statute of the 6th. of Anne,33 Writts of assistance { 130 } are continued, in Company with all other legal Proscesses for 6 months after the Demise of the Crown.—Now What this Writ of assistance is, we can know only by Books of Precedents. And We have producd, in a Book intituld the modern Practice of the Court of Exchequer,34 a form of such a Writ of assistance to the officers of the Customs. The Book has the Imprimatur of Wright, C.J. of the King's Bench which is as great a sanction as any Books of Precedents ever have, altho Books of Reports are usually approvd by all the Judges.35 And I take Brown the Author of this Book to have been a very good Collector of Precedents. I have two Volumes of Precedents of his Collection, which I look upon as good as any, except Coke and Rastal.36
And the Power given in this Writ is no greater Infringement of our Liberty, than the Method of collecting Taxes in this Province.37
Every Body knows that the subject has the Priviledge of House only against his fellow subjects, not vs. the King either in matters of Crime or fine.38
{ 131 }
Extracts from the Acts of Parliament.39
14. Car. 2nd.40 “And it shall be lawful to and for any Person or Persons authorized by Writ of assistants,41 under the seal of his Majesties Court of Exchequer, to take a Constable, Headborough, or other public officers inhabiting near unto the Place, and in the day time to enter and go into any House, shop, Cellar, Warehouse or Room or other Place, and in Case of Resistance to break open Doors, Chests, Trunks and other Package, there to seize and from thence to bring any Kind of Goods, or Merchandize what soever prohibited and uncustomed and to put and secure the same in his Majesties store House, in the Port [next] to the Place where such seizure shall be made.”
7. & 8th. Willm. 3rd.42 “And that the officers for collecting and managing his Majesties Revenue and inspecting the Plantation Trade in any of the said Plantations shall have the same Powers and authorities &c.43 as are provided for the officers of his Majesties Customs in { 132 } England by the said last mentioned Act made in the 14th. Year of the Reign of K. Char. 2d. and also to enter Houses or Warehouses to search for and seize any such Goods.44 And that the like assistance shall be given to the said officers in the Execution of their office, as by the said last mentiond Act is provided, for the officers in England.”45
Prov. Law. Page 114.46 Be it enacted &c. that there shall be a Superiour Court of Judicature, Court of Assize and General Goal &c. over this whole Province &c. who shall have Cognizance of all Pleas Real, Personal or mixt, as well all Pleas of the Crown &c. and generally of all other matters as fully and amply to all Intents and Purposes whatsoever as the Courts of Kings Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer within his Majesties Kingdom of England, have or ought to have.
Petition. To the honorable &c.47
Humbly shews,
{ [facing 132] } { [facing 133] } { 133 }
That he is lawfully authorized to execute the office of surveyor of all Rates, Duties, and Impositions, arising and growing due to his Majesty, at Boston in this Province and cannot fully exercise said office in such manner as his majesties service and the Laws in such Cases require Unless your Honours, who are vested with the Power of a Court of Exchequer for this Province will please to grant him a Writt of assistants, he therefore prays he and his Deputties may be aided in the Execution of said office within his District by a Writ of assistants under the seal of this superior Court in legal Form and according to Usage in his Majestys Court of Exchequer and in Great Britain.
[signed] C.P.
Province of the Massachusetts BayGeorge the second by the Grace of God of Great Britain France and Ireland King, Defender of the Faith &c.48

[salute] To all and singular Justices of the Peace, sherriffs and Constables, and to all other our officers and subjects within said Province and to each of you

[salute] Greeting.

Whereas the Commissioners of our Customs have by their Deputation dated the 8th. day of Jany. 1752, assignd Charles Paxton Esqr. surveyor of all Rates, Duties, and Impositions arising and growing due within the Port of Boston in said Province as by said Deputation at large appears, We therefore command you and each of you that you permit the said C.P. and his Deputies and servants from Time to time at his or their Wi[ll]49 as well in the day as in the Night to enter and go on board any ship, Boat or other Vessel riding lying or being within or coming to the said Port or any Places or Creeks appertaining to said Port, such ship, Boat or Vessell then and there found to View and search and strait to examine in the same, touching the Customs and subsidies to us due, and also in the day Time together with a Constable or other public officer inhabiting near unto the Place to enter { 134 } and go into any Vaults, Cellars, Warehouses, shops or other Places to search and see, whether any Goods, Wares or Merchandizes, in the same ships, Boats or Vessells, Vaults, Cellars, Warehouses, shops or other Places are or shall be there hid or concealed, having been imported, ship't or laden in order to be exported from or out of the said Port or any Creeks or Places appertaining to the same Port; and to open any Trunks, Chests, Boxes, fardells or Packs made up or in Bulk, whatever in which any Goods, Wares, or Merchandizes are suspected to be packed or concealed and further to do all Things which of Right and according to Law and the statutes in such Cases provided, is in this Part to be done: and We strictly command you and every of you that you, from Time to Time be aiding and assisting to the said C.P. his Deputties and servants and every of them in the Execution of the Premisses in all Things as becometh: Fail not at your Peril:
[signed] Witness Stephen Sewall Esqr.50 &c.
1. In JA's hand, one large sheet folded three times to make a pocket-size gathering of sixteen pages; seven pages are blank. Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 185. Printed by CFA in 2 JA, Works 521–523, and, with extensive annotation, in Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 469–476. For the dating, see note 23 above.
2. That is, the procedure for taking and selling property for nonpayment of taxes authorized under Province Law. Act of 3 Oct. 1730, c. 1, §§12, 13, 2 A&R 552–553.
3. Anthony Fitzherbert, New Natura Brevium (various edns.: French, ca. 1531–1635; English, 1652–1793).
4. The Registrum Brevium, or Register of Writs, a semi-official compilation based on the medieval manuscript registers kept by clerks of Chancery and practitioners. See Percy H. Winfield, The Chief Sources of English Legal History 298–302 (Cambridge, Mass., 1925). The writs to which Thacher refers are found in Registrum Brevium tam Originalium quam Judicialium, Appendix 46–47 (London, 4th edn., 1687). Gray points out that they direct the sheriff to assist a “party to a suit in chancery to get possession, under a decree of the Court, of lands withheld from him by another party to the suit.” Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 396.
5. As the remarks of Otis and Gridley, notes 1769, 3486, below, indicate, the work referred to here is William Brown's Compendium of the Several Branches of Practice in the Court of Exchequer at Westminster (London, various edns., 1688–1725). The writ in question, found at p. 358–361 in the 1688 edition, is set out in full in Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 398–399. See an extract, note 1769 below. See also notes 12 above, 1668 below. A work entitled The Modern Practice of the Court of Exchequer (London, 1731) contains nothing even resembling a writ of assistance.
6. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §5(2) (1662), extracted by JA, text at note 4092 below. The section cited bears Thacher out, but it probably should be read with 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §15, providing that no goods “shall be seized as forfeited” except by persons authorized by the Customs Commissioners, the Treasury, or the Crown.
7. Presumably Horne v. Boosey, 2 Str. 952, 93 Eng. Rep. 963 (K.B. 1733): Trover held to lie against a tidesman (a minor official charged with searching vessels for prohibited goods), who had seized goods ashore and had them condemned in the Exchequer. The Court noted a distinction between a seizure by “a proper officer,” which could be attacked only in the Exchequer, and the seizure by this defendant, “who could not enter a house without a writ of assistance and a peace officer, the words of his warrant being so restrained.” See Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 470 note.
8. That is, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, note 658 above. For the Act of 7 & 8 Will. 3, see note 15 above.
9. Gray has identified this case as McNeal v. Brideoak, SCJ Rec. 1754, fol. 150 (Suffolk, Feb. 1754), in which the complainants, Ann and Mary McNeal of Dublin, proceeded as “Debtors and Accountants to his Majesty.” The action, described as a “Bill in Equity,” was dismissed and the complainants were allowed an appeal to the King in Council, of which no record has been found. Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 470–471 note. Compare Quincy, Reports 54. See Min. Bk. 67, SCJ Suffolk, Nov. 1752, N–137; Feb. 1754, C–26. The Exchequer jurisdiction in question, either legal or equitable, arose from a writ known as quominus, because the plaintiff made a fictional allegation that he was debtor to the King for the amount of his claim and was “by which less” able to meet his debt. The court acted by virtue of its power in matters affecting the royal purse. See 3 Blackstone, Commentaries *45–46; Plucknett, Concise History 160–161, 170. The Massachusetts court's refusal to act would seem to be a reflection more of its lack of equity powers than of any desire to disclaim the powers of Exchequer, conferred on it by statute. Act of 26 June, 1699, c. 3 §1, 1 A&R 370, set out, note 4698 below. The writ of assistance was part of the Exchequer's common-law revenue jurisdiction, rather than an equitable process. See Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 538–539; Brown, Compendium 28–29; note 18 above; note 3082 below.
10. Thacher here seems to be citing Leglise v. Champante, 2 Str. 820, 93 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1728) where in an action at law against a customs officer for the seizure of goods which the Exchequer had found not liable to forfeiture, “it was held, that in these cases the officer seizes at his peril, and that a probable cause is no defense.” The authority of this case is cast in doubt by the statute, 19 Geo. 2, c. 34, §16 (1746), continued to 29 Sept. 1764 by 32 Geo. 2, c. 18, §1 (1759), which made a court's certification of probable cause a bar to any suit against the seizing officer. See 12 Viner, Abridgment 173. It seems to have been well established in England, however, that in case of a wrongful search as distinct from a wrongful seizure, probable cause was not a defense to an action, even when the search had been carried out by virtue of a writ of assistance. See authorities cited in Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 533–534 note. These cases were all decided after 1761, but even if this had clearly been the rule when Thacher argued, it would seem to cut against his position, since it demonstrates that the power given by the writ could be curbed by the courts.
11. Illegible in the MS. Gray's reading is “incroached.” Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 471 note. It is textually more likely, but hardly more satisfactory than CFA's reading of “infringed.” 2 JA, Works 521.
12. For the powers of customs officers to enter on special warrant see 12 Car. 2, c. 19 (1660) quoted, note 5 above. In a number of situations the General Court granted provincial customs and other officers power to obtain a special search warrant to search specific premises upon giving information to a justice of the peace. See for example, Act of 13 Feb. 1760, c. 28, §25, 4 A&R 311 (Collector of excise to search for liquors sold without permit); Act of 3 Feb. 1764, c. 28, §5, 4 A&R 684 (Sheriff or constable to have warrant to search for flesh or skins of moose and deer killed out of season). Prior to the Import Act of 20 April 1756, c. 47, §§18–20, 3 A&R 936, province customs officers had the right to search in all suspected places “for illegally imported goods.” In the 1756 act and thereafter the general provision was retained, but officers with a warrant on oath of information could force an entry to search. Compare Act of 27 June 1755, c. 1, §§18, 19, 3 A&R 845. See Frese, Writs of Assistance (dissertation) 179 note, 181 note.
13. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 82.
“But it seems to be very questionable whether a Constable can justify the Execution of a general Warrant to search for Felons or stolen Goods, because such Warrant seems to be illegal in the very face of it; for that it would be extremely hard to leave it to the discretion of a common Officer to arrest what Persons, and search what Houses he thinks fit. And if a Justice cannot legally grant a blank Warrant for the Arrest of a single Person, leaving it to the Party to fill it up, surely he cannot grant such a general Warrant, which might have the effect of an Hundred blank Warrants.”
14. Gray's suggestion that JA meant to write, “If some of em are commissioned others are uncommissioned,” seems sound in context, although the MS also supports CFA's reading of “common” and “uncommon.” Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 472 note; 2 JA, Works 522.
15. This is apparently a reference to the prior practice in Massachusetts. See text and note 17 above. Gray reads the passage as “Government Justices” and suggests that it is a reference to the 17th-century English practice under which justices of the peace would issue warrants authorizing a general search for stolen goods upon the complaint of one who had been robbed. Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 472 note. See also 2 JA, Works 522. There is a passage in JA's “Abstract,” at note 33135 below, in which Otis goes on at some length about the former powers of Justices of the Peace to issue general warrants. The use of the phrase “perpetual Edicts” in the present text, however, surely indicates a writ giving a general power of search, rather than the more limited Justice's warrant.
16. Probably a reference to the form of a writ in Brown's Compendium. See note 557 above, note 3486 below. Although this work was not published until 1688, the form recites that the customs officers therein given writs were commissioned by virtue of Letters Patent dated “anno regni nostri vicesimo septimo” (in the twenty-seventh year of our reign), which could refer to no English monarch ruling between Elizabeth I and George II except Charles II. The date of the form would thus be between 1676 and 1685, the year of Charles II's death.
17. Gray notes that the language of the writ is “so curious a justification of Otis's suggestion” that he reprints it in full. Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 398–399. As the following extract may suggest, it is certainly an interesting example of the degeneration of Latin:
“Ac etiam in tempore diurno unacum Constabular' Praeposito Anglice Headborough aut alio publico officiario prope inhabitan” intrare & ire in aliquas Cellas Anglice Vaults Cellur' Repositor' Anglice Warehouses Shopas vel alia loca scrutare & videre utrum aliqua bon' res vel merchandizas. . . . Ac aperire aliquos riscos Anglice Truncks cistas pixid' fardell' Packs fatt' vel de la Bulke quecunque in quibus aliqua bona res vel merchandiz' erint suspect' fore paccat' vel concelat.'” Id. at 399.
The translated form, issued to Charles Paxton in Massachusetts in 1756, is printed in text at note 48100 below.
18. See Clare v. Clare, Talb. 21, 26–27, 25 Eng. Rep. 638, 640 (Ch. 1734) (Talbot, Lord Chancellor):
“The case of Higgins versus Dowler is very imperfectly reported; and was upon a Demurrer, where Things are not argued with that Nicety which they are upon arguing the Merits of a Cause. That of Stanley and Lee has not been particularly mentioned; so that what we have of it is only upon memory: And I think it much better to stick to the known general rules, than to follow any one particular precedent which may be founded on reasons unknown to us: Such a proceeding would confound all Property. . . . The Case of Lady Lanesborough versus Fox is the strongest authority that can be; and even, had it not been in the House of Lords, I should have thought myself bound to go according to the general and known Rules of Law.”
Compare Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 473 note 17. Otis here makes use of two of the loopholes available in the 18th century to ensure that precedent did not stifle the orderly growth of the law. These were the inadequacy of the source of the asserted precedent and an appeal to principles variously described as those of common law, natural law, reason, and common sense. See 12 Holdsworth, History of English Law 150–158; C. H. S. Fifoot, Lord Mansfield 214–218 (Oxford, 1936).
19. Probably an inadvertence for the writ itself. A statute in the language of the petitions upon which the case came up would have been neither unconstitutional nor effective. See text at note 22 above. The petition of Charles Paxton for a writ in 1755, printed at note 4799 below, even if it had been urged in this case, is scarcely less neutral in tone. But compare Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 474 note. Gray suggests that the phrase “natural equity” means that Otis cited Lord Hobart's language in Day v. Savadge, Hobart 85, 87, 80 Eng. Rep. 235, 237 (C.P. 1615): “Even an act of Parliament, made against naturall equitie, as to make a man judge in his owne case, is void in it selfe, for Jura naturae sunt immutabilia, and they are leges legum.” See Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 521–524. See note 41 above.
20. That is, the courts of justice, which “execute” the law. See Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 474 note; No. 46, text at note 1592. Compare Hutchinson's Charge to the Grand Jury, March Term, Suffolk, 1769:
“We, Gentlemen, who are to execute the Law, are not to enquire into the Reason and Policy of it, or whether it is constitutional or not. . . . We, and you, Gentlemen, as the Executive Body, are to enquire what is Law, and see that the Laws are inforced. If we step over this Line, and judge of the Propriety or Impropriety, the Justice or Injustice of the Laws, we introduce the worst sort of Tyranny:—the most absolute Despotism being formed by a Union of the Legislative and Executive Power.” Quincy, Reports 307–308.
21. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 118, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652–653 (C.P. 1610), here cited by Otis from the extract of it in 19 Viner, Abridgment 512–513, tit. Statutes (E. 6, p. 15), which is as follows (variations in Coke's text being indicated in brackets):
“It appears in our Books, That in several [many] Cases the Common Law shall [will] controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void; For when an Act of Parliament is against Common Right and Reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the Common Law shall[will] controul it, and adjudge it[such act] to be void, and therefore in 8 E. 3. 30. a. b. Thomas Tregor's Case upon the Statute of Westm. 2. cap. 38 & Artic. super Cartas cap. 9 Herle said, that Sometimes [some] Statutes are made contrary to [against] Law and Right which the Makers of [those who made] them perceiving will not put them in Execution.”
For discussion of this passage, see text at notes 35–44 above.
22. The reference has not been identified, but it is presumably to the debates in Parliament on 23 Geo. 2, c. 29 (1750) prohibiting iron manufacture in the colonies. See Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 474 note. This is the only mention of the statutes regulating colonial trade and manufacture in either of JA's contemporary accounts. In his later letters, however, JA described Otis' massive attack of “four or five hours” on these Acts. See 10 JA, Works 315–350. He also told Tudor in a letter of 21 Aug. 1818 that “Mr. Otis asserted all these acts to be null and void by the law of nature, by the English constitution, and by the American charters, because America was not represented in Parliament.” Id. at 351. This statement would not seem to be justified by the bare reference here.
23. Freeman v. Bluet, 12 Mod. 394, 396, 88 Eng. Rep. 1403, 1404 (K.B. 1700), an action against a court officer who had seized goods in replevin under a precept from the sheriff directing a return. In upholding a demurrer to a plea of justification, on the ground that it did not allege a return, Holt, C.J., said,
“in all Capias's ad Respondend, or other mean Process to [the] Sheriff [or other immediate officer], if Trespass or false Imprisonment be brought against him for executing them, he cannot justify without showing a Return . . . for, he that has not shewed to the Court that he has done his Duty in what the Process of the Court required him, shall not be justified by the Process.”
Otis seems to be arguing that since the writ of assistance does not require a return the court has no control over its use. See his argument, text at note 35137 below. Compare Thacher's argument, text at notes 9–1061–62 above.
24. That is, the statutes of Charles II referred to in the next paragraph. Compare Thacher's remark, text at note 658 above.
25. 12 Car. 2, c. 19, §1 (1660), discussed, note 5 above.
26. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §5(2) (1662), text at note 4092 below.
27. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §6 (1696), text at notes 42–4594–97 below.
28. That is, 1 Anne, stat. 1, c. 8, §5 (1702), providing for continuation of the writ of assistance and other processes after the death of the sovereign. JA's notes may be somewhat garbled, but Otis seems to be saying that this statute is of equal force whether the writs are special or general in nature. See his remarks in JA's “Abstract,” text at notes 32–34134–136, and following note 46148 below.
29. These incidents are more fully described in JA's “Abstract,” text at notes 38–42140–144 below.
30. Otis is here apparently rehearsing Thacher's arguments, text at note 961 above, that the Superior Court had renounced the Exchequer powers given it by province law (note 4698 below). The last sentence, which may be inaccurately reported by JA, seems to mean that the only Exchequer powers which the court retained were those given it by provincial and parliamentary Acts of Trade and Revenue over violations of their provisions. See note 18 above. If this is the argument, it may prove too much. For, while the provincial statutes contained sharply limited search provisions (see note 1264 above), in cases under English statutes it could well be argued that the power to issue writs of assistance was a power incident to the revenue jurisdiction, rather than an inherent chancery power which the court had renounced.
31. At notes 42–4594–97 below.
32. The 12th of Charles II is quoted, note 5 above. For the “14th” (i.e. 13th & 14th) of Charles II, see text at note 4092 below.
33. Apparently an inadvertence for 1 Anne, stat. 1, c. 8, §5 (1702). The confusion, whether in Gridley's argument or JA's reporting, may perhaps be explained by the fact that the duration of Parliament and the Privy Council and the tenure of all Crown officers was extended for six months after the death of the sovereign by 6 Anne, c. 7, §§4, 8 (1707).
34. That is, Brown's Compendium, cited in note 557 above.
35. Under the various Licensing Acts which controlled the British press during the greater part of the 17th century, the imprimatur was a required proof that permission to publish had been granted. See 6 Holdsworth, History of English Law 367–378. Upon occasion, however, the judges used it to convey some opinion of a book's value. See John William Wallace, The Reporters 34 note (Boston, 1882). The Compendium bears no such judgment, but only the statement, “Imprimatur, R. Wright, May 1st, 1688.” This was Sir Robert Wright, Chief Justice of the King's Bench, 1687–1688. Gray suggests that Wright's incompetence weakens the value of his imprimatur, relying largely on the judgment of Roger North, whose brother, Baron Guilford, was Wright's personal enemy. Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 477 note. See 6 Holdsworth, History of English Law 507–508, 530, 534. Both Wright's rise to judicial eminence and his conduct upon the Bench under the Stuarts were politically tainted, as was his end, which came in Newgate in 1689 while under indictment for high treason and bribery. He was nevertheless a lawyer of long experience, having entered Lincoln's Inn in 1654, been made serjeant in 1679, and been appointed a Baron of the Exchequer in 1684. DNB.
36. That is, Sir Edward Coke, Booke of Entries; containing perfect and approved Presidents of Counts, Declarations, etc. (London, 1614), and William Rastell, Colleccion of entrees, of declaracions, of barres, replications, rejoinders, issues, verdits, and divers other matters and fyrst an Epistle, with certayne instructions (London, 1566). As to these two basic works on common law pleading, see 5 Holdsworth, History of English Law 384, 461. The volumes of Brown which Gridley owned were probably his Formula bene placitandi; a Book of Entries, containing Precedents (London, 1671), and Methodus Novissima intrandi Placita Generalia (London, 1699). See 5 Holdsworth, History of English Law 385–386; 6 id. at 600, 683, 686.
37. See note 254 above.
38. See Dalton, Country Justice 404: “The Officer, upon any Warrant from a Justice, either for the Peace or Good Behaviour, or in any other Case where the King is a Party, may by Force break open a Man's House to arrest the Offender.” Compare 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown 82, 92, to the effect that an officer may break a house to arrest a suspect felon, “for it is a proceeding for the king by persons by law authorized”; but that a private person does so at his peril. But see 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 86–87: “But where one lies under a probable suspicion only, and is not indicted, it seems the better Opinion at this Day, That no one can justify the Breaking open Doors in Order to apprehend him.”
39. The material following is in a more careful hand and was evidently added to the foregoing by JA at some time after the argument.
40. That is, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §5(2) (1662). Quotation marks supplied; italics are JA's.
41. There was considerable confusion between this spelling and “assistance.” In the Nov. 1761 argument Gridley urged that “assistants” was correct, and that it signified the controlling power which a constable could exercise in the search. Quincy, Reports 56–57. Contemporary sources indicate that the original spelling was “assistance.” See, for example, Thomas Manley, ed., A Collection of the Statutes Made in the Reigns of King Charles I and King Charles II 131 (London, 1667); J. Keble, ed., Statutes at Large 1216 (London, 1676); compare 5 Statutes of the Realm 394 (London, 1819). Although this spelling was followed in the index to the 1688 edition of Brown's work on Exchequer practice (note 557 above), “assistants” is found in all editions of the Statutes at Large published between 1681 and 1758. See, for example, Keble, ed., Statutes at Large 1218 (London, 2d edn., 1681); William Hawkins, ed., Statutes at Large, 2:583 (London, 1735). In editions of 1758 and after, however, the spelling is once again “assistance.” See John Cay, Statutes at Large, 2:708 (London, 1758); Owen Ruffhead, Statutes at Large, 3:237 (London, 1763). It seems probable that the confusion was due to an error in Keble's 1681 edition of the Statutes at Large. According to R. C. Jarvis, present Intelligence Officer and Librarian, H.M. Customs and Excise, “assistance” is merely an archaic form of “assistants,” meaning a body of official helpers. Letter of 8 Nov. 1963 and memorandum in Adams Papers editorial files. Compare OED. If this interpretation is correct, Gridley's view is sound, regardless of the spelling adopted.
42. That is, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §6(2) (1696). Quotation marks supplied. Passages omitted by JA are set out in notes 4395 and 4496 below from Hawkins, Statutes at Large.
43. JA has here omitted the following: “for visiting and searching of ships, and taking their entries, and for seizing and bringing on Shoar any of the Goods prohibited to be imported or exported into or out of any of the said Plantations or for which any Duties are payable or ought to have been paid, by any of the aforementioned Acts.”
44. JA has here omitted the following:
“And that all the Wharfingers, and Owners of Keys and Wharfs, or any Lightermen, Bargemen, Watermen, Porters, or other Persons assisting in the Conveyance, Concealment or Rescue of any of the said Goods, or in the hindring or Resistance of any of the said Officers in the Performance of their Duty, and the Boats, Barges, Lighters or other Vessels, employed in the Conveyance of such Goods shall be subject to the like Pains and Penalties as are provided by the same Act made in the Fourteenth Year of King Charles the Second, in relation to prohibited or uncustomed Goods in this Kingdom.”
45. The section continues with provisions for penalties upon officers who violate the Act and for special pleading on their behalf in actions brought against them for performance of their duties. See note 1062 above.
46. That is, Act of 26 June 1699, c. 3, §1, 1 A&R 370. JA's reference here may be to the text of the Act in Acts and Laws of His Majesties Province of Massachusetts Bay 114 (Boston, 1726), where it appears as 11 Will. 3, c. 3. The relevant section is as follows:
“[T]here shall be a Superiour Court of Judicature, Court of Assize and General Goal Delivery, over this whole Province, to be Held and Kept Annually at the respective Times and Places in this Act hereafter mentioned and expressed, by One Chief Justice, and Four other Justices to be Appointed and Commissionated for the same. Any Three of whom to be a Quorum, who shall have Cognizance of all Pleas, Real, Personal or Mixt, as well all Pleas of the Crown, and all matters relating to the Conservation of the Peace, and Punishment of Offenders; as Civil Causes or Actions between party and party; and between His Majesty and any of His Subjects, whether the same do concern the Realty, and relate to any Right of Freehold and Inheritance; or whether the same do concern the personalty, and relate to matter of Debt, Contract, Damage or personal Injury; and also all mixt Actions which concern both realty and personalty brought before them by Appeal, Review, Writ of Error, or otherwise as the Law directs. And generally of all other Matters as fully and amply to all intents and purposes whatsoever, as the Courts of Kings Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer within His Majesty's Kingdom of England, have, or ought to have. And are hereby Impowred to give Judgment therein, and award Execution thereupon.”
47. JA has here copied the form of petition used by Charles Paxton in applying for a writ in 1755. The original, printed by Gray, was captioned, “To the Honourable his Majestys Justices of his Superior Court for said Province to be held at York in and for the County of York on the third Tuesday of June 1755.” The writ was issued by order of the Superior Court in August 1755. See Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 402–403 and notes. The document is now in MHi:Misc. MSS.
48. JA has here copied the form of the writ issued to Paxton. The original has not been found. As Gray, who printed JA's copy, notes, it is a translation of the form in Brown's Compendium, note 557 above. Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 404 note.
49. Missing in worn margin of the MS. This is Gray's reading. The Latin is “volunt'.” Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 399, 404.
50. As to Sewall, see note 20 above.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0002-0003

Author: Adams, John
Date: 1761-04

Adams' “Abstract of the Argument”1

Ca. April 1761
Boston Superior Court February 1761.2
On the second Tuesday of the Court's sitting, appointed by the rule of the Court for argument of special matters, came on the dispute on { 135 } the petition of Mr. Cockle3 and others on the one side, and the Inhabitants of Boston on the other, concerning Writs of Assistance. Mr. Gridley appeared for the former, Mr. Otis for the latter. Mr. Thacher was joined with him at the desire of the Court.
{ 136 }
Mr. Gridley.4 I appear on the behalf of Mr. Cockle and others, who pray “that as they cannot fully exercise their Offices in such a manner as his Majesty's Service and their Laws in such cases require, unless your Honors who are vested with the power of a Court of Exchequer for this Province will please to grant them Writs of Assistance. They therefore pray that they and their Deputies may be aided in the Execution of their Offices by Writs of Assistance under the Seal of this Court and in legal form, and according to the Usage of his Majesty's Court of Exchequer in Great Britain.”
May it please your Honors, it is certain it has been the practice of the Court of Exchequer in England,5 and of this Court in this Province, to grant Writs of Assistance to Custom House Officers. Such Writs are mentioned in several Acts of Parliament, in several Books of Reports; and in a Book called the Modern Practice of the Court of Exchequer, We have a Precedent, a form of a Writ, called a Writ of Assistance for Custom house Officers, of which the following6 a few years past to Mr. Paxton under the Seal of this Court, and tested by the late Chief Justice Sewall is a literal Translation.7
The first Question therefore for your Honors to determine is, whether this practice of the Court of Exchequer in England (which it is certain, has taken place heretofore, how long or short a time soever it continued) is legal or illegal. And the second is, whether the practice of the8 Exchequer (admitting it to be legal) can warrant this Court in the same practice.
In answer to the first, I cannot indeed find the Original of this Writ of Assistance. It may be of very antient, to which I am inclined, or it may be of modern date. This however is certain, that the Stat. of the 14th. Char. 2nd. has established this Writ almost in the words of the Writ itself. “And it shall be lawful to and for any person or persons authorised by Writ of Assistance under the seal of his Majesty's Court of Exchequer to take a Constable, Headborough, or other public Officer, inhabiting near unto the place, and in the day time to enter and go into any house, Shop, Cellar, Warehouse, room, or any other { 137 } place, and in case of Resistance, to break open doors, Chests, Trunks and other Package, and there to seize any kind of Goods or Merchandize whatever prohibited, and to put the same into his Majesty's Warehouse in the Port where Seisure is made.”9
By this act and that of 12 Char. 2nd.10 all the powers in the Writ of Assistance mentioned are given, and it is expressly said, the persons shall be authorised by Writs of Assistance under the seal of the Exchequer. Now the Books in which we should expect to find these Writs, and all that relates to them are Books of Precedents, and Reports in the Exchequer, which are extremely scarce in this Country;11 we have one, and but one that treats of Exchequer matters, and that is called the “Modern practice of the Court of Exchequer,” and in this Book we find one Writ of Assistance, translated above. Books of Reports have commonly the Sanction of all the Judges, but books of Precedents never have more than that of the Chief Justice. Now this Book has the Imprimatur of Wright, who was Chief Justice of the King's Bench,12 and it was wrote by Brown, whom I esteem the best Collector of Precedents; I have Two Volumes of them by him, which I esteem the best except Rastall and Coke. But we have a further proof of the legality of these Writs, and of the settled practice at home of allowing them; because by the Stat. 6th Anne which continues all Processes and Writs after the Demise of the Crown, Writs of Assistance are continued among the Rest.
It being clear therefore that the Court of Exchequer at home has a power by Law of granting these Writs, I think there can be but little doubt, whether this Court as a Court of Exchequer for this Province has this power. By the Statute of the 7th. & 8th. W. 3d., it is enacted “that all the Officers for collecting and managing his Majesty's Revenue, and inspecting the Plantation Trade in any of the said Plantations, shall have the same powers &c. as are provided for the Officers of the Revenue in England; also to enter Houses, or Warehouses, to search for and seize any such Goods, and that the like Assistance shall be given to the said Officers as is the Custom in England.”13
Now what is the Assistance which the Officers of the Revenue are to have here, which is like that they have in England?14 Writs of { 138 } Assistance under the Seal of his Majesty's Court of Exchequer at home will not run here. They must therefore be under the Seal of this Court. For by the law of this Province 2 W. 3d. Ch. 315 “there shall be a Superior Court &c. over the whole Province &c. who shall have cognizance of all pleas &c. and generally of all other matters, as fully and [amply]16 to all intents and purposes as the Courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer within his Majesty's Kingdom of England have or ought to have.”
It is true the common privileges of Englishmen are taken away in this Case, but even their privileges are not so in cases of Crime and fine. 'Tis the necessity of the Case and the benefit of the Revenue that justifies this Writ. Is not the Revenue the sole support of Fleets and Armies abroad, and Ministers at home? without which the Nation could neither be preserved from the Invasions of her foes, nor the Tumults of her own Subjects. Is not this I say infinitely more important, than the imprisonment of Thieves, or even Murderers? yet in these Cases 'tis agreed Houses may be broke open.
In fine the power now under consideration is the same with that given by the Law of this Province to Treasurers towards Collectors, and to them towards the subject. A Collector may when he pleases distrain my goods and Chattels, and in want of them arrest my person, and throw me instantly into Goal. What! shall my property be wrested from me!—shall my Liberty be destroyed by a Collector, for a debt, unadjudged, without the common Indulgence and Lenity of the Law? So it is established, and the necessity of having public taxes effectually and speedily collected is of infinitely greater moment to the whole, than the Liberty of any Individual.
Thacher. In obedience to the Order of this Court I have searched with a good deal of attention all the antient Reports of Precedents, Fitz. N. Brev.17 and the Register, but have not found any such Writ as this Petition prays. In the latter indeed I have found Two Writs which bear the Title of Brev. Assistentice, but these are only to give possession of Houses &c. in cases of Injunctions and Sequestration in Chancery. By the Act of Parliament any private Person as well as { 139 } Custom House Officer may take a Sheriff or Constable and go into any Shop &c. and seize &c. (here Mr. Thacher quoted an Authority from Strange which intended to shew that Writs of Assistance were only temporary things).18
The most material question is whether the practice of the Exchequer is good ground for this Court. But this Court has upon a solemn Argument, which lasted a whole day, renounc'd the Chance of [Chancery]19 Jurisdiction which the Exchequer has in Cases where either party is the King's Debtor.
In England all Informations of uncustomed or prohibited Goods are in the Exchequer, so that the Custom House Officers are the Officers of that Court under the Eye and Direction of the Barons and so accountable for any wanton exercise of power.
The Writ now prayed for is not returnable. If the Seizures were so, before your Honors, and this Court should enquire into them you'd often find a wanton exercise of power. At home they seize at their peril, even with probable Cause.
May it please your Honours,
I was desired by one of the court to look into the books, and consider the question now before the court,21 concerning Writs of Assistance. I have accordingly considered it, and now appear not only in obedience to your order, but also in behalf of the inhabitants of this town, who have presented another petition, and out of regard to the liberties of the subject. And I take this opportunity to declare, that whether under a fee or not, (for in such a cause as this I despise a fee) I will to my { 140 } dying day oppose, with all the powers and faculties God22 has given me, all such instruments of slavery on the one hand, and villainy on the other, as this writ of assistance is. It appears to me (may it please your honours) the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of the constitution,23 that ever was found in an English law-book. I must therefore beg your honours patience and attention to the whole range of an argument, that may perhaps appear uncommon in many things, as well as points of learning, that are more remote and unusual, that the whole tendency of my design may the more easily be perceived, the conclusions better descend,24 and the force of them better felt.
I shall not think much of my pains in this cause as I engaged in it from principle. I was sollicited to engage on the other side.25 I was sollicited to argue this cause as Advocate-General, and because I would not, I have been charged with a desertion of my office; to this charge I can give a very sufficient answer, I renounced that office,26 and I argue this cause from the same principle; and I argue it with the greater pleasure as it is in favour of British liberty, at a time, when we hear the greatest monarch upon earth declaring from his throne, that he glories in the name of Briton, and that the privileges of his people are dearer to him than the most valuable prerogatives of his crown.27 And as it is in opposition to a kind of power, the exercise { 141 } of which in former periods of English history, cost one King of England his head and another his throne. I have taken more pains in this cause, than I ever will take again: Although my engaging in this and another popular cause28 has raised much resentment; but I think I can sincerely declare, that I cheerfully submit myself to every odious name for conscience sake; and from my soul I despise all those whose guilt, malice or folly has made my foes.29 Let the consequences be what they will, I am determined to proceed. The only principles of public conduct that are worthy a gentleman, or a man are, to sacrifice estate, ease, health and applause,30 and even life itself to the sacred calls of his country. These manly sentiments in private life make the good citizen, in public life, the patriot31 and the hero.—I do not say, when brought to the test, I shall be invincible; I pray GOD I may never be brought to the melancholy trial; but if ever I should, it would be then known, how far I can reduce to practice principles I know founded in truth.—In the mean time I will proceed to the subject of the writ. In the first,32 may it please your Honours, I will admit, that writs of one kind, may be legal, that is, special writs, directed to special officers, and to search certain houses, &c. especially set forth in the writ, may be granted by the Court of Exchequer at home, upon oath made before the Lord Treasurer by the person, who asks, that he suspects such goods to be concealed inthose very places he desires to search. The Act of 14th Car. II. which Mr. Gridley mentions proves this. And in this light the writ appears like a warrant from a justice of peace to search for stolen goods. Your Honours will find in the old book, concerning the office of a justice of peace, precedents of general warrants to search suspected houses.33 But in more modern books you will find only special warrants to search such and such houses specially named, in which the complainant has before sworn he suspects his goods are concealed; and you will find it adjudged that special warrants only are legal. In the same manner I rely on it, that the writ prayed for in this petition being general is illegal. It is a power { 142 } that places the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer. I say I admit that special writs of assistance to search special houses,34 may be granted to certain persons on oath; but I deny that the writ now prayed for can be granted, for I beg leave to make some observations on the writ itself before I proceed to other Acts of Parliament.
In the first place the writ is universal, being directed “to all and singular justices, sheriffs, constables and all other officers and subjects, &c.” So that in short it is directed to every subject in the king's dominions; every one with this writ may be a tyrant: If this commission is legal, a tyrant may, in a legal manner also, controul, imprison or murder any one within the realm.
In the next place, it is perpetual; there's no return, a man is accountable to no person for his doings, every man may reign secure in his petty tyranny, and spread terror and desolation around him, until the trump of the arch angel shall excite35 different emotions in his soul.36
In the third place, a person with this writ, in the day time may enter all houses, shops, &c. at will, and command all to assist.
Fourth, by this not only deputies, &c. but even their menial servants are allowed to lord it over us—What is this but to have the curse of Canaan with a witness on us, to be the servant of servants, the most despicable of God's creation.37 Now one of the most essential branches of English liberty, is the freedom of one's house. A man's house is his castle; and while he is quiet, he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally annihilate this privilege. Custom house officers may enter our houses when they please—we are commanded to permit their entry—their menial servants may enter—may break locks, bars and every thing in their way—and whether they break through malice or revenge, no man, no court can inquire—bare suspicion without oath is sufficient. This wanton exercise of this power is no chimerical suggestion of a heated Brain—I will mention some facts. Mr. Pew had one { 143 } of these writs, and when Mr. Ware succeeded him, he endorsed this writ over to Mr. Ware, so that these writs are negotiable from one officer to another, and so your Honours have no opportunity of judging the persons to whom this vast power is delegated. Another instance is38 this.—Mr. Justice Wally had called this same Mr. Ware before him by a constable, to answer for a breach of the Sabbath day acts, or that of profane swearing. As soon as he had done,39 Mr. Ware asked him if he had done, he replied, yes. Well then, says he,40 I will shew you a little of my power—I command you to permit me to search your house for unaccustomed41 goods; and went on to search his house from the garret to the cellar, and then served the constable in the same manner.42 But to shew another absurdity in this writ, if it should be established, I insist upon it every person by 14th of Car. II. has this power as well as Custom-house officers; the words are, “it shall be lawful for any person or persons authorized, &c.” What a scene does this open! Every man prompted by revenge, ill humour or wantonness to inspect the inside of his neighbour's house, may get a writ of assistance; others will ask it from self defence; one arbitrary exertion will provoke another, until society will be involved in tumult and in blood. Again these writs are not returned. Writs in their nature are temporary things; when the purposes for which they are issued are answered, they exist no more; but these monsters in the law43 live forever, no one can be called to account. Thus reason and the constitution are both against this writ. Let us see what authority there is for it. No more than one instance can be found of it in all our law books, and that was in the zenith of arbitrary power, viz. In the reign of Car. II. when Star-chamber powers were pushed in extremity by { 144 } some ignorant clerk of the Exchequer. But had this writ been in any book whatever it would have been illegal. All precedents are under the controul of the principles of the44law. Lord Talbot Says, it is better to observe these45 than any precedents though in the House of Lords, the last resort of the subject. No Acts of Parliament can establish such a writ; Though it should be made in the very words of the petition it would be void, “An act against the constitution is void.” Vid. Viner.46 But these prove no more than what I before observed, that special writs may be granted on oath and probable suspicion. The Act of 7th and 8th of William III. that the officers of the plantations shall have the same powers, &c. is confined to this sense, that an officer should show probable grounds, should take his oath on it, should do this before a magistrate, and that such magistrate, if he thinks proper should issue a special warrant to a constable to search the places. That of 6th of Anne can prove no more.47
It is the business of this court to demolish this monster of oppression, and to tear into rags this remnant of Starchamber tyranny—&c.
The court suspended the absolute determination of this matter. I have omitted many authorities; also many fine touches in the order of reasoning, and numberless Rhetorical and popular flourishes.48
1. The text that follows is the most complete rendition possible today of JA's “Abstract of the Argument for and against the Writts of Assistance,” probably made by him sometime in the spring of 1761. See text at note 49 above. Five versions of this famous document are here brought together: (1) The text of the Gridley and Thacher arguments from Israel Keith's Common Place Book, as printed in Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 479–482, from a document then (1864) in the possession of John Newell of Pittsford, Vt., and Boston, which recent extensive search has not located; (2) the text of the Gridley and Otis arguments from the Joseph Hawley Common Place Book now in NN:Hawley Papers; (3) the text of the Otis argument as printed in the Massachusetts Spy, 29 April 1773, p. 3, cols. 1–3; (4) the text of the Otis argument as printed in George Richards Minot, Continuation of the History of the Province of Massachusetts Bay, 2:91–99 (Boston, 1803), with paraphrases of the arguments of Gridley and Thacher; (5) Minot's text of the Otis argument as reprinted by CFA with some further minor corrections and the elimination of phrases which JA had described as interpolations, in 2 JA, Works 523–525. All five versions are closely related. The Spy and Minot texts of Otis differ only in corrections of grammar and style, apparently made by Minot, and CFA follows the latter, except for the interpolations. The Hawley version of Otis and that in the Spy are identical, with the exception of material apparently omitted in copying by Hawley and certain touches of style omitted, perhaps for editorial reasons, from the Spy. Gray did not print Keith's text of Otis, but we have his testimony that it closely followed Minot. Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 482. A similar identity prevails among the various texts of the Gridley and Thacher arguments, including Minot's paraphrase.
Although no copy in JA's hand has been found, the evidence that his was the common parent of these five versions seems overwhelming. The similarity in content and phraseology to JA's rough notes has already been pointed out, as have his later recollections that it was his notes which appeared first in the Spy, then in Minot's History of Massachusetts Bay. See text and note 51 above. For other circulation of the “Abstract,” see note 52 above. The best independent evidence of JA's authorship is the Keith Common Place Book. Keith, Harvard 1771, served in the Continental Army and was admitted an attorney in the Superior Court for Suffolk County in March 1780. No record of his clerkship has been found, but he undoubtedly studied law in Boston both before and after his military service. His Common Place Book was said to contain not only the argument on the writs, but other legal notes known to have come from JA. Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 478. On the basis of this evidence it seems a fair conclusion that Keith copied both the argument and the other materials either from JA's own papers, or from a copy by someone who had clerked for him. The history of the Hawley version cannot be so readily traced, but since Joseph Hawley was JA's friend and contemporary at the bar, it seems likely that he too copied the arguments from JA. The only other reasonable hypothesis would seem to be that the Keith and Hawley texts were copied from a summary of the argument which another (perhaps Jonathan Williams Austin, whom JA accused of the 1773 “theft” of the materials, text at note 1 above) had made on the basis of JA's on-the-spot notes, which are indubitably the source of the longer version. This theory seems refuted by the evidence of the diary entry, note 49 above, and by JA's later taking credit for the Spy and Minot texts.
The basic texts followed here are Gray's rendition of the Keith version of Gridley's and Thacher's arguments, and the Massachusetts Spy version of the Otis argument. These are textually the most complete versions and are probably also closest to the missing original. In the footnotes, variations with the other versions have been noted where they seem significant, either as touches of style that might have been JA's, or as examples of later editorial practice.
2. The following text of Gridley's and Thacher's arguments is from Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 479–482. See note 1103 above. Gray pointed to the first paragraph, placing the argument on the second Tuesday of the term, as corroboration of the Keith document's “antiquity and authenticity,” since an order of court at the August term 1759 had provided that “the special pleadings shall come on the second Tuesday in each term.” Id. at 479; see Min. Bk. 71, SCJ Suffolk, Aug. 1759, following N–73. The Massachusetts Spy's version of the Otis argument began with the first sentence of this introduction (erroneously dated Feb. term, 1771), and added that Gridley “endeavoured to support the legality of Writs of Assistance by force of several statutes and precedents in England, but his chief stay he acknowledged was the necessity of the case, and in the course of his arguments he discovered himself to be an ingenious lawyer.” Massachusetts Spy, 29 April 1773, p. 3, col. 1.
3. James Cockle, Collector of Customs at Salem from 1760 to 1764. See Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 422–424. That Cockle was one of the officers who sought writs seems certain from the fact that one was granted to him shortly after the second argument in Nov. 1761. Id. at 422. Paxton was probably the first to apply, however, and the matter was actually heard on the petitions of the merchants and the Surveyor General. See notes 22, 27, above.
4. The Hawley MS is headed “Substance of Mr. Gridley's Argument Before the Superior Court in favor of Writs of Assistance.” The argument begins: “May it please your honors.”
5. Hawley: “Great Britain” for “England.”
6. Hawley here supplies the inadvertent omission of “given.”
7. Hawley omits the writ. According to Gray, who also omitted it from his rendition of the Keith MS, it was the writ granted to Paxton in 1755, printed in text at note 48100 above, which JA had apparently copied from the court files. See Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 480.
8. Hawley here supplies “Court of.”
9. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §5(2). See JA's copy, text at note 4092 above. The text of the statute is omitted by Hawley.
10. 12 Car. 2, c. 19, note 5 above.
11. Hawley: “Province” for “country.”
12. Hawley here adds “&c.” and omits the remainder of the present sentence.
13. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §6. See JA's copy, text and notes 42–4594–97 above. Hawley omits some portions quoted here.
14. It has been suggested that “like assistance” in 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §6, may be a reference to 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §32, providing that royal officers and others concerned were to “be aiding and assisting” the customs officers in performance of their duties. Frese, “Early Parliamentary Legislation on Writs of Assistance,” 38 Col. Soc. Mass., Pubns. 318, 354 note (1959). While “like assistance” certainly does not literally refer to the writ of assistance, the phrase is broad enough to include it as well as the aid and assistance of other officers.
15. That is, 11 Will. 3, c. 3, 1 A&R 370. See JA's copy, text at note 4698 above.
16. Apparently supplied by Gray. See Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 481.
18. Horne v. Boosey, note 759 above. This helps to establish that the “Abstract” is from JA's rough notes, although the case may not have been cited for this proposition.
19. Correction apparently by Gray. See Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 482. Compare JA's rough notes at note 961 above. Interestingly enough, the same error appears in Minot's paraphrase. 2 Minot, History of Massachusetts Bay 90.
20. The text of Otis' argument, up to the sentence at note 47149 below, is from the Massachusetts Spy, 29 April 1773, p. 3, cols. 1–3. The argument was introduced as follows:
“For the massachusetts spy. mr. thomas, As the public have been lately alarmed with the evil and wicked effects of the power lodged in custom-house officers, by virtue of that most execrable of all precepts, a Writ of Assistance: And as I conceive it to be more immediately destructive of the liberty of the subject, than any other innovation of power: The following is offered to the public, being taken from the mouth of that great American oracle of law, James Otis, Esq; in the meridian of his life.”
Then follows the material quoted in note 2104 above, concluding with “Mr. Otis appearing for the inhabitants of Boston, with his usual zeal for the common liberties of mankind, spoke as follows, viz.”
21. Minot substitutes “them” for “the court,” a change typical of his minor improvements of style, most of which will not be noted herein.
22. Hawley here adds “almighty.”
23. Minot: “law” for “the constitution.”
24. This word apparently is illegible in the original. Hawley read it as “answered.” CFA has changed Minot's reading of “descend” to “discerned,” which is probably correct.
25. Minot omits this sentence.
26. In 1769, Otis published in the Boston Gazette a deposition alleged to be Paxton's, dated 28 Feb. 1761, which indicates that a more direct cause of his resignation as Advocate General of Admiralty was the attack upon the Vice Admiralty Court that resulted in the case of Gray v. Paxton, note 21 above. See Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 542 note. Robert Auchmuty was shortly thereafter appointed to the position. See the latter's biography in 12 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 12–16.
27. George III, in his accession speech on 18 Nov. 1760, had actually said:
“Born and educated in this country, I glory in the name of Briton; and the peculiar happiness of my life will ever consist in promoting the welfare of a people, whose loyalty and warm affection to me, I consider as the greatest and most permanent security of my throne; and I doubt not, but their steadiness in those principles will equal the firmness of my invariable resolution to adhere to, and strengthen, this excellent constitution in church and state; and to maintain the toleration inviolable. The civil and religious rights of my loving subjects are equally dear to me with the most valuable prerogatives of my crown: and, as the surest foundation of the whole, and the best means to draw down the divine favour on my reign, it is my fixed purpose to countenance and encourage the practice of true religion and virtue.”
This speech was reprinted in its entirety in the Boston News-Letter, 15 Jan. 1761, p. 1, cols. 2–4. In his diary for 9 Feb. 1761, JA set down his favorable reaction to the speech, concluding “These are sentiments worthy of a King—a Patriot King.” 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography200–201.
28. As Gray points out, this “popular cause” was probably Gray v. Paxton. Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 482. See note 21 above.
29. This clause was rendered by Hawley, “whom guilt, malice or folly has made my foes,” and by Minot, “whose guilt, malice or folly has made them my foes.”
30. Hawley: “worthy a gentleman, a man of sense, or a Christian, are, to sacrifice estate, ease, health, honor, applause.”
31. Hawley: “the patriot, the man and the hero.”
32. Hawley and Minot supply “place.”
33. See text at note 1365 above.
34. Minot: “places” for “houses.”
35. Hawley: “raise” for “excite.”
36. The preceding clause, beginning “until the trump,” is one omitted by CFA, on the basis of JA's comments. The presence of both this and the other omitted passage (note 37139 below) in the Keith and Hawley MSS supports Gray's suggestion that in repudiating them JA “was guided by his taste rather than his notes or his memory.” Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 479. JA's notation that these passages were interpolations may be seen in his copy of Minot's History of Massachusetts Bay at p. 95–96, now among his books in the Boston Public Library.
37. This sentence, beginning “What is this,” is the second passage omitted by CFA because disclaimed by JA. See note 36138 above.
38. Hawley telescopes this entire episode into “where the same Mr. Ware from a principle of revenge went on to search a number of houses from Garret to Cellar.”
39. Minot: “finished.”
40. Minot: “said Mr. Ware.”
41. Minot: “uncustomed” — no doubt a proper correction.
42. Compare the account in the version of the argument in the Boston Gazette for 4 Jan. 1762, attributed to Otis. Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 490. Jonathan Pew (or Pue) (d. 1760) was Searcher and Surveyor of the Port of Boston from 1735 until he was succeeded by Paxton in 1752. At the latter date he entered into the same office at Salem, where he served until his death. Book of Charters, Commissions, Proclamations, &c., fols. 80, 173–175, M-Ar; Wolkins, ed., “The Boston Customs District in 1768,” 58 MHS, Procs. 418, 430 (1924–1925). Nathaniel Ware was Comptroller of Customs for the Port of Boston from 1750 until 1764. Book of Charters, &c., fols. 79–80; Wolkins, “Boston Customs District,” 58 MHS, Procs. 418, 430. Abiel Walley was appointed a Justice of the Quorum in Suffolk County, 5 Nov. 1740. Whitmore, Mass. Civil List 128. No documentation of these incidents has been found.
43. Minot omits “monsters in the law.”
44. Minot omits “THE.”
45. Hawley adds “principles of law.”
46. Hawley omits the remainder of this paragraph.
47. The next sentence appears only in the Hawley MS. See note 1103 above. It may be an elaboration of the well-known passage, “the executive courts must pass such acts into disuse.” See notes 42, 2072, above.
48. This paragraph appears in the Hawley MS. At least the first sentence of it also appears in the Keith MS. Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 482. See note 1103above.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0002-0004

Author: Hutchinson, Thomas
Date: 1761-12

Thomas Hutchinson's Draft of a Writ of Assistance1

December 1761
Prov. of Mass. BayGeorge the third by the grace of God of Great Britain France and Ireland King Defender of the faith &c.sealTo all and singular our Justices of the Peace Sheriffs Constables and to all other our Officers and Subjects within our said Province and to each of you Greeting.
{ 145 }
Know ye that whereas in and by an Act of Parliament made in the <thir> fourteenth year of the reign of the late King Charles the second <it is declared> the Officers of our Customs and their Deputies are authorized and impowered to go and enter aboard any Ship or Vessel outward or inward bound and for the Purposes in the said Act mentioned and it is <also> in and by the said Act further enacted and declared that it shall be lawful to or for any person or persons authorized by Writ of assistants under the seal of our Court of Exchequer to take a Constable Headborough or other Publick Officer inhabiting near unto the Place and in the day time to enter and go into any House Shop Cellar Warehouse or Room or other Place and in case of resistance to break open doors chests trunks and other package there to seize and from them to bring any kind of goods or merchandize whatsoever prohibited and uncustomed and to put and secure the same in <his Majestys> our Store house in the port next to the place where such seizure shall be made.2
And where as in and by an Act of Parliament made in the seventh and eighth year of the reign of the late King William the third there is granted to the Officers for collecting and managing our Revenue and inspecting the Plantation trade in any of our Plantations the same powers, and authority for visiting and searching of Ships and also to enter houses or warehouses to search for and seize any Prohibited or uncustomed goods as are provided for the Officers of our Customs in England by the said last mentioned Act made in the fourteenth year of the reign of King Charles the second, and the like assistance is required to be given to the said Officers in the execution of their office as by the said last mentioned Act is provided for the Officers in England.3
And where as in and by an Act of our said Province of Massachusetts bay made in the eleventh year of the reign of the late King William the third it is enacted and declared that our Superior Court of Judicature Court of Assize and General Goal delivery for our said Province shall have cognizance of all matters and things within our said Prov• { 146 } ince as fully and amply to all intents and purposes as our Courts of King's Bench Common Pleas and Exchequer within our Kingdom of England have or ought to have.4
And whereas our Commissioners for managing and causing to be levied and collected our customs subsidies and other duties have by Commission or Deputation under their hands and seal dated at London the 22d. day of May in the first year of our Reign deputed and impowered Charles Paxton Esqr. to be Surveyor and Searcher of all the rates and duties arising and growing due to us at Boston in our Province aforesaid and in and by said Commission or Deputation have given him power to enter into any Ship Bottom Boat or other Vessel and also into any Shop House Warehouse Hostery or other Place whatsoever to make diligent search into any trunk chest pack case truss or any other parcell or package whatsoever for any goods wares or merchandizes prohibited to be imported or exported or whereof the Customs or other Duties have not been duly paid and the same to seize to our use In all things proceeding as the Law directs.5
Therefore we strictly Injoin and Command you and every one of you that, all excuses apart, you and every one of you permit the said Charles Paxton according to the true intent and form of the said commission or deputation and the laws and statutes in that behalf made and provided, as well by night as by day from time to time to enter and go on board any Ship Boat or other Vessel riding lying or being within or coming to the said Port of Boston or any Places or Creeks thereunto appertaining such Ship Boat or Vessel then and there found to search and oversee and the persons therein being strictly to examine touching the Premises aforesaid and also <according to the form effect and true intent of the said commission or deputation> in the day time to enter and go into the vaults cellars warehouses shops and other places where any prohibited goods wares or merchandizes or any goods wares or merchandizes for which the customs or other duties shall not have been duly and truly satisfied and paid lye concealed or are suspected to be concealed, according to the true intent of the law to inspect and oversee and search for the said goods wares and merchandizes, And further to do and execute all things which of right and according to the laws and statutes in this behalf shall be to be done. And we further strictly Injoin and Command you and every one of you that to the said Charles Paxton Esqr. you and every one of you from time to time be aiding assisting and helping in the execution of { 147 } the premises as is meet. And this you or any of you in no wise omit at your Perils. Witness Thomas Hutchinson Esq. at Boston the day of December in the Second year of our Reign Annoque Dom. 1761.6
[signed] By order of Court
N.H. Cler.7
1. In Hutchinson's hand, Dec. 1761. Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 185. It is unclear how this document found its way into the Adams Papers. Gray printed it, identifying it as from the court files. Notations on the back of the writ as to the issuance of writs to individuals between 1763 and 1769, in the hand of Superior Court Clerk Samuel Winthrop, not printed here, confirm this suggestion. Perhaps Gray, who had access both to the court files and to the Adams Papers, inadvertently effected a transfer. See Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 418–421, 434. It is photographically reproduced in Wolkins, “Writs of Assistance in England,” 66 MHS, Procs. 362 (1936–1941). See Freiberg, Prelude to Purgatory 18 note. Hutchinson's draft was undoubtedly used as the basis for all subsequent writs issued. Compare the writ issued to Nathaniel Hatch, 3 June 1762, in SF 100515b.
2. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §5(2), text at note 4092 above.
3. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §6(2), text at notes 42–4594–97 above.
4. Act of 26 June 1699, 1 A&R 370, text at note 4698 above.
5. As to Paxton's commission, see Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 421 note.
6. The last three words are in another hand, perhaps that of Nathaniel Hatch, a clerk of the Superior Court. See Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 418.
7. The initials (standing for Nathaniel Hatch) are in Hutchinson's hand, but “Cler.” (for Clerk) is not; Gray suggests it is in Samuel Winthrop's hand. See Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 418.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0003-0001

Editorial Note

In this, Adams' earliest known appearance in an Admiralty action for a violation of the Acts of Trade, he and James Otis argued for Timothy Folger, Searcher and Preventive Officer at Nantucket. The lawyers were not engaged on the side of royal authority, however. Folger was a native of the island, sympathetic to Massachusetts mercantile interests. Arrayed against him were the customs officers of the port of Boston, backed by the newly created American Board of Customs Commissioners.
The Boston customs establishment, like that in other English and colonial ports, was under the joint control of a Collector and a Comptroller. Until 1767 these officers were appointed by the Commissioners of Customs in England,1 and were responsible to John Temple, Surveyor General of the Customs for the Northern District, also an appointee of the Com• { 148 } missioners. Temple was empowered to exercise disciplinary control over inferior officers and add his efforts to theirs in the control of illicit trade throughout the northern colonies. Acting in this capacity, he had commissioned Folger to serve at Nantucket in 1764.2
The Boston officers, Joseph Harrison, Collector, and Benjamin Hallowell, Comptroller, later claimed that they had always disapproved of Folger's position,3 and there is reason to believe that this claim was not entirely the product of hindsight. In the first place, there was a serious legal question whether Temple had power to appoint such an officer. Secondly, on a more immediate level, Nantucket was traditionally within the port of Boston, so that Folger's presence deprived Harrison and Hallowell of a portion of the income from fees and forfeitures which was a substantial part of their compensation.4
Finally, and most important, Folger represented a threat to the security of the revenue. Temple, who took office at the time of the writs of assistance controversy in 1761 (No. 44), had at first won a reputation as a dedicated and successful officer. From the beginning he had shown sympathy with the position of the Boston merchants, however, and his feelings soon manifested themselves in an open feud with Governor Bernard of Massachusetts and in doubts of the wisdom and efficacy of parliamentary efforts to raise a revenue in the colonies. Yet, although his brush with Bernard, in which he had dismissed James Cockle, Collector at Salem, on charges of corruption, had won him the acclaim of the merchants, it had also been approved by his superiors in England.5
{ 149 }
While Temple thus remained in favor, his appointment of Folger in 1764 is consistent with an intent to use his powers to mitigate the effect of the new duties and enforcement measures imposed by the American Act of that year.6 There was both practical justification and precedent for the appointment of an officer at Nantucket. The distance of the island from Boston made customs enforcement difficult and meant a long voyage around Cape Cod for vessels seeking to enter or clear. As a result, for at least forty years an officer appointed either by the Surveyor General or the Collector of Boston had been stationed there.7 Folger's background suggests other purposes, however. Descended from one of Nantucket's oldest families and deep in local politics, he had been master or part-owner in numerous whaling and trading voyages, and kept a store in which imported goods were sold. In addition he was engaged in extensive dealings in whale oil with various merchants, including John Hancock.8 Whether Temple in• { 150 } tended it or not, there now existed at Nantucket a sizable loophole for evaders of the Acts of Trade.
If the Boston customs officers had borne Folger's appointment with misgivings, they had made no formal protest. Temple was not only their superior, but a dangerous opponent, as his contest with Bernard had shown. Moreover, the political lines were still vague enough so that, despite his opinions, Temple could not be characterized as an enemy of the revenue.9 The Townshend Acts, passed in the summer of 1767, changed both of these conditions. Temple's post as Surveyor General was eliminated in the creation of the American Board of Customs Commissioners, a five-man body which was to sit at Boston and carry out the functions of control and management previously within the province of the English Customs Commissioners. Temple was made a Commissioner, but his former authority was now to be exercised by a majority of the Board.10
At the same time the political situation was solidified by the colonial reaction to the import duties laid by the Acts.11 Inspired by the vote of the Boston town meeting in the fall of 1767, a drive for the nonimportation of British goods developed, uniting and defining the opposition to royal authority. Folger, elected to an unruly House of Representatives in 1767, was clearly a part of this opposition. In January 1767 Temple had married Elizabeth, daughter of James Bowdoin, a prominent merchant and member of the Council, who became one of the leaders in the fight for nonimportation. Whatever his prior vacillations, Temple too was now definitely aligned with the Boston faction.12 The other Commissioners saw as their first duty { 151 } the plugging of procedural loopholes that encouraged smuggling. Temple, who felt that compliance could be obtained without undue restrictions, was from the beginning of their deliberations an articulate but ineffective minority of one.13 The Boston customs officers now had both higher authority to support them in opposing Folger and a clear-cut political basis for doing so.
After the Commissioners took office on 16 November 1767 they occupied themselves in clarifying the scope of the new statutes, which were to take effect on 20 November, and in determining the extent of their new domain and the current state of the customs establishment. From the moment when three of them arrived from England on 5 November in the midst of a well-behaved but hostile Pope Day celebration, they had been aware of the opposition to them; they thus seemed determined to move carefully.14
The first call to action came on 29 January 1768 when Folger reported that a week previously he had seized the sloop Cornelia, William Summers master, at Tarpaulin Cove in the Elizabeth Islands, the easterly boundary of Buzzards Bay. The vessel was ostensibly bound for New York from the Dutch island of St. Eustatia with a cargo of eighteen casks of Bohea tea, a commodity that could be imported only by way of England and upon pay• { 152 } ment of the new duties.15 He had brought the Cornelia to Nantucket, sequestered her cargo in his house, and now sought advice on how to proceed. The Commissioners referred him to their solicitor, Samuel Fitch, for legal assistance and directed him to report the seizure to Harrison and Hallowell.16
These officers at once raised the question of Folger's authority to seize the vessel and, after consulting with Jonathan Sewall, Advocate General in Admiralty, informed Folger that his commission was invalid and that the seizure would fail if a claim were entered for the vessel or cargo. They offered, however, to let him accompany them to Nantucket to seize her again under proper authority. According to Harrison's later account, Folger agreed to do so and to join with them in the forfeiture proceedings in exchange for a substantial share as informer. When the time came to leave for the island, however, Folger backed out, explaining that his “friends” had advised him not to join, and that he was determined to file an information in his own right. Knowing that James Otis was one of Folger's “friends,” Harrison immediately dispatched Hallowell and George Lyde, Surveyor and Searcher of the port, to Nantucket, where they seized the Cornelia and cargo. Upon their return they found that Folger had, on 4 February, filed his information in the court of Admiralty. A new attempt to win him over failed, and, on 12 February, Harrison, Hallowell, and Lyde joined in a second information against vessel and tea.17
{ 153 }
Hearings in both actions were set for 29 February, then continued.18 In the meantime other pressures were building up. On 26 February, with Folger voting in the majority, the House approved nonimportation resolutions, which pledged it, among other things, “to discountenance the use of foreign superfluities, and to encourage the manufactures of this province.”19 The Customs Commissioners met on 7 March and dismissed Folger, determining that a nominee of the Boston collector should be appointed in his stead. There was an immediate outcry in the press that Folger had been dismissed solely because of his vote on the resolves. The Board, in a later statement of its position, admitted asking him about his vote, but insisted that “he had been before charged with being concerned in Trade, and he was only told that the Board had no further service for him.” The Commissioners also suggested that direct opposition to the principal officers of the port and open alliance with the antigovernment faction did not constitute the conduct expected in the customs service.20 For whatever reason, Folger was no longer searcher and preventive officer when the case of the Cornelia came to trial.
Both proceedings were tried in the court of Admiralty on 21 and 26 March before Judge Robert Auchmuty, probably in a combined hearing.21 { 154 } No claim for vessel or goods appears to have been filed in either suit, but Adams and Otis were opposed by Jonathan Sewall, who had intervened in Folger's proceeding on behalf of the Crown and was doubtless of counsel for Harrison and his associates in their information. Adams' role is perhaps unfairly minimized in the later report of the Commissioners that Folger “having Mr. Otis for his Lawyer, the Cause was contested with great Spirit.”22
The three documents printed here are: (I) Adams' minutes on the depositions of several witnesses as to Folger's performance of his functions; (II) Adams' minutes of the arguments on both sides; and (III) Auchmuty's opinion and decree in the case, an unusual report which summarizes the arguments and deals with the questions involved in great detail.
Sewall's position was, first, that by statute only a duly commissioned customs officer could seize; second, that Folger had not been duly commissioned; and, third, that if his commission were valid, it had been terminated when Temple's office was merged in that of the American Board of Customs Commissioners. In reply Adams and Otis contended that no commission was necessary for the seizure, first, because under applicable statutes evidence of reputation as an officer was sufficient; second, because Folger had been a de facto officer whose acts were valid despite lack of authority. Then they argued in the alternative that Folger's commission was properly given by Temple, did empower him to make seizures, and was still in force despite the establishment of the American Customs Commissioners.
On 2 April, Auchmuty handed down his opinion and decree, dismissing Folger's information. He found that the statutes allowing reputation evidence created only a presumption, rebutted by the production of the invalid commission under which Folger had acted. Further, the common law rules validating the acts of a de facto officer were intended to protect innocent third parties who had relied upon the officer's apparent status; they could not be taken advantage of for his own profit by the officer himself. As for the commission, Auchmuty held that Temple had no power to create new officers, and, although he might have created a deputy, he had not done so in this case, thus making it unnecessary to consider in detail the effect of the creation of the American Commissioners.
Auchmuty's argument on the reputation statutes seems a proper construction. As for the de facto argument, he managed to turn Otis' own authority against him in pointing out the distinction between Folger's case and the cases chiefly relied on. If the arguments that Folger acted in good faith and that the proceeds of the forfeiture were a kind of compensation for his efforts might have altered the result, at least in a modern view, they do not seem to have been made by counsel.23
{ 155 }
The question of the commission is more difficult. As Adams seems to have argued, the statutes establishing the customs were vague as to the types and duties of officers, and ambiguous as to the source of the power to appoint.24 Temple's general powers probably could have been read as implying an authority to create lesser officers to implement them; if so, it would seem unduly restrictive to require that this authority be exercised only through the formal creation of a deputy surveyor general. The real question was whether an officer so created had the power to seize, in view of the statutory limitation on that power. As an original matter, the language of that limitation, “officers of his majesty's customs for the time being,”25 could be stretched to include a person situated as Folger was, but the point does not seem to have been pressed by Adams or Otis, and Auchmuty did not address himself to the question. Even if Folger were duly empowered to seize, however, another ground supported Auchmuty's decision.
This ground was the fact that not only had Temple been removed from office but that the office itself had been abolished. The analogy to officers whose powers survive the death of the principal, urged by Otis, was thus inapposite. Here, the existence of the authority which had created the lesser office, rather than the life of the individual who had made the appointment, had terminated; it seems obvious that lesser offices also should cease to exist, barring express confirmation or ratification.26 Adams and Otis urged certain statutes as confirmatory, but these acts clearly applied only to appointments by the English Commissioners. They apparently did not argue that the American Commissioners had ratified Folger's appointment by keeping him on after November 1767, or even by dismissing him as unfit, rather than as a usurper. Thus, despite the obvious political advantage in a finding against Folger, Auchmuty's opinion seems on the merits to be sound.
Having dismissed Folger's information, Auchmuty on 4 April decreed in favor of Harrison, Hallowell, and Lyde in the other proceeding.27 Fol• { 156 } ger appealed both decisions to the High Court of Admiralty, but the result is not known. In any event, the vessel was sold, and the governor received his one-third share.28 The victory can have been small consolation to the Commissioners, however; they were almost at once embroiled in the disastrous consequences of the seizure of John Hancock's sloop Liberty (No. 46), which demonstrated that countering colonial resistance was more than a matter of plugging loopholes.
Not satisfied with the ordinary appellate process, Folger sailed to England in August 1768. There he petitioned the Lords of the Treasury for relief, asserting that the Cornelia and his position had both been unjustly taken away from him and that, as he had given up his position as shipmaster to serve as a customs officer, he was “now out of all employ whatsoever.” The last was a manifest exaggeration since he had been master on the voyage that brought him to England.29 His memorial was referred to the American Board of Customs Commissioners, who finally replied on 24 July 1769, denying the validity of Folger's complaints and pointing out his relations with the antigovernment faction.30 No record has been found of further action on the matter, but Folger was doubtless able to survive his losses, thanks to various maritime and mercantile ventures, which, despite his protestations, he never seems to have abandoned completely. That he did not fall out of political favor altogether appears in his appointment as { 157 } Justice of the Peace for Nantucket County in 1771. Thereafter, he went on to play a leading role in that peculiar mixture of seamanship and diplomatic intrigue which was Nantucket's brief flirtation with neutrality during, and for a decade or so after, the Revolution.31
1. For the statutory authority of the Commissioners, see notes 1351 and 1452 below. The collector was primarily responsible for gathering the revenue; entering, registering, bonding, and clearing vessels; and prosecuting violations of the Acts. The comptroller checked the collector's performance of these duties and audited his accounts. In Boston these officers were assisted by a surveyor and searcher and a tide surveyor (both also commissioned by the Customs Commissioners), who were charged with boarding and searching vessels for illegal goods. There were also a deputy collector and about a dozen waiters, tidesmen, boatmen and the like, all appointed locally. See Instructions by the Commissioners of His Majesty's Customs to [] who is established Collector of His Majesty's Customs at[] 4 (London, ca. 1764); 4 Andrews, Colonial Period 204–212; letter of Joseph Harrison and Benjamin Hallowell to American Customs Commissioners, 30 April 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:465, fols. 179–193, printed in Wolkins, ed., “The Boston Customs District in 1768,” 58 MHS, Procs. 418, 429–432 (1924–1925). As JA suggests, text at note 240 below, the statutes did not even attempt to limit the numbers of these officers or to define their duties. Their titles and functions were modeled on the English establishment, which had evolved from medieval administrative practice without benefit of parliamentary control. See Hoon, English Customs 5–25; 4 Andrews, Colonial Period 178–221.
2. As to the surveyor general's powers, see 4 Andrews, Colonial Period 202–204. This office was also modeled on the English system. See Hoon, English Customs 113–114, 190–191. For Folger's deputation, see note 745 below.
3. In April 1768, after Folger had been dismissed, and again in July 1769, Harrison and Hallowell reported that their doubts of Folger stemmed from the beginning of his tenure. Wolkins, “Boston Customs District,” 58 MHS, Procs. 433–434; Harrison to Commissioners, 27 July 1769, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 189–190.
4. The legal problems are discussed in text at notes 24–26 below. The position of Nantucket is described in Wolkins, “Boston Customs District,” 58 MHS, Procs. 421, 428–429. For the importance of fees, see id. at 438, 445; Harrison to Temple, 30 May 1766, 1 Bowdoin-Temple Papers (9 MHS, Colls., 6th ser.) 74–75 (1897); Barrow, Colonial Customs 272–274; Instructions by the Commissioners 1 (1764); 6 W. & M., c. 1, §5 (1694); 5 Geo. 3, c. 45, §27 (1765). Compare Sewall's comment, text at note 2765 below.
5. Temple, born in Boston, but raised in England, was appointed surveyor general in Dec. 1760, but did not arrive in Boston until Nov. 1761. Treasury Warrant, 1 Dec. 1760, PRO, Treas. 11:26, p. 5 (a reference furnished the editors by Thomas C. Barrow). See 1 Bowdoin-Temple Papers xv–xvii; Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 428 note; Temple to Commissioners, Jan. 1762, Temple Letter Book, 1762–1768, fols. 7–9, MHi; Temple's Memorial, undated, id. at fol. 187. His early zeal is commended in Thomas Whately to Temple, 18 June 1764, id. at fols. 19–21. For the Cockle-Bernard affair, see Barrow, Colonial Customs 406–408; Ubbelohde, Vice Admiralty Courts 58–60; Whately to Temple, 5 Nov. 1764, 1 Bowdoin-Temple Papers 36–39; Joseph Harrison to Temple, 12 June 1765, id. at 57–58; Commissioners to Temple, 9 March 1765, 1 Bowdoin-Temple MSS, fol. 60, MHi. The feud with Bernard and opposition to the customs service seem to have begun with Temple's sympathy toward Benjamin Barons, dismissed as Collector in 1761. See note 644 below; Barrow, Colonial Customs 358–359; No. 44, note 21. For Temple's adverse reactions to the American Act, 4 Geo. 3, c. 15 (1764), and the Stamp Act, 5 Geo. 3, c. 12 (1765), see Temple to Whately, 10 Sept. 1764, 1 Bowdoin-Temple Papers 24–28. Temple and Bernard also could not agree on procedures for clearing vessels without stamps. See Edmund S. and Helen M. Morgan, The Stamp Act Crisis: Prologue to Revolution 134–139 (Chapel Hill, 1953).
6. 4 Geo. 3, c. 15 (1764). Folger was commissioned on 17 Aug. 1764. See note 745 below. For fears of the Boston customs officers, expressed in April 1768, see Wolkins, “Boston Customs District,” 58 MHS, Procs. 434–435. Temple had previously appointed several minor functionaries in the port of Boston, and had made one “Mr. Hubbard” deputy collector at Stamford, Conn., but these seem to have been ordinary dispensations of patronage. See id. at 418, 431–432; Harrison to Temple, 30 May 1766, 1 Bowdoin-Temple Papers 74–75. In 1764 and 1765, in addition to Folger, he appointed his brother-in-law, John Fenton, deputy collector at Albany; Edward Winslow, deputy collector at Plymouth; James McCobb, searcher and preventive officer at “the port of Kennebec”; and other similar officers at Charleston, Annapolis, Cape Breton, and Canso. Wolkins, “Boston Customs District,” 58 MHS, Procs. 418, 435–436; 1 Bowdoin-Temple Papers 66–70; PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 192–193; Book of Commissions, 1677–1774, fols. 44–45, 48, M-Ar; Temple to Commissioners, 10 April 1766, Temple Letter Book, 1762–1768, fol. 155. MHi. His appointments may all represent an effort to place favorably disposed men in strategic locations. For Temple's defense of the appointments, see Temple to Treasury, 10 Aug. 1769, 7 Bowdoin-Temple MSS 18–27, MHi.
7. Wolkins, “Boston Customs District,” 58 MHS, Procs. 432–433. See note 1878 below.
8. On the Folger family, see Alexander Starbuck, The History of Nantucket 113, 740–755 (Boston, 1924), where the Timothy Folger in question here (1732–1814) is genealogically confused with his uncle at p. 749. Compare 1 Vital Records of Nantucket, Massachusetts, to the Year 1850 509 (Boston, 1925); 3 id. at 472 (Boston, 1927); 5 id. at 280 (Boston, 1928). Folger was appointed coroner in 1762. Whitmore, Mass. Civil List 159. His mercantile interests are catalogued in Joseph Harrison's Report to the American Customs Commissioners on Folger's memorial, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 472–474. See also 1 Commerce of Rhode Island (69 MHS, Colls.) 97–98 (1914). For the connection with Hancock, see, for example, Folger to Hancock, 28 June 1764, 2 Hancock Papers 165, MB; list of debts to Hancock, 4 May 1769, id. at 227. See also W. T. Baxter, The House of Hancock 169–174, 226–231 (Cambridge, Mass., 1945); Abram E. Brown, John Hancock His Book 274 (Boston, 1898); Edouard A. Stackpole, The Sea-Hunters 88 (N.Y., 1953). For his subsequent career, see note 31 below.
9. Harrison, appointed collector in 1766, was doubtless further inhibited by the fact that he had obtained his position in part through Temple's influence, and had assisted in presenting Temple's case in the matter of Cockle in England. See Temple to Whately, 3 Oct. 1764, 1 Bowdoin-Temple Papers 29; Harrison to Temple, 12 Jan. 1765, id. at 42–45; 12 July 1765, id. at 62–64. Moreover, Harrison may have had some sympathy for the colonial view himself. See William Molineux to——, June 1768, 3 Chalmers New England MSS 1, MH. Temple's strength was dependent in great part upon his family connection with the Grenvilles, who had been his patrons during his early years in England and continued to ease the way for him. See 1 Bowdoin-Temple Papers 1, and materials cited in note 5 above. See also Charles Paxton to George Townshend, 6 Nov. 1769, 56 MHS, Procs. 351–352 (1922–1923).
10. The Commissioners were authorized by 7 Geo. 3, c. 41 (1767). For their commission, see note 341 below. See also Clark, “The American Board of Customs, 1767–1783,” 45 AHR 777–785 (1940). The offices of all the colonial surveyors general were abolished and their commissions revoked when the Board was commissioned. Id. at 783; Samuel Venner to Thomas Bradshaw, 28 March 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:465, fols. 250–251.
11. 7 Geo. 3, c. 46, §§1–7 (1767)
12. On nonimportation, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution, 1763–1776 106–111 (N.Y., 1918). Folger sat for a single term in the House at this time. Starbuck, History of Nantucket 635; 18 A&R 225. For Temple's marriage, see 30 Boston Record Commissioners, Reports 329 (1903); 1 Bowdoin-Temple Papers 80–81. The Commissioners and Hutchinson both blamed Temple's opposition on his marriage, which brought him also into close relationship with James Pitts and John Erving, patriot members of the Council. See Hutchinson to ——, Dec. 1769, 26 Mass. Arch. 417; Commissioners to Treasury, 6 Jan. 1769, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 438–439, 452.
13. For the disputes between Temple and the Commissioners, see Clark, “American Board of Customs,” 45 AHR 782, 790–791. Temple dissented in the Board's determination to flee to Castle William after the Liberty riots in June 1768 (No. 46) and in the dismissal of John Fisher, collector at Salem, for corruption in July 1768. In the latter case, he was upheld by the Lords of the Treasury, who ordered Fisher reinstated. See No. 47, note 7. Finally in Feb. 1769 the other four members of the Board complained formally and at length to the Treasury about Temple's continuing opposition to their doings. PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 429–430. See also sources on Temple's marriage, note 12 above. For a sympathetic view of Temple's position, see Memorial of Samuel Venner to the Duke of Grafton, 1 May 1769, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 495, 497. As to Venner, see note 16 below. Temple was finally dismissed in the fall of 1770, but he soon obtained a position in the English customs and lived to be British consul at New York after the Revolution. Clark, “American Board of Customs,” 45 AHR 791; 1 Bowdoin-Temple Papers xvi–xvii, 151–152, 281–282.
14. See Commissioners to Lords of Treasury, 12 Feb. 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:465, fols. 330–334; Charles Paxton to George Townshend, 24 Feb. 1768, 56 MHS, Procs. 348–349 (1922–1923). For examples of their activities, see opinions of the solicitor general on construction of the statutes, 15 Dec. 1767 and 18 Jan. 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:465, fols. 138–144; extracts of general letters to the collector of each port, 10 Dec. 1767 and 11 Jan. 1768, id., 1:471, fols. 177, 179. The Minute Book of the Vice Admiralty Court shows that no seizures were prosecuted between Nov. 1767 and the entry of Folger's suit, note 17below. The arrival of the Commissioners is described in Clark, “American Board of Customs,” 45 AHR 785–786. Following the formula prescribed for the English Commissioners in 6 W. & M., c. 1, §5 (1694), Temple and Henry Hulton, “the first two named in the Commission,” took oath in the Superior Court, “before the Barons of the Exchequer,” on 16 Nov. 1767. See Minutes of the Commissioners, 16 Nov. 1767, 7 Bowdoin-Temple MSS 147, MHi; compare Min. Bk. 86, SCJ Suffolk, Aug. 1767, following N–115.
15. The import restrictions were laid by 7 Geo. 1, Stat. 1, c. 21, §9 (1721), and the duties by 7 Geo. 3, c. 46 (1767).
16. Letters of Folger to Commissioners, 29 Jan., 1 Feb. 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 171–174; Minutes of the Commissioners, 29 Jan., 1 Feb. 1768, 7 Bowdoin-Temple MSS 147, MHi. Compare the account of the Commissioners replying to Folger, 24 July 1769, PRO, 1:471, fol. 363. According to Samuel Venner, writing after his dismissal as secretary to the Commissioners (No. 46, notes 20, 27), almost as soon as the Board was constituted, the Commissioners had begun a concerted attack on Temple by questioning the legality of a list of his former appointments which he had submitted. Upon the seizure of the Cornelia,
“the Board having consulted Mr. Samuel Fitch, then acting as their Soliciter, he reported that a Libell should be filed in the Court of Vice Admiralty against the Vessel and Goods. But the Commissioners apprehending that this would give a Sanction to such Officers [i.e.Temple's appointees], immediately declared that Mr. Folger had no Power to make such Seizure, and directed the Collector and Comptroller of the Port of Boston to reseize the Vessel and Cargo.” Venner to Duke of Grafton, 1 May 1769, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fol. 496.
The chief materials cited here and in note 17, above, supporting the view that Harrison and Hallowell took the initiative to reseize, were prepared by the Commissioners or the officers, and are thus as liable to prejudice as Venner's account. Temple's own copy of the Commissioners' Minutes indicates that he did not submit a list of his appointees until 14 March, however. 7 Bowdoin-Temple MSS 151, MHi. Folger's Memorial to the Treasury, 24 Nov. 1768, states that it was the collector and comptroller who declared the seizure illegal. PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 366–367. Although the Commissioners were probably unofficially aware of what was going on, the fairest conclusion seems to be that their opposition to Temple's appointments was brought about by Folger's case, rather than that the opposition to Folger was a calculated part of a scheme directed against Temple.
17. Folger v. The Cornelia and 18 Casks of Tea, Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 4 Feb. 1768; Harrison v. The Cornelia and 18 Casks of Tea, id., 12 Feb. 1768. See notices of monitions, Boston Gazette, 18 Feb. 1768, p. 1, col. 1. For accounts of the maneuvering prior to the filing of suit, see the materials cited above, note 16; Harrison and Hallowell to Commissioners (extract), 8 March 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 181–182; Folger's Memorial, 24 Nov. 1768, id., fols. 366–367; Harrison to Commissioners, 21 June 1769, id., fols. 472–475. Harrison's fears about Otis are substantiated by the latter's familiarity with Folger's commission in the incident of 11 Feb., described below, note 2260. It was Harrison's letter of 21 June 1769, containing the reference to Folger's “friends,” which started the bad blood between Otis and the customs officials leading to Otis' disastrous fight with Commissioner John Robinson. See Minutes of the Commissioners, 4 Aug. 1769, 7 Bowdoin-Temple MSS 188, MHi. As to the fight and subsequent litigation in which JA was of counsel for Otis, see 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography47–48.
18. Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 4 Feb., 12 Feb. 1768.
19. Mass. House Jour. 1767–1768, p. 198–199. Boston Gazette, 29 Feb. 1768, p. 2, col. 2. See American Commissioners to Lords of Treasury, 28 March 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:465, fols. 363–364.
20. See Minutes of Commissioners, 7 March 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fol. 159; Boston Gazette, 14 March 1768, p. 3, col. 1; Commissioners to Treasury, 24 July 1769, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 364–365. Compare Hutchinson to ——, Dec. 1769, 26 Mass. Arch. 417, 418. Temple did not dissent from Folger's dismissal, but on 10 May 1768, he wrote a testimonial for him. PRO, Treas. 1:465, fols. 248–250. There was a specific prohibition against engaging in trade and an injunction to report any such activity by inferior officers in the Collector's instructions. Instructions by the Commissioners 6 (1764). Most of Temple's other appointees were reappointed. See note 1878 below. As late as 12 March the Commissioners were willing to offer Folger a settlement. Minutes of the Commissioners, 12 March 1768, 7 Bowdoin-Temple MSS 153, MHi.
21. Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 4 Feb., 12 Feb. 1768. See Rowe, Letters and Diary 157, 158. Interrogatories on Folger's behalf were served on the Commissioners. After taking Fitch's advice, they directed him to except to the interrogatories. Minutes of the Commissioners, 24, 25 March 1768, 7 Bowdoin-Temple MSS 155–157, MHi. It is not known whether the exceptions were filed, or what the result was.
22. Commissioners to Treasury, 24 July 1769, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fol. 364.
23. The rule at common law in the United States in the 19th century was that a de facto officer was not entitled to compensation (except, perhaps, his expenses), even when he had acted in good faith. Floyd R. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers §§331–334, 342 (Chicago, 1890). More recently some courts have allowed compensation, even where there is a rightful claimant, if the de facto officer has acted in good faith. Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, vol. 4, §12.181 (Chicago, 3d edn., 1949); Charles S. Rhyne, Municipal Law 145 (Washington, 1957).
24. See JA's argument, text at notes 2–640–44 below. The statutes, 25 Car. 2, c. 7, §3 (1673), and 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §11 (1696), which deal with the power of the English Commissioners over the colonial customs, are quoted in notes 1351, 1452, below. For the narrower question whether the Commissioners themselves were authorized to appoint under these Acts without warrant from the Treasury, see No. 50 at notes 3–8.
25. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §15 (1662), quoted in note 22 below.
26. There was authority to this effect in the 18th century. See 16 Viner, Abridgment, tit. Officers and Offices, O. 4, pl. 7. For similar modern authority, see Mechem, Public Offices §407; 3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§12.115, 12.121.
27. Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 12 Feb. 1768. See Harrison and Hallowell to Commissioners, 8 April 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fol. 183.
28. Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 4 Feb., 12 Feb. 1768. See order of sale, Massachusetts Gazette, 15 April 1768, p. 3, col. 2. Andrews suggested that the Minute Book must be in error in recording that this appeal was to the High Court, because he believed that after 1766 Vice Admiralty appeals lay only to the Privy Council. Andrews, “Vice Admiralty Courts in the Colonies,” in Records of the Vice Admiralty Court of Rhode Island, 1716–1752 22 note (Washington, ed. Dorothy S. Towle, 1936). Subsequent research has disclosed that the High Court and the Privy Council continued to exercise concurrent jurisdiction in appeals, at least in cases under the Acts of Trade, after 1766. See Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council 191–192. A newspaper correspondent reported that “The first Civilian in this Kingdom has undertaken for Capt. Folgier in his Appeal from your [i.e. the Boston] Court of Admiralty; and it is expected that he will not only succeed in the appeal, but also have a handsome appointment.” Boston News-Letter, 12 Jan. 1769, p. 2, col. 2.
29. Rowe, Letters and Diary 173. Boston News-Letter, 25 Aug. 1768, p. 2, col. 3. Commissioners to Treasury, 24 July 1769, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fol. 365. Folger's memorial, received on 24 Nov. 1768, is found in id. at fols. 366–368. It was accompanied by Temple's testimonial, note 20 above.
30. American Commissioners to Treasury, 24 July 1769, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 363–365. The reply was accompanied by much documentation, including statements of the customs officers, earlier letters from their records concerning the surveyor general's powers, and Auchmuty's opinion and decree (Doc. III). The documents, which have been heavily relied on in this account, are scattered throughout PRO, Treas. 1:465, 471. Folger returned to Massachusetts in April 1769. Massachusetts Gazette, 27 April 1769, p. 1, col. 3. In June he applied to the Commissioners for reinstatement, but action was deferred pending reply to the Memorial. Minutes of the Commissioners, 6, 20 June 1769, 7 Bowdoin-Temple MSS 180, MHi. Temple, who apparently saw the attack on Folger as an attack on himself, wrote at length to the Treasury in Folger's behalf, asserting the power of the surveyor general to appoint inferior officers and the legality of seizures made under such appointments. Temple to Bradshaw, 10 Aug. 1769, 7 Bowdoin-Temple MSS 18–27, MHi.
31. As to Folger's commercial activities, see notes 8, 29, above. For his appointment as Justice, see Whitmore, Mass. Civil List 148. The adventures of Folger and Nantucket from 1775 to 1795 are chronicled in Stackpole, Sea Hunters 66–144. See also Starbuck, History of Nantucket 206–259, 384–414. In 1785 Folger served again as a Representative to the General Court. Id. at 636. He was related to Benjamin Franklin and in 1771 provided him with a map of the Gulf Stream, upon which Franklin relied in later scientific writings. Id. at 374–375. For Folger's later contact with JA, see No. 58, note 9.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0003-0002

Author: Adams, John
Date: 1768-03

Adams' Minutes of the Testimony1

Court of Vice Admiralty, Boston, March 1768
Folger vs. Tea
James Athern Esqr.
Joshua Gardiner.2 Folger has entered and cleared Vessell I am concerned in to and from London. Commonly reputed a Custom House Officer at Nantucket. Have seen a Plantation Certificate signed by him, the Governor and Peleg Gardiner Naval Officer.3
{ 158 }
Jno. Handcock Esqr.4 Cleared two Vessells that Deponent is concernd in for London, since the arrival of the Commissioners.5 And has acted in all Respects, with the Regard to my Navigation at Nantucket, as the officers of the Customs do here. Commonly reputed an officer of the Customs. I know of his Acting, by his clearing my Vessells. I cant say I ever saw a Clearance of his signing, or saw him sign one. I know of his Clearing my Vessells by the Consequences for that the Vessells were admitted to an Entry in London. And others here by the Officers here.
Thos. Gray. Dep. vide
Mr. Sheaf. Have seen Papers of his signing, as Searcher and preventive Officer at Nantucket. Coasting Clearances. I acted under Sir H. Frankland, as Deputy Collector for this Port, for some Years.6 Mr. Harrison the present Collector, wrote a Letter to Mr. Folger giving him Instructions about a Vessell with sugars at Nantucket.7
Captn. Partridge. Used [to] London Trade. Made many Voyages there. Papers are demanded of Us, on our Arrival by the Custom House Officers. Clearance from the Customs demanded. Once admitted to an Entry without producing my Clearance, but was soon sent for by the Clerk and told by the Clerk that he had done wrong, and that the Clearance was his only Security, for Entering me. Never { 159 } admitted upon Producing Manifest and Register, except in the above Instance.
1. In JA's hand. Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 185.
2. The deponent may have been the junior partner in Folger & Gardner, Folger's whale oil business. See sources in note 8 above.
3. The term “Plantation Certificate” may here refer to the certificate of registry, required for every vessel by the statute 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §§17, 18 (1696), in which the governor and collector attested that oath of the vessel's place of construction and ownership had been made by the master or owner before them. Although there was no requirement that the naval officer join in this procedure, that official was the governor's appointee charged with general responsibility for maritime matters and oath was often actually taken before him, the governor's name probably being affixed to certificates in blank beforehand. See Register of the Lusanna, 28 June 1773, cited in No. 58, note 16; compare 3 Hutchinson, Massachusetts Bay, ed. Mayo, 311–312; Instructions by the Commissioners, Form I (1764). As to the naval officer, see generally, 4 Andrews, Colonial Period 187–189. It is perhaps more likely that the reference is to one of the certificates that bond had been given or other export requirements complied with, issued as part of the vessel's clearance. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §13; 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §24 (1764). The term seems to have been so used on occasion. See Instructions by the Commissioners for Managing and Causing to Be Levyed and Collected His Majesty's Customs, Subsidies, and other Duties in England, to [] who is established Collector of His Majesty's Customs at [] in America 13 (London, ca. 1733). The signature of the governor was required only on the certificates attesting that pig iron, hemp and flax, and hewn timber were the produce of the colonies. 23 Geo. 2, c. 29, §5 (1750); 4 Geo. 3, c. 26, §3 (1764); 5 Geo. 3, c. 45, §2 (1765); Instructions by the Commissioners, Forms XXVII, XXIX (1764). In the more usual certificates the collector and naval officer alone seem to have signed. See certificates of the Lusanna, cited in No. 58, note 17; compare certificates of the Rebecca, Pensacola, 28 Feb. 1765, SF 101107.
4. For Hancock's business relations with Folger, see note 8 above.
5. The American Board of Customs Commissioners, who landed on 5 Nov. 1767 and took office on 16 November. See text and note 14 above.
6. William Sheaffe (1706–1771), Harvard 1723, a familiar figure in the Boston customs office since 1731. Not only had he served as Frankland's deputy, but after the latter's dismissal in 1759 he acted as collector until Benjamin Barons was appointed to the post by the English Commissioners. In Jan. 1762, in the aftermath of Barons' dismissal (note 644 below), Sheaffe was again made acting collector, this time by John Temple. This tenure was also brief, Roger Hale taking office under an appointment from the Commissioners in July. Sheaffe served as deputy to both Hale and his successor, Joseph Harrison. He was also appointed a port waiter by Temple sometime before Oct. 1766 and was acting in both capacities at the time of this proceeding. In 1769, he was placed upon the establishment as an “Officer of the Customs,” and remained deputy collector until his death. See Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 424–429; Stark, Loyalists of Mass. 439; Wolkins, “Boston Customs District,” 58 MHS, Procs. 431, 436; PRO, Treas. 1:471, fol. 161, 461–463; 7 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 253.
7. Perhaps a reference to an episode in April 1767 in which Folger sought to collect the duties on a vessel arrived at Nantucket from the Spanish sugar port of Monti Christi, which had not entered at Boston. When Harrison asked Temple for guidance, the latter replied,
“Capt. Folger has no Authority to Enter or clear any Goods that are Dutiable and the Vessel he mentions I think ought to be Entered at Boston before anything is discharged; after she is so Entered, I have no objection to her unloading at Nantucket under the Inspection of Mr. Folger, or if you think necessary send an Officer from Boston to inspect her unlading, which Officer they must pay.” Letters of Harrison and Temple, both dated 13 April 1767, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 185, 188.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0003-0003

Author: Adams, John
Date: 1768-03

Adams' Minutes of the Argument1

Court of Vice Admiralty, Boston, March 1768
Folger vs. Hallowell.
The Affairs and Transactions of the Customs and Revenue, are very loose. Customs and Duties and subsidies, have from Time to Time been granted by Parliament to his Majesty and the Collection and Management of them has been committed by Parliament to his Majesty, in short the Crown seems to have been entrusted with a discretionary Power <by the Parli> of appointing as many Sorts of Officers and as many in Number, as are or shall be thought convenient. We hear of Surveyors, Collectors, Searchers, and Comptrollers but there is not any act of Parliament, which describes and limits their Provinces and Powers.2
Compare the Commission of the Commissioners with the Act of Parliament on which it is grounded. How small the Foundation! How mighty the super Structure! Are there no Powers in the Commission which are not pointed out in the Act?3
{ 160 }
Compare the Act that empowers the King to constitute Commissioners at Home, with the Powers exercisd by them,4 and by the late Surveyors General as Representatives of them.5 The Commission empowers to suspend, and remove &c. Does the Act of Parliament enable the K. to give such Powers to Commissioners?
Where did Mr. Lechmere get his Authority to suspend Mr. Barons as Collector of this Port? He claimed an Authority, and exercised it of suspending.6 Yet there is no Act of Parliament in the whole Statute Book, that enables the K. or Commissioners of Customs or any Body else to create such an officer as Surveyor General.
Folgiers Commission. Preventive officer. In my behalf.7 All Temples { 161 } Authority ceased, on Arrival of Commissioners. Made vs. Claimers.8 Exclusion of officers and [their?] dues.9
Reputation and Exercise sufficient. 6. G. 1, c. 21, §24.10 11. G. 1, c. 30, §32.11
{ 162 }
Continuance of Deputations &c. after Death of Commissioners. 12. Ann. St. 2, c. 8, §13.12
Comrs. of Customs. 25th. Car. 2, Chap. 7 §3.13
Comrs. of Customs and Lds. of Treasury to appoint officers. 7. & 8. W. 3. Chapt. 22§11.14
{ 163 }
7. G. 3d15
Mr. Otis. Admitted an officer De Facto, and therfore have given up their Cause. Distinction between King De Jure and De Facto.16 Maxim officers to be favoured.
Viners Abridgment Tit. Officers, and Offices G, Plea 2. Keeper of Goal De Facto, and De Jure.17 Mayor De Facto.18 G. 4, Plea 2. All Judicial Acts shall be good.19Colour of Election all Judicial and Ministerial Acts good.20
{ 164 }
Evidence that he was in Fact an officer, an officer De Facto.
If it should appear that the King was deceived21 in his Grant and issued a Commission to the Commissioners that was void, would it be pretended that all their Acts and Orders through the Continent were void? No. Their Reputation And Exercise, sufficient to make their Acts and orders good.
All the Officers Comptrollers, Searchers Inspectors and even Commissioners them selves are only Preventive officers, none of them are to collect his Majesty's Duties.
Wonderfull Parenthesis (in my Behalf).22 These Words cant make Folger a Deputy, merely Surplussage, currente Calamo, and may go out again without injuring the Commission.
If not rejected as surplusage, yet capable of several Constructions that will not vitiate or render void the Commission.
Whether the Surveyor General had, and the Commissioners have a Power to dismember a Port, or to make any Alterations in a Port, Yet if they will undertake to do it, it must be good till set aside by superiour Authority.
Lechmere went to England and appointed Coll. Brinley his Deputy in his Absence, and many of the officers got him to allow them salaries &c. Wages, Fees or some thing that they never could get before, and particularly the present Commissioner Paxton got a large sum at that Time.23
{ 165 }
A Deputy Sherriff would be liable to an Action if he should act after the death of his Principal, but this is not the Case of the Custom House officers. Their Deputations or other Authorities, are not nullified by the Demise of the Crown, any more than the Judges.24
2 Lev. 131. 10. Co.——.25
Sewall. General Question, whether Mr. Folger had any Authority to make the Seizure.
The supposition of his having another Commission besides this from Temple.
Q. whether I have not offered such Evidence of his Having no Authority, as shall oblige Folger to produce <his> some other Commission.
The Act of 6. G. 1, c. 21, §24.26 intended for the security of the Officers and off the Revenue. It is inconsistent with Common sense to suppose that the Legislature had any such Case in View, as this before your Honour.
This Act not extended to America.
I believe there is no Bottom to this Affair of the Customs.
By fair Contract the officers entituled to all the Fees within Their District.27
{ 166 }
In my Behalf, intended to make him Deputy, not to make a new office or officer. No Person can make a Deputy but the Principal. No Surveyor General can make a Deputy Collector, any more than I, as Advocate can make a Deputy Judge of Admiralty, or than your Honour can make Deputy Advocate General.
Surveyor and Searcher.28
1. In JA's hand. Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 185. The first four paragraphs seem to be JA's notes for an argument that in the absence of specific statutory language an officer's authority was to be found in his commission or in customary practice. See the statutes in notes 1351 and 1452, below. Compare note 1 above. The notes were probably written out at leisure before Sewall's argument, which ensues.
2. See note 1 above.
3. Presumably the American Board of Customs Commissioners, notes 10, 14, above. The act authorizing their positions provided that the customs in the plantations might “be put under the management and direction of such commissioners, to reside in the said plantations, as his Majesty, his heirs, and successors, by his or their commission or commissions under the great seal of Great Britain, shall judge to be most for the advantage of trade, and security of the revenue of the said British colonies.” The commissioners, “or any three or more of them,” were to “have the same powers and authorities for carrying into execution the several laws relating to the revenues and trade” of the colonies as other acts gave to the English commissioners, and it was to be lawful for the King “in such commission or commissions, to make provision for putting in execution the several laws relating to the customs and trade of the said British colonies.” 7 Geo. 3, c. 41, §§1, 2 (1767). Their commission, which is set out in Book of Commissions, 1677–1774, fols. 83–92, M-Ar, was detailed, providing not only the general powers conveyed by the Act, but power to appoint and suspend inferior officers (see No. 50, note 15); power to apply the funds collected to rewards and salaries; power to administer oaths, to enter and search vessels and buildings, to compound forfeitures, to compel obedience from inferior officers and assistance from other officials; and authority to oversee the accounts of the entire system. In addition the Commissioners were granted salaries, were relieved of liability for the defaults of inferior officers, and were freed from obligations for jury service and other local offices. Part of the text is quoted in No. 50, notes 15, 16.
4. The English Customs Commissioners were first appointed by royal patent in 1671 and seem to have functioned by that authority until the passage of 9 Geo. 1, c. 21, §1 (1722), which, to remedy a defect in the Act of Union with Scotland of 1707, provided that
“the customs and other duties, now under the management of the several and respective commissioners of the customs of England and Scotland, shall and may be put under the management of one commission of the customs for the whole united kingdom, or under the management of several commissions of the customs for England and Scotland respectively, from time to time, as his Majesty shall judge to be most for the advantage of trade and security of his revenues.”
The Act also made it lawful for the King “in such commission or commissions to make provision for putting in execution the several laws relating to the customs.” id. §2. See Hoon, English Customs 56–57. The very extensive powers actually granted in the commissioners' patents, including the appointment and dismissal of inferior officers, are summarized in id. at 59–60. For their authority over the colonial customs, see notes 1351, 1452, below.
5. That is, John Temple and the surveyors general for the other continental districts, whose commissions were revoked upon the appointment of the American Board of Customs Commissioners. See note 10 above. For their powers, see text at note 2 above.
6. Benjamin Barons, appointed Collector in 1759, was already on bad terms with the rest of the customs establishment, and sought to turn the system to his own profit by allying himself with the Boston merchants. In June 1761 he was dismissed by Thomas Lechmere, the Surveyor General, on charges of interfering with the Admiralty courts and the customs officers; he was not reinstated, despite the appeals of the merchants and the tacit support of Temple, who succeeded Lechmere in the midst of the squabble. See notes 5, 637, above. The dispute produced extensive litigation, including the case of the writs of assistance (No. 44), and the cases of Gray v. Paxton and Erving v. Cradock. Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 425–426, 541–557. See generally Barrow, Colonial Customs 262, 352–360; see also No. 44, note 21. As to the Surveyor General's power to suspend and appoint, see note 1177 below.
7. The text of Folger's commission, dated at Boston, 17 Aug. 1764, and signed by Temple, is as follows:
“To all People to whom these presents shall come, Know ye, That I the Surveyor General of his Majesty's Customs in the Northern District of America, By Vertue of the Power and Authority to me given, Do hereby appoint Timothy Folger to be Searcher and preventive Officer in his Majesty's Customs at the Island of Nantucket in the Province of Massachusetts Bay and by Vertue of these presents he hath Power to enter any Ship, Bottom, Boat, or any other Vessel, as also into any Shop, House, Warehouse, Hostry, or other Place whatsoever, to make diligent Search into any Trunk, Chest, Pack, Case, Truss, or any other Parcel or Package whatsoever, for any Goods, Wares or Merchandize, prohibited to be Imported or Exported, or whereof the Customs or other Duties have not been duly paid, and the same to Seize (in my behalf) to his Majesty's Use, and also put in Execution all other the lawful Powers and Authorities for discharging the Trust reposed in him as an Officer of the Customs In all things proceeding as the Law directs; Hereby praying and requiring all Officers both Civil and Military In the Province of the Massachusetts Bay to be aiding and assisting to him the said Timothy Folger in all things as becometh.” Book of Commissions, 1677–1774, fol. 39, M-Ar.
Folger took the necessary oaths before Governor Bernard on 18 August. Ibid.
8. Probably an argument by Sewall that Folger's defenses under the Acts of 6 and 11 Geo. 1, notes 1048, 1149, below, might properly have been made against parties claiming the vessel, but were not valid against other royal officials. Compare Auchmuty's opinion, text following note 571 below.
9. The reference is not clear. The phrase may simply echo the thought expressed in text at note 2765 below, or it may refer to the practice of exempting customs officers from local obligations such as the payment of provincial taxes, jury duty, and military service. See note 341 above. See the complaint of the Commissioners to the Lords of the Treasury that the Province assessors were seeking to levy on their salaries, 27 July 1769, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 459–460; see also 4 Andrews, Colonial Period 204.
There follows a gap of half a page in the MS. The materials which follow in text through note 53 were probably JA's notes for his own argument.
10. 6 Geo. 1, c. 21, §24 (1719), provided that
“if upon trial or trials of or in any information, action, suit or prosecution whatsoever relating to his Majesty's duties of customs and excise, or to either of them, or to any other his duties whatsoever, or to any seizure or seizures, penalty or penalties, forfeiture or forfeitures, relating to the said duties, or any of them, or if upon any trial or trials of or in any action, suit or prosecution whatsoever against any person or persons, for anything done by virtue or in pursuance of any act or acts of parliament relating to the said duties, any or either of them, any question or questions shall be made, or any doubt or doubts, dispute or disputes, shall arise or happen, touching or concerning the keeping of any office or offices of excise in any city or cities, town or towns, or touching or concerning any one or more defendants being an officer or officers of or for the said duties, any or either of them, that in every such case and cases proof shall and may be made, or evidence given, either of the actual keeping of such office or offices of excise in such city or cities, town or towns, or of such one or more defendants actually exercising of and being employed and intrusted in such office or offices respectively, before and at the respective time and times when the matter or matters in question upon such trial or trials shall happen to have been done or committed, or omitted, or neglected to have been done or performed, without producing any particular person or persons to prove the names of the particular and respective commissioners to any commissions in the respective cases before-mentioned, any or either of them, to be of their own hand-writing; and that in every such case and cases respectively such proof and evidence shall be deemed and taken to be legal and sufficient evidence, unless or until by other evidence the contrary shall or do appear.”
11. 11 Geo. 1, c. 30, §32 (1724), simplified the language and clarified the coverage and procedure of the Act of 6 Geo. 1, note 1048 above. After reciting the failure of the earlier act, it provided that if, in the same categories of actions, as well as
“upon the trial of any information or indictment for assaulting, resisting or obstructing any officer or officers of the customs, excise or duties upon salt, or other duties due and payable to his Majesty, in the execution of his or their respective office or offices, or for rescuing any goods or merchandizes seized or to be seized by any such officer or officers; any question shall arise, whether any person be an officer of his Majesty, his heirs or successors, of or for any of the said duties: in every of the said cases, proof shall and may be made and admitted, that such person was reputed to be and had acted in, and in fact exercised such office, and at the respective time and times, when the matter or matters in controversy upon such trial or trials shall happen to have been done or committed, or omitted to have been done or performed, without producing or proving the particular commission, deputation, or other authority, whereby such officer was constituted and appointed, and that in every such case such proof shall be deemed and taken by the judges or justices before whom any such trial shall be had, to be good and legal evidence, unless by other evidence the contrary shall be made to appear; any law or usage to the contrary hereof notwithstanding.”
12. 12 Anne, Stat. 2, c. 8, §13 (1713), continued by 5 Geo. 1, c. 7 (1718), provided that all “collectors, surveyors, or other inferior officers” appointed by the Commissioners of the Customs “shall be deemed to remain and continue in their respective offices and imployments, notwithstanding the death or removal of any of the commissioners of the customs who deputed and appointed such officers, until the deputations of such officers respectively shall be by the said commissioners, or any other superior authority, revoked, annulled, or made void.”
13. An undated MS copy of this section in JA's hand reads:
“And for the better Collection of the several Rates and Duties aforesaid imposed by this Act, be it enacted and it is hereby further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, that this whole Business shall be ordered and managed, and the several Duties hereby imposed shall be caused to be levyed by the Commissioners of the Customs in England now and for the Time being, by and under the Authority and Directions of the Lord Treasurer of England or Commissioners of the Treasury for the Time being.” Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 185.
The section is part of the Act of 1673 which first imposed duties to be collected in the colonies; it served as the basis for the first organized establishment of a colonial customs service, although isolated officials had been sent out before. See A. Berriedale Keith, Constitutional History of the First British Empire 76 (Oxford, 1930); Barrow, Colonial Customs 37–41.
14. An undated MS copy of the relevant portion of this section in JA's hand reads:
“And for the better executing the several Acts of Parliament relating to the Plantation Trade, be it enacted, that the Ld. Treasurer, Commissioners of the Treasury, and the Commissioners of the Customs in England for the Time being, shall and may constitute and appoint such and so many officers of the Customs in any City, Town, River, Port, Harbour, or Creek, of or belonging to any of the Islands Tracts of Land and Properties, when and as often as to them shall seem needfull.” Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 185.
This statute, passed in 1696, consolidated and defined the authority of the colonial customs service, gave its officers the powers and duties of their English counterparts, and facilitated placing them upon the English establishment. See Barrow, Colonial Customs 118–130, 133–136; 4 Andrews, Colonial Period 163–165, 213–215; No. 44.
15. Presumably a reference to 7 Geo. 3, c. 41, §3 (1767), which provided that
“all deputations, and other authorities, granted by the commissioners of the customs in England before the passing of this act, or which may be granted by them before any commission or commissions shall issue in pursuance of this act, to any officer or officers acting in the said colonies or plantations, shall continue in force as fully, to all intents and purposes, as if this act had not been made, until the deputations or other authorities, so granted to such officer or officers respectively, shall be revoked, annulled, or made void, by the high treasurer of Great Britain, or commissioners of the treasury for the time being.”
See Auchmuty's discussion of this point, text at note 1979 below.
16. According to Blackstone, when Edward IV assumed the throne,
“after a breach of succession that continued for three descents, and above threescore years, the distinction of a king de jure, and a king de facto began to be first taken; in order to indemnify such as had submitted to the late establishment, and to provide for the peace of the kingdom by confirming all honors conferred, and all acts done, by those who were now called the usurpers, not tending to disherison of the rightful heir.”
1 Blackstone, Commentaries *204; see also 4 id. at *77–78; compare 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown 101–103 notes. If Otis here referred to Blackstone's formulation, he was on treacherous ground, since the doctrine seems intended to protect those who had relied upon a usurper, but not to support the claims of the usurper against those of the rightful “heir”—in this case the de jure officers.
17. “The Words Sheriff, Gaoler, &c. in the Statute 13 E. 1. cap. 11. extend to all Keepers of Gaols; and therefore if one hath the keeping of a Gaol by Wrong or De facto, and suffers an Escape, he is within this Statute as much as he that has the keeping of it De Jure. 2 Inst. 381, 382.” 16 Viner, Abridgment, tit. [Officers and] Offices, G. 3, pl. 2.
18. “An Action will lie against a Mayor de Facto for a false Return upon a Writ of Mandamus. Lutw. 519. Trin. 6 W. & M. in Case of Knight v. the Corporation of Wells.” 16 Viner, Abridgment, tit. [Officers and] Offices, G. 3, pl. 3.
“Acts done by an Officer De Facto, and not De Jure, are good; As if one being created Bishop, the former Bishop not being deprived or removed, admits one to a Benefice upon a Presentation, or collates by lapse, these are good and not avoidable. Arg. Quod Curia Concessit; for the Law favours Acts of one in a reputed Authority, and the inferior shall never inquire if his Authority be lawful. Cro. E. 699. Mich. 41 & 42 Eliz. B.R. in Case of Harris v. Jays. [In the margin:] S.P. Where the Bishop De Facto made a Lease which was confirmed by the Dean and Chapter, and after the Bishop De Jure died in the Life of the Bishop De Facto; it was resolved, that he not being lawful Bishop, and this Lease being to charge the Possessions of the Bishoprick, it is void; altho' all Judicial Acts, as Admissions, Institutions, Certificates, &c. shall be good; but not such voluntary Acts as tend to the Depauperation of the Successor, and so affirmed a Judgement given in B.R. in Ireland. Cro. J. 552, 554. Reuan Obrian & al. v. Knivan.” 16 Viner, Abridgment, tit. [Officers and] Offices, G. 4, pl. 2.
“If one is elected Mayor of a Corporation without being duly qualified according to a late Charter, to be chose into that Office, and after such Election he puts the Seal of the Corporation to a Bond, this Obligation is good: For by his coming into the Office by Colour of an Election, he was thereby Mayor De Facto, and all Judicial and Ministerial Acts done by him are good; and tho' the Corporation might have removed and displaced him, yet this not being done he had Power to seal the Bond. Lutw. 508. 519. Trin. 6 W. & M. Knight v. the Corporation of Wells.” 16 Viner, Abridgment, tit. [Officers and] Offices, G. 4, pl. 3.
21. For this usage, see No. 55, note 814.
22. That is, the parenthetical phrase in Folger's commission, note 745 above. Otis had earlier had to defend this phrase in a coffeehouse gathering when William Molineux, the radical leader, attacked Temple and Folger, asserting that the latter had been appointed only to provide profit for the former. When a question was raised as to the validity of Folger's commission,
“Mr. Otis said the commission, he thought, was very Good, but that there was one Expression in it that some People Hesitated about and Repeated the Sentence in the Commission which Runs thus—and in my Behalf to seize for his Majesty's Use—Upon repeating of this Sentence Mr. Mollineux [said] 'Now Gentlemen, you see that I am Right in what I said,' and seemed to lay great Stress upon these words—in my Behalf—signifying that whatever seizures were made by Folger, he, the said Folger, was not to have the profit arising from such seizures but the Surveyor General and that the Surveyor General gave him his Commission on these terms.” Rowe, Letters and Diary 150–151 (11 Feb. 1768).
The commissions which Temple gave to Edward Winslow as deputy collector at Plymouth and James McCobb as searcher and preventive officer at Kennebec omitted the phrase. Book of Commissions, 1677–1774, fols. 44–45, 48, M-Ar.
23. Further documentation of this incident has not been found. Brinley was undoubtedly Col. Thomas Brinley (d. 1765), a leading resident of Roxbury, whose son, Thomas, Harvard 1744, was a loyalist who fled to Halifax in 1776. 11 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 366–367. Since Lechmere should have obtained permission from England for his trip and the appointment of a deputy, it is possible that Brinley was acting with the sanction of the Commissioners. See Barrow, Colonial Customs 296–298.
24. By statute every “office or employment, civil or military,” was continued for six months after the death of the sovereign, unless revoked by the successor. 1 Anne, stat. 1, c. 8, §2 (1701). A requirement subsequently imposed by 6 Anne, c. 7, §18 (1707), that all such officers take a new oath before continuing in office was replaced by 1 Geo. 2, c. 5, §2 (1727), and id., stat. 2, c. 23, §7 (1728). See Samuel Baldwin, A Survey of the British Customs, part 2, p. 195 (London, 1770). Compare 12 Anne, stat. 2, c. 8, §13, note1250 above.
25. Otto v. Selwin, 2 Lev. 131, 83 Eng. Rep. 483 (K.B. 1675), citing The Case of the Marshalsea, 10 Co. Rep. 68b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (C.P. 1612). Otto held, per Hale, C.J., that an officer of the Court of Admiralty, pleading the warrant of that court in justification in an action of trespass and false imprisonment against him, need not plead and prove that the Admiralty had jurisdiction of the original cause. The Case of the Marshalsea had held that the warrant of a court lacking jurisdiction of the cause was not a defense in an action of false imprisonment; Hale distinguished that case on the ground that the lack of jurisdiction had there appeared (it was in fact conceded arguendo). Otis seems to be citing Otto for the proposition that when the actions of an officer are justified by a document regular on its face, the burden of proving an underlying irregularity lies with the opposing party.
26. Note 1048 above.
27. That is, the officers appointed by the English Customs Commissioners are entitled to all the fees without competition from officers appointed by other sources. See text and note 4 above.
28. The MS breaks off here and the reference is unexplained. The office of Surveyor and Searcher is described in note 1 above. George Lyde, the incumbent, had accompanied Hallowell in reseizing the Cornelia and was a party to the action. See text at note 17 above.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0003-0004

Author: Auchmuty, Robert
Date: 1768-04-02

Auchmuty's Opinion and Decree1

Court of Vice Admiralty, Boston, 2 April 1768
Timothy Folger vs. Sloop Cornelia and Eighteen Casks Tea. On this information the Advocate general in behalf of the King intervened.
In determining this cause, I shall consider the matters on each side of the question principally relied on by the Gentlemen in their arguments and much in the same order as proposed.
The Advocate general in behalf of the King urged, that none but the Officers of the Customs could seize in cases similar to this, relying on the 14 Car. 2d. for this point.2 That the informer, who in the information, calls himself searcher and preventive Officer in the Island of Nantuckett never was an Officer of the Customs, and that granting he was, his Authority ceased on the commissioners of the Customs in North America entering upon the Execution of their Office. Because the Informer was authorized and appointed, as by an authenticated copy of his Commission exhibited by the said advocate appears, by the { 167 } Honble. John Temple Esqr. late surveyor general of the northern district; whose office was entirely vacated and made void by the said commissioners executing their said Office, which was prior to the seizure set fourth in said Information. That the three known principal officers of the Customs in the port of Boston, of which the said island of Nantuckett is a member, had seized and informed against the same vessel and goods which information was pending in this Court; wherefore on his Majesty's behalf said advocate prayed that the libel of the said informer might be dismissed unless he could shew his authority to seize.
To all which it was answer'd by James Otis and John Adams Esqrs. advocates for the informer, first that he was not held to produce any commission to authorize him to make or hold said seizure, because it was sufficient to prove himself a reputed Officer of the Customs, by acting as such at the time of seizing. To support which the statutes of the 6 Geo. 1 and the 11. of the same reign were produced.3 Secondly, that considering the exhibits, proofs and Advocate's concession in the case, it evidently appeared, the Informer was either an Officer of the Customs de facto, or de jure or both. If the latter a right of seizing must undoubtedly have been in him. If only the informer,4 yet even by the rules of the common law, without the aid of the Statutes, it was sufficient. Thirdly, that the Informer was an Officer de jure by his commission from the said late surveyor general, produced by the advocate and by the Court allowed to be filed as evidence and lastly, that the Authority granted by said commission did not cease on the Surveyor generals office being vacated by the appointment of the Commissioners of the customs in North America, and their Executing their office. To prove which the 12. Ann. and the 7. Geo. 3. were cited and relied on.5
The force and operation of the two statutes of Geo. 1. must be considered in order to determine whether the same comprehend the present case, Those were formed to guard the revenue, by protecting the real Officers thereof against certain inconveniences. A construction therefore of the statutes different from that design or exceeding such Inconveniences must be erroneous: In the first act by the perview which immediately relates to the section under consideration it clearly appears, the mischiefs intended to be remedied were, the trouble and expence Officers were necessarily at in procuring the condemnation of { 168 } Goods seized, and in consequence thereof the enacting part enables officers to give proof of their actually exercising and being imployed and entrusted in an Office, without producing evidence to prove the names of the Commissioners to any Commission to be their hand writing. But there are only two Cases in which such proof of reputation is Admissible, First, when the trial is between the Officer seizing and the Claimer. Secondly when the Officer is prosecuted for any thing done by virtue of any act relating to duties. If therefore the present dispute is not such an instance as is pointed out by the Act, it cannot be within it Because this Act, which is enlarged by the 11. Geo. 1. but for the same purposes, gives a remedy not known at common law, in particular cases. Therefore by the rules of law relative to the constructions of Acts, such remedies cannot be extended to alter the Common law in any others than those particular instances mentioned in the Act. This rule is founded on the deference always justly paid to the common law by the Judges in construing statutes and by which the common law is preserved from Constructive innovations. It is indisputable that the present controversy is not a Trial between an Officer and Claimer, or a civil action or other process brought against an Officer by a Subject, but a litigation founded on the intervention of the Kings Advocate in behalf of his Majesty, The point is now between the King and one who claims to be an Officer of the Customs under his Majesty: therefore to extend the said Acts or either of them to such a case would be both absurd and illegal. Illegal, because by so construing the Act, the King himself would be thereby affected, tho' not mentioned therein, and tho' considering the nature and tendency of the Act, he cannot consistently with the rules of law, be constructively included. Absurd because it would be foreclosing his Majesty from whom all the powers of Officers mediately or immediately flow from trying whether one asserting to be his Officer was so, and notwithstanding the admission of such an enquiry, it appears to me, the letter as well as the spirit of the Acts will be preserved entire; and so no reason presents why it should not be granted. I am sensible, it is objected that the trial now is founded on an information, and relates to a seizure, and from thence concluded to be within the express words of the Acts. To this it may be answered, that those Acts are not to be construed by the different modes of prosecution therein enumerated, nor by the general expressions pointing out the causes of such prosecutions; but by the mischeifs intended to be remedied, and not guarded against by the common law, and therefore, tho' a Case in one sense may depend on a seizure and information, yet if none of the mischeifs mentioned { 169 } in and designed to be redressed by said acts, attend it, the law will not adjudge such a Case to be within the Acts. It is an established rule that tho' a Case be within the letter of an Act, if not within the real meaning thereof, it cannot be included therein, A construction different from that I have given would make said Acts productive of a very great repugnancy, by forcing the same to operate in favour of persons, without an enquiry whether they were or were not properly Officers of the Crown to the prejudice of others duly appointed, for the protection and advantage of whom said statutes most undoubtedly were designed. And lastly, that by the duly authenticated Copy of the Informers commission exhibited by the Advocate, evidence appears to the contrary of the informers being an Officer of right at the time of making the seizure, as far as a negative can. The reservation in the Acts made in these Words, “unless by other Evidence the contrary shall be made to appear,” entitles even a claimer, a fortiori his Majesty, to prove if he can; that the Officer seizing, notwithstanding his being reputed and acting as such, really was not, otherwise the statutes are justly chargable with one of the greatest irregularities known in the law, in preferring the lowest kind of evidence to the highest. To support the words “other evidence to the contrary” intend to confine the evidence to a persons being an Officer de facto, in exclusion of an enquiry if one de jure, must render the Acts totally ridiculous. Because when once the fact of his being an Officer de facto is established by positive evidence, it must be impossible negatively to prove the contrary. In short, tho' the acts give great releif to Officers even claimers are not by force thereof left remediless, nor do the Acts place persons proving their reputation as Officers absolutely beyond the inspection and reach of law. But the burthen of Strict legal proof is by force of the same acts removed from the Officer, in certain Cases; and if the Claimer or prosecutor would avail himself against the proof resulting from reputation, he is obliged to produce legal evidence, that notwithstanding such reputation the person seizing either was never commissioned, or if he was, the authority thereby conferred was determined, or he had exceeded his Authority. Therefore I do adjudge and decree, that said Acts are not sufficient to authorize the informer to prosecute said information without shewing a further right so to do.
I shall next determine what influence the rules of the common law touching Officers de facto ought to have in this cause.
Those rules appear to me to be calculated only to make such as presume to act as Marshall or Mayor &c. without being completely qualified, answerable for their own misconduct, in cases where the Interest { 170 } of others is concerned, but not to extend to such as immediately tend to their own private advantage.6 They are institutions to prevent mischeifs happening to some, through an undue exercise of power by others, rather than to give a sanction to it for the sole benefit of the Actors. It is but just that he who undertakes as a publick Officer the Execution of any thing without a full Authority for so doing, and of which he is to be the judge in the first instance, and does it in such a manner as renders another a sufferer, should be adjudged accountable therefor. But It by no means follows that such an undertaker should advance his own Interest by his own wrong Act, in direct opposition to the legal Officer: Therefore the law cases above alluded to and the one in trial materially differ from each other. Also the cases of the parson and bishop appear to me not applicable to the present dispute, for the same and other reasons.7 In both the latter instances their acts which may be considered as judicial, are allowed good for the benefit of others their inferiours in the law sense and so not obliged to know the legality of the induction of the parson, or the deprivation or removal of the Bishop; Where a Bishop de facto does an act which charges the possession of the bishoprick, as a lease of lands, it is void.8 The true reason of which I take to be, he shall not by any act advance his own private interest, and thereby deprive an Officer de jure of his. This case is more applicable to the present dispute than any of the others. And indeed without observing this rule all distinction between Officers de facto and de jure must cease. But to close this subject the very making of the acts9 evidently shew that at common law, Officers of the Customs could not be sufficiently guarded by proving themselves such de facto: then consequently none of those rules abstractedly were able to support the doings of such an Officer, even when the contest was not between him and the King, but a Claimer. So that tho' by the Exhibits in the case it is both proved and granted that the informer was { 171 } an Officer de facto, yet as the Statutes allow of proof being made against his being one de jure, and the common law does not avail him in this point, I am next to enquire what proof there is of his being the latter.
The proof of this point arises out of his Commission and the Authority of the late surveyor general to grant the same. It is certain the informer was by said commission created, if any thing, either a New Officer, or deputy surveyor general. It could not be a deputation as searcher and preventive Officer, if there had been any such Office known, because the surveyor general could not make a deputy to another Officer, that power being lodged only in the principal. As to the first, considering that the Island of Nantuckett is a member of the port of Boston, it is necessary to examine whether the late surveyor general had any authority, without positive orders or instructions from the Commissioners of the Customs in England under the direction of the Commissioners of the treasury to create new Officers, when there were proper Officers of the port duly commissioned and acting; and secondly if not, whether by the said Commission the Informer was deputy surveyor general.
As the statute did confine the appointment of the Officers of the Customs to the Lord treasurer Commissioners of the treasury and Commissioners of the Customs in England for the time being,10 it is impossible that any surveyor general could legally appoint or create new Offices and Officers without an authority for so doing from those who by the law had that power. It was said in the argument, that the late surveyor general had equal authority with the Commissioners of the Customs in England but it was neither attempted or possible to be proved on an inspection of his instructions as far as relate to this enquiery and consideration thereof.11 I do not perceive any thing which { 172 } proves or has a tendency to prove a power in him to create new Offices or Officers. His power of suspending for misbehavior, and appointing others in the places of the persons so suspended or of such as decease by no means can be extended to create new officers ad libitum. The former is a contracted and limitted power, and was usually lodged with all surveyor generals by the Commissioners of the Customs, and founded in necessity. The latter comprehends almost all the powers of both the Commissioners of the treasury and Customs and it is not to be supposed they ever delegated such Authority to any person whatsoever, there being neither necessity or law for so doing. It was urged in favor of such appointments of the Surveyor generals, that great inconveniences will follow if they are not adjudged valid, as many have been made, particularly one at Plymouth a member of this port.12 If the fact is so, of which there is no evidence excepting the instance at Plymouth, it ought not to regulate a judgment on the validity of such appointments, because that would be Establishing a practice not founded in law, in opposition to law. Nor can I conceive it the duty of [a] judge to depart from the law to cure inconveniences resulting from the misapprehensions of any other Officer, without something very express to warrant his so doing. Secondly if the late surveyor general had authority to appoint a deputy, which is very supposeable though not proved, it is clear he has not executed that power in the appointment of the informer, but attempted one entirely different, and therefore it is not a deputation as Surveyor general. These two points being determined makes a minute enquiry into the objection of the said commissions being superceded by the appointment of the Commissioners of the Customs in North America and { 173 } their exercise of that Office, needless; I shall therefore only say, that neither the statute of Ann, or of his present Majesty extend to any deputations save those granted by the Commissioners of the Customs in England.13 These acts also prove the legislature never conceived of or had in contemplation any other appointments then such as were made by the Commissioners of the Customs in England as aforesaid. If they had, doubtless the death and removal of surveyor generals would have been guarded against, as well as that of the commissioners. Those who made the last act must certainly have known, that the Office of surveyor general was merged in that of the Commissioners: therefore it is against reason to imagine, it was intended first to destroy the Office of principal, and secondly, to secure his deputys, or to extend the words of the proviso expressly mentioning certain Officers, to others probably not known, and if known, certainly not noticed. Therefore haveing fully heard the Kings Advocate and the Advocates for the informer and after a mature consideration of their arguments and of all the statutes and authoritys quoted and used, proofs allegations and exhibits adduced in the cause, I decree the information against the aforesaid sloop and tea filed by the said Timothy Folger to be dismissed.
[signed] Rob[ert] Auchmuty Judge
1. MS, endorsed: “Copy. Decree in the Court of Admiralty at Boston in the Case of Folger &ca. vs. Sloop Cornelia, and 18 Casks of Tea.” Subscribed: “A true copy. Att[estatu]r Ez. Price D. Regr.” PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 152–158 (photostats in DLC:British Reproductions).
2. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §15 (1662) provided that no ship or goods were to be seized for violations of the Acts of Trade
“but by the person or persons who are or shall be appointed by his majesty to manage his customs, or officers of his majesty's customs for the time being, or such other person or persons as shall be deputed and authorized thereunto by warrant from the lord treasurer or under-treasurer, or by special commission from his majesty under the great or privy seal.”
Seizures by others were to be void. This section was presumably made applicable in the colonies by 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §7 (1696). It was interpreted strictly in England. See Hoon, English Customs 271–272.
3. Notes 1048, 1149, above.
4. Apparently an inadvertence for “former.”
5. Notes 1250, 1553, above.
6. A reference to the cases from Viner cited by Otis, notes 17–2055–58 above. At the same place in the Abridgment it is also stated, “He who occupies as Marshal in B.R. be he Officer of Right or by Tort, shall be charged with the Escapes. Br. Escape, pl. 18, cites 39 H. 6. 33.” 16 Viner, Abridgment, tit. [Officers and] Offices, G. 3, pl. 1.
7. The case of the parson is evidently the following passage in Viner not taken down by JA:
“Where an Abbot or Parson is inducted erroneously, and makes a Grant or Obligation, and after is deprived or dereigned for Precontract or such like, this shall bind; because he was an Abbot or Parson in Possession, but a Usurper who usurps before Installation, or Induction, or Presentation, where another Abbot or Parson is Rightfully in Possession, or if one enters, and occupies in the Time of Vacation without any Election or Presentation, the Deed of such is void. Br. Non est Factum, pl. 3, cites 9 H. 6. 32.” 16 Viner, Abridgment, tit. [Officers and] Offices, G. 4, pl. 1.
8. See note 1957 above.
9. The statutes of Geo. 1, notes 1048, 1149, above.
10. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §11 (1696), note 1452 above. Compare No. 50.
11. Temple's instructions and commission have unfortunately not been found. For the powers of surveyors general, see note 2 above.
When Temple's predecessor, Thomas Lechmere, suspended Benjamin Barons in 1759 (prior to his dismissal in 1761, note 644 above), he appointed George Cradock temporary collector, relying on the powers given him by the Commissioners of Customs “for managing and causing to be levied and collected His Majesty's customs,” and “to appoint officers that may be for the service of His Majesty's Revenue.” See Cradock's commission, 13 Dec. 1759, SF 172363. Lechmere used this formula in other appointments. See Book of Commissions, 1756–1767, fols. 80–81, 203, M-Ar. Temple contented himself with reciting “the Powers and Authority to me given.” See Folger's commission, note 745 above, and examples cited, note 6 above. Accompanying the American Commissioners' reply to the Treasury on Folger's memorial in 1769 (note 30 above), were extracts from letters of the English Commissioners in 1740 and 1765 in which they had questioned not the Surveyor General's authority to appoint deputy collectors, but the wisdom and propriety of his doing so without consulting them. PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 192–193; Wolkins, “Boston Customs District,” 58 MHS, Procs. 432–433. This material does not seem to have been put in evidence, perhaps because it dealt with the office of collector, rather than that of preventive officer.
12. See Temple's appointments, including that of Edward Winslow at Plymouth, in note 6 above. The “inconvenience” was simple enough to remedy. The Commissioners confirmed Winslow in his office and either confirmed or replaced other Temple appointees. Samuel Proctor was appointed to Folger's place, but was forced from the island in the fall of 1768. PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 461–463; Boston News-Letter, 11 Aug. 1768, p. 2, col. 1; Minutes of the Commissioners, 15 March 1768, 7 Bowdoin-Temple MSS 151–153, MHi; Massachusetts Gazette, 3 Nov. 1768, p. 1, col. 3. Although it does not seem to have been put in evidence, Temple's predecessors had been appointing officers at Nantucket since at least 1740, a fact which was relied on in this case by both sides in their memorials to the Treasury. Folger claimed that it showed the antiquity of the practice; the Commissioners pointed out that the English Commissioners had often rejected such appointments. See Wolkins, “Boston Customs District,” 58 MHS, Procs. 432–433; PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 363–365, 366–367; Minutes of Commissioners, 15 March 1768, 7 Bowdoin-Temple MSS 152–153, MHi.
13. 12 Anne, Stat. 2, c. 8, §13 (1713), note 1250 above; 7 Geo. 3, c. 41, §3 (1767), note 1553 above.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0004-0001

Editorial Note

In November 1768 Adams undertook the defense of John Hancock in what, politically, was his most important case until the Boston Massacre trials (Nos. 63, 64). Jonathan Sewall, the advocate general, had sued Hancock in Admiralty for penalties incident upon the alleged smuggling of wine from the latter's sloop Liberty. The circumstances of this prosecution and portions of Adams' defense were carried in a variety of contemporary newspapers and played a leading part in the development of colonial opposition to the British customs system and Vice Admiralty courts.
The case arose in a Boston already antagonized by the activities of the recently formed American Board of Customs Commissioners. The fate of Timothy Folger and the sloop Cornelia (No. 45), must have convinced the town, if proof were needed, that the Commissioners had no interest in the { 174 } kind of benign administration that might have permitted an accommodation between the stringencies of the Townshend Acts of 1767 and the realities of commercial life. In the forefront of mounting opposition to the Board and the Acts was Hancock, leading merchant, Boston selectman, and representative to the General Court, who must have been pleased to find that he could so easily combine his zest for politicking with pursuit of his commercial interest. His political tactics included a variety of threats, boasts, and social snubs, nicely calculated both to offend the Commissioners and to arouse the public.1
On the commercial side, Hancock's opposition was less flamboyant, but no less determined. In early April, he had found Owen Richards, one of two tidesmen sent to supervise the discharge of his brigantine Lydia, poking around in the hold of that vessel. Hancock ordered Richards forcibly brought topside, making clear that he considered the deck to be the limit of the officer's jurisdiction.2 Attempts to prosecute Hancock in the Superior Court for this incident were frustrated when Jonathan Sewall gave his opinion as attorney general that no offense had been committed and refused to put the matter in suit. The Commissioners wrote to England asking that Sewall be overruled.3 Before a reply could be received, the affair of the Liberty gave them a better opportunity to make an example of their chief tormentor.
The sloop had arrived in Boston from Madeira on 9 May; next day, Nathaniel Barnard, her master, made entry of twenty-five pipes of madeira wine, upon which the duties were paid.4 According to the later testimony of various royal officials, Hancock had boasted that he would land wine from his vessel without payment of duties, and rumors were rife that he had done so.5 The customs officers had to be satisfied with rumor until, on { 175 } 10 June, Thomas Kirk, a tidesman who at the time of the Liberty's arrival had reported nothing amiss, now made affidavit to a different story. On the night of 9 May, he testified, one Captain Marshall came aboard and, after failing to persuade Kirk to allow several casks of wine to be unloaded before the vessel's entry the next day, locked him in the steerage. Confined for about three hours, Kirk “heard a Noise as of many people upon deck at Work hoisting out Goods,” as well as “the Noise of the Tackles.” He was released when the activity ceased, but Marshall's dire threats had kept him silent; Marshall had since died, and Kirk no longer feared to come forward.6
Joseph Harrison, Collector of the port, presented Kirk's affidavit to the Commissioners. Corroboration was impossible, Kirk's fellow tidesman being variously reported as asleep or drunk during the hours in question, but the Commissioners and their solicitor determined that the affidavit was grounds for a seizure of the Liberty for violation of the statutory provisions against unloading before entry. Harrison and Benjamin Hallowell, the Comptroller, were ordered to make the seizure. To avoid the possibility that the townspeople might rescue the vessel, the Commissioners suggested that the officers obtain the assistance of H.M.S. Romney, which had arrived in the harbor on 17 May in response to the urgent pleas of the Board that it could not enforce the laws without such assistance.7
At about sunset on the 10th, with the tide near full, Harrison, Hallowell, and a number of lesser officers proceeded to Hancock's wharf, where the Liberty lay, loaded with two hundred barrels of oil and a few barrels of tar. According to a contemporary account, these goods were not cargo for another voyage, but had been put aboard for storage, there being no room in the warehouses along the wharf.8 The officers boarded the sloop, { 176 } went through the formalities of seizing her, and signaled the Romney, at anchor nearby. Two boats of marines and sailors came to the wharf and set about taking the Liberty in charge. Meanwhile a crowd, including Captain Daniel Malcom (long an enemy of the revenue) and a number of other waterfront figures known to be friendly to Hancock, had gathered. Despite assurances from the mob that there would be no interference with the seizure, and efforts to hold the vessel to the wharf, the marines cut her loose and, with the consent of Harrison and Hallowell, towed her out into the harbor, where she was moored under the guns of the Romney.9
A small riot then ensued, in the course of which Harrison and Hallowell were roughed up, windows in their houses were smashed, and the Collector's pleasure boat was burned on the Common.10 The Commissioners, fearing that they would be next, went into hiding and the next day transferred their operations to the Romney. Harrison began to negotiate with Hancock for the return of the Liberty in exchange for a bond for her value to abide the outcome of proceedings against her in the Court of Admiralty.11 Meanwhile, Boston remained in an uproar, stimulated by a series of town meetings at which fiery orations were delivered. John Adams' first connection with the case was his service upon a committee appointed by the Town to draw up instructions to its representatives.12 Hancock at length { 177 } declined to stipulate for the vessel, apparently on the theory that her continued presence in the harbor would serve to keep the Town reminded of the incident.13 After the failure of this step at conciliation, the Commissioners chose to view the situation in Boston as one of serious emergency; and, when Governor Bernard reported that he could not guarantee their personal safety in town, they took up residence at Castle William in Boston Harbor. From this retreat the North American customs were managed until mid-November, when the presence of troops and Governor Bernard's assurances finally eased the Commissioners' fears.14
While the Commissioners languished, Jonathan Sewall on 22 June filed a libel in behalf of Joseph Harrison against the Liberty and the oil and tar aboard her at the seizure.15 Although no papers in the suit have survived, the grounds were probably three: (1) landing goods before entry, as Kirk had sworn; (2) loading the oil and tar without having given bond; and (3) loading the oil and tar without having a sufferance from the Collector. For the first, the penalty was forfeiture of the vessel;16 for the { 178 } second, vessel and goods were forfeit;17 and for the third the goods alone were forfeit.18 The second and third counts would have been included to justify seizing the oil and tar and retaining it aboard the Liberty as she lay under the Romney's protection. To have brought the sloop back to the wharf for discharge would have exposed her to rescue. These counts, of course, had the additional value of further harassing Hancock by complicating the suit and by tying up his goods pending the outcome.
The identity of Hancock's counsel in this in rem proceeding is not known. He may well have been Adams, who had recently tried Timothy Folger's action against the sloop Cornelia (No. 45), in which Hancock was a witness. Adams was doubtless on hand in the summer of 1768, since he had recently moved to Boston19 and had no cases on circuit with the Superior Court in June or July. Whoever Hancock's lawyer was, he did not let the forfeiture go by default. An appearance was entered on 7 July and, after several continuances, Hancock's claim was filed on the 29th. Counsel had earlier agreed that witnesses should be examined by the Register upon interrogatories filed by the parties. On 4 August, Judge Auchmuty himself attended the examination of two witnesses, Captain Malcom and William Mackay. Auchmuty gave his decree on 17 August, declaring the Liberty forfeit, but releasing the oil and tar.20 No copy of the decree exists, but it { 179 } apparently condemned the Liberty for unlading without entry, and cleared the oil and tar as having been loaded for storage rather than shipment.21 On 6 September, the sloop was put up for sale and purchased by Harrison for the Commissioners, who proceeded to have her fitted out as a revenue cutter. In this capacity she served until July 1769, when a Rhode Island { 180 } mob seized and burned her at Newport in wrath over the enforcement activities of her commander, Captain William Reid.22
The focus now shifted to those responsible for running the wine and fomenting riot. Efforts to indict the rioters before the Suffolk Grand Jury in August were effectively forestalled when Boston returned Captain Malcom and other alleged participants as jurors.23 On 2 September the Commissioners directed their solicitor to consult with the advocate general as to prosecuting “the master of the Sloop Liberty and all persons concerned in running the cargo for treble the value of the goods run.”24 During the summer, in response to a request from the Lords of the Treasury for an opinion on a memorial submitted by the Commissioners, William DeGrey, Attorney General in England, had found that there was not only a basis for proceeding against the vessel, but that “Actions may likewise be brought against the Persons concern'd in the unshipping the Goods, and in obstructing the Seizure.”25 Emboldened or coerced by this opinion, Sewall on 29 October filed informations against Hancock and five others, including Nathaniel Barnard, master of the Liberty, and Daniel Malcom.26 { 181 } His delay had probably resulted, at least in part, from a prudent desire to wait until excitement over the arrival of the first troops in September had died down and they were in place and ready to be of assistance.27
The suits were based on a provision of the American Act of 1764 that persons “assisting or otherwise concerned” in landing goods without payment of duties should forfeit treble the value of the goods in a proceeding in the Court of Admiralty. Despite a certain vagueness in the language of the information, it is clear that Sewall brought the actions as informer. In this capacity he was entitled to a third of the proceeds, which may have been the price of his abandonment of an earlier reluctance to proceed in such an unpopular cause.28 The information against Hancock alleged that he had aided and assisted in landing one hundred pipes of Madeira wine valued at £30 sterling each, knowing that the duties had not been paid. The penalty sought was £9,000, treble the value of the wine. Judge Auchmuty set bail at £3,000 and ordered a warrant to issue for Hancock's appearance on 7 November.29 According to the patriot propaganda sheet, “A Journal of the Times,” the warrants were served on 3 November by “Mr. Arodi Thayer, marshal of the Court of Admiralty for three provinces, with a hanger at his side.” After offers of property and Massachusetts currency for bail were refused, Hancock and the others produced the amount demanded in sterling.30
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When the court sat on 7 November, the informations were read and the matter continued until the 28th.31 Thus began a lengthy trial, in which Adams served as counsel for Hancock and probably the other respondents as well. Years later in his Autobiography he said of Hancock's case: “and a painfull Drudgery I had of his cause. There were few days through the whole Winter, when I was not summoned to attend the Court of Admiralty. It seemed as if the Officers of the Crown were determined to examine the whole Town as Witnesses. Almost every day a fresh Witness was to be examined upon Interrogatories. They interrogated many of his [Hancock's] near Relations and most intimate Friends and threatened to summons his amiable and venerable Aunt, the Relict of his Uncle Thomas Hancock, who had left the greatest Part of his Fortune to him. I was thoroughly weary and disgusted with the Court, the Officers of the Crown, the Cause, and even with the tyrannical Bell that dongled me out of my House every Morning.”32
The cases were further continued from time to time until 2 January 1769.33 The trials seem to have proceeded together without objection from any party. Interrogatories had been filed on 13 December, and now the first of many witnesses for the Crown was called.34 For many weeks Auchmuty continued to examine witnesses both in court and in chambers, an Admiralty practice that, like the constant continuances and long delays, offended the common-law practitioners.35 Finally on 16 February the { 183 } respondents' witnesses were examined, and the case was set for argument on Tuesday the 21st. On that date, however, the Crown sought, and was granted, leave to examine additional witnesses “for the whole of this week,” which prompted “A Journal of the Times” to conclude that the respondents' evidence had seriously damaged Sewall's case.36
On the 24th Adams tried to impeach one Joseph Maysel, apparently a key witness for the Crown, by questioning another witness in an effort to prove that Maysel was a fugitive from justice, guilty of a “heinous crime.” The Crown opposed the line of questioning, pointing to the common-law rules that only a witness' general character for truth was admissible as oral testimony, and that a written record of conviction was necessary to establish a specific crime. Adams argued that the civil law, which he said would permit his evidence, should be followed, since this was a Court of Admiralty.37 On 1 March, Auchmuty, in an interlocutory decree, ruled that the question objected to should be withdrawn on the grounds that even under civil-law rules the evidence was inadmissible, but that in any event the common law controlled this matter in a statutory proceeding.38
As far as can be determined, no further sessions of the court were held. Sometime in March the Suffolk County Grand Jury reportedly indicted Maysel for perjury, but, according to “A Journal of the Times,” he was spirited out of the jurisdiction by the Commissioners, and the indictment was not brought to trial.39 Finally, on 25 March 1769 Sewall moved that the informations against Hancock and the other respondents be withdrawn.40 There has never been a satisfactory explanation for the Crown's action, although in the “Journal” the withdrawal was implicitly linked with the reading of Auchmuty's commission as Judge of Admiralty for the new, enlarged district centered at Boston.41 Since Sewall at the same time had been commissioned Judge of Admiralty at Halifax, it has been sug• { 184 } gested that Auchmuty and he, now assured of fixed salaries, were willing to forgo the expected profits from these actions.42 It might just as well have been that Sewall now felt himself sufficiently independent of the Customs Commissioners to withdraw actions which he had instituted only under pressure from them. Neither theory explains why the actions were not dropped when the commissions were actually received in Boston on 20 January.43 It seems more likely that the departure of Maysel and a failure of other evidence were the reasons for the withdrawal.44 It is also possible that the actions were settled in some way, although there is no evidence of such a result. Whatever the fact, the withdrawal probably coincided with the reading of Auchmuty's commission only because the opening of court for that purpose provided a convenient opportunity for Sewall's motion.
The trial of Hancock and the others was an event of major political importance in the colonies. Its very length played into the hands of the revolutionary propagandists. From November 1768 until the following summer, “A Journal of the Times,” which appeared in a variety of colonial newspapers, carried periodic accounts of the proceedings, interspersed with tart comments on the twin themes of the venality of the Customs Commissioners and the arbitrary injustice of the Court of Admiralty.45 These attacks helped to establish the Commissioners as obnoxious at the very beginning of their tenure. Their effectiveness was permanently damaged and they served until the Revolution in an atmosphere of constant hostility.46
The attack on the Admiralty Court was buttressed by a portion of Adams' draft argument in the case, which was widely circulated as part of his Instructions to the Boston Representatives of May 1769.47 These and other responses to the prosecution of revenue cases brought the Vice Admiralty courts under the disapprobation of the colonists. The jurisdiction was more and more invoked only in enforcement of the Acts of Trade, and ordinary civil maritime cases were tried in the common-law courts.48 A multitude { 185 } of revenue cases in each port served to stir up local feeling; Sewall v. Hancock helped to unite this feeling and to produce the single impulse against the courts which increased steadily until its manifestation in the Declaration of Independence.49
Recently it has been argued that the whole affair of the Liberty is proof that the Commissioners were in fact as venal, and the Admiralty Courts as arbitrary, as the colonists contended. Hancock is pictured as the innocent victim of a prosecution carried on by “customs racketeers” bent on “plunder,” who sought to obtain their evil ends in an arbitrary and oppressive mockery of a trial.50
Hancock's innocence is open to question. His reported boasts that he would defy the Commissioners and the rumors that he had done so may be dismissed as the self-serving statements of interested royal officials, but there remains the fact that the Liberty was condemned for unloading cargo before entry.51 Without court files it is difficult to evaluate that decision, but on balance it was probably justified. In the first place, the problem of proof was relatively simple. The issue was only the fact of unloading, not the complicity of Hancock or anyone else. Secondly, Kirk's deposition, which has been attacked as vague and perjured,52 was probably not the only evidence for the Crown. During the eight weeks of trial interrogatories were filed and the court examined several witnesses, presumably including Kirk. In any event, his original deposition, if believed, was persuasive ground for condemnation, regardless of the testimony of Hancock's witnesses, who had the difficult job of proving a negative.53 Even if the deposition could not be corroborated by other testimony, Kirk could have been further examined to ascertain his credibility, and character witnesses could have been called.54
To argue that Auchmuty decided the case against the weight of the { 186 } evidence is to say that he either was wrong in believing the witnesses or was influenced by prejudice. Both are possible, but the presumption is surely the other way. At least as to testimony given in his presence, only Auchmuty could weigh credibility, and there is no actual evidence of prejudice. Moreover, if the condemnation had not been supported by the evidence it is hard to believe that there would not have been some outcry. Not only was none forthcoming, but the few mentions of this phase of the case which are found support the view that the forfeiture was justified.55 A conclusion that the Liberty was justly condemned for unloading before entry does not convict Hancock of smuggling; it does indicate that wine or other goods were smuggled from the Liberty on the night of 9 May. It seems unlikely that Hancock would have been so out of touch with his affairs as not to have been involved.
If the Commissioners were reasonable in believing that Hancock was not innocent, then they were justified in proceeding against him with all the weapons they could command. They had been sent to Boston to implement a new policy of strict enforcement of the Acts of Trade. Hancock led the opposition to the new establishment, both with his political attacks and with the example of his own violation. If the law could be applied strictly to him, others would fall into line. The procedures used to gain this end were harsh, but they were neither extortion nor persecution. All were prescribed by the law which the Commissioners had sworn to uphold, and all were dictated by the position of outright defiance which Hancock had taken.
The forfeiture of the Liberty and the penalties sought in the in personam actions were not “plunder” unless that term is understood to include rewards sanctioned by law. It was common 18th-century practice to divide the proceeds of such suits, a third each to Governor, informer, and Crown. In many situations fees and forfeitures were used to encourage an element of private enterprise which helped to keep salaries low and place the cost of government on those who invoked its powers. In the area of the customs the practice was especially necessary to encourage effective enforcement in the face of firm opposition.56 This system could certainly be abused if { 187 } profit, rather than enforcement, became the sole aim of the officials involved. There was no abuse in the seizure of the Liberty, however. The cause was not a breach of some technical and previously unenforced requirement, but a violation that amounted to the very kind of smuggling which the Commissioners had been sent to root out.57
Nor were the penalties in the in personam proceedings an abuse. The statute under which they were sought had been enacted precisely because forfeitures alone were not sufficient to deter violators.58 The substantial amount asked for here was necessary to make an impression upon a man of Hancock's wealth, power, and obstinacy. Although the figure of one hundred pipes alleged to have been smuggled was doubtless chosen arbitrarily to raise the stakes, there could be no unlawful exaction, because the fines which would have been paid if Sewall had obtained a decree were based upon the quantity and value of the wine smuggled, matters of fact which the Crown had to prove at the trial. The ultimate penalty thus would not have been dictated by the allegations in the information, but would have been computed according to the offense, as authorized by statute.59
The principal result of the high ad damnum was that a high bail was levied. There is some justice to complaints on this point, as the rule at common law in England seems to have been that only the fictitious common bail was required in an action on a penal statute. The figure itself was not excessive, however. Although it might have seemed so in a criminal action, where bail was proportioned to the gravity of the offense, this was a quasicivil proceeding, in which the purpose of bail was to provide security for the amount sued for, rather than merely for the defendant's appearance. In a civil action at law the plaintiff could demand that the sheriff take security in the full amount of the ad damnum, and full bail was required in an in personam civil suit in the English High Court of Admiralty.60 The { 188 } court here was more lenient, requiring bail for only one third of the amount sought.
The procedure followed in the in personam actions was unusual and, no doubt, tended to Hancock's disadvantage, but it was not persecution invented arbitrarily by the Commissioners for political revenge or financial gain. The statute provided the choice of proceeding at common law or in Admiralty, because it was a truism that no jury could be found to convict for violation of the Acts of Trade.61 After the recent failure to indict the Liberty rioters, the Commissioners can hardly be blamed for accepting truism as truth and exercising the option to proceed in Admiralty. Since the trial was in Admiralty, it was by information, not indictment;62 it was before a judge sitting without a jury; and the whole range of civil law procedure followed in the High Court of Admiralty in England was invoked—interrogatories, irregular sessions, secret examination of witnesses, and the rest.63 Whether these procedures were “illegal” depended not on their inherent qualities but upon the power of Parliament to place violations of the statute within the Admiralty jurisdiction. There was much dispute on this point, and it is not surprising that the Commissioners upheld the parliamentary side of a constitutional question which was resolved only by the Revolution.64
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Hindsight suggests that wiser administrators than the Commissioners might have sought to gain compliance through friendship and understanding rather than in an outright confrontation which they were bound to lose. A different course could have slowed or even prevented what became a headlong rush toward American independence. The British policy in accordance with which the Commissioners acted was based upon an unrealistic appraisal of the proper role of the colonies, which the colonial constitutional arguments were intended to correct. To recognize the justice of the colonial position, however, is not to say that the actions of the Commissioners were immoral or illegal. Hancock had defied authority. As representatives of that authority they were duty-bound to react to his defiance. Their reaction was not the only possible one, but it was a proper, if ultimately ineffective, course.
The document printed below from Adams' Admiralty Book concerns only the in personam action against Hancock. It consists of a copy in Adams' hand of the information and statutes involved, followed by a draft of his argument in Hancock's behalf. In this argument Adams approached the case as presenting a problem in statutory construction. Conceding that wine had been landed from the Liberty without payment of duties, he first argued that Hancock could not be said to fall within the statutory description of one “assisting or otherwise concerned” unless his knowing complicity in the unloading could be directly proven. Sewall must have been equally aware that Hancock's liability turned on the question of his knowledge and participation. Only this could account for the flood of friends, relations, employees, and business associates who were called as Crown witnesses, doubtless to be interrogated on possible links between Hancock and the nocturnal activities of the late Captain Marshall. Sewall's decision to abandon the action may well have turned on his inability to produce evidence of this vital element in his case.
Adams' basic argument was supported by a plea that the act be strictly { 190 } construed in Hancock's favor. Presumably this meant that “assisting or otherwise concerned” should not be expanded to include any kind of constructive or circumstantial implication of Hancock in the unloading. There was, of course, a familiar canon of construction that penal acts were to be construed narrowly,65 but Adams' argument was unusual in the reasons which he assigned for calling this statute penal. Not only was there an obvious disproportion between offense and penalty, but there were two grave constitutional defects in the act: (1) Adams' “Clyent Mr. Hancock never consented to it,” through his own vote or that of his actual representative; (2) its penalties were to be recovered in Admiralty courts, which deprived Hancock of the right to trial by jury, a defect all the more grievous because comparable offenses in England were to be tried to a jury in the Exchequer.
Here, like Otis in the famous argument on writs of assistance (No. 44), Adams attacked a statute as an intrusion upon fundamental rights. Unlike Otis, Adams did not make this invasion the basis for a demand that the court repudiate the statute altogether. Bonham's Case, upon which Otis grounded his argument that “the Executive Courts must pass such Acts into disuse,” held only that a statute should be construed to avoid a result in conflict with common-law principles.66 Adams' position neatly tied his broad political and constitutional arguments in with a similar narrow theory of construction: a penal statute conflicting with basic principles should be construed in every instance in favor of the subject.
In the light of later theorizing on the question whether Otis had foreshadowed the doctrine of judicial review,67 it is interesting that Adams' argument was so much more in accord with traditional English legal theories. Perhaps he had not understood Otis to have gone beyond those theories; or, if Otis had gone farther, Adams might now have come to realize that this was not a correct statement of the law. Otis' appeal to Bonham's Case could be rationalized in a narrow view, because he was urging invalidity in the application of a statute; the statute here, if void, was void on its face, a much more drastic flaw. Whatever the force of these considerations, Adams undoubtedly felt the need to ask for relief in terms acceptable to the judge trying the case. Auchmuty could hardly be persuaded as a loyal servant of the Crown that the act was void, but he might be convinced that in the circumstances it should not be applied harshly to Hancock.68 The structure of the argument may also be explained by an intention on Adams' part to make political use of the draft—a possibility discussed more fully below.
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The remainder of the draft deals with the question of the application of the civil law. Although Auchmuty had held that common-law rules governed the questioning of an impeaching witness, that opinion was based on alternative grounds and could have been limited to the issue there raised. Adams here argued for the civil-law approach on a broader front, buttressing his position with an array of citations from the Digest and other appropriate authorities. Conviction must be on the evidence of two or more witnesses whose credibility the court must establish. If oral testimony of Maysel's criminal record was not admissible on the question of credibility, his present condition, as well as his own testimony as to his past should be taken into account. The civil law also supported Adams' previous contention that harsh laws should be construed strictly, especially in criminal cases. The draft ends with the unexpected insertion of a summary of the earlier arguments and decree on the impeachment question. In this material was the crux: If the court was to apply some common-law rules, it should apply all, including the jury. If it was to follow the civil law in matters such as interrogatories, it should not omit those civil-law rules which favored Hancock.
Adams may have delivered this argument in open court, but no direct evidence of such a dramatic event has been found, and there is reason to believe that it never occurred. As already noted, argument on the merits had been set for 21 February but was postponed until after 1 March by the Crown's call for further witnesses and the subsequent controversy over the impeachment of Maysel. In all probability Maysel's indictment and disappearance led to further postponements, so that there was no occasion to hold argument prior to the withdrawal of the actions on 25 March.69 In any event, “A Journal of the Times,” which faithfully recorded these and other stages of Hancock's trial, made no mention of an argument. If Adams had addressed the court in the eloquent and politically provocative terms of his draft, it seems likely that the “Journal” would have reported it, perhaps embellishing the account with passages supplied by Adams from his own text.
The state of the manuscript is ambiguous on this point. The draft contains textual errors of a sort suggesting that at least the portions of it dealing with the constitutional issues were copied from an earlier, rougher draft.70 At the same time, the less organized and less careful manner in which the extracts from civil-law sources were entered, the sudden insertion of the impeachment materials, and the lack of a formal conclusion on the civil-law issues indicate that this is not a final draft. If there had been an argument on the merits, the draft could be either a copy or expansion of the text from which Adams argued, or it could be an intermediate state from which he prepared a now missing final version for presentation to the court.
In view of the likelihood that there was no argument on the merits, { 192 } another explanation is called for. Adams may well have prepared an argument on the constitutional points for presentation on 21 February, and copied the first part of the present draft from it into his Admiralty Book, perhaps in expanded form. Possibly inspired by the issues raised in the impeachment argument, he doubtless added the civil-law extracts during the latter part of February or early in March. Then, “disregarding order,” he inserted the material on “the Controversy We had last Week.”—that is, the impeachment71—some time after Auchmuty's 1 March decree. His failure to complete the draft may be ascribed to the fact that at some point in March he learned that it would not be needed in court.
Whether or not the argument was ever presented, there are many indications that Adams intended his draft to serve a purpose beyond mere advocacy in court. “A Journal of the Times” twice promised a full account of Sewall v. Hancock, although none ever appeared.72 Adams had earlier turned law reporting to partisan advantage with his “Abstract” of the argument on the writs of assistance (No. 44, Document II), and he now had before him a recent example of this technique in the pamphlet attack which Henry Laurens of Charleston had launched upon the activities of the South Carolina Vice Admiralty Court.73 Adams may have intended to use his draft as the basis for a similar pamphlet, which would fulfill the “Journal's” promises, graphically demonstrating Boston's grievances and presenting the Town's legal position in its quarrel with the Customs Commissioners and the Admiralty Court.
Whether termination of the trial, the press of other business, or another reason caused Adams to leave his draft unfinished, a gap of ten pages before the next entry in the Admiralty Book (Rex v. Corbet,No. 56, tried in May and June 1769) suggests that he intended to return to it. The work that he had done did not go to waste, whatever his intentions. As previously noted, he used his arguments on the right to jury trial almost verbatim in his Instructions to the Boston Representatives in May 1769. This document was carried in the newspapers as well as in “A Journal of the Times,” and so played a political role. The passage on impeachment was similarly adapted for the “Journal.”74
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If these partisan uses of portions of the draft suggest that it was as much a political as a legal document, its content provides firm ground to support such a theory. In the first place, both Adams' use of court documents with appended comments and the general tone of his arguments indicate a desire to emulate Laurens' South Carolina pamphlet.75 More important, Adams' draft stands in its own right as skilled political writing.
The language and style of his political and constitutional arguments, which might have impressed a jury but would have been wasted on a hostile judge, suggest the intention to reach a wider audience. In fact, the portion on Magna Carta, later used in the May 1769 Instructions, shows great similarity to a passage in Adams' “Clarendon Letters” of 1766, attacking the Stamp Act.76 His juxtaposition of broad constitutional positions with a plea for strict construction gives rise to an irony more appropriate in political writing than in legal argument. To call a statute merely “penal” when it has been enacted by an improperly constituted legislature and invades a basic constitutional right is the kind of understatement which implies a more drastic conclusion: The statute is invalid and the political system which produced it must be changed. Even the civil-law argument seems calculated less for legal advantage than as a means of emphasizing the deprivation of jury trial and the unfair manipulation of the law in the Admiralty court.77 The case was to be tried on the facts; these arguments were for the world.
Adams' “Abstract” of the writs of assistance argument was the transformation of a legal argument into a political tract. His argument in Sewall v. Hancock is a much more subtle and accomplished piece of craftsmanship. Here, political theory is manipulated within a legal framework in such a way that the case is presented both at the level of the court room and at the level of the public forum in which broader constitutional issues are discussed. Whatever the purpose for which it was written, the argument deserves recognition as an unfinished contribution to the political literature of its time.
1. See W. T. Baxter, The House of Hancock 260–263 (Cambridge, Mass., 1945). For one customs officer's view of the situation, see Joseph Harrison to the Marquis of Rockingham, 17 June 1768, in Watson, “Joseph Harrison and the Liberty Incident,” 20 WMQ (3d ser.) 585, 587–589 (1963).
2. See deposition of Owen Richards and Robert Jackson, 11 April 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:465, fols. 351–353; Ubbelohde, Vice Admiralty Courts 119–121. Richards was to suffer more violent physical opposition to his role. See Richards v. Doble, Pleadings Book, Form VI.
3. See the Memorial of the Commissioners, 12 May 1768, enclosing the depositions of Richards and Jackson, note 2 above; the opinion of Samuel Fitch, Solicitor to the Commissioners, in favor of prosecution; and the opinion of Sewall, PRO, Treas. 1:465, fols. 348–360. Sewall's opinion, 23 April 1768, is reprinted in Dickerson, “Opinion of Attorney General Sewall of Massachusetts in the Case of the Lydia,” 4 WMQ (3d ser.) 499, 501–504 (1947). Thomas Hutchinson also questioned the wisdom of prosecution in the matter. See Hutchinson to ——, 17 April 1768, 26 Mass. Arch. 299–300. In Oct. the Commissioners again ordered Hancock's prosecution in the Superior Court, but no record of any action has been found. Minutes of the American Board of Customs Commissioners, 20 Oct. 1768, 7 Bowdoin-Temple MSS 167, MHi.
4. The duty had been levied since 1764. See note 986 below.
5. The arrival and entry of the Liberty and Hancock's boasts are described in Opinion of William DeGrey, 25 July 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:463, fol. 85, printed in Wolkins, “The Seizure of John Hancock's Sloop 'Liberty,'” 55 MHS, Procs. 239, 273 (1921–1922); Thomas Hutchinson to Richard Jackson, 16 June 1768, 26 Mass. Arch. 310–312, printed in 55 MHS, Procs. 281; Examination of Benjamin Hallowell, Treasury Chambers, 21 July 1768, American Gazette (No. 6) 449 (London, 2d edn., 1770); Testimony of Joseph Harrison, 27 June 1770, 5 Acts, Privy Council (Col.) 254; see also Baxter, Hancock 263 note.
6. Deposition of Thomas Kirk, 10 June 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:465, fol. 72; Opinion of William DeGrey, 55 MHS, Procs. 273–274. Marshall, one of Hancock's captains, died on 10 May, allegedly from overexertion in the unloading. Boston Gazette, 16 May 1768, p. 3, col. 1. See Andrew Oliver to Francis Bernard, 3 Dec. 1769, 12 Bernard Papers 164, MH; Oliver, Origin and Progress 69.
7. For the decision to seize the vessel and seek aid from the Romney, see Minutes of the Commissioners, 13 June 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:465, fol. 67; letter of Harrison and Hallowell to Commissioners, 11 June 1768, id. at fol. 88; letter of Harrison to John Powell, 13 June 1768, 3 Chalmers New England MSS 2, MH; Harrison to Rockingham, 17 June 1768, 20 WMQ 3d ser.) 589–590 (1963); Examination of Hallowell, 21 July 1768, American Gazette (No. 6) 449; Testimony of Harrison, 27 June 1770, 5 Acts, Privy Council (Col.) 255. For the requests of the Commissioners for naval support and the arrival of the Romney, see Samuel Venner (Secretary of the Board) to Thomas Bradshaw, 3 June 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:465, fol. 149; Boston Gazette, 23 May 1768, p. 3, col. 1; Wolkins, “Liberty,” 55 MHS, Procs. 239, 246 note, 248, 271–272.
8. As to the lading, see Boston News-Letter, 16 June 1768, p. 2, col. 1; Boston Evening-Post, 20 June 1768, p. 2, col. 1. Sunset was at 7:33 p.m. and high tide at 7:38 p.m. on 10 June. John Mein and John Fleeming, Register . . . 1768 18 (Boston, 1768). The accounts in note 9 below vary as to the time of the seizure according to the politics of the declarant. In question was a mistaken understanding that the limitation in the writ of assistance to daylight activities applied to seizures. 3 Hutchinson, Massachusetts Bay, ed. Mayo, 138 note; Boston Gazette, Supp., 23 Jan. 1769, p. 1, col. 3. Actually no writ was necessary to board, search, and seize a vessel. See 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §§4, 5 (1662); 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §6 (1696). The time was doubtless dictated in part by a delay in making the decision to seize, and in part by a desire to catch the tide. See Harrison to Powell, 13 June 1768, 3 Chalmers New England MSS 2, MH.
9. See the following accounts of the seizure: Boston News-Letter, 16 June 1768, p. 2, col. 1; Deposition of Harrison, 11 June 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:465, fol. 74; Deposition of Hallowell, 11 June 1768, id. at fol. 76; Harrison to Rockingham, 17 June 1768, 20 WMQ (3d ser.) 590 (1963); Testimony of Harrison, 27 June 1770, 5 Acts, Privy Council (Col.) 255; Affidavits accompanying Boston, “A Letter from Boston to a Gentleman in London,” American Gazette (No. 2) 97–110 (London, 2d edn., 1768). As to Malcom, see Wolkins, “Daniel Malcom and Writs of Assistance,” 58 MHS, Procs. 14–15 (1924–1925).
10. For the riot, see sources cited in note 9 above.
11. Harrison to Rockingham, 17 June 1768, 20 WMQ (3d ser.) 592 (1963); Examination of Hallowell, 21 July 1768, American Gazette (No. 6) 450; Minutes of the Commissioners and other materials, 12–14 June 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:465, fol. 67–107; Testimony of Hallowell, 26 June 1770, 5 Acts, Privy Council (Col.) 250. For the negotiations and an account of events in Boston generally, see John Gary, Joseph Warren 74–79 (Urbana, III., 1961). The flight to the Romney marked John Temple's open break with the rest of the Board. Thereafter he participated in their routine activities, but opposed them on all political matters. See Barrow, Colonial Customs 480–487. All subsequent references to “the Board” or “the Commissioners” refer to the four-man majority, exclusive of Temple.
12. PRO, Treas. 1:465, fols. 70–71, 92–93, 112–113; 16 Boston Record Commissioners, Reports 253–259 (Boston, 1886). The Instructions, of which JA claimed the authorship and which were adopted by the Town on 17 June, were first printed in the Boston Gazette, 20 June, and reprinted in 3 JA, Works 501–504. See 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography291; Gary, Joseph Warren 77–78.
13. See sources cited, note 11 above. On 15 June Hancock's warehouse was burgled and his papers “displaced.” Massachusetts Gazette, 16 June 1768, p. 1, col. 1. This may have been an effort on the part of the Commissioners to find evidence linking him with the Liberty's alleged cargo. See Dickerson, Navigation Acts 243.
14. See Commissioners to Governor Bernard, 12 June 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:465, fols. 86–87; 13 June 1768, id. at fols. 100–101; Bernard to Commissioners, 13 June 1768, id. at fol. 102; Collector and Comptroller to Commissioners, 14 June 1768, id. at fols. 106–107; Commissioners to Commodore Hood, General Gage, Col. Dalrymple, 15 June 1768, id. at fols. 108–111. The troops were requested in July; two regiments arrived in Boston at the end of Sept., and two in early November. It was not until the second week of Nov. that the Commissioners felt sufficiently sure of their safety to venture back to Boston. Commissioners to Treasury, 11 July 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:465, fol. 420; Venner to Bradshaw, 26 Nov. 1768, id. at fols. 127–138; Massachusetts Gazette, 10 Nov. 1768, p. 1, col. 3; Rowe, Letters and Diary 175–176. It is possible that they were awaiting the public reaction to the in personam suits against Hancock and the others, in which process was served on 3 November. See note 30 below.
15. Joseph Harrison Esq. v. The Sloop Liberty, 20 Barrels of Tar, 200 Barrels of Oil, Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 22 June 1768. See Boston News-Letter, 23 June 1768, p. 2, col. 1. Samuel Fitch was also of counsel for the Crown, and David Lisle, solicitor to the Commissioners, assisted in the preparation for trial. Minutes of the Commissioners, 8 Aug. 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fol. 7.
16. 15 Car. 2, c. 7, §8 (1663), set out in No. 48, note 210. See Opinion of William DeGrey, PRO, Treas. 1:463, fol. 87, printed in 55 MHS, Procs. 276. The violation of a statutory requirement that entry be made before unlading was the only possible basis for proceeding against the Liberty on the alleged smuggling. The statutes levying penalties for landing goods without payment of duties provided for the forfeiture of the goods alone (6 Geo. 2, c. 13, §3, made applicable by 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §5), or for pecuniary penalties against the smugglers themselves (4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §37). For proceedings under the former, see No. 47; the latter was the basis of the later in personam proceedings against Hancock; see notes 26, 582, below. A suit based on 6 Geo. 2, c. 13, was presumably impossible, the wines having been dispersed. 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, presented evidentiary problems, as subsequent events demonstrated. See text at note 44 below. Moreover, under both acts proof had to be made that dutiable goods had been landed, whereas under 15 Car. 2, c. 7, §8, only the landing before entry need be shown. The statute I Eliz. 1, c. 11, §2 (1558), forbidding landing of goods except in the daylight would also have been ineffective, since it provided for seizure of goods, not vessel. See No. 49, notes 10–1314–17.
17. Vessel and goods were forfeit if either enumerated or nonenumerated goods were loaded before bond was given. 12 Car. 2, c. 18, §19 (1660); 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 26, §11 (1670); 6 Geo. 3, c. 52, §30 (1766). Tar was enumerated and oil was not. 3 & 4 Anne, c. 10, §8 (1704); Samuel Baldwin, A Survey of the British Customs, pt. 2, p. 201 (London, 1770).
18. 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §29 (1764).
19. At the end of April. Elizabeth Smith to Isaac Smith Jr., 13–18 April 1768, 1 Adams Family Correspondence 63–66.
20. See Harrison v. The Liberty, et al., Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 22 June 1768. The date and substance of the decree are known only from a contemporary newspaper report that “Wednesday the 17th the Hon. Robert Auchmuty Esq. Judge of Admiralty for this province, decreed the sloop Liberty, seized the 10th of June last, to be forfeited; but the 200 barrels oil, and six barrels tar, which were on board her when seized, were cleared.” Boston Chronicle, 22 Aug. 1768, p. 331, col. 3; Boston Post-Boy, 22 Aug. 1768, p. 1, col. 3. This result is confirmed by the order of sale, dated 31 Aug. 1768, which dealt with the vessel alone. Massachusetts Gazette, 1 Sept. 1768, p. 1, col. 2. Sewall's conduct of the cause, although successful, was not vigorous enough to suit the Commissioners. They found that he had been dragging his feet because he had been informed by Samuel Venner, their secretary, that they had criticized his conduct in the matter of the Lydia to the Treasury. This episode apparently had something to do with the delay in prosecuting Hancock in personam and may even have affected the outcome of that suit. See notes 2728, 42, below. Although Sewall remained in favor, Venner was finally suspended by the Board. See Minutes of Commissioners, 8 Aug. 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 7–8. Other materials are in id. at fols. 1–88, 303–312, 435–436, 492–502. See also Clark, “American Board of Customs,” 45 AHR 791 note; Dickerson, “John Hancock,” 32 MVHR 517, 532–534 (1946).
21. It has been argued that the Liberty was seized and condemned solely for having loaded oil and tar without bond or permit, a technical offense against a requirement that had not previously been enforced in Boston. The loading is said to have been made the basis for the suit, because it provided ground for condemnation more readily provable than unloading before entry, and at the same time allowed the customs officers and Governor Bernard to take the proceeds of the cargo as well as of the vessel. Dickerson, Navigation Acts 237–238. See also Lovejoy, “Rights Imply Equality: The Case against Admiralty Jurisdiction in America, 1764–1776,” 16 WMQ (3d ser.) 459, 478 (1959); Ubbelohde, Vice Admiralty Courts 121–122. This view was followed in 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography 306 note. The files of the Vice Admiralty Court are lost, but secondary materials support the contrary position on several grounds: (1) There is complete unanimity in the contemporary accounts of the various royal officials concerned that Kirk's deposition of 10 June as to the unloading and the opinion of the Board's solicitor thereon provided the immediate impetus for the seizure. See materials cited in notes 7, 9, above; also, Commissioners' Minutes, 8 Aug. 1768, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 7, 8; Bernard to Lord Hillsborough, 11 June 1768, 6 Bernard Papers 311, MH; Hutchinson to Richard Jackson, 16 June 1768, 55 MHS, Procs. 281. The case was presented to Attorney General DeGrey for his opinion on this basis. Opinion of William DeGrey, 25 July 1768, 55 MHS, Procs. 273–276. (2) The only accounts which mention the failure to secure bond or permit indicate that this was an alternative ground for the seizure. Boston News-Letter, 16 June 1768, p. 2, col. 1; 3 Hutchinson, Massachusetts Bay, ed. Mayo, 137 (The latter states expressly that the vessel was seized for false entry, and the goods for lack of a permit). (3) Dickerson's argument that the use of a writ of assistance to search the Liberty shows that her present cargo, rather than her past misdeeds, was the basis for the seizure, seems to be based on a misreading of Hutchinson's account of the question raised by the fact that the seizure was at sunset. See note 8 above. No contemporary account mentions a writ of assistance. (4) If the suit had been based only on loading without bond or permit, the oil and tar would certainly have been condemned with the vessel. The release of the goods (note 20 above) indicates that there was no violation of the bond and sufferance provisions at all. See also Hutchinson to——, ca. 3 Nov. 1768, 26 Mass. Arch. 324–325. (5) In all the furor which the Town of Boston produced in print as a result of the seizure and its aftermath, there is not a single complaint that the cause of seizure was the technical, and therefore unjust, one of loading without bond or permit. Boston's position was that the employment of the Romney, already despised for the impressment activities of her captain, brought on the riot of 10 June; this was the basis of all subsequent complaints. See Instructions to Boston Representatives, 17 June 1768, 16 Boston Record Commissioners, Reports 258; “A Letter from Boston to a Gentleman in London,” 15 June 1768, American Gazette (No. 2) 97–110; An Appeal to the World, or a Vindication of the Town of Boston 14–17 (London, 1770); Letters to the Right Honorable the Earl of Hillsborough from Governor Bernard, General Gage, and the Honorable His Majesty's Council 44 (London, 1770); Observations on Several Acts of Parliament 19 note (Boston, 1769). See also Gary, Joseph Warren 75–76. (6) One contemporary account favorable to Boston states that the seizure and condemnation of the Liberty were “for a non-entry of a part of her cargo of Madeiria wines.” “A Journal of the Times,” 3 Nov. 1768, in Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 18. An early historian of the Revolution, who had access both to documents and personal accounts in Boston, states that the seizure was for a false entry. 1 Gordon, History of Independence 231.
22. On the sale, see Massachusetts Gazette, 1 Sept. 1768, p. 1, col. 2; Boston Evening-Post, 12 Sept. 1768, p. 3, col. 1. Governor Bernard received his third on 9 Nov. 1768. Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 22 June 1768. The Liberty sold for £102 15s. 1/2d; the expense of fitting her out as a cutter was £813 18s. 9d. Commissioners to Treasury, 28 July 1769, quoted in Wolkins, “Liberty,” 55 MHS, Procs. 261 note 3. Full details regarding her destruction may be found in PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 200–225, 289–292, 371–385. See also Boston Gazette, 24 July 1769, p. 2, col. 3; Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 456–457; Wolkins, “Liberty,” 55 MHS, Procs. 261 note. Baxter is incorrect in identifying the Liberty with the Gaspee, destroyed below Providence in June 1772. Baxter, Hancock 268. See Edward Channing, A History of the United States, 3:125 (N.Y. 1912).
23. See Bernard to Hillsborough, 9 Sept. 1768, 7 Bernard Papers 26, 27, MH. The venire for the Aug. term of the Superior Court in Suffolk County includes Daniel Malcom among the Grand Jurors from Boston. SF 101222.
24. Minutes of the Commissioners, 2 Sept. 1768, 7 Bowdoin-Temple MSS 166, MHi.
25. Opinion of William DeGrey, 55 MHS, Procs. 273–276. The memorial of the Commissioners, which with its enclosures, is found in PRO, Treas. 1:465, fols. 67–121, was carried to England by Benjamin Hallowell, who presented the case personally to the Treasury. See Examination of Benjamin Hallowell, 21 July 1768, American Gazette (No. 6) 450; Dickerson, Navigation Acts 241, 261 note; Wolkins, “Liberty,” 55 MHS, Procs. 260. DeGrey's opinion could not have reached Massachusetts in time to affect the in rem proceeding, but it was undoubtedly the basis for the in personam actions. See Hillsborough to Bernard, 13 Aug. 1768, 11 Bernard Papers 285, MH.
26. Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 29 Oct. 1768. See “A Journal of the Times,” 31 Oct. 1768, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 16. The other respondents were John Matchet, William Bowes, and Lewis Gray. Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 29 Oct. 1768. The citation against Barnard was not served, no doubt because he had gone to sea. Id., 21 Nov. 1768. He was lost on a voyage from Madeira in June 1769. A. Oliver to F. Bernard, 3 Dec. 1769, 12 Bernard Papers 164, MH; Boston Gazette, 17 July 1769, p. 3 col. 2. On 29 Oct. Sewall also brought actions against Malcom and three others for unloading wines from the schooner Friendship in Feb., after Malcom had unsuccessfully sought a reduction in duties from the customs. In these informations £2400 was sought from each respondent and bail was set at £800. Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 29 Oct. 1768; Observations on Several Acts of Parliament 19 note (Boston, 1769); Minutes of Commissioners, 10 Oct. 1768, 7 Bowdoin-Temple MSS 167, MHi; Bernard to Shelburne, 21 March 1768, 6 Bernard Papers 289–290, MH. These suits were dismissed with Hancock's on 25 March 1769. See note 40 below. The Friendship was seized on 31 Oct. and adjudged forfeit in March. Trail v. The Friendship,Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 18 Nov. 1768; Massachusetts Gazette, 24 Nov. 1768, p. 2, col. 1.
27. So General Gage suggested. Gage to Hillsborough, 5 March 1769, quoted in Dickerson, Navigation Acts 262 note. The delay may also be related to the Sewall-Venner affair, note 20 above. Sewall had refused to reveal Venner's name to the Commissioners. Apparently with Sewall's tacit consent, Hutchinson told the Commissioners that Venner was the informant in a letter dated 29 Oct. 1768. PRO, Treas. 1:471, fol. 43; see Hutchinson to Commissioners, 3 Jan. 1769, id. at fol. 81. The delays both in the suits and in revealing Venner may have been occasioned by Sewall's reluctance to proceed until he had some kind of assurance of the Commissioners' support.
28. See 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §§37, 41, 42 (1764), quoted, text at notes 582, 1693, 1996, below. In England the Attorney General would proceed for penalties owed the Crown, but where forfeitures were divided between informer and Crown, the usual form was the qui tam action brought by the informer for himself and other parties. See 3 Blackstone, Commentaries *160, 261–262; 4 id. at *303–304. The form of the information shows that Sewall was proceeding in the latter capacity. See note 380 below. It has been suggested that retainers of £72 each paid to Sewall and Fitch in Oct. and Feb. for “sundry causes” disguise a single large fee necessary to get them to take on Hancock's case. Dickerson, Navigation Acts 263 note. The suggestion is refuted by the fact that on the docket of the Vice Admiralty Court at this period were seven forfeiture actions pending, as well as three penal suits. Vice Adm. Min. Bk., Oct. 1768—Feb. 1769. See, for example, No. 47, No. 48, No. 49. See also note 26 above.
29. The information and order are set out in text at notes 2–579–82 below.
30. “A Journal of the Times,” 3 Nov. 1768, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 18. The account of the trial which follows is largely based on this source. Political bias casts doubt on the “Journal's” treatment of events, but its dating is probably accurate and is corroborated by what little other information there is.
31. “A Journal of the Times,” 7 Nov. 1768, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 19.
32. 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography306. The sheer length of the proceeding was a source of contemporary complaint also. See note 35 below; JA's Instructions to the Boston Representatives, 14 May 1769, 3 JA Works 509. In his Autobiography JA wrongly dated the suit as beginning in 1773 and being “suspended at last only by the Battle of Lexington.” 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography305–306. He also stated that the action against Hancock was “upon a great Number of Libells for Penalties, upon Acts of Parliament, amounting to Ninety or an hundred thousand Pounds Sterling.” Id. at 306. Either JA here added a zero to the sum involved, or else he meant that Hancock had undertaken to make good any liability imposed upon the other respondents. Hancock's account with JA, beginning in March 1769 and receipted 21 Dec. 1771, contains the following statement in JA's hand, but lined out, which probably refers to his fees in this case: “The Affair in the Admiralty is omitted for the Present, Mr. Price [Deputy Register of the Vice Admiralty Court] has promised to give me the Particulars Tomorrow. I had much rather leave that to Mr. Hancocks Pleasure, but if he chooses to have me make an Account of it I will do it tomorrow.”
33. “A Journal of the Times,” 28 Nov., 5 Dec., 14 Dec., 1768, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 28–34.
34. “A Journal of the Times,” 14 Dec. 1768, 2 Jan. 1769, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 34, 43. Further interrogatories were filed on 7 Jan. Id. at 46.
35. See the entries in “A Journal of the Times” for 5 Jan., 7 Jan., 23 Jan., 28 Jan., 30 Jan., 11 Feb. 1769, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 44–64. Critical comments on the practice of the Admiralty Court are appended to these entries. See id. at 43 (number of witnesses); id. at 46 (Star Chamber method of interrogation and exercise of jurisdiction on land); id. at 54 (examination in chambers); id. at 56 (powers and perquisites of the judge); id. at 57 (length of trial); id. at 64 (length of trial). JA may have supplied some or all of these comments. See note 74 below.
36. “A Journal of the Times,” 17, 18, 23 Feb. 1769, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 66–67.
37. “A Journal of the Times,” 24 Feb. 1769, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 68, quoted, note 49126 below. The “Journal” here paraphrased a portion of JA's argument. See note 74 below.
38. “A Court of Admiralty relative to Mr. Hancock's libels, sat yesterday.—It is said the judge has given his decree upon the question mentioned in our last Journal [i.e. 24 Feb., note 37 above].” “A Journal of the Times,” 2 March 1769, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 72. See JA's copy of the decree and comments on it, text at notes 50–57127–134 below.
39. “A Journal of the Times,” 27 March, 22 April 1769, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 84, 92. No copy of the indictment or record of trial has been found in the Suffolk Files.
40. “The Advocate General prays leave to retract this information and says Our Sovereign Lord the King will prosecute no further hereon. Allowed.” Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 25 March 1769.
41. “A Journal of the Times,” 26 March 1769, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 83. Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 25 March 1769.
42. Lovejoy, “Rights Imply Equality,” 16 WMQ (3d ser.) 459, 481–482. See also Dickerson, Navigation Acts 245–246. These authorities also suggest that the impending recall of Bernard and the Treasury's disapproval of the activities of the Customs Commissioners led to the withdrawal. The evidence on this point is at present inadequate. The new judges were created pursuant to a statute providing for superior Admiralty courts of both original and appellate jurisdiction to sit in the colonies. 8 Geo. 3, c. 22 (1767). The salaries were fixed at £600 to be paid out of the King's share of fines and forfeitures, or from the sale of old naval stores in England if the former was insufficient. Ubbelohde, Vice Admiralty Courts 133.
43. “A Journal of the Times,” 20 Jan. 1769, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 53. News of the commissions was received in Boston on 29 Nov. 1768. Id. at 28.
44. One contemporary historian found lack of evidence to be the reason. 1 Gordon, History of Independence 240–241.
45. See notes 30–41 above.
46. See Barrow, Colonial Customs 487–511; Clark, “American Board of Customs,” 45 AHR 787–790.
47. See note 1693 below; text at note 74 below.
48. See Wroth, “The Massachusetts Vice Admiralty Court and the Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction,” 6 Am. Jour. Legal Hist. 250, 360–364, 367 (1962); p. 102–104, notes 17, 22, 24, above.
49. The Declaration spoke out against judges independent of colonial legislatures, as well as against trial without jury. For a summary of the much more detailed attacks between 1769 and 1774, see Ubbelohde, Vice Admiralty Courts 142–147, 189–190.
50. Dickerson, Navigation Acts 231–246; see also Lovejoy, “Rights Imply Equality,” 16 WMQ (3d ser.) 459, 478–482.
51. See note 21 above.
53. Opinion of William DeGrey, 25 July 1768, 55 MHS, Procs. 273–276. As to the problem of weighing evidence, see Gilbert, Evidence 150, 157–158.
54. The location of the burden of proof depends on the statute, 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §45 (1764), providing that “if any ship or goods shall be seized for any cause of forfeiture, and any dispute shall arise whether the customs and duties for such goods have been paid, or the same have been lawfully imported or exported, or concerning the growth, product, or manufacture of such goods, or the place from whence such goods were brought, then and in such cases, the proof thereof shall lie upon the owner or claimer of such ship or goods.” Assuming that goods landed before entry were not “lawfully imported” within this statute, Hancock bore the burden. He thus could have failed either because his evidence was insufficient on its face, or because Kirk's testimony outweighed it.
55. JA in his argument, text following note 986 below, conceded that the wines were smuggled, although this may have been a recognition either of the principle of res judicata, or of the practical futility of rearguing this point before the same court. See also the language of his Autobiography, admittedly many years later, that “a great Uproar was raised in Boston, on Account of the Unlading in the Night of a Cargo of Wines from the Sloop Liberty from Madeira, belonging to Mr. Hancock, without paying the Customs.” 3 JA, Diary and Autobiography305–306. See also Gordon, 1 History of Independence 231, 240–241. Some of the colonial writings which might have raised an objection, but did not, are cited in note 21 above.
56. This system had been incorporated in all of the Acts of Trade from the beginning. See, for example, 12 Car. 2, c. 18, §§1, 3 (1660); 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §42 (1764). See also Hoon, English Customs 275–276, 285–289. In England it had been standard practice in a variety of situations since the 15th century. See 9 Holdsworth, History of English Law 240. One of the earliest of such statutes provided that a customs officer who embezzled duties should be liable for treble the value of the goods, with a third to the informer who sued. 3 Hen. 6, c. 3 (1424). The process was commonly followed in Massachusetts penal acts. See, for example, Act of 26 Feb. 1768, 4 A&R 983 (All penalties and forfeitures for breach of Province customs laws to be paid one-half to Province and one-half to informer).
57. See note 21 above.
58. 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §37 (1764), text at note 582 below. See Barrow, Colonial Customs 323, 473–474. For use of penalties in England, see Hoon, English Customs 288–289.
59. See 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, c. 26, §75. It should be noted that the sum sued for was required to be in sterling by 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §41 (1764).
60. 3 Blackstone, Commentaries *289–291, Appendix III, §5; 1 Bacon, Abridgment 209–210; 12 Geo. 1, c. 29 (1725); Francis Clerke, Praxis Curiae Admiralitatis Angliae, tit. 4 (London, 3d edn., Latin and English, 1722). (The Harvard Law School's copy of this work bears the following notation on its title page in the hand of Simon Greenleaf: “This book belonged to the late Prest. John Adams, whose autograph was stolen as above appears, after I gave it to the Law Library. S.G.” The page is cut at the top.) The Massachusetts practice has not been determined, but in the absence of statute the English procedure was presumably followed. For the English rule on bail in suits on penal statutes, see Presgrave v. ——, 1 Comyns 75, 92 Eng. Rep. 966 (K.B. 1700); St. George's Case, Yelv. 53, 80 Eng. Rep. 38 (K.B. 1604); Gilbert, Common Pleas 37. The statute embodying this rule was specifically limited to cases arising in the common-law courts at Westminster, however. 29 Eliz. 1, c. 5, §21 (1587). Even if the case law could be deemed applicable in the colonies, it would not bind the Court of Admiralty. See a proceeding under the White Pine Acts in New York in which the “Defendent” was held to bail. Wentworth v. Dean, Hough, Reports 227, 228 (N.Y. Vice Adm. 1769). The complaint about bail was thus in effect only another complaint about the latter jurisdiction. See “A Journal of the Times,” 2 March 1769, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 72; see notes 63, 64, below.
61. 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §§41–42 (1764). See Anthony Stokes, A View of the Constitution of the British Colonies in North America 360–361 (London, 1783); Barrow, Colonial Customs 322–323.
62. In England such proceedings were by information, although at common law. 4 Blackstone, Commentaries *303; Hoon, English Customs 279–280. In his opinion in the case of the Lydia, note 3 above, however, Sewall had expressed a great reluctance to proceed by information in the Superior Court, noting that this method had “seldom been used [in Massachusetts] without the consent of the Judges, except in cases where the offense has been clearly against Law and the public Good has evidently required it.” 4 WMQ (3d ser.) 504. The implication is clear that if the Commissioners had wished to proceed at common law in the Liberty case, they would have had to obtain an indictment.
63. For the English Admiralty practice, see Arthur Browne, A Compendious View of the Civil Law, 2:396–443 (London, 2d edn., 1802).
64. One basic issue was the power of Parliament to pass such legislation without colonial representation. See JA's Argument, text following note 1289 below. The colonial position, which had at first been that there should be no taxation without representation, gradually broadened after 1765 into a denial of all parliamentary power over the colonies; moreover, the remedy sought became not representation in Parliament, but colonial home rule. Needless to say, the orthodox English view was opposed to the colonial stand. Miller, Origins of the American Revolution 225–231. Equally critical was the question of the power of Parliament, however constituted, to interfere with what the colonists claimed as fundamental rights. In his argument for Hancock, JA urged that trial in Admiralty was an interference with the right of trial by jury, and others argued, if he did not, that such statutes were void. See text at notes 15–2792–104 below. The English position was that Parliament could not be controlled in this regard. No. 44, notes 32–34. There was a further problem in the effect of the statutes, 13 Ric. 2, c. 5 (1389), and 15 Ric. 2, c. 3 (1391), limiting the Admiralty jurisdiction to matters not arising “within the bodies of the counties,” which had been relied upon at common law in both England and the colonies to restrict the Admiralty courts in ordinary civil matters to things “done upon the sea.” The common-law courts used the writ of prohibition to halt Admiralty proceedings that exceeded these statutory limits. See 1 Holdsworth, History of English Law 552–559. In Massachusetts the Superior Court seems to have interfered in customs suits only when the Vice Admiralty Court acted beyond the jurisdiction given it by the Acts of Trade, indicating an understanding that the latter legislation abrogated the statutes of Richard II pro tanto. See Wroth, “The Massachusetts Vice Admiralty Court,” in George A. Billias, ed., Law and Authority in Colonial America: Selected Essays (Barre, Mass., in press). Perhaps for this reason, JA did not touch upon the issue in Hancock's case. It was raised by others in Massachusetts and elsewhere, however, implying that the ancient acts had attained the stature of fundamental law. See, for example, “A Journal of the Times,” 7 Jan. 1769, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 46; Ubbelohde, Vice Admiralty Courts 188–190; Henry Laurens, Extracts From The Proceedings Of The Court Of Vice-Admiralty In Charles-Town, South Carolina 18–19 ([Phila.], 1768), discussed further, note 73 below.
65. See No. 51, notes 8–1316–21, text at notes 33–35.
66. See Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 114, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 647, 652 (C.P. 1610); No. 44, notes 35–38.
67. See No. 44, note 44.
68. In making what was really a political appearance before the Governor and Council to argue for the opening of the courts during the Stamp Act crisis of 1765, Adams urged the invalidity of the Act in the strongest terms. Quincy, Reports 200–202; 2 JA, Works 158–159 note. See No. 44, note 48. See also 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography263–267.
69. See text at notes 36–44 above.
70. See, for example, text at notes 1289, 1491, 28105, below.
71. See text at note 49126 below.
72. “Journal of the Times,” 7 Jan., 26 March 1769, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 46–47, 83–84.
73. Laurens' pamphlet, Extracts From The Proceedings Of The Court Of Vice-Admiralty In Charles-Town, South-Carolina, was first published in Philadelphia late in 1768. A portion of it entitled “General Observations on American Custom House Officers and Courts of Vice Admiralty” appeared in the Boston Gazette for 9 Jan. 1769, p. 2, cols. 1–3. An expanded version of the pamphlet, Extracts from the Proceedings of the High Court of Vice Admiralty upon Six Several Informations, published in Charleston, in Feb. 1769, may also have been available to JA. See T. R. Adams, “American Independence”, Nos. 57a–c; “A Journal of the Times,” 7 Jan. 1769, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 46–47; Ubbelohde, Vice Admiralty Courts 109–112.
74. See text at note 47 above; text and note 1693, ||text and note||49126, below. Horace Gray suggested that these passages show JA's hand in the “Journal.” Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 457. JA's comment in June 1771 that he had “not wrote one Line in a Newspaper these two Years” (2 JA, Diary and Autobiography39), has been taken to mean that he probably did not participate in the “Journal.” Arthur M. Schlesinger, Prelude to Independence 312 (N.Y., 1958). JA's statement would not have excluded his supplying both the impeachment materials and other commentary on the trial (note 35 above) to the “Journal,” however, since these accounts were published no later than May 1769. Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 82.
75. Laurens' pamphlet (note 73 above) consisted chiefly of papers from the files of the court in the seizure of his ship Ann, with comments. Compare JA's text at notes 2–579–82, 50–57127–134, below. For political similarities, compare JA's argument with Laurens' “General Observations.” JA did contemplate a report of this nature based on his notes in Rex v. Corbet, also in his Admiralty Book. See No. 56, note 24.
76. The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym, Boston Gazette, Supp., 13 Jan. 1766, in 3 JA, Works 470–472. See also 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography273–275. Compare text at notes 20–2597–102 below.
77. Compare note 55132 below. The political significance of JA's argument is discussed in Lovejoy, “Rights Imply Equality,” 16 WMQ (3d ser.) 459, 478–484 (1959).

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0004-0002

Author: Adams, John
Author: Sewall, Jonathan
Author: Auchmuty, Robert Jr.
DateRange: 1768-10 - 1769-03

Adams' Copy of the Information and Draft of His Argument1

Court of Vice Admiralty, Boston, October 1768–March 1769
Jonathan Sewal vs. John Hancock
Prov. &c.2 Before the Honorable Robert Auchmuty Esqr.
Be it remembered, that on the 29 day of October in the Ninth Year of the Reign of his Majesty George the Third, Jonathan Sewall Esqr. Advocate General for the said Lord the King, in his proper Person comes and as well on behalf of the said Lord the King, as of the Governor of this Province,3 gives the said Court to understand and be informed, that on the ninth day of May last, a certain Sloop called the Liberty, arrived at the Port of Boston in said Province, from the Islands of Madeira, having on Board, one hundred and twenty seven Pipes of Wine of the Growth of the Madeira's; of which said Sloop, one Nathaniel Barnard was then Master, and that in the Night Time of the same day the said Nathaniel Barnard with Intent to defraud the said Lord the King of his lawfull Customs, did unlawfully and clandestinely unship and land on shore in Boston aforesaid one hundred of the aforesaid Pipes of Wine4 of the Value of Thirty Pounds Sterling Money of Great Britain, each Pipe, the Duties thereon not having been first paid, or secured to be paid, agreable to Law. And that John Hancock of Boston aforesaid Esqr. was then and there willfully and unlawfully aiding and assisting in unshipping and landing the same one hundred Pipes of Wine, he the said John Hancock, at the same Time well knowing, that the Duties thereon were not paid or secured and that the unshipping and landing the same, as aforesaid, was with Intent to defraud the said Lord the King as aforesaid, and contrary to { 195 } Law; against the Peace of the said Lord the King and the Form of the Statute in such Case made and provided, whereby and by Force of the same Statute, the said John has forfeited Treble the value of the said Goods, so unshipped and landed as aforesaid, amounting in the whole to the Sum of Nine Thousand Pounds Sterling Money of Great Britain, to be divided, paid and applied in manner following, that is to say, after deducting the Charges of Prosecution, one Third Part thereof to be paid into the Hands of the Collector of his Majesty's Customs for the said Port of Boston, for the Use of his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, one Third Part to the Governor of said Province, and the other Third Part to him that informs for the same.
Whereupon as this is a matter properly within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Advocate General prays the Advisement of the said Court in the Premisses, and that the said John Hancock may be attached and held to answer to this Information, and may by a Decree of this honourable Court be adjudged to pay the aforesaid Sum of Nine Thousand Pounds to be applied to the uses aforesaid.
[signed] Jon. Sewall Advocate for the King
Octr. 29, 1768. Filed and allowed and ordered that the Register of this Court or his Deputy issue out a Warrant for the Marshall of this Court or his Deputy to arrest the Body of the said John Hancock and him keep in safe Custody so that he have him at a Court of Vice Admiralty to be holden at Boston on the Seventh day of November next at Nine of Clock before noon and that he take Bail for Three Thousand Pounds Sterling money of G. Britain.
[signed] Robert Auchmuty Judge &c.
Upon what Statute is this Libel founded? Is it on 4 G. 3, C. 15, §37.5 Be it enacted, &c. “if any Goods or Merchandizes whatsoever, liable to the Payment of Duties in any British Colony or Plantation in America, by this or any other Act of Parliament shall be loaden on Board any Ship or Vessel outward bound, or shall be unshipped or landed from any ship or Vessell inward bound, before the respective Duties due thereon are paid, agreable to Law; or if any prohibited Goods whatsoever shall be imported into, or exported out of, any of the said Colonies or Plantations contrary to the true Intent and meaning of this or any other Act of Parliament; every Person who shall be assisting, or otherwise concerned, Either in the Loading outwards, or in the Unshipping or landing Inwards, such Goods, or to whose Hands the same shall knowingly come after the Loading or unshipping there• { 196 } of, shall for each and every offence forfeit treble the Value of such Goods, to be estimated and computed according to the best Price that each respective Commodity bears at the Place where such offence was committed; and all the Boats, Horses, Cattle, and other Carriages whatsoever, made Use of, in the Loading, Landing, removing, Carriage or Conveyance of any of the aforesaid Goods, shall also be forfeited and lost, and [shall and] may be seized and prosecuted, by any officer of his Majestys Customs, as hereinafter mentioned.”6
There is a Clause similar, in most respects to this in 8. Ann, C. 7, §17.7 “And for preventing the Frauds, which may be practised in unshipping to be landed any Pepper, Raisins, Mace, Cinnamon, Cloves, Nutmegs, Snuff, or any other Sort of Goods whatsoever, subject to the Payment of Duties without paying the same as also to hinder the Importation of any Sort of prohibited Goods into Great Britain, Be it further enacted by the Authority aforesaid, that if any Pepper, Raisins, Mace, Cinnamon, Cloves, Nutmegs, Snuff, or any other Sort of Goods whatsoever, liable to the Payment of Duties, shall be unshipped, with Intention to be laid on Land (customs and other Duties, not being first paid or secured) or if any prohibited Goods whatsoever, shall be imported into any Part of Great Britain, then not only the said uncustomed and prohibited Goods, shall be forfeited and lost, but also the Persons who shall be assisting, or otherwise concerned in the unshipping the said prohibited and uncustomed Goods, or to whose Hands the same shall knowingly come, after the unshipping thereof, shall forfeit Treble the value thereof, together with the Vessells and Boats, and all the Horses, and other Cattle and Carriages whatsoever, made use of in the Landing, removing, Carriage, or Conveyance of any of the aforesaid Goods,” &c.8
Madeira Wines are Goods and Merchandises, liable to the Payment of Duties in this British Colony or Plantation.9 Admitting it { 197 } proved that a Quantity of such Wines were unshipped and landed, from the sloop Liberty inward bound, before the Duties due upon it, were paid, agreable to Law. What shall be the Construction of the Words “assisting or otherwise concerned,” in the Unshipping or Landing inwards. The Labourers, the Porters, and Sailors, who manage the Tacles and with their own Hands, hoist out the Pipes, are no doubt, concerned, and the Master who oversees and gives orders, is no doubt assisting. But is the owner Either concerned or assisting in it, if he does not know of it. He may be asleep in his Bed, and not so much as know or dream that any Body is unshipping and landing his Wines. Is he then concerned or assisting? Can it be proved that Captain Barnard was concerned? Can it be proved that Captn. Marshall was? What then? Can it be proved that Captn. Marshall asked Leave of Mr. Hancock? Can it be proved that Mr. Hancock knew of this Frolick? If he neither consented to it, nor knew of it, how can he be lyable to the Penalty?10
I must beg the Indulgence of the Court, while I consider the Character of this Act of Parliament. There is a great Variety in the Characters of Laws as well as Men. A benign and beneficial Law is to receive a liberal and benign Construction. A rigorous and severe Law is to receive a strict and severe Construction. And the more penal it is the more severe must the Construction of it be, and the more tenderly must it be carried into Execution. It will not be impertinent therefore to shew in some Detail the Circumstances, that render this Law the most rigid and severe, or in other Words the most poenal of almost any Law in the whole British Pandect.
The Degree of severity in any Poenal Law is to be determined only { 198 } by the Proportion between the Crime and the Punishment. Treason is justly punished with death because it is an attempt to overthrow the whole Frame of the Government, and the Government can never be overturned without the slaughter of many Hundreds of Lives and the Ruin of many Thousands of Fortunes. If a Man will murder his Fellow subject it seems but equall that he should loose his own Life. But in this Case what is the Crime? Landing a few Casks of Wine. Admitting the Crown to have the clearest Right to the Duties it is but unjustly taking away a small sum of Money from the Crown, and one would think that the forfeiture of £100 would be an equal Punishment for withholding £100 in Duties.11 But surely the Forfeiture of an whole Cargo of Wines worth Ten Thousand Pounds, for withholding one hundred Pounds in Duties would be a great Disproportion between the Crime and Punishment. To carry it one step further, and subject the ship, as well as Cargo to Confiscation, but above all to subject the Master to £1000,12 and every Person concerned to a forfeiture of threble value, is such a stretch of security as renders this Act more Penal, than any Statute vs. Rape, Robbery, Murder or Treason.
But among the Groupe of Hardships which attend this Statute, the first that ought always to be mentioned, and that ought never to be forgotten is
1. That it was made without our Consent. My Clyent Mr. Hancock never consented to it. He never voted for it himself, and he never voted for any Man to make such a Law for him. In this Respect therefore the greatest Consolation of an Englishman, suffering under any Law, is torn from him, I mean the Reflection, that it is a Law of his own Making, a Law that he sees the Necessity of for the Public. Indeed the Consent of the subject to all Laws, is so clearly necessary that no Man has yet been found hardy enough to deny it. And The Patrons of these Acts allow that Consent is necessary, they only contend for a Consent by Construction, by Interpretation, a virtual Consent.13 But this is { 199 } only deluding Men with Shadows instead of Substances. Construction has made Treasons where the Law has made none. Constructions, in short and arbitrary Distinctions, made in short only for so many by Words,14 so many Cries to deceive a Mob have always been the Instruments of arbitrary Power, the means of lulling and ensnaring Men into their own Servitude. For whenever we leave Principles and clear positive Laws, and wander after Constructions, one Construction or Consequence is piled up upon another untill we get at an immense distance from Fact and Truth and Nature, lost in the wild Regions of Imagination and Possibility, where arbitrary Power sitts upon her brazen Throne and governs with an iron Scepter. It is an Hardship therefore, scarcely to be endured that such a poenal Statute should be made to govern a Man and his Property, without his actual Consent and only upon such a wild Chimaera as a virtual and constructive Consent.
But there are greater Proofs of the Severity of this statute, yet behind.
2. The Legislative Authority by which it was made is not only grievous, but the Executive Courts15 by which it is to be carried into Effect is another. In the 41st section of this Act 4 G. 3, c. 15.16 we find that “All the Forfeitures and Penalties inflicted by this or any other Act [or Acts] of Parliament, relating to the Trade and Revenues of the said British Colonies or Plantations in America, which shall be incurred there, shall and may be prosecuted, sued for, and recovered, in any Court of Record,17 or in any Court of Admiralty, in the said Colonies or Plantations where such offence shall be committed, or in any Court of Vice Admiralty, which may or shall be appointed over all America, (which Court of Admiralty or Vice Admiralty, are hereby respectively authorized and required to proceed, hear, and determine { 200 } the same), at the Election of the Informer or Prosecutor.” Thus, these extraordinary Penalties and Forfeitures, are to be heard and try'd,—how? Not by a Jury, not by the Law of the Land, [but] by the civil Law and a Single Judge. Unlike the ancient Barons who unâ Voce responderunt, Nolumus Leges Angliae mutari,18 The Barons of modern Times have answered that they are willing, that the Laws of England should be changed, at least with Regard to all America, in the most tender Point, the most fundamental Principle. And this Hardship is the more severe as we see in the same Page of the Statute and the very preceeding section §40, “That all Penalties and Forfeitures, herein before mentioned, which shall be incurred in Great Britain, shall [and may] be prosecuted, sued for and recovered in any of his Majestys Courts of Record in Westminster or in the Court of Exchequer in Scotland respectively.”19
Here is the Contrast that stares us in the Face! The Parliament in one Clause guarding the People of the Realm, and securing to them the Benefit of a Tryal by the Law of the Land, and by the next Clause, depriving all Americans of that Priviledge. What shall we say to this Distinction? Is there not in this Clause, a Brand of Infamy, of Degradation, and Disgrace, fixed upon every American? Is he not degraded below the Rank of an Englishman? Is it not directly, a Repeal of Magna Charta, as far as America is concerned. It is not att all surprising that the Tryals of Forfeiture and Penalties are confined to the Courts of Record at Westminster, in England. The Wonder only is that they are not confined to Courts of common Law here.
The People of England are attached to Magna Charta.20 By the 29th Chapter of that Statute, “Nullus liber Homo capiatur, vel imprisonetur, aut disseisietur de libero tenemento [suo], vel libertatibus, vel liberis Consuetudinibus [suis], aut utlagetur, aut exuletur, aut aliquo modo destruatur, nec super eum ibimus nec super eum mittemus, nisi per { 201 } legale Indicium Parium Suorum vel per Legem Terrae.”21 This 29, Chap, of Magna Charta, has for many Centuries been esteemed by Englishmen, as one of the noblest Monuments, one of the firmest Bulwarks of their Liberties—and We know very well the Feelings and Reflections of Englishmen whenever this Chapter has been infringed upon even in Parliament. One Proof of them has been given us by Lord Coke, in his Exposition of this Chapter.22 2. Inst. 51. “Against this ancient and fundamental Law, and in the Face thereof I find an Act of Parliament made, that as well Justices of Assize as Justices of Peace without any finding or presentment of 12 Men, upon a bare Information for the King before them made, should have full Power and Authority by their Discretions,” &c.23
Lord Coke after mentioning the Repeal of this Statute and the Fate of Empson and Dudley, concludes with a Reflection, which if properly attended to might be sufficient even to make a Parliament tremble.24 “The ill success of this Statute and the fearfull End of these 2 oppressors, should deter others from committing the like, and should admonish Parliaments, that instead of this ordinary and precious Tryal Per Legem Terrae, they bring not in absolute and partial Tryals by Discretion.”25
{ 202 }
These are the Reflections of an Englishman, upon a Statute which gave to Justices of Assize, and Peace, the Tryal of Penalties and Forfeitures, which by the 29. C[hapter] of Magna Charta ought to be tryed by Jury. The Statute 4 G. 3. takes from Mr. Hancock this precious Tryal Per Legem Terrae, and gives it to a single Judge.26 However respectable the Judge may be, it is however an Hardship and severity, which distinguishes my Clyent from the rest of Englishmen, and renders this Statute, extremely poenal.27
I have mentioned this Particular, not merely to shew the Hardship { 203 } of this Statute and Prosecution, and that my Client is therefore in a favourable Case,28 but for another Purpose, vizt. to shew the Nature of the Evidence, that is required in this Case. We are here to be tryed by a Court of civil not of common Law, we are therefore to be tryed by the Rules of Evidence that we find in the civil Law, not by those that We find in the common Law. We are to be tryed, both Fact and Law is to be tryed by a single Judge, not by a Jury. We therefore claim it as a Right, that Witnesses not Presumptions nor Circumstances are to be the Evidence.
We are to enquire what is the Evidence required by the civil Law, <in Criminal Cases> in order to convict a Person of a Crime and to Subject him to a Penalty. New Inst. civil Law. Page 316.29 2. “The Number of Witnesses ought to be two at the least to make a full Proof, and these must be free from all Exceptions, Either as to their Persons or their Depositions. For the Testimony of a single Witness is of no Validity, tho the Person is of a great Character,” &c.30 “For one Witness may mistake or lie, and be corrupted, and yet be consistent with himself, and so remain undiscovered; whereas two or three Witnesses may more easily be found in a Conspiracy by a prudent Judge if they are separately examined; and tho many Criminals would escape and many might loose their Right for Want of two Witnesses, yet it would be a lesser Evil than to trust so much Power to the Mistakes or Malice of one Person.”
Dig. Lib. 22. Tit. 5. §12. De numero Testium. “Ubi numerus testium non adjicitur, etiam duo sufficient. Pluralis enim elocutio duorum numero contenta est.”31
Codicis Lib. 4. Tit. 20. §9, §1. “Simili modo sanximus, ut unius testimonium nemo Iudicum, in quacunque causa facile patiatur ad• { 204 } mitti. Et nunc manifeste sanximus, ut unius omnino testis responsio non audiatur, etiamsi praeclarae Curiae honore prefulgeat.”32 Vide Note 32. “Unus testis, nullus testis. Unius Testimonium non admittitur. Vox Unius, Vox nullius est.”33 In this Respect the civil Law conforms to the divine Law. Deut. 19. 15. “One Witness shall not rise up against a Man for any Iniquity, or for any Sin, in any sin that he sinneth: at the Mouth of two Witnesses, or 3, shall the matter be established.”34
But in Hancock's Case, if there were 2 or ten such Witnesses as Mezle,35 they would not amount to Proof sufficient for Condemnation. Because there are against him, the strongest legal Exceptions, 1. His Condition. New Inst. civ. Law. 315. “Indigent Persons and Beggars ought to be suspected, because they are easily corrupted.”36 Dig. 22. 5. 3. “Testium Fides diligenter examinanda est: Ideoque in Persona eorum exploranda, erunt in primis, Conditio, cujusque; utrum quis decurio an Plebeius sit; et an honestae et inculpatae vitae, an vero notatus quis, et reprehensibilis. An locuples vel egens sit ut lucri causa quid facile admittat: vel an inimicus ei sit, adversus quem testimonium fert; vel amicus ei sit, pro quo testimonium dat:” &c.37 Vide Note 22. “In Testibus hac sunt inquiranda, Conditio, Vita, Facultates, Inimicitiae, vel amicitiae, suspicio denique &c.”38
Calv. Lex. Testes.“Callistratus, testium Fidem, Conditionem, Vitam anteactum, Fortunam, Aestimationem, atque dignitatem diligenter exquirendam esse praecipit.”39
{ 205 }
Fortescue De Laudibus Legum. C. 31. page 38. “It will not always happen that they [i.e. perjured witnesses] are or can be known by the Party, Defendant in the Cause, in order to call in Question their Life and Conversation, that as Persons of a profligate Character, they might be cross examined; upon which account their Evidence might be set aside.”40
The general Character of this Witness cant be known. We can have no Citation to the Mountains of Switzerland, or the Fens of Holland or the Plains of Cape Francois,41 for Witnesses to his general Character for Truth. We ought to know therefore all that can be known of his History from his own Mouth. Life and Conversation, Fides, Vitam anteactam, inculpatae et honestae Vitae are Expressions, that denote more than a general Character for Truth or falshood.
The civil Law seems to lean to the side of Mercy, as much as the common Law. Wood Inst. 310. “In Criminal Cases the Proofs ought to be as clear as the Sun at Noon day:”42
Domat. V. 1. Page 13. Preliminary Book. Tit. 1. Sect. 2. N. 15.43 “The Laws which restrain our natural Liberty, such as those that forbid any Thing that is not in itself unlawfull or which derogate in any other manner from the general Law, the Laws which inflict Punishments for Crimes and offences, or Penalties in civil matters; those which prescribe certain Formalities; the Laws which appear to have any Hardship in them” &c.44 “are to be interpreted in such a manner, as not to be applied beyond what is clearly expressed in the Law,” &c.45 “We ought to give to such Laws all the Temperament of Equity and Humanity, that they are capable of.” Notae: “Interpretatione Legum Poenae molliendae sunt, potius quam asperendae. In Poenalibus Causis benignius interpretandum est. In levioribus Causis proniores at Lenitatem Judices esse debent, in gravioribus Poenis, Severitatem Legum, cum aliquo temperamento benignitatio subsequi.”46
{ 206 }
Codicis. Lib. 4. Tit. 19. §.25. De Judiciis criminalibus. “Sciant cuncti accusatores eam se rem deferre in publicam notionem debere quae munita sit idoneis Testibus, vel instructa apertissimis documentis vel indiciis ad probationem indubitatis et luce clarioribus expedita.”47 Vide Notes also.48
But disregarding order, for the present let me record the Controversy We had last Week, Concerning the Rules of Law which were to govern this Case.49 The Court of Admiralty is originally a Civil Law Court. Jurisdiction of a Crime, is given to it in this Case by Act of Parliament. The Question is whether it is to proceed by the civil Law? If it is, We have a Right to examine the Witnesses whole past Life, and his Character at large. A Son cannot be examined against the Father nor the Father against the Son, and other Relations are disqualified to be Witnesses. All Persons under Twenty are disqualified, under 20 years of age I mean, from being Witnesses. Servants and dependants { 207 } are not to be Witnesses. Nay. Mr. Fitch says we must adopt the Method of Torture, among the rest.
On the Contrary I argue, that if We are to be governed by the Rules of the common Law We ought to adopt it as a whole and summon a Jury and be tryed by Magna Charta. Every Examination of Witnesses ought to be in open Court, in Presence of the Parties, Face to Face. And there ought to be regular Adjournments from one Time to another.
What other Hypothesis shall we assume? Shall We say that We are to be governed by some Rules of the common Law and some Rules of the civil Law, that the Judge at his Discretion shall choose out of each system such Rules as please him, and discard the rest. If so Misera Servitus est. Examinations of witnesses upon Interrogatories, are only by the Civil Law. Interrogatories are unknown at common Law, and Englishmen and common Lawyers have an aversion to them if not an Abhorrence of them. Shall We suffer under the odious Rules of the civil Law, and receive no advantage from the beneficial Rules of it? This, instead of favouring the Accused, would be favouring the Accuser, which is against the Maxims of both Laws.
Interlocutory Decree50
Advocate General vs. John Hancock, Esqr.
The Substance of the Point before the Court, is, whether a Witness shall be examined to charge another Witness in the Cause with a particular infamous Crime.
It is urged by the Advocates offering the first mentioned Witness, first, that this is a civil Law Court, and secondly, by that Law such Evidence is admissible. To the last Point several authorities were cited, but the principal one from the Digest 22. 5. 2. 3.51
{ 208 }
To which it was answered by the Advocates on the other side that this is not a civil Law Court in such Cases as the present. And that the Authorities produced were not to be understood in the Sense contended for by the Respondents Advocates. In support of the last, the Notes under the aforesaid 3 Law in the Digest were read and relyed on.52 It was also urged, that admitting the civil Law to be as contended for, the argument would prove too much, because it would exclude relations in certain Degrees, intimate Friends, Persons under the age of Fourteen &c. from testifying.
I take the Sense of the Authority first mentioned, to be no more than a general description of what are good objections against persons being admitted to their Oaths as Witnesses without describing the mode whereby such disqualifications are to be ascertained. If said Authority is not so construed, it certainly clashes with the notes, which clearly relate not to the Admission of Witnesses, but the Credit or Refutation of their Evidence. The reason why proof by record ought to be exhibited against a Witness, when charged with a Crime, appears clear from the Question put in the Note, under D. 22. Tit. 3. “Quis enim, si sufficiat accusasse, innocens fiet?”53 Such a reading reconciles the Text and comment in the Digest to each other, and the former to Reason. I am therefore of opinion the motion is not well supported, even by the Rules of the civil Law. In addition to which, when I consider the process now in question, is founded on an Act of parliament, originally intended to be guided by the Rules of the common Law,54 that the Practice of the Court has ever been to hear and determine similar cases, according to those rules, the manifest and great inconveniences which must accrue, by the Admission of such { 209 } evidence, I am clearly of opinion, the Question put is improper, and therefore Decree the same to be withdrawn.55
[signed] Robt. Auchmuty Judge &c.
Obsirve, The Expressions. The Substance of a Point. A Point has not Parts, therefore is indivisible, therefore to talk of the substance of it, is not the neatest or most elegant. But to omit Criticism, let me make a few Observations upon the <Reasoning> substance of the Decree.
1. The Advocates for the Crown, did not argue that our Argument would exclude Relations, Friends, Persons under 14. &c. But the Advocates for the Respondent, insisted that all those Rules of the civil Law ought to be adopted, because they were beneficial to the subject the Respondent. We had no difficulty at all in Admitting the Consequence as far as it is here mentioned. So far from it that we desired it, because Mr. Hancock's Relations, Friends, and many Persons under age have been examined in this Case. It is true Mr. Fitch did argue that our Principle would justify the Introduction of Torture and this he thought was proving too much, and this was well observed by Mr. Fitch and was the best argument I have heard in the Case.56
2. The Judge has totally mistaken the “Sense” of the Authority, for instead of being a Description of Objections against Persons being admitted to their Oaths it is wholly confined to those who are already sworn. It is Testium Fides examinanda est,57 not Personarum Fides, and as a Witness in English implies the Competency of the Person, so { 210 } Testis in Latin implies the same, and a Person cannot be Testis, untill he is admitted, to tell what he knows, i.e. to give Evidence.58
1. In JA's hand, in his Admiralty Book, Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 184. Apparently a copy from an earlier state now lost. See text at note 70 above. Portions of the MS were printed in Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 457–463, and 2 JA, Works 215. For the dating of the MS, see text following note 70 above.
2. An abbreviated form for the usual caption, probably “Province of Massachusetts Bay / Court of Vice Admiralty.”
3. The usual form of the qui tam information used to prosecute these divided forfeitures. See notes 28, 56, 62, above. The name derives from the full Latin phrase, “qui tam pro Domino Rege quam pro seipso” (who [sues] as well for our Lord the King as for himself). See 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, c. 26, §17. Sewall omitted the usual last phrase “for himself,” but it is clear from the form of the information as a whole that he was suing as informer. See form used in New York, Hough, Reports 272–274.
4. According to testimony, note 5 above, twenty-five pipes were entered at the Custom House. It is not known whether the two additional pipes alleged here are the correct figure or represent counsel's margin for error.
5. The American Act of 1764, 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §37. Quotation marks supplied.
6. That is, in a court of law or of Admiralty, the proceeds to be divided equally among the Crown, the governor of the province in which the case was tried, and the informer. 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §§41, 42.
7. 8 Anne, c. 7, §17 (1709). Quotation marks supplied.
8. The remainder of the section provides that half of the penalties and forfeitures levied go to the Crown and the other half to the informer, “to be recovered by bill, plaint, or information, wherein no essoin, protection, or wager of law shall be allowed.” The latter clause, which in other similar acts had been held to limit the jurisdiction to the common law, and the seeming limitation on the face of the act to imports into England, indicate that this statute could not have been the basis of the action. See Chalmers, Opinions 500.
9. A duty of £7 per tun was levied on Madeira wine by the American Act of 1764, 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §1; Knollenberg, Origin of the American Revolution 176–177. According to Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass., 1949), a tun was equal to two pipes, or about 250 gallons.
10. This represents the general common-law rule on the liability of a principal for the misdemeanor of an agent, at least in the absence of the principal's negligence. See William L. Clark and William L. Marshall, Law of Crimes §8.12 (Chicago, 6th edn., M. F. Wingersky, 1958). As to Captains Barnard and Marshall, see text at notes 4–6 above. In Attorney General v. Woodmass, Bunbury 247, 145 Eng. Rep. 662 (Exch. 1727), an information on 8 Anne, c. 7, §17, note 784 above, “for being assisting or otherwise concerned in unshipping five hundred gallons of brandy,” some of the brandy “run” was ultimately “carried to the defendant's house; but it did not appear the defendant was present either at the time of running or removing the goods to his house; but he afterwards paid the cobblemen for running these goods.” The court held that “this was a being concerned within the statute, if the jury were of opinion that the defendant employed the persons to run the goods on his account, and paid them for that purpose.” Verdict for the Crown. See also Attorney General v. Flower, Bunbury 227, 145 Eng. Rep. 656 (Exch. 1726); Attorney General v. Lake, Bunbury 277, 145 Eng. Rep. 673 (Exch. 1729). William Bunbury's Reports of Cases in the Court of Exchequer was first published at London in 1755. 1 Sweet and Maxwell, Legal Bibliography 322.
11. The duties on 100 pipes, or 50 tuns, would have been £350. See note 986 above.
12. Thus in MS. The penalty on a master permitting dutiable goods to be loaded aboard his vessel for unlawful entry in the Plantations was actually £100. 6 Geo. 2, c.13, §7 (1733), made applicable by 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §7 (1764). It would seem that the master would also be liable under the broader provisions of 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §37, note 582 above. Sewall did proceed against the master of the Liberty. See note 26 above.
13. The doctrine of virtual representation, by which a member of Parliament was held to represent the interests of the Empire as a whole, rather than those of his constituents, was used by the English to justify their own system of limited franchise and rotten boroughs, as well as colonial nonrepresentation. See Miller, Origins of the American Revolution 212–215.
14. Thus in MS. Compare 2 JA, Works 215 note. The garbled text here suggests that JA was copying from notes or an earlier draft.
15. That is, the courts of justice, which “execute” the laws, as distinguished from legislative “courts,” such as the General Court, which make them. See No. 44, note 2072.
16. American Act of 1764, 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §41. Opening quotation mark supplied. The text following, through note 27104, was used by JA with some revision in his “Instructions of the Town of Boston to their Representatives,” 15 May 1769, 3 JA, Works 508–509, 16 Boston Record Commissioners, Reports 285–289, abbreviated in “A Journal of the Times,” 14 May 1769, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 99. The MS, in JA's hand, is in the Boston Public Library. The instructions were published in full in the Boston Gazette, 15 May 1769, p. 1, cols. 1–3. See text at notes 47, 74, above. Important variations between the text of the argument and that of the “Instructions” are noted below, but a detailed comparison must await publication of the “Instructions” in Series III of The Adams Papers. ||Digital edition: “Instructions,” 15 May 1769, now available in Papers of John Adams, volume 1.||
17. In quoting the statute in his “Instructions”JA omitted all clauses dealing with the concurrent jurisdiction at common law.
18. Translated in JA's “Instructions” as “who answered with one voice, 'We will not that the laws of England be changed.'” This famous line is the reply of the barons to the request of the bishops that they be permitted to follow the canon law by certifying children born before marriage as legitimate. Statute of Merton, 20 Hen. 3, c. 9 (1234). The phrase appears in slightly different form in the text of the statute itself, but JA followed Coke's rendition of Bracton's version. 2 Coke, Institutes *98. See 2 Holdsworth, History of English Law 218. In Coke's text, the active voice of the infinitive “mutare” (to change) is used. JA's probably inadvertent use of the passive, “mutari,” is carried over into his translation, changing the barons' denial of a request for legislation into a legislative principle.
19. American Act of 1764, 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §40.
20. This and the preceding three sentences were omitted in the “Instructions,” and the two paragraphs were telescoped into a single sentence, “Is it not with respect to us a Repeal of the 29th Chapter of Magna Charta?” 3 JA, Works 509.
21. Translated by JA in his “Instructions,” 15 May 1769, as “No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised of his freehold or liberties or free customs or outlawed or exiled or any otherwise destroyed, nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land.” 3 JA, Works 509. The text is that of Magna Carta, 9 Hen. 3, c. 29 (1225), quoted from the version given by 2 Coke, Institutes *45. Quotation marks and omitted words supplied. It is this text, approved by Henry III at his majority, rather than that granted by John at Runnymede in 1215, which actually has the force of law today. See Plucknett, Concise History 23. The differences between the two documents are slight, however, and are not material in this section. See William S. McKechnie, Magna Carta 181–183, 436, 445–446 (Glasgow, 1905). For changes in translation brought about by modern scholarship, see id. at 436–448; 1 Holdsworth, History of English Law 59–63.
22. This and the preceding sentence are rendered in the “Instructions” as “Englishmen are inviolably attached to the important right expressed in this clause, which for many centuries has been the noblest monument and firmest bulwark of their liberties. One proof of this attachment, given us by a great sage of the law, we think proper to mention, not for your information, but as the best expression of the sense of your constituents.” 3 JA, Works 509.
23. 2 Coke, Institutes * 51. Quotation marks supplied. Coke's sentence continues, “to heare and determine all offenses, and contempts committed, or done by any person, or persons against the forme, ordinance, and effect of any statute made, and not repealed, &c.” The Act, 11 Hen. 7, c. 3 (1494), excepted treason, murder, and felony from its provisions. See 4 Coke, Institutes *40–41. In his “Instructions”JA quoted Coke as saying “by their discretions to hear and try men for penalties and forfeitures.” 3 JA, Works 509.
24. In the “Instructions” the last phrase is “to discourage such attacks upon fundamental principles.” 3 JA, Works 509.
25. 2 Coke, Institutes *51. 11 Hen. 7, c. 3, was repealed by 1 Hen. 8, c. 6 (1509), which, according to Coke, recited that under the earlier act, “it was manifestly known, that many sinister, and crafty, feigned and forged informations, had been pursued against divers of the kings subjects to their great damage, and wrongful vexation.” 2 Coke, Institutes *51. This is a reference to the doings of Sir Richard Empson and Edmund Dudley, councilors of Henry VII employed in the collection of taxes and forfeitures due the Crown, who were purported to have abused the power of proceeding by information under 11 Hen. 7, c. 3. On the accession of Henry VIII they were thrown into the Tower, accused of various oppressive tactics; while there, they were charged with and convicted of having compassed the death of the new king, and were executed on these grounds in 1510. 1 Howell, State Trials 283–288; see DNB under both names. JA used this episode in his Clarendon Letters of 1766, attacking the use of the Admiralty courts in the Stamp Act. See note 76 above.
26. Coke does not deal with the problem under the clause “Iudicium Parium suorum,” or judgment of peers, the traditional source of the right to jury trial. He seems to view that clause merely as a confirmation of the nobility's right to a trial by their peers. 2 Coke, Institutes *48–50. Instead, his “reflections” are a gloss on the clause “per Legem Terrae,” to which he gives the meaning “due process of law.” His criticism of 11 Hen. 7, c. 3, seems to be based more on the fact that no indictment was required, than on the absence of a trial jury. id. at 50–51; but see 4 Coke, Institutes *41. Modern scholars are agreed that in granting a trial by judgment of peers, Magna Carta granted not the modern trial by jury but rather the right to trial in a court of peers instead of in the King's court. There is disagreement as to whether “the law of the land” means due process, or simply the usual medieval modes of trial—battle, ordeal, and compurgation. See 1 Holdsworth, History of English Law 59–63; 2 id. at 214–215. Whatever the correct interpretation, Parliament does not seem to have regarded summary trial as a deprivation of due process. No general measure was ever enacted again, but by the middle of the 18th century certain customs violations and at least 200 other specific offenses against statutory regulation, punishable corporally or by fines ranging up to £500, were to be tried by one or more justices of the peace sitting without a jury. Frankfurter and Corcoran, “Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury,” 39 Harv. L. Rev. 917, 922–934 (1926); Hoon, English Customs 277, 280. A similar range of offenses was within the jurisdiction of Massachusetts justices, but there was a theoretical right to a jury through an appeal procedure much hedged in with restrictive security requirements. 39 Harv. L. Rev. 938–942. Moreover, in England the proceeding by information, rather than indictment, was a common one for many misdemeanors even when trial was to a jury. See note 62 above.
27. In the “Instructions” the preceding paragraph is summed up in the sentence, “Such are the feelings and reflections of an Englishman upon a statute not unlike the statute now under consideration, and upon courts and judges not unlike the courts and judges of admiralty in America.” 3 JA, Works 509.
28. This may be another garbled passage showing that JA copied from notes. See text at note 70 above. Or it could mean that Hancock's “Case” was to be considered “favourable” in the sense that the hardships were extenuating circumstances which entitled him to favorable consideration. See OED.
29. Wood, New Institute of the Civil Law 316. Quotation marks supplied.
30. JA has here omitted the following passage: “unless he swears of his own Fact, and where there are other Circumstances to concur or corroborate, or unless he is a publick Officer; as a Notary, &c. deposing by Vertue of his Office. This is founded upon very good reason.” Wood, New Institute of the Civil Law 316.
31. Justinian, Digest, bk. 22, tit. 5, §12. Quotation marks supplied. For translation see 5 Scott, Civil Law 235: “Where the number of witnesses is not specified by law, two are sufficient, for the term 'several' is embraced in the number two.”
32. Justinian, Codex, bk. 4, tit. 20, §9, §1. Quotation marks supplied. See 13 Scott, Civil Law 37: “In like manner, we have ordered that no judge shall in any case readily accept the testimony of only one witness; and now We plainly order that the evidence of only one witness shall not be taken, even though he should be distinguished by senatorial rank.”
33. The edition used by JA has not been found. For this passage, see 2 Corpus Juris Civilis 176, note 18 (Antwerp, 1726).
34. Deuteronomy 19:15. Quotation marks supplied. The reference appears at the page in Wood's New Institute, cited in note 26106 above.
35. As to Mezle, or Maysel, see text at notes 37–39 above.
37. Justinian, Digest, bk. 22, tit. 5, §3. Quotation marks supplied. See 5 Scott, Civil Law 232–233:
“The integrity of witnesses should be carefully investigated, and in consideration of their personal characteristics, attention should be, in the first place, paid to their rank; as to whether the witness is a Decurion or a plebeian; whether his life is honorable and without blame, or whether he has been branded with infamy and is liable to censure; whether he is rich or poor, lest he may readily swear falsely for the purpose of gain; whether he is an enemy to him against whom he testifies, or whether he is a friend to him in whose favor he gives his evidence.” The concluding sentence of the above translation, which was omitted by JA, is, in the Latin, “Nam si careat suspicione testimonium, vel propter personam, a qua fertur, quod honesta sit: vel propter causam, quod neque lucri neque gratiae, neque inimicitiae causa sit: admittendus est.”
38. See 1 Corpus Juris Civilis 436 note 38 (Antwerp, 1726).
39. Johannes Calvinus, Lexicon Juridicum Juris Caesarei Simul et Canonici 905, tit. “Testis,” (Cologne, 1622). Quotation marks supplied. The editors' translation: “Callistratus decreed that the good faith, condition, previous life, lot, reputation, and rank of witnesses should be diligently inquired of.”
40. Sir John Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae 38 (London, 1741). Quotation marks supplied. Fortescue was actually pointing to this as a defect in civil-law procedure. His De Laudibus, written about 1468, and first published in the 16th century, was intended to demonstrate the great superiority of the English to the Roman law. See 2 Holdsworth, History of English Law 569–570.
41. Maysel was evidently of European origin. See note 49126 below.
42. Wood, New Institute of the Civil Law 310. Quotation marks supplied.
43. Jean Domat, The Civil Law In Its Natural Order, 1:13–14 (London, transl. Strahan, 1722). Quotation marks supplied.
44. JA here omitted “those which permit Disinheriting and others the like.”
45. JA here omitted: “to any consequences to which the Laws do not extend. And on the contrary . . .”
46. The preceding three sentences are in a note at the end of the passage from Domat, cited, note 43120 above. They are quoted from the following sections of Justinian, Digest: bk. 48, tit. 19, §42; bk. 50, tit. 17, §155(2); bk. 48, tit. 19, §11. See 11 Scott, Civil Law 124: “By the interpretation of the laws, penalties should rather be mitigated than increased in severity.” Id. at 312: “In penal cases, the most benevolent construction should be adopted.” Id. at 115: “It is clear that in cases of minor importance, judges should be inclined to lenity; and where heavier penalties are involved, while they must comply with the stern requirements of the laws, they should temper them with some degree of indulgence.”
47. Justinian, Codex, bk. 4, tit. 19, §25. See 13 Scott, Civil Law 36: “All accusers are hereby notified that they cannot bring a criminal charge for anything which has been established by reliable witnesses; or clearly proved by documentary evidence; or shown to be true by undoubted testimony clearer than light.” A better translation of the first clause might be “charge unless a thing has been established.” This section is cited in the margin of the passage in Wood's New Institute, cited, note 42119 above.
48. The notes in 2 Corpus Juris Civilis 175, notes 24–26 (Antwerp, 1726), reiterate the sense of the text quoted at note 47124 above.
49. According to “A Journal of the Times,” on 24 Feb. “The advocates for Mr. Hancock, offered evidence to prove that a witness, who had been before examined for the proponent, was a fugitive from his native country, to avoid the punishment due to a very heinous crime. The advocates for the crown objected to this evidence as improper, urging that by common law, nothing could be proved against a witness but his general character for falsehood. The advocates for the respondent replied, that the Court of Admiralty proceeded according to the civil law, whereby a witnesses whole life and conversation ought to be examined. And they insisted upon knowing by what law their client was to be tried.” Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 68. The passage continues with a close paraphrase of the text here, adding a few phrases from JA's earlier notes on the civil law. The English common-law rule at this time was basically that asserted by the Crown. A witness' general moral character and character for truth were admissible to impeach, but evidence of specific misconduct could be admitted only in the form of a record of criminal conviction. See Wood, Institute of the Laws of England 597; 2 Bacon, Abridgment 288, 296; Gilbert, Evidence 157–158. The distinction was doubtless due to the fact that those guilty of felony and other crimes involving falsehood were altogether excluded as witnesses. Id. at 142–145.
50. Probably given on 1 March 1769. See note 38 above.
51. Though partly overwritten, this refers to bk. 22, tit. 5, §§2, 3. For §2, see 5 Scott, Civil Law 232: “The rank, the integrity, the manners and the gravity of witnesses must be taken into consideration, and therefore those who make contradictory statements, or who hesitate while giving their evidence, should not be heard.” “Manners” (Latin “mores”) might be better translated as “morals.” The first part of §3 appears in text at note 37114 above. The section goes on to provide that the judge should determine credibility; that all available kinds of proof should be investigated; that the judge should examine the witnesses if possible, allowing them their costs; and that witnesses should not be summoned from afar unless it is the custom of the region. The passage most relevant here would seem to be the following:
“It is proved by the Lex Julian relating to violence, that those shall not be permitted to give testimony against a defendant who has [i.e. have] been freed by him or his father; or who have not yet arrived at puberty, or anyone who has been condemned for a public crime, and has not been restored to his former condition, or who is in chains, or in prison, or has hired himself out to fight with wild beasts; or any woman who openly prostitutes herself, or has already done so; or anyone who has been sentenced or convicted of having received money for giving or witholding testimony.” Id. at 233–234.
52. For the notes, see 1 Corpus Juris Civilis 436–437 (Antwerp, 1726). See note 53130 below.
53. 1 Corpus Juris Civilis 437 note 1, a note to the latter part of Justinian, Digest, bk. 22, tit. 5, §3. Editors' translation: “Who, however, will be found innocent, if it be sufficient to have been accused?” The preceding sentence is, in translation, “In the refutation of a witness, it is not enough that he be accused of a crime; it is necessary that he be convicted.” See also, 1 Corpus Juris Civilis 436, note 73, an annotation to the passage quoted in note 51128 above concerning those who are in chains or in prison, which states that such persons are not rejected as witnesses unless they have been convicted, seemingly because chains and prison alone are not a sign of infamy.
54. Compare “A Journal of the Times,” 24 Feb. 1769: “If therefore the court is to adopt the common law, because the jurisdiction was created by Act of Parliament; it ought to adopt it as a system.” Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 68.
55. For a somewhat similar argument, see Stokes, Constitution of the British Colonies 361. In “A Journal of the Times,” 2 March 1769, Auchmuty's point that the evidence would be inadmissible even under the civil law was not mentioned and the decision was said to have turned upon “the usage of the court, and the inconveniencies that would attend the introduction of the rules of the civil law, in cases of this nature.” The writer asked upon what usage this unique case could be based, and went on to point out that the court had not been deterred by inconvenience in using interrogatories, in sitting without regular adjournments, in issuing compulsory citations to witnesses, and in ordering arrest and high bail for immediate appearance. After noting that only the judge's discretion determined which law would apply, the account continued, “It is reported that the advocates for Mr. Hancock, had no solicitude about the question they put to the witness, but they thought that if the court would proceed by such rules of the civil law as pleased the officers of the revenue, they had a right to such rules of the same law, as made in favour of Mr. Hancock.”Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 72.
56. This point was turned to good account in the entry in “A Journal of the Times,” note 55132 above. As a consequence of the judge's discretion to determine the applicable law, “if a case should happen that should require it, or if the C[ommissio]n[e]rs should give their mandate to the court, supposing them hereafter to get a judge fit for the purpose, why might he not gently put parties or witnesses to the torture, and extend them on the rack? Donec eorum rumpuntur nervi, et venae in sanguinis fluenta prorumpunt.” Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 72.
57. That is, in the passage in the Digest in text at note 37114 above.
58. Both the abrupt termination of his argument at this point without a formal conclusion and the state of the manuscript suggest that JA intended to continue this paper.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0005-0001

Editorial Note

While the affair of John Hancock's Liberty (No. 46) drew public attention, a steady flow of other cases of illicit importation kept merchants, customs officers, and lawyers busy. On 6 September 1768, Joseph Dowse, surveyor and searcher of the customs for the port of Salem and Marblehead, seized thirty-three hogsheads and four tierces of molasses which had allegedly been landed in Gloucester without entry or payment of duties.1 Although another seizure which Dowse had made on Cape Ann was rescued at about this time by the inhabitants, he managed to retain control of the molasses. Jonathan Sewall filed an information against it for him in the Court of Admiralty on 26 October, with claimants cited to appear on 7 November.2
Since Adams was to appear in court for Hancock on the latter date,3 it is probable that he was of counsel for David Plumer of Gloucester, who claimed the molasses. In any event, Adams' minutes, printed below, show that when the case came on to trial, probably some time in December, Plumer sought to establish that the molasses had been imported, duty-paid, in August on his schooner Earl of Gloucester. Unfortunately, this vessel, after earlier evading the officers, had been seized on 22 October for the illicit importation of forty hogsheads of molasses on the same August voyage. An in rent proceeding was begun against her on 6 December.4
{ 211 }
The Commissioners also sought to impose penalties upon the individuals responsible for the alleged smuggling. At the end of December, Sewall filed in personam actions against seven men, including Plumer and Moses Bray, master of the Earl of Gloucester. On 3 February 1769 the citations were returned not served.5 It is possible that the respondents entered into a settlement whereby they agreed to withdraw their opposition in the forfeiture proceedings in exchange for an undertaking not to press the penal actions. Whatever the reason, the molasses, condemned earlier, was ordered sold on 2 March; on 18 April the Earl of Gloucester was adjudged forfeit, no claim having been entered for her.6
If Plumer did not voluntarily withdraw his claim for the molasses, there were other reasons why his defense might have failed. Adams' minutes indicate that Plumer produced witnesses to establish an identity between the molasses in suit and certain molasses covered by a cocket certifying legal entry on payment of duty, which had been signed by John Fisher, Collector at Salem. At the end of September, however, Fisher had been suspended by the Commissioners of the Customs on a number of charges, { 212 } including that of crediting merchants with more duties than they had actually paid.7 The court thus may well have found the cocket fraudulent, or may not have accepted the evidence of Plumer's witnesses.
1. The duties, of a penny a gallon on all molasses imported except from the island of Dominica, were imposed by 6 Geo. 3, c. 52, §4 (1766). Forfeiture, as provided by 6 Geo. 2, c. 13, §3 (1733), was the penalty for landing without entry and payment of duties, because §12 of the 1766 Act had incorporated prior statutes. As to Dowse, see Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 428.
2. Dowse v. 33 Hogsheads and 4 Tierces of Molasses, Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 26 Oct. 1768; Massachusetts Gazette, 27 Oct. 1768, p. 1, col. 3. The rescue, “at Squam” in Gloucester occurred at midnight on 11 September. In Nov. the Commissioners offered a reward of £50 for the culprits, which was supported by a proclamation of Governor Bernard. Id., 10 Nov. 1768, p. 1, col. 1. Dowse was still searching for these or other goods at Squam in the middle of October. Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 428 note. See also Dowse v. Nineteen Casks of Molasses, No. 49.
3. No. 46, note 31.
4. Grason v. The Earl of Gloucester, Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 6 Dec. 1768; Massachusetts Gazette, 8 Dec. 1768, p. 2, col. 2; “A Journal of the Times,” 24 Oct. 1768, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 10. Commissioners' General Letter, 14 Oct. 1768, Salem Custom House Record Book, 1763–1772, p. 254, MSaE. The Earl of Gloucester was informed against by her former master, Samuel Fellows, who apparently had a grievance against the owners. Minutes of the Commissioners, 30 March 1769, 7 Bowdoin-Temple MSS 173, MHi; “A Journal of the Times,” 16 Dec. 1768, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 36. See R. Reeve to Salem Customs Officers, 28 Jan. 1769, Salem Record Book, 1763–1772, p. 262. By way of reward, Fellows was given a position aboard a customs vessel and was soon in trouble. In May he led several men to rescue a member of his crew from a Salem deputy sheriff, firing on the officer in the process. Commodore Hood turned him over to the civil authorities, and at Ipswich Superior Court in June he was fined £10 and ordered to give £50 bond to keep the peace for two years. “A Journal of the Times,” 20 May, 3 June, 2 July 1769, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 100–101, 105–106, 113–114; Massachusetts Gazette, 25 May 1769, p. 1, cols. 1–2; Boston News-Letter, 1 June 1769, p. 1, col. 2; Min. Bk. 85, SCJ Essex, June 1769; SCJ Rec. 1769, fol. 71; SF 131768.
5. Advocate General v. David Plummer, Moses Bray, Daniel Plummer, Peter Clowning, Daniel Trew, Joseph Eveleth, and Thomas Corbin, Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 3 Feb. 1769; “A Journal of the Times,” 28 Dec. 1768, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 40. The Commissioners had asked the Salem customs officers for these names in a letter of 13 Sept. 1768. Salem Record Book, 1763–1772, p. 237.
6. For the molasses, see Notice of Sale, Massachusetts Gazette, 2 March 1769, p. 1, col. 3. The sale was set for 16 March. Only thirty hogsheads are included in the order, but it is not clear whether this was a typographical error, or whether in fact only thirty were condemned. Governor Bernard was paid his share of the proceeds on 8 June. Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 26 Oct. 1768. The Earl of Gloucester was first condemned along with her lading of a hogshead of rum, 1000 feet of white pine boards, and 3000 shingles, on 15 March 1769, and sale was set for 21 March. Grason v. The Earl of Gloucester, Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 6 Dec. 1768; Massachusetts Gazette, 16 March 1769, p. 1, col. 3. Perhaps because the buyer failed to pay, or else for some technical error in the proceedings, the vessel was then seized again on 10 April and declared forfeit on 18 April, this time with a cargo of 488 planks and 13,000 shingles. No order of sale or distribution of proceeds has been found. Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 10 April 1769; Massachusetts Gazette, 13 April 1769, p. 1, col. 2.
7. Fisher had been appointed in 1765 at the behest of John Temple, then Surveyor General of the Customs. His case was sent to the Treasury in London, who reversed the Commissioners and ordered them to reinstate him in Aug. 1769. Full documentation of the matter appears in PRO, Treas. 1:465, fols. 285–328, 389–391; 1:471, fol. 438. See also Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 451; Barrow, Colonial Customs 483–487. As to cockets, see note 512 below.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0005-0002

Author: Adams, John
Author: Sewall, Jonathan
DateRange: 1768-10 - 1769-03

Adams' Copy of the Libel and Report of the Trial1

Court of Vice Admiralty, Boston, October 1768-March 1769
Dowse vs. Thirty Three Hdds. Molosses
Be it remembered that on the 26 October 1768 Joseph Dowse of Salem in the County of Essex Esqr., Surveyor and Searcher for the Port of Salem and Marblehead in said Province, who prosecutes as well &c.2 comes and gives the Court to be informed that on the Sixth day of September last at Glocester in the Port aforesaid, he Seized as forfeited, one Third to the King &c.3 Thirty Three Hogsheads and four Tierces of Molasses, for that the same, on the same day was illegally imported, in some Ship or Vessell to the said Informant unknown, from foreign Parts, and was illegally unshipped and landed on Shore in Glouster aforesaid, no Report or Entry thereof having been first made and the Same being customable Goods and the Dutys thereon not having been first paid; against the Form of the Statute in that Case made and provided;4 whereby the Same Molasses is become forfeit to the Uses aforesaid. Whereupon as this is a matter properly within the Jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the said Joseph Dowse prays the Advisement of the Court in the Premisses, and that the same may by proper Process from this Court, be taken into Custody of the { 213 } Marshall of the same Court and by Decree be adjudged and decreed to remain forfeit to the Uses aforesaid.
[signed] Jona. Sewall Advo. for said Dowse &c.
David Plumer of Glocester in the County of Essex Merchant produces a Cockett from the Custom House in Salem 20 Aug. 1768 signed by Fisher Collector Mascarene Comptroller and John Turner Jr. Navall officer, for Thirty Three Casks of foreign Molasses, 3089 Gallons imported from St. Eustatia in the Earl of Glocester, duties paid by Moses Bray, now on board the Schooner Olive Branch Wm. Low Master, bound for Boston.5
And said Plumer proves by Witnesses that the Molasses now libelled against is the Same, that is mentioned in the above cockett.
1. In JA's hand, in his Admiralty Book, Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 184.
2. Omitted in MS is the remainder of the usual form of words in the qui tam information, “on behalf of the said Lord the King and of the Governor of this Province, as for himself.” See No. 46, note 380.
3. The omitted language is presumably “One Third to the Governor of said Province, and one Third to him that informs and sues for the same,” the statutory scheme of distribution. See 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §42 (1764), applicable here. See also No. 46, note 56.
4. See note 1 above.
5. A cocket was a document required for intercolonial shipment of goods, showing their quantity and quality, shipper, consignee, and where and when duties had been paid. 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §29 (1764); 5 Geo. 3, c. 45, §25 (1765). Auchmuty had ruled in Dawson v. Lighter and Molasses (May 1768) that a cocket was not needed for shipments from port to port within a colony, but the Commissioners had asked for a ruling from the Treasury in London. The opinion of the attorney general upholding Auchmuty was not given until 8 Sept. See sources cited in Dickerson, Navigation Acts 214–215; Oaks v. Dawson, SF 101809. As to Fisher, see note 7 above. John Mascarene had been appointed comptroller of the port of Salem and Marblehead in Aug. 1764. See Quincy, Reports (Appendix) 434, 450–451. As to the Naval Officer, see No. 45, note 34.

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Editorial Note

The documents that follow tell all that is known about this forfeiture proceeding in Admiralty. The basis of the suit was apparently the same statutory prohibition against unloading cargo before entry upon which John Hancock's Liberty had been condemned.1 The parties were cited to appear on 7 November, the date on which the in personam actions against Hancock and others involved in the Liberty affair began. Adams was thus certainly in court to make the brief minute of Otis' argument printed here as Document IV, and may also have been of counsel for Solomon Davis, the owner. The Minute Book entry (Document III) does not report the outcome, but presumably the Triton was acquitted, since no notice of sale was published in the Boston newspapers, and the Minute Book does not indicate a distribution of the proceeds of condemnation.
1. 15 Car. 2, c. 7, §8 (1663), set out in note 210 below. As to the Liberty, see No. 46, note 16.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0006-0002

Date: 1768-10-24

“A Journal of the Times”1

24 October 1768
This day the brig Tryton, owned by Mr. D——s, a merchant of this town,2 was seized by order of the Board of Customs, on supposition it is said, that she had some time ago been employed in an illicit trade; and that they may oblige the owner to prove where and how she has been employed.—This seizure exhibits another instance of the generosity of the Commissioners, and their friendly disposition towards trade, in as much as it is said, that they have not now any more cause of suspicion than they had four months past; during which time she has remained in port undisturbed till the owner had spent £.100 sterling in repairs, and had taken a freight for Hull, the insurance of which has been some time past wrote for by the several freighters.3
1. Printed in Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 9, from the New York Journal, 10 Nov. 1768.
2. Solomon Davis.
3. The italicized portion was omitted in the Boston Evening-Post publication of the item. Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 9 note.

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Date: 1768-10-27

Minutes of the Customs Commissioners' Proceedings1

27 October 1768
Read a Letter of the 25 Instant from the Collector and Comptroller of Boston. Ordered that the Solicitor do attend the Advocate General, and give him Instructions for prosecuting the Brigantine Tryton formerly called The Popet for Breach of the Acts of Trade.
1. 7 Bowdoin-Temple MSS 169, MHi.

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Date: 1768-10-29

Vice Admiralty Court Minute Book Entry1

29 October 1768
Wm. Sheaffe, Esqr.,2 Dy. Collector &c. vs. Brigt. Triton. Sewal3
Cited to appear 7 Novr.
His Honor the Judge gave his Decree as on file.
1. Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 29 Oct. 1768.
2. As to Sheaffe, see No. 45, note 637.
3. That is, Jonathan Sewall, who filed the information as Advocate General.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0006-0005

Author: Adams, John
Date: 1768-11

Adams' Minutes of the Argument1

Court of Vice Admiralty, Boston, November 1768
Sol. Davis's. Triton.
Otis. 15. C. 2, c7, §. 8.2
1. In JA's hand. Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 185.
2. 15 Car. 2, c. 7, §8 (1663). The pertinent portion of the section provides:
“(2) and no ship or vessel coming to any such land, island, plantation, colony, territory or place [i.e. royal colonies in Asia, Africa, or America, except Tangier. 15 Car. 2, c. 7, §6], shall lade or unlade any goods or commodities whatsoever, until the master or commander of such ship or vessel shall first have made known to the governor of such land, island, plantation, colony, territory or place, or such other person or officer as shall be by him thereunto authorized and appointed, the arrival of the said ship or vessel, with her name, and the name and surname of her master or commander, and have shewn to him that she is an English-built ship, or made good by producing such certificate, as abovesaid [i.e. that required by 12 Car. 2, c. 18, §10 (1660)], that she is a ship or vessel bona fide belonging to England, Wales, or the town of Berwick, and navigated with an English master, and three fourth parts of the mariners at least Englishmen, and have delivered to such governor or other person or officer a true and perfect inventory or invoice of her lading, together with the place or places in which the said goods were laden or taken into the said ship or vessel; (3) under the pain of loss of the ship or vessel, with all her guns, ammunition, tackle, furniture and apparel, and of all such goods of the growth, production or manufacture of Europe, as were not bona fide laden and taken in England, Wales, or the town of Berwick, to be recovered and divided in manner aforesaid” (i.e. in “any of his Majesty's courts” in the colony, one third to the Crown, one third to the Governor, and one third to the informer. 15 Car. 2, c. 7, §6).

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Editorial Note

September 1768 was a busy month for Joseph Dowse. On the night of 6 September, in which he seized the goods involved in Dowse v. Thirty-three Hogsheads of Molasses, No. 47, nineteen additional casks were allegedly landed in Salem from the schooner Neptune, which had entered on 19 August. Dowse seized them on the 7th. In November the Commissioners of the Customs asked their solicitor to consult with Jonathan Sewall about filing a libel against the Neptune and her contraband in the name of Rowland Savage, “Land waiter, Weigher and Gauger at Salem,” who had apparently seized the vessel.1 No action was taken against the Neptune, { 216 } perhaps because of legal doubts as to Savage's authority to seize. On 6 December, Sewall filed an information in Dowse's behalf against the molasses alone.2
On 14 December no claimant appeared and the molasses was decreed forfeit.3 Adams, who was then spending most of his time in the Admiralty Court as counsel in Sewall v. Hancock, No. 46, apparently contemplated making a claim in behalf of the consignee of the molasses. His notes, printed below, show that he had made a study of the statutes requiring an officer's warrant for goods to be landed, which, the information alleged, had not been obtained. He probably intended to argue that these Acts did not apply in an in rem proceeding against the goods, since they provided only for monetary fines against those involved in the landing or for the forfeiture of any small craft used. The decision not to file a claim may have been based on a desire to avoid exposure to an in personam action for these or the much more serious penalties imposed for entry without payment of duties, which were the basis of the suit against Hancock.4
1. Minutes of the Commissioners, 18 Nov. 1768, 7 Bowdoin-Temple MSS 169, MHi. See Commissioners' letter, 9 Sept. 1768, ordering seizure of molasses. Salem Custom House Record Book, 1763–1772, p. 238, MSaE. According to the notice of monition, note 2 below, the seizure was on 7 September. Dowse was informed of the entry by Thomas Rowe, tidesman. Popular displeasure at this led to a riot on 8 Sept. in which Rowe was injured. See Commissioners to Salem Customs Officers, 13 Sept. 1768, 2 Feb. 1769, Salem Record Book, 1763–1772, p. 237, 264.
2. Joseph Dowse v. 19 Casks of Molasses, Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 6 Dec. 1768. See the notice of monition in Massachusetts Gazette, 8 Dec. 1768, p. 2, col. 2. For the statutes involved, see notes 8–204–16 below. Savage had been appointed by the American Commissioners of Customs on 30 March 1768. Salem Record Book, 1763–1772, p. 61. The question of the power of such officers to seize remained open until it was apparently decided in the negative in July 1769. No. 50. There may have been doubt previously, however, in view of the decision in Folger v. The Cornelia, No. 45, against the power of an appointee of the surveyor general.
3. Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 6 Dec. 1768. See Notice of Sale, dated 3 Jan. 1769, for sale on 11 Jan. 1769. Boston News-Letter, Postscript, p. 2, col. 1. Governor Bernard received his third of the proceeds on 9 June 1769. Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 6 Dec. 1768.
4. No. 46, note 28 and text at note 83. The Commissioners sought those responsible, apparently in contemplation of such suits. See Commissioners to Salem Customs Officers, 13 Sept. 1768, 26 Nov. 1768, Salem Record Book, 1763–1772, p. 237, 258.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0007-0002

Author: Adams, John
Date: 1768-11

Adams' Copy of the Information and Statutes Involved1

Court of Vice Admiralty, Boston, December 1768
Josh. Dowse Esq. vs 19 Casks of Molasses. Gardiners.2
For that the same Molasses on 19 Aug. last, was imported and brought into the Port of Salem and Marblehead, from the Island of Guadaloupe, in a certain Schooner called the Neptune, Phillip Saun• { 217 } ders Master, and in the Night Time between the 6. and 7. days of September last, the said 19 Casks of Molasses were fraudulently and clandestinely landed from on board the said Schooner, and put on Shore in Salem aforesaid, with Intent to defraud the said Lord the King of his customary Duties thereon; neither the said Master nor any other Person having first duly entered and paid the legal Duties for the same, and without having first duly entered and paid the legal Duties for the same,3 and without having first obtained a Warrant from a proper officer, for the landing the same against the Form of the statutes in such Case made and provided,4 whereby the same is become forfeited as aforesaid.
13. 14. C. 2, C. 11, §. 7.5 Be it enacted that [if] any Wharfinger, or his servant, shall take up or land, &c. or suffer to be waterborn &c. any prohibited Goods &c.6 without the Presence of some officer, &c. or at Hours and Times, not appointed by Law (1. Eliz.)7 &c. he shall forfeit 100£.—and if any Goods or Merchandizes shall be taken in from the shore &c., into any Bark, Hoy, Lighter &c.8 without a Warrant, and the Presence of an officer, the Bark &c. shall be forfeited and the Master, Boatswain, Mariner9 &c. consenting shall forfeit the value of the Goods.
1. Elisabeth. C. 11, §. 2.10 Not lawfull for any Person to lade or put off or from any Wharf, Key, or other Place on the Land &c. or to take up, discharge and lay on Land, out of any Lighter, Ship, Crayer or Vessell any Goods, Wares or Merchandises &c.11 but only in the Day light, i.e. from March to Sept., between Sun setting and Sun rising, { 218 } &c.12 and in some open Place that shall be appointable,13 upon Pain of Forfeiture of all such Goods &c.
7. 8. W. 3, C. 22, §.6.14 For the more effectual preventing of Frauds and regulating abuses in the Plantation Trade, be it enacted that all Ships coming into or going out of, any of the said Plantations and lading or unlading any Goods or Commodities, whether Ships of War or Merchant Ships and the Masters and Commanders thereof and their Ladings, shall be subject and liable to the same Rules, Visitations, Searches, Penalties and forfeitures, as to the Entering, lading, or discharging their respective Ships and Lading, as Ships and their ladings and the Commanders and Masters of Ships, are subject and liable unto in this Kingdom, by 14 Car. 2d. &c.15 and the officers shall have the same Powers and be subject to the same Regulations, as officers in England by that act.16
1. In JA's hand, in his Admiralty Book, Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 184.
2. Presumably “Gardiner” was consignee and potential claimant of the molasses. Possibly Joshua Gardiner, a considerable merchant in Boston and a commercial partner of John Hancock. See No. 45, note 233.
3. Thus in MS. Either a copying error on JA's part, or an example of extreme nicety in pleading.
4. For the statutes requiring the duties and entry, see No. 47, note 1; No. 46, note 16. A warrant was required by 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §7 (1662), made applicable in the colonies by 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §6 (1696), which are set out in the text immediately following.
5. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §7 (1662). Pertinent omissions are supplied in footnotes.
6. The statute also included goods “whereof any custom, subsidy or other duties are due and payable unto the King's majesty.” 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §7.
7. That is, 1 Eliz. 1, c. 11, §2 (1558), set out immediately following in the text, which establishes times and places for the loading and unloading of cargo. The reference in 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §7, is actually to an exception made in the Act of Elizabeth for the town of Hull.
8. “To be carried aboard any ship or vessel outward bound for the parts beyond the seas, or laden or taken in from or out of any ship or vessel coming in and arriving from foreign parts,” 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §7.
9. “The master, purser, boatswain, or other mariner of any ship inward bound.” 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §7.
10. 1 Eliz. 1, c. 11, §2 (1558). Pertinent omissions are supplied in footnotes.
11. “Whatsoever . . . to be brought from any the parts beyond the sea.” 1 Eliz. 1, c. 11, §2.
12. “And from the last of September until the first of March, between the hours of seven in the morning and four at the afternoon.” 1 Eliz. 1, c. 11, §2.
13. That is, an “open place, key or wharf,” designated by the Crown within London or certain other named ports, or at any such place in any other port in which there had been a customs officer resident for the preceding ten years. 1 Eliz. 1, c. 11, §2. By 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §14 (1662), the Crown was given the power to establish the limits of all ports and appoint landing places within them.
14. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §6 (1696). Paraphrased with insignificant omissions.
15. That is, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11 (1662).
16. The sections of both statutes regarding the powers of officers are set out in No. 44, at notes 40–4592–97.

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Editorial Note

In this forfeiture proceeding, as in Folger v. The Cornelia, No. 45, Adams argued in favor of the power of an inferior officer of the customs to seize a vessel. In this case, however, he was defending the interests of an officer appointed by the Commissioners of Customs. On 12 May 1769 Jonathan Sewall had filed a libel against the brigantine Union in behalf of John Butler, tide surveyor in the port of Salem, who had earlier seized the vessel at Marblehead. Claimants were cited to appear on 22 May, at which time an exception attacking Butler's authority was evidently filed, and the case continued for argument.1
{ 219 }
On 22 June the Commissioners directed their solicitor “to engage Mr. Adams and Mr. Quincy to assist the Advocate General in supporting the Libel” against the Union. This action is doubtless accounted for by the fact that, from 24 June to 12 July, Sew all was on a trip to Halifax, the seat of his new jurisdiction as Judge of Admiralty.2 The trial was probably held during Sewall's absence, because Adams' minutes, printed below, do not mention the Advocate General and indicate that Adams himself argued the case for Butler. James Otis appeared for the claimants.
Butler had been commissioned by the American Commissioners of Customs without warrant from the Treasury. By statute, only the Commissioners themselves, “officers of his majesty's customs for the time being,” or others appointed by Crown or Treasury, could make a valid seizure.3 Adams argued first that Butler was de jure an “officer of his majesty's customs” because the American Commissioners had by statute and commission all the powers of their English counterparts to appoint such officers. His second point was that, by statute, exercise of office made Butler a de facto “officer” regardless of his commission. Despite these arguments, the libel was dismissed, presumably on the theory that the seizure was void because Butler lacked authority.4
Although the statutes and other instruments involved are ambiguous, there are reasonable grounds for such a result. The statute establishing the colonial customs system had provided that “officers of the customs” should be appointed by the Treasury and the Commissioners.5 It had long been the rule for the English Commissioners to make such appointments only upon warrant from the Treasury, a practice which the patent of the American { 220 } Commissioners confirmed.6 It was thus sound construction to hold that the “officers of his majesty's customs” empowered to make seizures were only those officers appointed upon warrant.7 If this view were adopted, the portion of the Commissioners' patent cited by Adams which gave their lesser employees power to enter vessels and premises “to Search and Survey” and do all other necessary acts “agreable to the Laws and Statutes relating to the said Revenues,”8 would be expressly limited by the statutory provisions to powers other than that of making seizure. Insofar as Butler's commission gave him such a power, it would thus be void.
The question of Butler's statutory de facto authority was controlled by the holding in Folger v. The Cornelia that the statutes in question created only a presumption, which could be rebutted by evidence of lack of authority. The principles of that case, which had concerned an officer friendly to local mercantile interests, thus seem to have been applied evenhandedly where the officer was loyal to the Crown.9
1. Butler v. The Union, Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 12 May 1769; Massachusetts Gazette, 18 May 1769, p. 1, col. 3. The Union was seized for an alleged unloading of molasses before entry on a former voyage in March 1768. On learning of the seizure the Commissioners directed that she be libeled in Butler's name and that prosecutions be commenced against her master, Edward Hales, and one John Gary, for aiding in the unloading contrary to 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §37, the act under which Hancock was prosecuted. See No. 46, notes 5–682–83; Commissioners to Salem Customs Officers, 5 May 1769, Salem Custom House Record Book, 1763–1772, p. 285, MSaE. Butler, appointed “Customs Officer” in March 1768, had immediately made himself so disliked that the customs boat in his charge was burned by a mob. In spite, or perhaps because, of this he was appointed Tide Surveyor of the Port in Aug. 1768, with the function of inspecting cargoes. He served in this capacity until at least Jan. 1775. See id. at 63–64, 227–234, 241–242; note 17 below. See also Salem Custom House Letter Book Outwards, 1772–1775, 9 Jan. 1775, Office of the U.S. Collector of Customs, Boston, Mass.
2. Minutes of the Commissioners, 22 June 1769, 7 Bowdoin-Temple MSS 180, MHi. It is not clear whether the reference was to Samuel or Josiah Quincy Jr. Sewall voyaged to Halifax and back aboard the Rose, the vessel involved in Rex v. Corbet, No. 56, which at this time was engaged in removing a portion of the British garrison from Boston. Boston News-Letter, 22 June 1769, p. 2, col. 1; Massachusetts Gazette, 13 July 1769, p. 1, col. 2. See “A Journal of the Times,” 25, 29 June 1769, Dickerson, Boston under Military Rule 112–113.
3. See notes 211, 312, below.
4. Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 12 May 1769. Dismissal suggests a disposition on such a preliminary question. See Folger v. The Cornelia, No. 45, Doc. III, where the information was dismissed in a case similar to that here. Likewise, in Dawson v. The Dolphin, No. 51, Doc. II, the libel was dismissed on the ground that it did not state a cause of action. Compare Dawson v. Lighter and Molasses, cited in No. 47, note 512, where the decree upheld the libel as to part of the seizure and adjudged the remainder not forfeit.
5. See text at note 413 below.
6. See note 615 below. In colonial appointments the English Commissioners had followed the system used in England, whereby they in practice recommended candidates for principal positions within their jurisdiction, but made the actual appointments only upon Treasury warrant. Hoon, English Customs 195–198. Failure to remedy this lack of control over appointments was a major error in the creation of the American Board which led to much of its later difficulty. Clark, “The American Board of Customs,” 45 AHR 777, 795–797. The one major exception to this practice was the commissioning of naval personnel as customs officers. See Hoon, English Customs 272. In a case in the Massachusetts Vice Admiralty Court in 1763, with Auchmuty as Advocate General, counsel for the claimants of a vessel seized by an officer of the navy had argued that the statute's conjunction of Treasury and Commissioners required a warrant. Nevertheless, the vessel was condemned. Bishop v. The Freemason, Quincy, Reports 387 (Mass. Vice Adm., 1763). On appeal in the High Court of Admiralty, it seems to have been argued that there was a standing order from the Treasury authorizing such commissions. The condemnation was affirmed without comment on this point. The Freemason v. Bishop, Burrell 55, 167 Eng. Rep. 469 (High Ct. Adm., 1767). See No. 51, note 1; No. 52, note 5.
7. This was the English interpretation. Hoon, English Customs 195. Apparently, however, the need for securing seizures sometimes caused the rule to be overlooked in practice. Id. at 198, 271–272.
8. See note 716 below.
9. No. 45, Doc. III. In Nov. 1772 Butler was allowed to join in the successful prosecution of a vessel which he had seized under the direction of the Collector. Commissioners to Salem Customs Officers, 30 Nov., 14 Dec. 1772, Salem Letter Book Inwards, 1772–1775. The authority to seize in this case was undoubtedly the Collector's.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0008-0002

Author: Adams, John
Date: 1769-07

Adams' Notes and Minutes of the Trial1

Court of Vice Admiralty, Boston, July 1769
Butler vs. Brigg Union.
14. Car. 2d, c. 11, §.15. Seizures confined to Officers of his Majestys Customs, for the Time being.2
{ 221 }
7. & 8. W. 3, c. 22, §. 6. Officers in America the same Power.3§.n. Treasury, and Commissioners may constitute such and so many officers of the Customs in any Port &c., when and as often as to them shall seem needfull.4
7. G. 3. American Commissioners vested with such Powers as are now exercised by Commissioners in England by Laws in being. May be put under the Management and direction of Commissioners. Expressly any 3 of em to have the same Powers with Commissioners in England.5
Commission. 2d. page. All the Powers expressly given that were exercised by the Commissioners in England, and particularly to constitute Inferiour officers in any Ports.6 4. page. Other Officers, Power to enter Houses, and ships, and do all Things agreeable to Law.7
{ 222 }
Butlers Commission. Full Power to search and seize.8 6. G. 1, c. 21, §.25. 11. G. 1, c. 30, §.22. Evidence of Officers Authority as of a Fact.9
Mr. Otis. Common Practice, for the principal Officers of the Port to seize, not for the Inferiour Officers to seize.
King cant erect new Courts. They must be established by Act of Parliament. Therefore if the Powers in the Commission exceed the Act, they are void.
Q. whether within the Acts, Butler can seize. By the Act of C[harles]10 he is not appointed by his Majesty, nor an officer of the Customs. He is merely a preventive officer.
Commissioners Commission. Inferiour Officers. No Warrant from the Treasurer. No Authority without.
Is he constituted by the Treasury and Customs in England.
No such officer has ever done ay11 one Thing about the Custom[s].
1. In JA's hand. Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 185. The material to note 18 below is on a separate page.
2. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §15 (1662), set out in No. 45, note 268.
3. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §6 (1696), set out in No. 44, notes 42–2594–97.
4. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §11 (1696), set out inNo. 45, note 1452.
5. 7 Geo. 3, c. 41 (1767), the act creating the American Board of Customs Commissioners, set out in No. 45, note 341.
6. Commission of the American Board, 12 Sept. 1767, Book of Commissions, 1677–1774, fols. 83–92, at 84–85, M-Ar.:
“And we do hereby give and grant unto you our said Commissioners during our pleasure as aforesaid or to any three or more of you full power and authority to cause to be duly observed and executed within the Limits of this your Commission [i.e. the geographical limits] all and singular the Laws and Statutes and all and every the powers, directions and Clauses in them or any of them contained touching or concerning the Collecting, Levying, receiving or Securing any of the said Duties hereby committed to your charge, and to do or cause to be done all other matters and things whatsoever touching or relating to the Revenues and Trade of the British Colonies in America within the Limits aforesaid as were before the passing of the said Act [i.e. 7 Geo. 3, c. 41] Exercised by the Commissioners of the Customs in England by virtue of any Act or Acts of Parliament in force at the time of the passing thereof. And we do hereby further impower and authorize you our said Commissioners or any three or more of you from time to time to Constitute and appoint by any writing under your hands and Seals or under the hands and seals of any three or more of you Inferior officers in all and singular the ports within the Limits of this your Commission (other than such officers as are or may be Constituted by Letters Patent of us our Heirs and Successors) according to such warrants as you shall from time to time receive from the Commissioners of our Treasury or our High Treasurer for the time being, and at such salaries as by the said Warrants shall be directed, and them from time to time to suspend, remove and displace as to you our said Commissioners or any three or more of you shall be thought necessary and expedient to our service in the premises.”
JA's page references, here and at note 716 below, are to a form of the Commission printed—apparently at Boston—from this record. A copy is in MBAt: Tracts, A–24. See also No. 45, note 341.
7. Commission, fols. 86–87:
“We have further given and Granted, and by these presents do give and Grant unto you our said Commissioners or any three or more of you, and to all and every the Collectors, Deputy Collectors, Ministers, Servants and other officers serving and attending in all and every the ports or other places within the limits of this your Commission aforesaid,” power “as well by night as by day to enter and go on Board any Ship, Boat or other Vessel . . . to Search and Survey and the persons therein being strictly to Examine touching or concerning the premises, and also in the daytime to enter and go into any House, Warehouse, Shop, Cellar and other place where any Goods, Wares or Merchandizes lye concealed or are suspected to lye concealed whereof the Customs and other Duties have not been or shall not be duly paid . . . and the said House, Warehouse, Shop, Cellar and other place to Search and Survey, and all and every the Trunks, Chests, Boxes and packs then and there found to break open and to do all and every other the matters and things which shall be found necessary for our service in such Cases and agreable to the Laws and Statutes relating to the said Revenues.”
8. Butler's commission as Tide Surveyor, dated 22 Aug. 1768, was in a standard form conveying powers to enter ships and, with a writ of assistance, buildings, to search for prohibited goods, “and the same to seize to his Majesty's use.” Salem Record Book, 1763–1772, p. 67. See also his instructions, 23 Aug. 1768, which deal with his authority to board vessels and “rummage” cargo, but contain no express power to seize. Id. at 68. There is no notation that this Commission was sworn, although it is clear (note 1 above) that Butler acted as Tide Surveyor. No objection on this point seems to have been made at the trial. If it had been, Butler might have been held to have seized under his earlier commission as “Customs Officer,” which conveyed the same powers. Id. at 63–64.
9. The correct citations are 6 Geo. 1, c. 21, §24 (1719), and 11 Geo. 1, c. 30, §32 (1724). These statutes provided that in trial upon forfeitures, penalties, and other matters relating to the customs, proof of the actual exercise of office at the time in controversy was sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption that the officer was authorized. They are set out in No. 45, notes 1048, 1149. See also id., text at note 975.
10. That is, 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §15, note 211 above.
11. Thus in MS. Perhaps JA started to write “any thing.” This sentence is in a thicker ink and appears more hurriedly written.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0009-0001

Editorial Note

On 14 October 1772 George Dawson, an officer of the royal navy, who since at least 1768 had been commissioned to assist in the enforcement of the Acts of Trade off the New England coast, seized the sloop Dolphin and her cargo at Holmes Hole, Martha's Vineyard.1 The cause of the seizure was a defect in the vessel's papers. She had been built and registered in Marshfield, Massachusetts, in 1759, but in the meantime had been sold to new owners in that port. Unfortunately the requirement of the Act of 1696 that the transfer be endorsed on the register was overlooked. The Dolphin was thus in technical violation of a provision of the statute which had not previously been enforced. Samuel Fitch, now the Advocate General, brought a libel against vessel and cargo in Dawson's behalf on 4 November.2
The parties had been cited to appear on 11 November, but the argument was probably had early in February 1773. In the interim, vessel and { 224 } goods were released on stipulation to the owners.3 When the case came on, Adams, making his first known appearance in a forfeiture proceeding since 1769,4 was of counsel for the claimants. Fitch argued for Dawson. Adams' notes (Document I) set forth the statutory provisions upon which the case turned, as well as several authorities on the question of statutory construction.5 The opinion and decree of the court (Document II) show that Judge Auchmuty resolved the case into three issues: (1) If there were a violation, did the provision of the Act making an improperly registered vessel liable to forfeiture “as any foreign ship” bring into play the section dealing with foreign vessels, under which cargo too was forfeit, or was the penalty forfeiture of the vessel only?6 (2) Was this a penal statute which must thus be construed strictly? (3) Did the penalty of forfeiture, which clearly attached for failure to obtain the new registration required in the event of change of name or sale to new owners in a different port, apply to a sale to new owners in the same port?7
Auchmuty decided all three questions in favor of the claimants in a detailed and lengthy piece of statutory construction. His opinion on the first two points is relatively clear. On the last question, which was conclusive in the case, his language is somewhat muddy, but he seems to have found two bases for the result: (1) That no penalty attached for violation of the home-port sale provisions, whatever the nature of the sale. (2) That if, as Fitch argued, these provisions only covered the sale of a part interest in the vessel, then no provision of the Act covered the case of the Dolphin, which was a sale of the entire vessel within the home port. On whatever ground, on 2 March, Auchmuty decreed that the libel be dismissed as a matter of law. He found probable cause for the seizure, however, which meant that the claimants were required to pay their own costs.8
1. Dawson's commission has not been found. For an early example of his activity, see Dawson v. Lighter and Molasses, Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 26 April 1768, discussed in No. 47, note 512. See also No. 52 (1773). His activities against American shipping in the early years of the Revolution are reported in William Bell Clark, George Washington's Navy 113–114, 125–128, 159–160 (Baton Rouge, 1960). Officers of the navy had long aided in enforcing the Acts of Trade, although the scope of their authority was sometimes questioned. See, for example, 12 Car. 2, c. 18, §1 (1660); Harper, English Navigation Laws 177–179. The Navy's success in halting trade with the enemy during the French wars led, after 1763, to expanded authorization for naval officers to seize vessels violating the Acts of Trade. 3 Geo. 3, c. 22, §4 (1763); 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §42 (1764); 5 Geo. 3, c. 45, §26 (1765); see Ubbelohde, Vice Admiralty Courts 38–44, 116. The authority for their commissions was not in the statutes, however. The Privy Council presumably directed the Commissioners of the Customs to deputize naval officers. See Lord Egremont to Governor Bernard, 9 July 1763, 10 Bernard Papers 120–121, MH. Their shares of seizures were established by Order in Council, 8 July 1763, Book of Charters, Commissions, Proclamations, &c., 1628–1763, fols. 254–257, M-Ar. Probably the American Commissioners acted under the same authority after 1767. The High Court of Admiralty in that year affirmed a decision of the Massachusetts Vice Admiralty Court condemning a vessel seized by the first of these officers to present his commission in Massachusetts in 1763. The question of the power to seize had been raised in the lower court and seems to have been discussed on the argument in the High Court, although the reported opinion there dealt with other questions. Bishop v. The Freemason, Quincy, Reports 387, 389–390 (Mass. Vice Adm., 1763), affirmed sub nom. The Freemason v. Bishop, Burrell 55, 167 Eng. Rep. 469 (High Ct. Adm., 1767). See No. 50, note 6; No. 52, note 5.
2. Massachusetts Gazette, 5 Nov. 1772, p. 3, col. 2. For the statute, see note 715 below. As to previous enforcement, see note 26 below. Fitch had been appointed Advocate General on 4 March 1770 to replace Sewall, who had finally resigned his post to undertake his new duties as Judge of Admiralty at Halifax. See “Boyle's Journal of Occurrences in Boston, 1759–1778,” 84 NEHGR 263 (1930).
3. See note 1738 below. The trial has been dated on two grounds: (1) The use of a stipulation suggests a delay in the proceedings, which usually followed the filing of the libel by a week or less. Since Dawson was a naval officer, delay may have been necessitated by his other duties. (2) Auchmuty's decree which might have been expected to follow trial by a week or so was given on 2 March 1773, and would have been given “some days sooner,” except for a petition for rehearing. See text following note 1940 below.
4. He had participated in the trial of an Admiralty appeal in Feb. 1772. See p. 104 above.
5. In the Adams Papers there is an undated MS in JA's hand entitled “Construction of Statutes,” which contains extracts from many of the authorities cited by JA at notes 8–1316–21 below. Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 185. In all probability these notes were made in preparation for this case.
6. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §§2, 18 (1696), notes 210, 412, below.
7. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §21, note 715 below.
8. The finding also barred any action against the seizing officer. 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §46 (1764). These advantages had long been given to English customs officers under statutes which presumably were not applicable in the colonies. See 19 Geo. 2, c. 34, §16 (1746), discussed in No. 44, note 1062. It is usually held that the Act of 1764 marked the introduction of this privilege in the colonies. See Ubbelohde, Vice Admiralty Courts 50–51; Dickerson, Navigation Acts 179–184; Knollenberg, Origin of the American Revolution 179. As this case shows, the provision did not throw the entire cost of litigation upon the claimant. The purpose was to alter the familiar practice whereby the losing party bore the entire cost of suit. See 4 Holdsworth, History of English Law 536–538.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0009-0002

Author: Adams, John
Date: 1773-02

Adams' Notes of Statutes and Authorities1

Court of Vice Admiralty, Boston, February 1773
George Dawson Esqr. vs. The Sloop Dolphin, Walson, Lothrop and others owners.
This Vessell was seized merely for the omission of an Indorsement upon her Register.
7. & 8. W. 3d, c. 22. An Act for preventing Frauds and regulating Abuses in the Plantation Trade.
§.2: Be it enacted, that after 25th March 1698— “No Goods or Merchandises, shall be imported into or exported out of, any Colony or Plantation, to his Majesty in Asia, Africa, or America, belonging, or in his Possession, or which may hereafter belong unto, or be in the Possession of his Majesty, his Heirs or Successors, or shall be laden in, or carryed from any one Port or Place in the said Colonies or Plantations, to any other Port or Place in the same, the Kingdom of England, Dominion of Wales, or Town of Berwick upon Tweed, in any Ship or Bottom but what is, or shall be of the built of England, or of the Built of Ireland or the said Colonies or Plantations, and wholly owned by the People thereof, or any of them, and navigated with the Masters, and three fourths of the Mariners of the said Places only” (except Prize ships &c. and foreign ships employed for 3 years to bring in naval Stores) “Under Pain of Forfeiture of Ship and Goods” 1/3 to the King, 1/3 to the Governor, 1/3 to the Informer.2
§.17. “For the more effectual Prevention of Frauds which may be used to elude the Intention of this Act by colouring Foreign Ships under English Names;” be it further enacted, &c. that, “No Ship, or Vessell, shall be deemed or pass, as a Ship of the Built of England, Ireland, Wales, Berwick, Guernsey, Jersey, or any of his Majestys Plantations in America so as to be qualified to Trade to, from, or in, any of the said Plantations untill the Person, or Persons, claiming Property in such Ship or Vessell shall register the same as follows, that is to say, if the Ship, at the Time of such Register doth belong to { 226 } any Port in England, Ireland, Wales, or to the Town of Berwick upon Tweed, then Proof shall be made upon oath of one or more of the owners of such Ship or Vessell, before the Collector, and Comptroller, of his Majestys Customs in such Port; or if at the Time of such Register, the Ship belong to any of his Majestys Plantations in America, or to the Islands of Guernsey or Jersey, then the like Proof to be made before the Governor, together with the Principal officer of his Majesty's Revenue residing on such Plantation or Island” &c.
Form of the oath.3
§.18. “Which Oath, being attested by the Governor or Custom officer, respectively who administered the same, under their Hands and Seals, shall after having been registered by them, be delivered to the Master of the Ship for the Security of her Navigation, a Duplicate of which Register shall be immediately transmitted to the Commissioners of Customs in the Port of London, in order to be entered in a general Register to be there kept for this Purpose, with Penalty upon any Ship or Vessell trading to, from, or in any of his Majesty's Plantations in America” &c. “and not having made Proof of her Built and Property, as is here directed that she shall be liable, and she is hereby made liable, to such Prosecution and Forfeiture, as any foreign ship” (except Prizes &c.) “would for trading with those Plantations by this Law be liable to.”4
Prize ships to be registered &c.5 Fisher Boats, Hoys &c. Lighters &c. not to be registered.6
§. 21. “That No Ships Name registered shall be afterwards changed, without registering such Ship de Novo, which is hereby required to be done, upon any Transfer of Property to another Port, and delivering up the former Certificate to be cancelled, under the same Penalties, { 227 } and in the like Method, as is herein before directed; and that in Case there be any alteration of Property in the same Port, by the Sale of one or more Shares in any Ship after registering thereof, such Sale shall always be acknowledged by Indorsement on the Certificate of the Register before two Witnesses, in order to prove that the entire Property in such Ship remains to some of the Subjects of England, if any dispute arises concerning the same.”7
Rules of Construction. Woods Inst. 8.8—3. Rep. 7.b.9—4. Inst. { 228 } 330.10—4 Bac. Abr. 652.11 1 Blackst. Com. 87. 88.12—1. Inst. 11.b.13
1. In JA's hand, in his Admiralty Book, Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 184. For the dating, see note 3 above.
2. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §2 (1696). Quotation marks supplied. Italics are JA's. The last clause of the section is “and the other third part to the person who shall inform and sue for the same, by bill, plaint or information, in any of his Majesty's courts of record at Westminster, or in any court in his Majesty's plantations, where such offense shall be committed.”
3. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §17 (1696). Quotation marks supplied. Italics are JA's. The section concludes,
“which oath the said governors and officers of the customs respectively are hereby authorized to administer in the tenor following, viz. “JURAT” A.B. That the ship [name] of [port] whereof [master's name] is at present master, being a [kind of built] Of [burthen] tuns, was built at [place, where] in the year [time when] and that [owners name] of [] and [] of, &c. are at present owners thereof; and that no foreigner, directly or indirectly, hath any share, or part, or interest therein.”
As to the administration of this provision, see Bernard and Lotte Bailyn, Massachusetts Shipping 1697–1714 1–12 (Cambridge, Mass., 1959).
4. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §18 (1696). Quotation marks supplied. Italics are JA's.
5. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §19 (1696), providing that ships condemned as prize in the High Court of Admiralty in England are to be specially registered, with oath made as to their capture and condemnation, rather than their building.
6. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §20 (1696), providing that such craft need not be registered if they are used only for river or coastwise navigation.
7. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §21 (1696). Quotation marks supplied. Italics are JA's.
8. This reference is ambiguous, since rules of statutory construction appear on page 8 of both Thomas Wood, An Institute of the Laws of England (London, 9th edn., 1763), and of Thomas Wood, A New Institute of the Imperial or Civil Law (London, 1704). While it is possible that JA used the latter work because of the civil-law nature of the court of Admiralty (See No. 46, note 49126), the rules in the former are more directly concerned with the interpretation of acts of Parliament, the problem here; moreover, the authorities cited in notes 917, 1018, and 1321, below, appear in the first cited work, which is also quoted in JA's other notes on construction. See note 5 above. Following are pertinent passages from Wood, Institute of the Laws of England 13–14:
“The Preamble or Rehearsal of a Statute is to be taken for Truth; therefore good Arguments and Proofs may be drawn from the Preamble or Rehearsal. . . .
“A Sentence, which begins and ends with specifying Persons and Things of an inferior Rank ought not to be extended by General Words to those that are Superior; as by these general Words, (viz.) And no other Person or Act whatsoever, &c. shall not include superior Persons or Things that were not particularly expressed.
“Statutes must be interpreted by reasonable Construction, according to the Meaning of the Legislators.
“It is natural to construe one part of a Statute by another.
“They may be construed according to Equity; especially where They give Remedy for Wrong; or are for Expedition of Justice, or to prevent Delays; for Law-makers cannot comprehend all Cases. . . .
“A Penal Statute regularly ought to be construed strictly. But it may be construed beneficially; for what is out of the Mischief, is out of the Meaning of a Law, though it is within the Letter. [The preceding two sentences appear in JA's notes on construction, note 5 above.] And on the contrary, what is within the same Mischief, shall be within the same Remedy, tho' it be out of the Letter of the Law. . . .
“It [a Statute] must be construed that no innocent Man may by a literal Construction receive [i.e. sustain] Damages.
“Statutes made to prevent and suppress Fraud ought to have a favourable Interpretation. . . .
“Custom or Usage is a good Interpreter of a Law.”
9. Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7a, 7b, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Exch. 1584), held that a copyhold estate was an estate for life within the meaning of 31 Hen. 8, c. 13 (1540), a statute intended to prevent religious orders from avoiding dissolution by making new leases of lands when estates were already in being in those lands.
“[F]or the sure and true Interpretation of all Statutes in general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the Com. Law,) four things are to be discerned and considered.
“1. What was the Common Law before the making of the Act.
“2. What was the Mischief and Defect for which the Common Law did not provide.
“3. What Remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the Disease of the Commonwealth.
“And 4. The true Reason and Remedy; and then the Office of all the Judges is always to make such Construction as shall suppress the Mischief, and advance the Remedy, and to suppress subtil Inventions and Evasions for Continuance of the Mischief, and pro privato commodo, and to add Force and Life to the Cure and Remedy, according to the true Intent of the Makers of the Act, pro bono publico.”
10. 4 Coke, Institutes 330:
“Every Statute ought to be expounded according t/o the intent of them that made it, where the words thereof are doubtful and incertain, and according to the rehearsal of the Statute; and there [i.e. in Year Book, 4 Edw. 4, fols. 4, 12] a general statute is construed particularly, upon consideration had of the cause of making of the Act, and of the rehearsal of all the parts of the Act. To conclude this point with a general rule allowed by all laws in construction of statutes, Quamvis lex generaliter loquitur, restringenda tamen est, ut cessante ratione et ipsa cesset: cum enim ratio sit anima vigorque ipsius legis, non videtur legislator id sensisse quod ratione careat etiamsi verborum generalitas prima facie aliter suadeat.”
11. 4 Bacon, Abridgment 652 contains several authorities to the effect that despite the rule of strict construction, the intent of the legislature must be observed. Compare note 3413 below. There follows a series of “other rules” to be followed in statutory construction which are more favorable to JA's case. For example,
“Acts of Parliament are to be so construed, that no Man, who is innocent or free from Injury or Wrong, be punished or endamaged.
“No Statute shall be interpreted so as to be inconvenient, or against Reason.”
In JA's notes on construction, note 5 above, appears the following extract from 4 Bacon, Abridgment 651:
“4. Bac. Abr. 651. 9. Penal Acts of Parliament are to be strictly construed. The Rules of the Common Law will not suffer the general Words of a Statute to be restrained, to the Prejudice of him upon whom a Penalty is to be inflicted: But there are a Multitude of Cases, where such general Words shall be restrained in his favour.”
12. 1 Blackstone, Commentaries *87–88, part of a discourse on “the rules to be observed with regard to the construction of statutes.” In JA's notes on construction, note 5 above, appear abstracts of the following passages:
“1. . . . Let us instance again in the same restraining statute of the 13 Eliz. [i.e. 13 Eliz. 1, c. 10]. By the common law ecclesiastical corporations might let as long leases as they thought proper: the mischief was, that they let long and unreasonable leases, to the impoverishment of their successors: the remedy applied by the statute was by making void all leases by ecclesiastical bodies for longer terms than three lives or twenty one years. Now in the construction of this statute it is held, that leases, though for a longer term, if made by a bishop, are not void during the bishop's life; or, if made by a dean and chapter, they are not void during the life of the dean: for the act was made for the benefit and protection of the successor. The mischief is therefore sufficiently suppressed by vacating them after the death of the grantors; but the leases, during their lives, being not within the mischief, are not within the remedy. . . .
“3. Penal statutes must be construed strictly. Thus the statute 1 Edw. VI. c. 12. having enacted that those who are convicted of stealing horses should not have the benefit of clergy, the judges conceived that this did not extend to him that should steal but one horse, and therefore procured a new act for that purpose in the following year. And, to come nearer our own times, by the statute 14 Geo. II, c. 6, stealing sheep, or other cattle, was made felony without benefit of clergy. But these general words, 'or other cattle,' being looked upon as much too loose to create a capital offence, the act was held to extend to nothing but mere sheep. And therefore in the next sessions, it was found necessary to make another statute, 15 Geo. II, c. 34. extending the former to bulls, cows, oxen, steers, bullocks, heifers, calves, and lambs, by name.”
13. Coke, Littleton 11b:
“From statutes his arguments and proofs are drawn, 1. From the rehersal or preamble of the statute. 2. By the body of the Law diversly interpreted. Sometime by other parts of the same statute, which is benedicta expositio & ex visceribus causae. Sometime by reason of the Common Law. But ever the general words are to be intended of a lawful Act, and such interpretation must ever be made of all statutes, that the innocent or he in whom there is no default may not be damnified.”

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0009-0003

Author: Auchmuty, Robert Jr.
Date: 1773-03-02

Auchmuty's Opinion and Decree1

Court of Vice Admiralty, Boston, 2 March 1773
George Dawson Esqr. vs. Sloop Dolphin and Cargoe.
This Libel is bottomed on the Act of the 7. & 8. Will. 3 Cap. 22. Those parts therefore of the Act, which relates to the present case must be thoroughly considered.
The facts either proved, or granted, by the Advocates on both sides are, that said sloop was built at Marshfield in this province by inhabitants of the same, and by them owned. In the Year 1759 was duly registered, afterwards by the original was sold to the present owners and claimants, who are inhabitants of the same port with her former owners, that she has been always navigated with three fourths, at least, of english subjects, and that her original name has never been changed. But that on the transferr to the present owners, there was neither a new register taken out, nor any indorsement on the certificate of the old one, and that said Vessell and Cargo being inward bound were seized by said Dawson at a place called Holmes's hole within the port of Boston.
The Advocate General insisted, that a vessel and cargo under the abovementioned circumstances are forfeited by force of the said Statute. Because all vessels, together with their Cargoes, trading to or from the plantations, which are not qualified as the Act directs, are thereby declared forfeit. That the words used in the seventeenth section thereof “deemed or pass” signify adjudged or decreed, and therefore taken in that sense, must relate to a Court and not to Custom Officers.2 That this Act ought not to be considered as a penal one, because the forfeiture therein given is not annexed to any crime, for which the Actor is to suffer corporally, but only to a neglect. And therefore, the rules urged by the gentlemen on the other side touching the construction of penal Statutes, are not applicable to the present case. That the importance of this Act, resulting from its great public { 230 } utility ought to draw such a construction, as will operate very Severely against Claimants. That the last clause in the Act relates only to a partial transfer of a vessel, the words being “and that in case of any alteration of property in the same port, by the sale of one or more Shares in any ship after registering thereof, such sale shall always be acknowledged by indorsement on the certificate of the register before two witnesses” &c.3 That by using those words “one or more Shares,” it is evident only a partial transfer was intended. That this last clause must be taken as part of the general plan of the Act, and therefore must be construed as connected with and relative to the penal parts of it. That the Statute does not say a subject shall forfeit his vessell for not registering her but that she shall not be qualified to trade, and therefore if she does without being registered, she ought, to all intents and purposes, be adjudged a foreign vessell, and so the Cargo condemnable as much as if seized on board a trading vessel actually belonging to foreigners.4
By the Gentlemen on the other side, it was urged, that as indorsements on the Certificate of the register were not practiced till of late nor even required at the Custom houses, it would be against equity now to mark such instances with the utmost severity.5 That, as there is not the least Shade of proof, or even a suggestion of fraud, in this case, it is not within the mischief intended to be remedied by the Statute.6 That the words “deemed or pass” ought not to be construed adjudged or decreed, but more properly are to be understood only as directory to Officers of the customs in the entering and clearing of vessels. That penal Statutes ought not constructively to be extended, because such a practice is against the well known and established rules of law, and in Support of which they produced several good authorities.7 That as no fraud was either committed or designed in this case, the Statute ought not to be construed Strictly against them, even if it was not penal.8 But that the same is penal and therefore a fortiori { 231 } it cannot. That the last clause in the Act has no penalty annexed to it, nor can that clause consistent with the Authorities mentioned be made by construction to relate to the preceeding parts of the Statute mentioning penalties. But if at all it must be confined to the forfeiture expressed in the eighteenth section,9 which extends only to the vessell. These were the principal matters mentioned and relied on by the gentlemen on both sides; some of which do not appear to me to deserve much notice in the present case.
In determining this cause first great care must be taken in making a true distinction between such parts of the Act, as relate entirely to vessels the property of foreigners, and those which only respect english built and owned vessels, tho' not registered pursuant to the directions of the Act. Because on a supposition, that the vessel now libelled against is forfeit a question will Arise, whether the Cargo is also, which question entirely rests on that distinction.
Secondly, whether this Act is to be considered as penal. Because, the rules of construing such Acts, are variant from those which relate to, and govern Acts which are not. And lastly, what is the legal construction of the words contained in the last clause of said Act.
In the second section of the Act Ship and goods are both declared forfeited.10 But then it must be recollected, that the whole of that section entirely relates to foreign built vessels, owned by foreigners and navigated by such. Indeed that section contains nothing more than a repetition of the capital act of navigation, the 12. Car. 2. excepting some additional prohibition touching the plantations.11 In this section there is not any mention of vessels really english built, owned by english Subjects or navigated by such: therefore such cannot be the objects of that clause not being therein mentioned. But the contrary will evidently appear by considering those subsequent parts of the same act, wherein notice is particularly taken and directions given how they shall be qualified, under a certain, and in part, a different penalty. I can not therefore conceive how, consistent with propriety or justice, the said second section, guarded by the forfeiture of ship and Cargo, and calculated for a certain express purpose can relate or be extended to a distinct detach'd part of the same Act, clearly made to regulate cases totally different and under a different forfeiture. Compare the { 232 } abovementioned section with the Eighteenth, and not only the difference in point of forfeiture but the reason of it, I apprehend, will appear obvious. In the second section the Act goes entirely on the supposition, that the vessel so trading is owned by foreigners of foreign built, and not navigated by three fourths english. Doubtless if such a practice was permitted, it would have a direct tendency to enrich foreigners and prevent the increase of English shipping and seamen; therefore in such instances both vessel and cargo are declared forfeit. But in the eighteenth section, the Legislators have no such foreign vessel in view, having already made provision for such, but are guarding against certain mischiefs which might arise among their own Subjects. As the dangers and loss to goverment, where the vessell is really of english built, owned and navigated by english subjects, though not registered pursuant to the Act, can not be so great as in the Case of foreign vessels trading in the plantations, so neither ought the penalty to be. The greater the injury done to a State or an individual, the higher the punishment ought to Arrise. This I take to be one of the two great reasons for varying the penalties in the aforementioned clauses. There is also another very obvious one for the parliament's not annexing the same penalty to the two sections. For had they done it, in some instances very great loss, and in others, total ruin might thereby have fallen upon innocent subjects; a consequence which that Legislature have always Studiously avoided, and where from the necessity of using general expressions, such an instance has come within the express letter of an Act, the common law Judges have in conformity to the designs and desires of parliament ruled it not to be within the meaning of it.12 This rule however is not perhaps to be taken as unlimited, but only applicable where such an exemption may safely be made, and the Act remain in its full intended force. The case alluded to is plainly that of freighters. The wisdom or justice of parliament ought never to be so impeached, as to suppose that, for the omission of an Owner, the innocent freighter who could not, in the nature of things, be privy to it, should suffer perhaps to his total ruin. Such a doctrine if once established, I imagine, would be very destructive to trade and Commerce, and therefore instead of promoting the Public interest, would have a quite contrary effect. And in Addition to what has been observed, I may safely assert, there never was, and I hope never will be found among the english law rules of construing Statutes, that a Judge shall extract the penalty from the first part of a law, calculated for one express evident purpose only, and annex it to another part of the { 233 } same Act, which relates entirely to a different case and governed by different reasons; especially, when in such other part, a penalty is given in an as express terms as that Contained in the first part, though not so great. Granting an english vessel and Cargo to be seized which came within the express provision of the Eighteenth Section, and surely thats as strong a case as the present, could a Judge make an addition to that Part of the Act by condemning both vessel and Cargo, when the Act itself declares only the former liable to forfeitures. On the whole, I am clear in opinion, on supposition the vessel now libelled by law ought to remain forfeit, her Cargo ought not.
In order to determine whether an Act is penal within the sense of the Law, it must first be enquired, whether the Common law is thereby altered, and Secondly, whether there is any penalty expressly annexed to such Act, either pecuniary or corporal. To conclude all Acts not penal, except such as inflict the latter, is contradicting rules too well established to be even called in question. Nor will it do to suppose that the general utility of an Act can exempt it from being Classed among penal Statutes; because such a conclusion proves too much. All public Statutes are made to supply some omission, or correct some defect in the common law, and in their nature must be founded in, and designed for the public Good; therefore as the law has not yet pointed out to what degree of public good such Acts must attain to prevent their being construed as penal ones, they must all remain so, which come under the first mentioned rules, or more. To affirm the latter, in direct contradiction to the many law Authorities, proving the contrary, is what I neither dare or wish to do. When a severe corporal punishment is enacted, the Argument drawn from importance and public utility, seems to me, will be stronger, for such Acts are made to prevent the most atrocious crimes, and therefore those Statutes may justly be said to be of the greatest importance and utility to the community. This doctrine however has never prevailed, nor never can untill the well known and established rules of law are entirely altered.13 And it is equally clear, from all the books treating on this Subject, that very many Acts, to the breach of which there is not any corporal punishment fix'd, but only a fine or forfeiture, have { 234 } always been esteemed penal, and received constructions applicable to such Statutes. To enumerate instances of this kind to convince Lawyers would be a misspence of time.14 On a due and thorough consideration of this point, I am of opinion, that the Act in question is and must be, notwithstanding its general importance, which undoubtedly is very great, and ought in every part to be punctually complied with, determined penal, and liable to the rules of construction relative to such Acts.
My next business is to endeavour to disclose the true meaning of the last words in the Statute,15 on which this Case rests.
I have already attempted to shew a distinction between those parts of the Act which relate to foreigners, and those which appertain to English Subjects, not conforming to the express requisites of the Statute. I shall now also attempt to shew a difference between cases coming under the last paragraph of said Statute, supposing this to be one of that class for the present, and such as are within the words immediately preceeding said paragraph. Whenever an Act is introductory of new rules for the regulation of commerce, ordaining what shall be done by the subject, and the manner of doing it, namely under oath, establishing a certain penalty for the neglect thereof, and then immediately goes on to regulate cases under other and different circumstances, without mentioning any penalty or oath, it must be supposed, that the Legislators did not conceive the latter instances of such importance as the former: otherwise they would have guarded the one as strongly as the other. On no other principle can the different modes pointed out by the Act be accounted for. This is exactly the present case. The Act very clearly orders a register de novo on a vessel's name being changed. Also on any transfer of property to another port, under, as I construe it, the forfeiture of the vessel. Then follows the last clause Vizt. “And that in case of any alteration of property in the same port, by the sale of one or more shares &c. such sale shall always be acknowledged by indorsement on the certificate of the register” &c. Is it possible, on due consideration of these two clauses to suppose, that the Parliament conceived there was in both cases a like necessity of a new register, supposing the words “one or more shares” include an entire transfer, and yet in the one, command it expressly, and in the other, which immediately follows, order a different mode. Or can it be imagined, that by guarding the first part, which they have ma• { 235 } terially differed from the last, with a certain penalty, they thereby intended the penalty should be extended by implication to the last; especially since its beyond all doubt, that the sanction of an Oath is required by the first and omitted in the last. It's natural to conclude, had not the intention of the law makers been to have discriminated between the cases, they would have inserted those words about transfering one or more Shares in the same port before the penalty; and thereby have brought the three cases under the same predicament. By admitting the indorsement before two witnesses to be one complete mode of evidence to prove the property english, and that not under the sanction of an Oath, the Strongest bond of society, it is evident they did not think there was equal danger in such cases of evading the Act, as in the others. This, I think, must be the reason why they omitted, in the last part of the Statute, that strong requisite and the penalty. In my Opinion it is equally justifiable to condemn, where an entire transfer is made in the same port (tho' the words share or shares only extended to a partial Sale) because there was not a new register taken out, under colour of promoting the main Scope and purpose of the Act, as to extend a penalty clearly designed for certain cases, and expressly annexed thereto, to others, apparently in the contemplation of the Legislators, of much less consequence; and whereto they did not think proper, in express terms at least, to fix any. This would not be construing an Act in conformity to any rules of law, but in fact, giving a decree in addition to an Act. Such a power would be subversive of the authority of parliament, and of all Acts.16 For by the same reason that a Judge could add to, he might diminish from any act, so that it would be in his power to mould them ad libitum. If the words, “any one or more Shares,” are taken as relative to and meaning a partial transfer, then the true sense of them is, that when the fact is known to the officers of the Customs, they shall have power to refuse entering or Clearing till the indorsement is made. And where it is done and produced, it shall amount, prima facie, to satisfactory evidence of the property's being wholly english; and thereby put an end to disputes about it, and prevent great delays in business. From this view of the words, the reason why the Compilers of the Act, did neither extend the penalty or require a new register in such partial transfers, is evident. First, there is not in such instances equal danger of the { 236 } Act's being evaded, with impunity, as where a vessel is wholy transfer'd to another Port or where her name is changed. And secondly, because considering the vast numbers of transfers of quarters eighths sixteenths and other small proportions or shares of vessels, it would be laying a heavy burthen on trade, not only of the pecuniary, but troublesome kind, to require in every such instance a new register. This construction, tho' not clear of all doubts, is much the most natural and easy, it being vastly more consistent with the other parts of the Act, than the one last contended for by the Advocate General.
I will now particularly consider that Gentleman's construction of this last part of the Act, and see how well his own doctrine will serve his purpose. He very Strenuously and repeatedly urged, that the words “any one or more Shares”, therein used, manifestly pointed out the meaning of Parliament. That thereby, I take his own words, “it is evident to any one, who has the least Idea of the force of english words, only a partial transfer was intended, and not an entire and complete one.” So far I incline to his Opinion. But in the Close of his Argument, he as strongly contended, that this very last part of the Act must be taken as part of the general System intended to be formed by the Act, must be connected with, and relate to the penal parts of it; and therefore as this vessel was not qualified to trade, that part of the Act, which gives the forfeiture of both vessel and Cargo, must be applied to this last part; And consequently, in the present case both are forfeited. This reasoning can not be right, because by his own doctrine the words, “any one or more Shares” mean no more than a partial transfer, which is not pretended in the present case, but the Contrary has been by him all along acknowledged, Vizt. an entire Sale of the said vessel. So that supposing his first argument right, the present case, beyond all possibility of doubt, is casus omissus. And it is equally certain granting it to be such, that it is not in any Judge's power to remedy that inconvenience, any more than to make a new law.
Upon the whole, as I can not find any Law by which either vessel or cargo ought to be condemned, I adjudge and decree, that the said libel be dismissed, and it is accordingly hereby dismissed, saving the right to both parties of appeal. I do not decree a restitution of said Sloop and cargo, because the same have been already delivered to the Claimant, by virtue of a writ of delivery they first having duly stipulated for the value thereof agreable to the practice of the Court.17
{ 237 }
I also certify, that as the Seizing officer could not possibly know whether the transfer was in the same port, or who were the real Owners, there was a probable cause for making said Seizure.18 As to the costs, I decree each party to pay his own.
[signed] Robert Auchmuty Comr. &c.19
The above decree would have been given some days sooner, had there not been an application for another argument which application is now waived.
[signed] Robt. Auchmuty Comr. &c.
1. NN: Samuel Adams Papers. Copy attested in the hand of Ezekiel Price, Deputy Register of the Court of Vice Admiralty.
2. See text following note 210 above. The argument seems to be that the court is required to find that an unregistered vessel is not a vessel belonging to the colonies or England.
3. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §21, note 715 above.
4. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §§2, 18, notes 210, 412, above.
5. This position is confirmed by a public notice from the Commissioners dated 12 Dec. 1772, reciting that there had been great neglect on the part of ship owners in complying with the provisions of 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §21 (note 715 above), requiring new registers or endorsements, and warning that ships failing to comply in the future “will be liable to the same Prosecutions and Penalties as if such Vessels were owned entirely by Foreigners.” Massachusetts Gazette, 7 Jan. 1773, p. 4, col. 1.
6. See authorities cited, notes 816, 917, 1220, above. Compare the preamble of the pertinent sections, text following note 210 above.
7. See authorities cited, notes 816, 1120, above.
8. See authorities cited, notes 816, 1119, 1321, above.
9. See text at note 412 above.
10. See text at note 210 above.
11. 12 Car. 2, c. 18, §1 (1660). The only differences with 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §2 (1696) are the provisions in the latter barring foreign ships in the intercolonial trade and making exceptions for foreign prizes and mast ships. See text at note 210 above.
12. See authorities cited, notes 816, 1119, 1321, above.
13. There is authority for the proposition that penal statutes tending to the public good, at least where the offense is a felony or heinous crime, should be freely construed, in 4 Bacon, Abridgment 652, the same page in which JA's authority, note 1119 above, appears. To the contrary, however, see the cases cited by Blackstone, note 1220 above. See also a passage extracted by JA in his notes on construction, note 5 above, from Wood, Institute of the Laws of England 561: “Penal Statutes shall not be extended by Equity: The Words may be construed beneficially, according to the Intent of the Legislators; but things out of the Words shall not be taken by Equity.”
14. See, for example, 4 Bacon, Abridgment 651, note 1119 above; 1 Blackstone, Commentaries *87–88, note 1220 above.
15. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 22, §21, note 715 above.
16. The argument is somewhat cloudy, but Auchmuty seems to refer to his position below, that the case of an entire sale within a port is not covered by the statute, and to say that extending to one section penalties clearly affixed to another would be a vice equal to extending a statute to cover a case which the legislature had omitted. See note 816 above.
17. Delivery of vessel and goods on stipulation for their value was a familiar Admiralty practice which was used in the Massachusetts court in revenue cases. See 2 Browne, Civil Law 411–412; Harrison v. The Chance, Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 10 March 1769. It was presumably this practice, rather than the statutory “Writ of Delivery” permitted in the Exchequer where goods were perishable or the informer delayed his suit, that was followed here. See 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 11, §30 (1662).
18. See note 8 above.
19. That is, “Commissary Deputy and Surrogate of the Court of Vice Admiralty of Boston in the Province of Massachusetts Bay.” See No. 54, note 4.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0010-0001

Editorial Note

The Jenny, owned by Elisha Doane, long one of Adams' clients, was stopped inward bound to Boston on 3 March 1773 by George Dawson, the naval officer involved in the case of the Dolphin, No. 51. Finding that she had goods aboard of European origin that had not been shipped in Great Britain as required by statute, Dawson seized her and had her brought into port. On 24 March, Samuel Fitch, the Advocate General, filed a libel in the Court of Vice Admiralty against vessel and cargo. Doane claimed the Jenny and at least a portion of the goods seized, and argument was had on the case sometime in April. John Adams and Sampson Salter Blowers were of counsel for Doane; Fitch and James Otis argued for Dawson.1
{ 238 }
As Adams' minutes, printed below, indicate, Blowers opened the case for Doane, presumably because under the Acts of Trade the claimant had the burden of proof as to the origin of the goods.2 Two statutes were involved. Under the Staple Act of 1663 if goods “of the growth, production, or manufacture of Europe,” were “imported” into the colonies without having been loaded in England, vessel and goods were forfeit.3 A provision of the American Act of 1764 tightened enforcement of this regulation by permitting the seizure at sea of any goods found aboard a vessel “arriving from any part of Europe,” for which there were no papers showing that the goods had been taken aboard at a British port.4
In 1767 the High Court of Admiralty had upheld a decision of the Massachusetts Vice Admiralty Court that a vessel which had been seized in Boston Harbor when still three miles from port had “imported” goods within the meaning of the 1663 Act.5 The facts in the Jenny's case were apparently within this decision because the question does not seem to have been raised at the trial. In order to avoid forfeiture of the vessel, Blowers and Adams thus had to show that none of her cargo was of European “growth, production, or manufacture” ; if this was impossible, then at least all goods of non-European origin might be kept from condemnation, if it could be proved that the Jenny had cleared from a non-European port.
Blowers attempted to meet this burden by introducing evidence to the effect that the cargo had been loaded at Tangier. This fact, if established, would at least save non-European goods, and might allow an inference that the entire cargo, having been loaded in Africa, was of African origin. The evidence consisted of the testimony of several witnesses, probably members of the crew; the certificates of one Meshod Meguiers, apparently English Vice Consul at Tangier, that the goods had been loaded there; and the master's manifest, presumably also to the same effect.
Otis and Fitch seemed to have no direct evidence in rebuttal, but launched a telling counterattack both on the credibility of Blowers' evidence and on the inferences which he hoped to draw from it. The witnesses were all connected with Doane, and their testimony was full of inconsistencies; the certificates were incomplete, inconsistent, and of doubtful probative value; the manifest was rendered doubtful by evidence that Doane had tampered with it, and by one witness who indicated that the harbor of Tangier did not have adequate facilities for taking on cargo. In addition, much of the cargo was patently European in origin. In all likelihood the Jenny had actually cleared from Gibraltar, across the straits from Tangier.
Adams must have closed the case for Doane, but he has left us no record of his arguments. Whatever they were, they failed to convince the court completely. On 12 May the Jenny and at least part of her cargo, { 239 } consisting of raisins, wine, cotton and silk stockings, and several pieces of silk, were ordered to be sold. Since not all of the goods mentioned in Fitch's argument appear in the notice of sale, it is possible that the court found some items to have been non-European, both in origin and point of shipment.6 In any event, the sale on 20 May produced an adequate return for Dawson's efforts. The court's receipt book shows that his half of the proceeds amounted to £773 16s. 11 1/2d.7
1. Massachusetts Gazette, 25 March 1773, p. 3, col. 1. Doane, a wealthy Cape Cod shipowner, was to be Adams' client in the case of the Lusanna, No. 51, note 1. That the Jenny was inward bound may be inferred from the award of pilotage to Dawson on her condemnation as well as from the size of his share in her proceeds. See note 7 below. In a letter of 22 April 1773 to Arthur Lee, Samuel Adams remarked that “Otis yesterday was engaged in a cause in the admiralty on the side of Dawson, commander of one of the king's cutters.” Adams reported that the tories considered this a victory, but he wondered how they could “boast of the acquisition of one, whom they themselves have been ready to expose as distracted.” Harry A. Cushing, ed., The Writings of Samuel Adams, 3:36–37 (N.Y., 1907). Otis, who had been intermittently confined and released, was at this point in a decline. 11 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 281–284.
2. 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §45 (1764), set out in No. 46, note 54.
3. 15 Car. 2, c. 7, §6, note 29 below.
4. 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §30, note 310 below.
5. Bishop v. The Freemason, Quincy, Reports 387 (Mass. Vice Adm., 1763), affirmed sub nom. The Freemason v. Bishop, Burrell 55, 167 Eng. Rep. 469 (High Ct. Adm., 1767). See No. 50, note 6; No. 51, note 1.
6. Massachusetts Gazette, 13 May 1773, p. 3, col. 1. A literal interpretation of 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §30, note 104 below, would have allowed condemnation of all goods not shipped in England, even though properly shipped outside Europe, if the vessel made a European stop prior to landfall in the colonies. Fitch's argument, text at note 1724 below, suggests a looser construction, however. It is possible that some of the Jenny's cargo may not have been claimed, and may have been sold separately under an order of 14 April 1773, for the sale of a small quantity of lemons and olives, and 1409 “raw hides” also seized by Dawson, for “illegal importation.” Massachusetts Gazette, 16 April 1773, p. 2, col. 3.
7. Receipts from Seizures of Ships, 2 July 1773, MBAt:Price Papers. Dawson also received £43 for “Pilotage, Information money and cash paid Mr. Otis.” Ibid. “Information money” may have covered either Fitch's fees or a payment to an informer. Dawson was entitled to a half, rather than a third, because the seizure was “at sea,” which was defined to include seizures “in or upon any river . . . not actually made on shore.” The Governor was thus not entitled to a share. 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §42 (1764); 5 Geo. 3, c. 45, §26 (1765).

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0010-0002

Author: Adams, John
Date: 1773-04

Adams' Minutes of the Argument1

Court of Vice Admiralty, Boston, April 1773
Captn. Dawson. vs. Jenny.
Blowers. Libel, claim, 15 Car. 2, c. 7, §.6.2
Hillman, and Cato.
Certificates. Goods claimed, taken in at Tangier.
{ 240 }
Captn. Brace. Hides cured in the Hair with salt.
Brooke and Guthrie. Fez, Morocco.
Downes's Manifest.
Mr. Otis. Reads Libel, Claim, and Answer. 15 C[ar.] 2, c. 7, §. 6.
4. G. 3, c. 15. page 291. No Vessell shall be cleard out in England unless the whole Cargo was shipped in <England> Great Britain.3
Onus on the Claimant.4 No attempt to prove the Goods grown in Affrica.
Bishop [Burnet?] said he always presumed a [Priest?] to be a Rogue untill the contrary is proved.5 Doane has been catched. And therefore must be presumed to be a Smuggler, untill he proves himself a fair Trader.
This Vessell as curious a Voyage as St. Paul made to Rome.6
Pieces of Silks.
Mr. Hallowell tasted one Quarter Cask, it has the Taste of Malaga Wines, not so sweet as some Malaga.7
{ 241 }
Jona. Wild8 would blush at mentioning the Supposition, that C[aptain] Dawson procurd these silks to carry about to take in a fair Trader.
It appears on Record that a Number of Packages were thrown over. Negatur.
French Chart. Shews that C[aptain] Brace was mistaken in many things.
500 Cattle, an over load for the Ark. [ . . . ] to an Horse.9
Ballances the Testimonies of Mathews, Hillman and Cato.
Harrison and Hallowell, about Downes's Manifest.
Major Doane required the Master to swear differently from what he first intended.10 A strong mark of fraud.
The Conversation between Major Doane and Mr. Waterhouse and Hallowell, can by no means help them for it appears clear the Major did not follow his Advice.
As to the Conculs Papers produced, tho I am willing to allow them authentick, yet they can prove nothing for every Body knows those Certificates can be obtained when askd for.
Advocate General.
The Cause rest[s] on two distinct points, the first is on the 15 Car 2d.11 That the Goods on board her were not of the Growth &c. of Europe.
The other is that this Vessell came from some parts of Europe, and has produced no Cocket or Clearance.12
The Burthen of proof on the Claimants.
Remarks on the Statutes.
1. The Act of Charles, of the utmost national Service.13
{ 242 }
Captn. McNeal. No Harbour at Tangier, no shelter since the Pier blown up. An open Bay.14
The Act. 4. G. 3. whole Cargo must be relanded and reshipped. p. 291.
No Proof that any one Article, the Produce of Africa. Only consequential.
Certificate from Mr. Meshod Meguiers.
Salt not exported from Africa.
Oyl. 26 Boxes. Figgs, Capers &c.
Honey. Matts. Silks never exported from Africa.15
Our Witnesses, their Connection with the Claimant.
Cato talks of a Xebec 3 Masts. Hillman a Schooner, with 2 Masts.
Cato believes 'em to be Spaniards. Cato's 200 could not be Hillmans 200 therefore 400.
Mathews 900. 1st. did not know.16
Unwillingness and forgetfulness of Hillman. At a Loss as to Time how long, &c. when the Mate died &c.
Pampouses, shipd in Europe, tho produced in Africa must be shipped in England by the statute 4. G.17
The Wine.
Doane and his V[ice] Consul dont agree. D. says not shippd, Consul that they were at Tangier.
The only unerring Guide is Truth.
Masters Manifest. From Tangier, should have been from Gibralter.
1. In hands of JA and Sampson Salter Blowers. Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 185. See notes 1017, 1320 below.
2. The Staple Act of 1663, 15 Car. 2, c. 7, §6: “[N]o commodity of the growth, production or manufacture of Europe, shall be imported into any land, island, plantation, colony, territory or place to his Majesty belonging, or which shall hereafter belong unto or be in the possession of his Majesty, his heirs and successors, in Asia, Africa, or America (Tangier only excepted,) but what shall be bona fide, and without fraud, laden and shipped in England, Wales, or the town of Berwick upon Tweed, and in English built shipping, or which were bona fide bought before the first day of October one thousand six hundred sixty and two, and had such certificate thereof as is directed in one act passed in the last sessions of this present parliament intituled, An Act for preventing frauds, and regulating abuses in his Majesty's customs; and whereof the master and three fourths of the mariners at least are English, and which shall be carried directly thence to the said lands, islands, plantations, colonies, territories or places, and from no other place or places whatsoever; any law, statute or usage to the contrary notwithstanding,” under penalty of forfeiture of ship and goods, one third to the Crown, one third to the Governor of the colony, and one third to the informer. Salt for the New England and Newfoundland fisheries, Madeira and Azores wines, and certain Scottish and Irish commodities were excepted. Id. §7. As to Tangier, see note 1421 below. For the construction of “imported,” see text at note 5 above.
3. 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §30 (1764), after reciting that British vessels had been carrying whole cargoes of goods shipped in Europe direct to the colonies under a clearance covering a few articles shipped in Britain, provided that no
“ship or vessel shall, upon any pretence whatsoever, be cleared outwards from any port of this kingdom, for any land, island, plantation, colony, territory, or place, to his Majesty belonging, or which shall hereafter belong unto or be in the possession or under the dominion of his Majesty, his heirs, or successors, in America, unless the whole and entire cargo of such ship or vessel shall be bona fide, and without fraud, laden and shipped in this kingdom; and any officer of his Majesty's customs is hereby impowered to stop any British ship or vessel arriving from any part of Europe, which shall be discovered within two leagues of the shore of any of the said British colonies or plantations in America, and to seize and take from thence, as forfeited, any goods (except as hereinafter mentioned) for which the master or other person taking the charge of such ship or vessel shall not produce a cocket or clearance from the collector or proper officer of his Majesty's customs, certifying that the said goods were laden on board the said ship or vessel in some port of Great Britain.”Id.
Salt, wines of the Madeiras and Azores, and certain Irish commodities were excepted from the last provision. §31.
4. See text at note 2 above.
5. The allusion has not been identified, but the remark undoubtedly should be attributed to Gilbert Burnet (1643–1715), Bishop of Salisbury and ecclesiastical prime mover of the Revolution of 1688, whose best known work is his History of His Own Times (London, 1723–1734). DNB.
6. A reference to Paul's voyage from Judaea to make his appeal to Caesar at Rome, in the course of which he was driven all over the Mediterranean by contrary winds and shipwrecked at Malta before attaining his goal. Acts 27–28.
7. Malaga wines are Spanish, and thus not within the exception in the statutes, notes 29, 310, above. The taster was probably Robert Hallowell, commissioned Comptroller of the Port of Boston in 1770, when his brother Benjamin, who held that office since 1764, was made a Customs Commissioner in place of John Temple. Jones, Loyalists of Mass. 158–160.
8. The archrogue of the 18th century and hero of Henry Fielding's ironic novel, The Life of Mr. Jonathan Wild (London, 1743).
9. The reference is unclear, but it apparently is a reflection on the testimony of Hillman, Cato, and Mathews, who seem to have described a loading operation at Tangier, perhaps involving live cattle. See text at note 1623 below.
10. This sentence and the following text through note 2013 are in Blowers' hand. JA was apparently called away during the argument. The point here seems to be that Doane had required the master to submit an altered manifest on entry at Boston. For another example of Doane's casual attitude toward shipping documents, see No. 58, note 27. Compare id., note 17167.
11. 15 Car. 2, c. 7, §6, note 29 above.
12. 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §30, note 310 above.
13. Probably the beginning of an argument for a construction of the Act favoring the Crown. Compare Fitch's argument in Dawson v. The Dolphin, No. 51, text following note 1623, and text at note 234. The remainder of the minutes are in JA's hand, suggesting that some of the argument may have been lost in the process of his resumption of note-taking.
14. Tangier was a British possession from 1662 until 1684. In the latter year the English abandoned it, blowing up the mole and fortifications which they had constructed. Commercial relations were maintained, however, primarily as a source of provisions for Gibraltar. Louis Sauveur de Chenier, The Present State of the Empire of Morocco, 1:20–21, 2:202, 355–356 (London, 1788).
15. One 18th-century account states that among the goods shipped at Tangier were “oils, gums, wax, elephants-teeth, . . . raw hides and wool.” 2 Chenier, Present State of the Empire of Morocco 356. The reading “pampouses” has been adopted on the supposition that the goods in question were slippers made of undressed cowhide. See OED: “pampootie,” “papoosh, or papouche.” The word might also be “pamponses,” perhaps a form of “pompon” or “pompion,” a kind of melon said to grow in the Indies, Java, and India. OED. Melons were a product of the Mediterranean. See John M. Baker, A View of the Commerce of the Mediterranean 100 (Washington, 1819). Some variety of the fruit might have been shipped to Boston in dried form, perhaps as gourds.
16. See text and note 916 above.
17. See note 6 above.

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Editorial Note

On 25 March 1774, aroused at the presumption which Boston had earlier displayed in dumping the East India Company's tea into the harbor, Parliament passed the Boston Port Act. This was the first of a series of harsh measures known as the Coercive, or Intolerable, Acts, which were designed to bring Massachusetts to heel. Instead they stirred an immediate storm of resistance, which produced that final colonial union necessary to make the fight for independence a reality.1 Adams' minutes of the arguments in a case arising in the first days of the Port Act's operation, which are printed below, are hardly prophetic of these later developments.
The Act, which was to remain in force until the Town had paid for the tea and made good other damage incurred through its rebelliousness, provided that after 1 June 1774 no goods other than food or fuel shipped coastwise could be loaded or unloaded in Boston Harbor, except by vessels which were there on or before that date. Even these ships were to depart by 14 June. Other vessels found moored or hovering in the Harbor, or within a league of it, could be seized as forfeit if they did not depart within six hours after being warned by a naval or customs officer. Violations of the Act were to be prosecuted in the same manner as offenses against the Acts of Trade, which meant at common law or in Admiralty at the option of the prosecutor.2
All that is known of the case which Adams minuted has been deduced from his notes. Some time in April 1774, one Ross, master of a vessel of unknown name, sailed from an unknown port bound for New York with a cargo which included indigo and wrought plate. When about 1500 miles from Boston, the vessel was seriously damaged, presumably through stress of weather. Finding his condition such that he could not make New York, Ross put into Boston although he had heard “in his Passage” that the port was closed. The date of his arrival cannot be calculated with any certainty; the best guess is that it was about the middle of June, but it could have been as late as mid-July.3 Apparently recognizing this as a genuine case of distress, Admiral Montagu and the customs officers allowed Ross to { 244 } enter the port for repairs. But Ross overstayed his welcome. After an indeterminate period, probably two to three weeks, his ship was still not ready to sail, and he had begun to offer some of his cargo for sale, perhaps to raise necessary funds.
The Crown now acted, presumably by seizing the vessel and libeling her in the Admiralty Court. In view of the local reaction to the Port Act, it is unlikely that the customs officers would have entrusted any case under it to a jury, and there is no record of any proceeding at common law.4 Daniel Leonard argued the case for the Crown and William Tudor appeared for Ross, who had presumably filed a claim for the vessel. Adams' minutes show that he attended the argument. It thus could have taken place before he left for the eastern circuit on 20 June, but it was probably held between his return from the eastward on about 18 July and his departure on 10 August to attend the Continental Congress at Philadelphia.5 The question chiefly agitated at the hearing was whether Ross had been diligent in getting his ship ready to put to sea. No record has been found of the result, but it seems most probable that the vessel was acquitted, because no notice of her sale as forfeit appeared in the Boston newspapers.
1. For the Tea Party and the Coercive Acts, see p. 105–106 above.
2. 14 Geo. 3, c. 19 (1774). As to the latter provision, see note 712 below.
3. One Ross entered at Boston from St. Croix early in May. Massachusetts Gazette, 5 May 1774, p. 2, col. 3. Since under 14 Geo. 3, c. 19, §4, a ship arriving before 1 June could have entered and would have had until 14 June to clear, it is unlikely that this was the Ross in question here. The dates in the text are consistent with the assumption that the hearing was held between 15 July and 10 August. See note 5 below. This would have been three to four weeks after the vessel's arrival, allowing her two or three weeks in port before seizure and a week to ten days between seizure and trial. A June arrival seems more likely because of Ross' “April” embarkation.
4. For accounts of several proceedings in Admiralty under the Act between 30 Sept. and 21 Nov. 1774, see “Letters of John Andrews,” 8 MHS, Procs. 371, 378, 386 (1864–1865).
5. See 2 JA, Diary and Autobiography96–97. The hearing was probably three or four weeks after the vessel's arrival. Since she must have arrived after 1 June, there probably would not have been time for trial before 20 June. See note 3 above. JA's return from Maine can be estimated on the basis of the fact that the Superior Court at Falmouth adjourned on 13 July. SCJ Rec. 1774, fol. 225.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0006-0011-0002

Author: Adams, John
DateRange: 1774-06 - 1774-07

Adams' Minutes of the Argument1

Court of Vice Admiralty, Boston, June or July 1774
Leonard. Port Bill, Lex Talionis. Punishment of Boston the main Object.
There is an Exception where by the Act of God, there is an Impossibility of getting out.2 A Necessity.
She had no Right to Stay to repair and refit for a Voyage.
She might have gone out, if not in 6 Hours,3 yet in two or three days.
She was not in a worse situation than she had been.
{ 245 }
She might have hired assistance.
The Part the Crown officers have acted is extreamly fair and legal.
The Admiral could not allow him to stay compleatly to refit. Tho he seemed to understand that he had leave to do so.
Mr. Gray4 tells us that the whole might have been had in a Week.
J. Hall thinks 7 or 8 days. Compasses were done in 4 days.
If she is not now fit for sea that is not an excuse.
He is shewing Specimens of his Indigo &c. and brings on shore some of his Wrought Plate. This comes within another Act.5
Plate—Goods, Wares or Merchandise.6
She was in the same Condition in which she came 500 Leagues.
Tudor. The Rules that govern other Acts, are to rule this.7
Ross Sail'd in April. Heard in his Passage that Boston Port was shut.8
Holrode describes their distress. Bound to N. York. Shut. And Middleton says, Distress. Mier, and Dodge.
John Hall. Mate of the Mercury9 describes her distress, no Masts, sails tattered.
James Hall. We have invalidated his Testimony.
{ 246 }
Jack the Pilot. Distress enough.
It was Ross's Duty to come in here.
Q. Whether Ross used his utmost Endeavour to get out?
Hall says Ross did Use a reasonable Dilligence. Middleton &c. Mier says Ross hurried them.
In Town. Mr. Hutchinson. Very dilligent. Concernd about lying at Expence.
His Landlady. Anxious to get away.
Ruggles the Sail maker. Up at Gun firing [hiring us?].10 Worked on the Mast when the Weather would permit. Employd as Many Hands as could be employed.
1. In JA's hand. Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 185. For the dating, see notes 3, 5, above.
2. There is no such exception within the Port Act. 14 Geo. 3, c. 19 (1774). Leonard may here refer to a doctrine of statutory construction that excuses liability for actions forced by acts of God. See 4 Bacon, Abridgment 649. Or he may be incorporating by analogy an exception in cases of necessity to the provision of the Act of 1764 requiring foreign vessels to leave colonial waters on warning. 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §33. See note 38 below.
3. Six hours was the grace period allowed to vessels after being warned to leave by naval or customs officers. 14 Geo. 3, c. 19, §3.
4. Perhaps John Gray, the proprietor of Gray's ropewalk.
5. Under 15 Car. 2, c. 7, §8 (1663), set out, No. 48, note 210, unloading goods before entry was a cause of forfeiture. Ross had presumably made no entry, because the customs officers had moved to Plymouth with their records. Warren, “The Colonial Customs Service in Massachusetts in its relation to the American Revolution,” 46 MHS, Procs. 440, 471–472 (1913). In addition, if the goods were European in origin, they could be forfeited if they had not been shipped in Great Britain. See No. 52.
6. The Port Act forbade the loading of “any goods, wares, or merchandise whatsoever, to be transported or carried into any other country, province, or place whatsoever, or into any other part of the said province of the Massachuset's Bay, in New England,” or the unloading of goods, wares or merchandise “to be brought from any other country, province, or place, or any other part of the said province of Massachuset's Bay in New England,” under penalty of forfeiture of goods, vessel, and small craft used in the process. 14 Geo. 3, c. 19, §1.
7. The Act, 14 Geo. 3, c. 19, §6, provided that forfeitures were to be prosecuted “in like manner as other penalties and forfeitures inflicted by any act or acts of parliament relating to the trade or revenues of the British colonies or plantations in America, are directed to be prosecuted,” under 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §§41–47 (1764) and 8 Geo. 3, c. 22 (1768). For authorities favoring strict construction of these Acts in favor of the claimant, see No. 51. In addition, there were provisions in some of the statutes for leniency toward unintentional violations. See, for example, 4 Geo. 3, c. 15, §22 (1764), excusing from liability goods improperly imported into England with no intent to defraud.
8. The Port Act was passed on 25 March 1774. News of it reached Boston on 11 May. Miller, Origins of the American Revolution 359–360.
9. One of the British warships on station off Boston to enforce the Act. See Rowe, Letters and Diary 273 (29 May 1774). Perhaps the Mercury had intercepted Ross' vessel and escorted her into port.
10. Illegible in MS. If the editors' reading is correct, the meaning may be “up at sunrise assembling a crew.”

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Editorial Note

Colonial forests were a natural resource upon which Britain depended for a vital element in her naval strength. The towering white pines which had grown untouched in the woods of northern New England for centuries were unequaled throughout the world as mast timber. Moreover, the supply from this source did not depend upon the vicissitudes of foreign trade or war and peace. The royal mast contractors met severe competition, however, because these same mighty trees were attractive to the colonists both for maritime uses and for the humbler purposes of the settler. To protect the forests from local depredations, the British developed a statutory conservation scheme, enforced in the Vice Admiralty Courts, which led to a running battle with the colonists through most of the 18th century.1
The basis of the scheme was the Massachusetts Charter of 1691, which combined the former colonies of Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay, Maine, Nova Scotia, and certain lands lying between the latter two, into a single province. In the Charter “all Trees of the Diameter of Twenty Four Inches and upwards of Twelve Inches from the ground” growing on land “not heretofore granted to any private persons” were reserved to the Crown, to be cut only by royal license; a penalty of £100 for each tree cut without license was established.2 To implement this provision a system of licensing certain royal mast contractors was established, and a Surveyor General of the Woods was appointed to oversee their operations and to put down unlicensed activity.3 After a series of only partly successful enforcement attempts, Parliament in 1711 embodied the Charter language in the { 248 } first of the White Pine Acts, which provided that no “white or other pine tree” meeting the Charter qualifications should be cut in any province or colony north of New Jersey. Penalties in the amount set in the Charter were to be sued for before the nearest justice of the peace and to be divided equally between the Crown and the informer.4
These provisions produced more controversy than conservation. The popular faction in the Massachusetts House, led by Dr. Elisha Cooke, a lifelong opponent of royal authority, denied that the Charter and Act bound the unincorporated Province lands in the timber-rich Gorges patent in Maine, claiming that the royal grant of this tract to Sir Ferdinando Gorges in 1639 brought it within the exception for lands granted to private persons.5 In 1718 Counsel for the Board of Trade held that the conveyance of these lands from the Gorges interests to the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1678 and the vacation of the colony charter in 1684 revested the lands in the Crown and took them out of the exception.6 The focus then shifted { 249 } to the trees themselves. In 1721 the House claimed and exercised the power to seize for the Province logs that had been cut into twenty-foot lengths. The justification advanced by Cooke was that the Charter reserved only timber fit for use as masts. This stand was the basis of one of the charges of usurpation of the prerogative which Governor Shute successfully prosecuted against the House before the Privy Council in 1725.7
The Act of 1711 also proved inadequate in its enforcement provisions. Jurisdiction of offenses under it had been given to justices of the peace { 250 } to avoid the hazards of jury trial, but the local interests of the justices made them of little more value than juries in obtaining convictions of violators.8 There were other impediments to prosecution: The Crown bore the burden of proving that trees had been cut on reserved land;9 the rigid and complicated common-law process, which was under the control of reluctant local courts and sheriffs made it difficult to obtain execution when penalties were awarded;10 there was no express authority for the in rem seizure and forfeiture of trees felled within the prohibited areas.11
The Naval Stores Act of 1722, which was the basis of enforcement until the Revolution, sought to deal with all of these problems. It repealed the Act of 1711 and replaced its provisions with a prohibition against the unlicensed cutting of “any white pine trees, not growing within any township,” in the colonies from New Jersey north, with penalties varying in amount according to the size of the tree. The bulk of the Gorges tract, being unincorporated, was thus covered, whatever the state of the title.12 The problem of locally oriented courts was solved by a provision that the penalties were to be recovered “before the judge of the admiralty, or his deputy, within the colony or plantation where such pinetree shall be { 251 } cut.”13 Other complaints about the judicial process were remedied by placing the burden of proof of the trees' location upon the claimant and by providing stringent measures for execution by distress and sale.14 To meet the contention that cut logs were not Crown property and to end the difficulties experienced in enforcing seizures, the statute further provided that all illegally-cut “white pine-trees, masts or logs made from such trees,” should “be forfeited and seized for the use of his Majesty.”15
{ 252 }
It was soon argued that the Act of 1722 had rendered void the Charter reservation. The Crown law officers ruled that the reservation was still in force, but repeal of the Act of 1711 meant that, except in Massachusetts, trees of the reserved size were protected only if they grew outside township bounds. Within Massachusetts the Charter covered trees in the towns, but its enforcement was again at the mercy of common-law juries.16 These loopholes were closed by the Act of 1729, which provided that in all of the American colonies no white pine trees should be felled (except by licensed cutters) even within a township's bounds unless they were “the property of private persons,” and that in Massachusetts white pines within the Charter reservation should not be cut unless they were on lands granted to private persons before 1690. The penalties and recovery machinery of the 1722 statute were to be applicable to violations.17
The construction which the Crown gave to the rules applicable in the Province of Massachusetts may be summarized as follows: (1) White pine trees of the size reserved in the Charter could not be cut without license unless they grew (a) within a township at the time of cutting, and (b) on land granted to private persons before 1690. (2) White pine trees of lesser size could not be cut without license unless at the time of cutting they were (a) within a township, and (b) the property of private persons.18 Until the Revolution this scheme was criticized as bad conservation and commercial policy, as well as an unjust taking of property without compensation. It was also attacked before the courts. Despite the best efforts { 253 } of men seriously interested in a sound forest policy, the attacks on policy grounds brought no change. The court battles provided a constant accompaniment to sporadic efforts at strict enforcement.19
These efforts and resultant opposition, legal and otherwise, continued steadily until 1743 when Benning Wentworth, Governor of New Hampshire, succeeded in becoming Surveyor General of the Woods, a fitting appointment, since the mast contract for the northern woods was also in the Wentworth family. Enforcement now subsided, perhaps because the wide-ranging family timber interests were able by different means to satisfy the demand for naval stores as well as for commercial lumber.20 Apparently moved both by new demands for enforcement from the Crown and by the encroachment of commercial rivals on the family preserve, Wentworth in 1763 suddenly began to enforce the Acts in a series of suits for logs brought in the Admiralty Court at Boston. These suits continued until his resignation, in 1766, as Governor of New Hampshire and as Surveyor.21
John Wentworth, nephew of Benning, and successor to both his titles, brought to his new positions a desire to enforce the laws and an enthusiastic interest in the welfare of his native New England. He was in office until the Revolution, and was always active in the surveying phase of his commission, which required him to locate trees suitable for masts and to mark them with the King's broad arrow. He also worked continually to remove colonial objections to the laws.22 From the beginning, however, he was engaged in the task of enforcement. In July 1767 and again in September he brought libels in the Vice Admiralty Court at Boston for the forfeiture of illegally cut logs and masts which he had seized.23 Thereafter he was not a suitor in that court until April 1769, although he may have brought { 254 } forfeiture actions in the Portsmouth Admiralty Court, held by William Parker, deputy of Robert Auchmuty, Judge of Admiralty at Boston.
In the spring of 1769 Wentworth was about to proceed in the Portsmouth court when Auchmuty suspended Parker from office; Wentworth therefore turned again to Boston. In a letter of 10 April he sent several “informations” against violators to Joshua Loring Jr., one of his deputy surveyors general, with directions to put them in suit before Auchmuty. (No. 54, Document III). At about the same time, John Hurd, one of the Governor's staff, forwarded other informations that had already been “under Consideration of Mr. Parker.” (No. 54, Document I). In his letter to Loring, Wentworth suggested that his old friend and Harvard classmate, John Adams, be retained to prosecute the suits. Wentworth spoke warmly of Adams and their somewhat neglected friendship, and ordered that Loring “Present the Lawyer rather a generous fee.”
Wentworth's letter may represent one of the influences which were brought to bear on Adams at about this time in an effort to draw him to the side of government.24 Adams, however, seems to have proceeded in the case more out of pleasant regard for his old companion (and perhaps for the “generous fee”) than from any conscious political motive. On 24 April he wrote Wentworth, reporting on his progress in drawing several libels, and asking for information necessary to complete others. (No. 54, Document IV). The letter concludes with a personal message, briefly reminiscent of the baroque style of Adams' youthful correspondence, which seems to express a longing for the freedom and innocence of their old friendship, while recognizing that in present circumstances it could never again exist.
Whatever his motive, Adams drafted an information praying forfeiture of 606 logs and nine masts seized by Wentworth in various locations in York and Cumberland Counties, Maine. (No. 54, Document II). Although Adams' draft is dated 20 April, the libel was filed on 1 May, and claimants were cited to appear on the 24th. The logs and masts were decreed forfeit on 1 June, apparently without a claim's being filed.25
In the months before and after the forfeiture, twenty in personam actions, some of them involving several respondents, were entered in the Court of Vice Admiralty on Wentworth's behalf. The Minute Book of the court shows that Adams filed three of these on 4 September 1769; penalties of £50 to £100 were decreed against the respondents upon their default on 20 November.26 Fifteen years later, in describing the White Pine Acts to the Maréchal de Castries, the French Minister of Marine, Adams wrote that at Wentworth's request he had “commenced and prose• { 255 } cuted a great number of libels in the court of admiralty at Boston against transgressions of those acts of parliament.”27 This statement and Adams' letter to Wentworth indicate that Adams was responsible for most, if not all, of the remainder of the twenty suits as well.28 The Minute Book shows that, in addition to the three defaults, forfeitures were decreed in only two other actions. Of the rest, two were settled, one was dismissed, and in twelve the respondents were not served.
After 1769 Wentworth's enforcement activities seemed to subside, at least as they were reflected in Admiralty actions at Boston. Perhaps he was trying to encourage compliance through persuasion and negotiation, rather than by legal process.29 His dealings with the Kennebec Company which preceded his action against logs found on the lands which it claimed in Maine (No. 55) suggest an effort to reach an understanding.
In the summer of 1769, the Company, one of Adams' most important clients, had won three significant actions against other claimants to that famous tract, the Kennebec Purchase.30 Perhaps encouraged, the Proprietors, all of whom were important figures in the Boston financial community, wrote to Wentworth on 16 October 1769, asserting their claim to the Kennebec lands, and protesting the entry thereon of the royal mast contractors, but expressing a willingness to furnish masts to the Crown on their own terms. Wentworth replied that he could not decide the validity of their title himself, but that he was as eager as they were to have a correct determination of it. He offered either to bring an action in Admiralty that would decide the question, or to transmit to England a state of the Proprietors' claim for a ruling. Although he could not “relinquish the Royal Claim either in honor or Justice,” he would in the meantime “endeavor to prevent tho' I have no power to refuse the Cutting Masts on the premises.”31 The Proprietors apparently hoped to avoid either variety of determination, perhaps relying on their social acquaintance with Wentworth to produce a favorable result. They thus wrote to him in May 1770, sug• { 256 } gesting that he submit the question to counsel for an opinion. Wentworth refused to be trapped, pointing out in reply that his position was based on the opinion given on Cooke's claims in 1718, to which he must conform, and that the question was beyond his competence. He renewed his offer to forward the Company's state of its claim, however.32
About a year later, Richard Jackson, counsel for the Board of Trade, was asked to decide the matter on the basis of a letter from Wentworth, stating the Kennebec claim. Jackson refused to decide the question of title involved, but stated that if the trees in question grew within a township, and if the claim of the Kennebec Company to a title derived prior to 1690 were established, the trees could be cut without penalty.33 The Proprietors were still reluctant to submit their title to the courts, however, probably fearing the effect of an adverse determination on other claims which might be brought for the lands. In December 1771 they petitioned the Admiralty and Treasury, not for complete relief, but for compensation for logs taken from their lands, stating that they wished to avoid litigation, “the entering into a Law Suit having the appearance of refusing the Masts for His Majesty's service.” Wentworth himself recommended this solution to the Treasury, “not as a matter of right, but as a Gratuity for the Timber being found well preserved upon their Land.”34 The petition, which had not been acted upon by the fall of 1772,35 was probably tabled, because the question was finally submitted to litigation.
Perhaps expecting efforts at settlement to fail, the Proprietors had already begun to prepare for litigation. At a meeting on 8 January 1772, James Bowdoin, James Pitts, Sylvester Gardiner, Benjamin Hallowell, and { 257 } William Bowdoin were constituted “lawful attorneys,” who were empowered, among other things, “to appear, and the Person of us said Proprietors Constituant to represent before any Governor, Judges, Justices, Officers and Ministers of the Law whatsoever, in any Court or Courts whatsoever, and there on our behalf to answer, defend, and reply unto all Actions, Matters and things whatsoever,” with power to appoint attorneys under them. Since the previous grant of such a power to a committee had authorized only the appointment of an “Attorney for the proprietors to appear for them in any Courts of Law or Equity in New England or Great Britain,” the 1772 vote indicates an awareness that the controversy with Wentworth would be tried in Admiralty. At the same meeting Adams, who had been acting for the Company since 1769, was formally voted “Attorney in all Causes, Real, personal, or Mixt, moved and to be moved for us or against us.”36
On 14 July 1772 an information was filed in the Court of Admiralty at Boston against a total of 573 logs, 424 pieces of hewn timber and 70,000 feet of pine board, alleged to have been seized on the Kennebec River and at various locations within the claimed lands to either side of it.37 The action seemed calculated to produce a determination both of the Kennebec claim and of the question whether the statutes applied to dressed timber (other than masts) and sawn boards, as well as to trees, masts, and logs.38 Adams appeared for the Kennebec Company and filed a claim, which apparently asserted its title. The case was argued on what Adams in his minutes described as a “demurrer” (No. 55, Document II), but which in Admiralty practice is more properly known as an exception. The effect was that of a demurrer, however, which admitted all the facts as to the chain of title pleaded in the claim, leaving in issue only questions of law as to the validity of the title and the construction of the White Pine Acts.39
{ 258 }
The case was heard in March 1773. James Otis and Samuel Fitch, the Advocate General, argued for the Crown. Adams appeared for his old clients, undoubtedly with a colleague whose identity is not known. Printed below in No. 55 are a list of questions of law apparently drawn for the hearing (Document I), Adams' minutes of the Crown argument (Document II), and Adams' notes of his own argument (Document III).
The Kennebec Company traced its title back to the Council for New England, or Council of Plymouth, established in 1620 by a royal patent which conveyed to it all of New England from 40° to 48° North Latitude. In 1630 the Council had granted to William Bradford, moving spirit in the Plymouth Colony, the so-called Plymouth Patent, which conveyed both the lands which the Pilgrims had occupied in Massachusetts and a tract on either side of the Kennebec to be used for trading purposes. In 1641 Bradford had “surrendered” to the colony his interest and that of his associates in the patent. Plymouth sought to improve the Maine lands, leasing the trading rights there periodically and adding further tracts acquired by deed from the Indians. Finally in 1665 the colony conveyed the land to four individuals. The heirs and successors of these grantees organized in 1749 as “the Proprietors of the Kennebec Purchase from the late colony of New Plymouth,” an arrangement given legal sanction by a Province Act of 1753 permitting the proprietors of undivided lands lying outside of organized townships to act as a body.40
The basic position of the Proprietors was that the chain validated their title and that at least the conveyance out of the Plymouth colony in 1665 was a grant to private persons before 1690, within the meaning of the Charter and statutes. Otis and Fitch attacked the Kennebec position along two lines: First, that the grants were made not to “private persons,” but to corporate bodies or to tenants in common of undivided lands, who as proprietors held in a capacity other than private. Second, that the chain of title was defective, so that even if the grantees were private persons, they did not hold by virtue of a grant, but by adverse possession. Even if the Proprietors' arguments on these points prevailed, only trees growing within townships would be protected.41 Fitch argued that the 1722 act had been { 259 } construed to mean that trees growing outside of township bounds were reserved, regardless of ownership. Adams met the argument with the proposition that the Charter excepted grants to private persons, regardless of township bounds, and that the exception was not narrowed by the Act of 1722, which was intended to apply only in other royal provinces in which all unincorporated lands of necessity belonged to the Crown.
Adams' arguments must have been successful, because on 3 May 1773 Wentworth's libel was dismissed. The Surveyor General appealed to the Privy Council, and in September 1774 his petition was referred to the Council's Committee for Hearing Appeals, which finally set the case for hearing on 3 August 1775.42 No record of the result has been found. If the petition was not withdrawn, the Order in Council resulting can have had little effect, since Boston was by the time of its issuance the besieged stronghold of the last vestiges of British authority in New England.
1. For an admirable treatment of the naval and economic considerations, and a summary of the 18th-century struggle, see Robert G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power 231–280 (Cambridge, Mass., 1926). The cutting and shipment of masts to England was further encouraged by the grant of bounties to importers, and the inclusion of masts and other naval stores in the list of “enumerated” colonial products that could be shipped only to an English or colonial port. The latter provision did not prevent the development of an illicit trade in these materials. Id. at 250–251, 264–265; see note 17 below.
2. Province Charter of 1691, 1 A&R 20, set out in pertinent part in No. 55, Doc. III, text and note 228. England had relied on colonial masts through most of the 17th century, but the Charter of 1691 was the first formal effort at regulation. It seems to have resulted from a combination of pressures exerted by the commencement of hostilities with the French and a mercantilist desire to protect the English woolen industry by encouraging colonial initiatives in other directions. Albion, Forests and Sea Power 233–240. Compare Board of Trade to Governor Shute, 16 Aug. 1722, Cal. State Papers (Col.), 1722–1723, §263. Although there was no enforcement provision in the Charter, actions under it were brought in the common-law courts. See materials cited in Albion, Forests and Sea Power 265 note; Usher to Secretary of State, 25 Nov. 1710, 9 Maine Hist. Soc., Colls. (2d ser.) 305 (1907).
3. Albion, Forests and Sea Power 235–238, 242–248.
4. 9 Anne, c. 17, §1 (1711), set out in No. 55, Doc. III, at note 531. For the enforcement efforts, see Albion, Forests and. Sea tower 242–249 and materials cited in note 2 above. An earlier statute had protected “pitch, pine trees, or tar trees, not being within any fence or actual inclosure, under the growth of twelve inches diameter, at three foot from the earth.” Penalties of £5 “for each offense” were to be sued for before the nearest justice of the peace, to be divided equally between Crown and informer. 3 & 4 Anne, c. 10, §6 (1704). The purpose of the latter act seems to have been to protect trees useful for naval stores such as tar, rather than mast trees. Albion, Forests and Sea Power 249. See Bridger to Board of Trade, 9 Maine Hist. Soc., Colls. (2d ser.) 266, abstracted in Cal. State Payers (Col), 1708–1709, §428. However, it did have the further effect of serving as a long-range conservation measure by assuring future growth of the great pines. The exception for trees within a fence or enclosure seems to have been intended to permit cutting for the purposes of clearing land for settlement only. Albion indicates that this limitation was continued in the White Pine Act of 1729, note 17 below. Id. at 258. It is probable, however, that the latter act, and that of 1721, note 13 below, which covered white pines of every size, and together limited unlicensed cutting to private property within township bounds, were considered to have repealed 3 & 4 Anne, c. 19, §6 sub silentio and not to embody its narrower limits. JA did not use its language in the information which he drafted for John Wentworth in 1769. No. 54, Doc. II.
5. The Gorges Patent, or Province of Maine, which ran from the New Hampshire border to the Kennebec River, had been conveyed by Gorges' heir through a straw to the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1678. See the deeds in 2 Maine Hist. Soc., Colls. (1st ser.) 257–264 (1847). As to the Gorges Patent, see No. 55, notes 6, 1117. The Massachusetts argument was that the Province title derived from the 1639 grant to Gorges through the title of the Bay Colony, which had allegedly been confirmed by another provision of the 1691 Charter (No. 55, note 1622). See “The right of Massachusetts to the Province of Maine, vindicated,” 9 Maine Hist. Soc., Colls. (2d ser.) 388–414. Cooke had a personal interest in this phase of the struggle against the Crown, for he had bought up at least two grants of land made by the Bay Colony General Court before 1678 which had never been laid out, and had proceeded to lay them out as a large tract within the Gorges Patent, which the Province General Court confirmed. John Bridger to ———, 8 April 1720, 10 id. at 134–135; 2 Mass., House Jour. 24, 66–67. As to Cooke generally, see 4 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 349–356; No. 5, note 514.
6. The question reached the Board of Trade on the petition of John Bridger, Surveyor General of the Woods, whom Cooke had personally attacked as part of his campaign (note 5 above). The House had approved these strictures against Bridger in Dec. 1718, Cooke having spent the session on the sidelines as a result of the Governor's negative of his election to the Council. See Bridger to Board of Trade, 14 July 1718, Cal. State Papers (Col.), 1717–1718, §616; 1 Mass., House Jour. 272; 2 id. at 3, 47, 52, 53, 108–109. By this time, however, Richard West's opinion, adopted by the Board of Trade, had destroyed the legal foundation of the Province arguments, since it meant that any conveyance of the Gorges lands from the Province General Court after 1691 could have been made only by virtue of a title derived from the 1691 Charter and must be subject to the reservation in that instrument. Opinion of Richard West, 12 Nov. 1718, Chalmers, Opinions 133–137; Cal. State Papers (Col.), 1717–1718, §§744, 755. See generally, Albion, Forests and Sea Power 256–257; Knollenberg, Origin of the American Revolution 132–133. Knollenberg argues that on a strict construction of the Charter language, West's opinion is unsound; since the only requirement was that the lands have been granted previously to private persons, the subsequent history of the title was irrelevant. Ibid. West's ruling that the Bay Colony title was revested in the Crown in 1684 had some sanction in English corporate law, however, and it was supported by a decision of the Privy Council on Gorges' application in 1691. See 9 Holdsworth, History of English Law 67–68; 9 Maine Hist. Soc., Colls. (2d ser.) 390–392; Cal. State Papers (Col.), 1689–1692, §1677. The 1691 Charter confirmed titles under previous grants in language which limited the confirmation to grantees actually holding title at the time of the Charter, thus excluding the Bay Colony. See No. 55, note 1622. When the Charter's exception of lands previously granted to private persons is read with this confirmation clause, it would seem that the Crown could not have intended to save private rights in trees growing on lands to which it did not at the same time confirm the title. The problem raised by the Gorges patent is thus to be distinguished from the case of the Kennebec Company's claims, which were based on a title that had not revested in the Crown in 1684 and was thus confirmed in r6gi. See text and notes 33–41, below.
7. See generally, Albion, Forests and Sea Power 256–267. For the House action, see 2 Mass., House Jour. 362–366, 381, 383, 386, 388; 3 id. at 30–32, 42, 154, 159, 174, 186. For Cooke's justification, see 3 id. at 31–32, 40. See also 2 Hutchinson, Massachusetts Bay, ed. Mayo, 190–191. Shute's charges were the result of a struggle that had been going on between him and the House since his arrival in 1716. Cooke, who was involved in all of the questions, traveled to England to argue the case for the House. He tried to maintain that they had acted so as to preserve the King's rights, but he was confronted with the defiant resolutions of the House, and after an adverse report by the hearing officers, was forced to abandon this and several other points. He ultimately prevailed before the Privy Council on the questions whether the Governor had the power to negative him as Speaker of the House, and whether the House could adjourn without the Governor's consent. The Explanatory Charter of 1726 was a direct result of Cooke's activities. See Cal. State Papers (Col.), 1722–1723, §§683, 704; id. 1724–1725, §346 1; 3 Acts, Privy Council (Col.) 94–95, 102–104; John Colman to Rev. Dr. Colman, 18 May 1724, 2 MHS, Colls., (1st ser.) 32 (2d edn., 1810); Boston Chronicle, 7–1 1 Jan. 1768, p. 33, cols. 1–3; 1 A&R 21–23.
8. For troubles with juries before 1711, see materials cited, note 2 above. For later instances, see Cal. State Papers (Col.), 1720–1721, §118; id, 1722–1723, §132; id. 1728–1729, §118; 6 Acts, Privy Council (Col.) §399. The situation was further complicated in Massachusetts by the fact that there was an appeal as of right from the decision of a single justice to the Court of General Sessions, which sat with a jury, 1 A&R 368–369. This provision was presumably applicable even where jurisdiction was conferred by Parliament, in the absence of any expression to the contrary.
9. Surveyor General Bridger urged that “The owners [i.e. onus] probandi must be on the cutters,” after losing on a failure of proof. Cal. State Papers (Col.), 1720–1721, §118; see id. §179 1. For similar but more conventional comments, see id. §§319, 352 11; 9 Maine Hist. Soc., Colls. (2d ser.) 267.
10. For Bridger's difficulties with fraudulent conveyances, faulty returns, inadequate jails, and the like, see Bridger to Lords of Trade, 14 July 1718, 9 Maine Hist. Soc., Colls. (2d ser.) 420; Bridger to Popple, 26 June 1719, 10 id. at 119—120 (1907).
11. Such seizures had been carried out at least as early as 1709, probably on the authority of the Surveyor General's commission or instructions, or perhaps by special warrant from the Admiralty. Logs so seized were apparently not forfeit without the approval of the Lords of Admiralty in England, however, which meant that difficult questions of fact and title had to be decided by a body far from the scene and unacquainted with local practice. As a result the chance of forfeiture was very uncertain, and the logs more than likely to rot where they lay before they could be condemned. See Bridger to Board of Trade, 27 March 1709, 9 Maine Hist. Soc., Colls. (2d ser.) 268; same to same, 17 Aug. 1709, id. at 298; Bridger to Lord Dartmouth[?], 21 May 1711, Cal. State Papers (Col.), 1710–1711, §846. Bridger to ———, 8 April 1720, 10 Maine Hist. Soc., Colls. (2d ser.) 137. The common-law courts could also interfere by treating a seizure as an attachment in a suit for penalties and ordering delivery on failure of conviction. Ibid.; Cal. State Papers (Col.), 1720–1721, §§57, 82, 118, 127, 179.
12. 8 Geo. 1, c. 12, §§5, 6 (1722), set out in No. 55, at notes 6–932–35. The reservation of all trees outside township bounds was an idea of Bridger's directed specifically against Cooke's claims to unincorporated lands. Bridger to ———, 8 April 1720, 10 Maine Hist. Soc., Colls. (2d ser.) 135–137.
13. 8 Geo. 1, c. 12, §. See No. 55, note 733. See the materials cited, note 8 above. Little consideration seems to have been given to the legal basis for this extension of the Admiralty jurisdiction to an area that was geographically far from its usual purview. Objections were occasionally made in a political context. See Cal. State Papers (Col.), 1722–1723, §4. However, no case has been found in which a plea to the jurisdiction was offered. See Wentworth v. Dean, Hough, Reports 227, 229, 233 note (N.Y. Vice Adm., 1769) (Respondent complained of “Hardship of the Prosecution in the Admiralty” and being held to bail; but no jurisdictional objection made). It may have been generally accepted that the Admiralty was a proper forum in which to litigate the King's right to royal property of a maritime nature, on an analogy to droits of Admiralty (great fish and other unclaimed objects cast up from the sea, which belonged to the Crown). The proceeds of the droits were granted to the Lord High Admiral and litigation concerning them was carried on in the Admiralty Courts. 1 Holdsworth, History of English Law 559–561. If this was the basis of the extension, the Crown interest must have been the chief justification, since ordinarily even today in delictual actions, some element of maritime location is usually necessary for jurisdiction. Grant Gilmore and Charles L. Black, The Law of Admiralty 18–30 (Brooklyn, 1957). There was also a clear administrative justification for the jurisdiction since the Lords of the Admiralty, who were the authority constituting the colonial Vice Admiralty Courts, had ultimate control of timber policy, having in fact previously supervised the process of seizure and forfeiture. See Albion, Forests and Sea Power 42–43; note 11 above. Although the in personam actions for penalties involved the same questions of title to royal property, colonial complaints about deprivation of the jury had more force here. They could be met, however, by the argument that in England countless such petty offenses were triable before justices of the peace, who sat without a jury, a practice which had doubtless been the model for the statute 9 Anne, c. 17 (note 4 above). See No. 46, note 26103.
14. 8 Geo. 1, c. 12, §5. As to burden of proof, see note 9 above. Problems concerning execution are covered, note 10 above. The act provided that if a convicted offender failed to pay the penalties assessed within twenty days, the judge was authorized to have the amounts due levied by distress and sale of the offender's goods (presumably through the office of Marshal of the Admiralty Court, rather than the sheriff), or to imprison him for three to twelve months. For this provision in action, see Wentworth v. Dean, Hough, Reports 227, 232–233 (N.Y. Vice Adm., 1769).
15. 8 Geo. 1, c. 12, §5. See No. 55, note 834. For the problems concerning property in the logs and the enforcement of seizures, see notes 8, 11, above. The statute did not expressly provide that such seizures should be prosecuted in Admiralty, but no case has been found in which an objection to the jurisdiction based on the statutory language was made. It may have been felt that the Admiralty's right to the logs made the jurisdiction clear. See note 13 above. In any event, the grant of jurisdiction over penalties could be read to include seizures. 8 Geo. 1, c. 12, §5. It is also not clear how the forfeited logs were to be dealt with, once condemned. The statutory language, and that of JA's information, No. 54, Doc. II, indicate that the logs or their proceeds were to go solely to the Crown. See also Wentworth v. Dean, Hough, Reports 227 (N.Y. Vice Adm., 1769), where the action for penalties is entitled Wentworth qui tam v. Dean, but the action against the logs is entitled Our Lord The King v. Three White Pine Trees. After condemnation, if the timber had been cut into logs too short for masts, it might be sold, with the proceeds going to the Surveyor General for the Crown, subject to a charge for his expenses. See Benning Wentworth v. Logs, SF 157245 (Mass. Vice Adm., 1763); Mayo, “The King's Woods,” 54 MHS, Procs. 50, 54 (1920–1921); Bridger to Board of Trade, 27 March 1709, 9 Maine Hist. Soc., Colls. (2d ser.) 268; same to same, 17 Aug. 1709, id. at 298. If the seized logs were fit for use as masts, at least in earlier practice they were taken in specie by the Crown. Ibid. That this remained the practice is suggested by the fact that no notices of sale appear in the Boston newspapers for John Went-worth's successful seizures in 1769–1772.
16. See Opinion of Francis Fane, 19 July 1726, Chalmers, Opinions 137; Cal. State Papers (Col.), 1726–1727, §226; Opinion of Attorney General Yorke and Solicitor General Talbot, 23 Dec. 1726, Chalmers, Opinions 139; Cal. State Papers (Col.), 1726–1727, §386. For the opposition to enforcement, including the necessity of a resort to common law, which these loopholes provoked, see id. 1724–1725, §§352, 771; id. 1726–1727, §§48, 172, 227, 290, 498; id. 1728–1729, §§627 1, 892 1, 1018; id. 1730, §§288, 402 ii. The problem was further aggravated by a sudden proliferation of new townships in the white pine country. See Albion, Forests and Sea Power 255–256; Cal. State Papers (Col.), 1726–1727, §335.
17. 2 Geo. 2, c. 35, §§1, 2 (1729), set out by JA in No. 55, notes 12–1738–43. That the Act was the result of the problems in note 16 above, appears in Cal. State Papers (Col.), 1726–1727, §§498, 771; id. 1728–1729, §§50, 118, 755. The statute also revived the system of bounties and enumeration enacted in 3 & 4 Anne, c. 10 (1705), which had lapsed in 1725. 2 Geo. 2, c. 35, §§3–17. See note 1 above.
18. Opinion of Richard Jackson, 5 June 1771, Chalmers, Opinions 157. In 1773 JA argued that the reservation of trees outside of township bounds was not meant to apply to Massachusetts. See No. 55, text at notes 10–1136–37.
19. For the failure of various well-intentioned efforts to change the colonial forest policy and the difficulties in enforcement, see Albion, Forests and Sea Power 258—269; Knollenberg, Origin of the American Revolution 130–131, 133–134.
20. Albion, Forests and Sea Power 253; Knollenberg, Origin of the American Revolution 134–135.
21. See Albion, Forests and Sea Power 253; Knollenberg, Origin of the American Revolution 135–137; Lawrence S. Mayo, John Wentworth 23–24, 47–51 (Cambridge, Mass., 1921). For instances of Benning Wentworth's activities in 1763 and after, see Wentworth v. Logs, SF 157245 (Mass. Vice Adm., 1763); Wentworth v. Loggs, Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 19 April 1766. See Governor Bernard's Proclamation, 9 July 1763, calling on all to aid the Surveyor General of the Woods. Book of Commissions, 1756–1767, fols. 339–340, M-Ar.
22. For Wentworth's role as Surveyor General, see Albion, Forests and Sea Power 253–254, 268–271; Mayo, John Wentworth 51–60. Born in 1737, he was a Harvard classmate of JA's, and a man of considerable education. He was one of the most sympathetic and effective colonial administrators, but remained loyal to the Crown at the Revolution. In 1782 he was reappointed Surveyor General of the Woods and took up residence in Nova Scotia, where he served as Lieutenant Governor from 1792 until 1808. He was knighted in 1795 and died in 1820. See generally, Mayo, John Wentworth.
23. Wentworth v. Loggs, Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 28 July 1767; Wentworth v. Masts and Bowsprit, id. 7 Sept. 1767. Wentworth did not arrive in Portsmouth to take up his duties until 13 June 1767. Mayo, John Wentworth 28–30.
24. As to other possible efforts to subvert JA, see p. 103 above. His early friendship with Wentworth is amply documented in 1 JA, Diary and Autobiography4, 19, 115, 355, 360, 2 id. at 308, 4 id. at 85–86. See also Mayo, John Wentworth 166–167, 189–190.
25. Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 1 May 1769; Massachusetts Gazette, 11 May 1769, p. 2, col. 1.
26. Wentworth v. Noyes, Wentworth v. Frost, Wentworth v. Knight, Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 4 Sept. 1769.
27. JA to the Maréchal de Castries, 9 Dec. 1784, 8 JA, Works 216.
28. Wentworth was present in Boston during June 1769 as a member of the Special Court of Admiralty convened for Corbet's Case, in which JA was of counsel for the accused. See No. 56. An agreement for JA to take on more of the logs cases may have been made at this point.
29. For Wentworth's own account of a successful attempt at persuasion along the Androscoggin in the summer of 1769, see Mayo, John Wentworth 52–54. The best known of his prosecutions, Wentworth v. Dean, Hough, Reports 227, was tried and decided in the New York Court of Vice Admiralty during the fall of 1769. See Mayo, John Wentworth 56–61; Ubbelohde, Vice Admiralty Courts 177–178. See also notes 13–15 above.
30. See JA to AA, Falmouth, 1 July 1769, 1 Adams Family Correspondence 67. JA's notes of two of these cases, Bowdoin v. Springer and Gardiner v. Tyng, show that the opposing claims were based at least in part on the Gorges Patent (notes 5, 6, above). Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 185.
31. Wentworth to the Committee of the Kennebec Purchase, 19 Oct. 1769, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fols. 149–150. The Proprietors' letter is in 1 Kennebec Purchase Letter Book 26–27, MeHi. For another statement of their position, see James Bowdoin to Thomas Pownall, 29 Sept. 1772, 1 Bowdoin-Temple Papers (9 MHS, Colls., 6th ser.) 296 (1897).
32. Wentworth to the Committee of the Kennebec Purchase, 29 June 1770, PRO, Treas. 1:471, fol. 150. See the Proprietors' letter in 1 Kennebec Purchase Letter Book 35–36, MeHi. For the 1718 opinion, see note 6 above. The Proprietors had replied to Wentworth's earlier letter (note 31 above) by asserting their claim in fuller detail, threatening to prosecute the “mast men,” and pointing out that they should at least have compensation for their efforts and expenditures in opening the country. Proprietors to Wentworth, 8 Nov. 1769, 1 Kennebec Purchase Letter Book 27, MeHi.
33. Opinion of Richard Jackson, 23 May 1771, Chalmers, Opinions 155–156. See also Opinion of same, 5 June 1771, id. at 157–158.
34. For the petition to the Admiralty, 18 Dec. 1771, and letters requesting Wentworth, Governor Hutchinson, and Admiral Montagu to forward it, see 1 Kennebec Purchase Letter Book 55–72, MeHi. Wentworth's comment is quoted in Albion, Forests and Sea Power 258. In an earlier letter, commenting upon a proposal by Hutchinson that the General Court curb the unlicensed destruction of timber in Maine, James Bowdoin of the Proprietors had stated their wish to cooperate in providing masts, if their title was made clear. Bowdoin to Thomas Pownall, 12 Nov. 1770, 1 Bowdoin-Temple Papers 234. See notes 31, 32, above. See also 3 Hutchinson, Massachusetts Bay, ed. Mayo 244–245. Hutchinson's family had long been active in Maine land speculation under claims opposed to those of the Kennebec Company. See Malcolm Freiberg, Prelude to Purgatory 119 and notes (Brown Univ. doctoral dissertation, 1950); Remarks on the Plan and Extracts of Deeds Lately Published by the Proprietors of the Township of Brunswick 6–7 (Boston, 1753). Later Bowdoin wrote that the Company's motive for avoiding litigation was financial. Bowdoin to Pownall, 29 Sept. 1772, 1 Bowdoin-Temple Papers 295–296.
35. Bowdoin to Pownall, 29 Sept. 1772, 1 Bowdoin-Temple Papers 296.
36. See the 1772 votes in 3 Kennebec Purchase Records 78–79, MeHi. The earlier power was granted on 19 Jan. 1764 to the same committee and Thomas Hancock. 2 id. at 341–342. JA's appointment seems to have been only a formal step, coincident with the withdrawal of William Cushing from the same post, which he had held since 1760. See id. at 255; Cushing's Account, Aug. 1761-Sept. 1771, Kennebec Purchase Waste Book 131–140, MeHi. Cushing was appointed to the Superior Court bench on 15 Jan. 1772. Whitmore, Mass. Civil List 70.
37. Massachusetts Gazette, 16 July 1772, p. 3, col. 2. In a letter of 22 July, the Proprietors asked Jonathan Bowman to find out whose were the logs mentioned in this notice and stated that if the owners would apply, the Company would defend for them. 1 Kennebec Purchase Letter Book 73, MeHi.
39. On 23 Oct. 1772 JA received a fee of £4 16s. “for his Appearing at the Court of Admiralty to claim Logs.” On 28 Nov. he received an additional £7 45. No other payments for this case have been found. See Accounts of Henry Alline, Kennebec Purchase Bills, Receipts, &c., MeHi. The term “exception” covers all preliminary objections including those in the nature of a demurrer. See 2 Browne, Civil Law 362. Despite JA's statement as to the effect of a demurrer here (No. 55, Doc. II), the Company obtained a Commission from the court to take depositions and obtain record copies at Plymouth in April 1773. Alline's Accounts, Kennebec Purchase Bills, Receipts, &c., MeHi.
40. For documentation of the title, see No. 55, notes 2, 3, 1117, 1218. For the history of the Kennebec Company see Gardiner, “History of the Kennebec Purchase,” 2 Maine Hist. Soc., Colls. (1st ser.) 269–294 (1847); L. C. Wroth, “The Thomas Johnston Maps of the Kennebeck Purchase,” in Walter M. Whitehill, ed., In Tribute to Fred C. Anthoensen, Master Printer 77–107 (Portland, Maine, 1952); Philip C. Olsson, The Kennebec Purchase from the Colony of New Plymouth, 1749–1765 (Harvard Univ. B.A. Honors Paper, 1962). For the Proprietorship Act, see 3 A&R 669. See also 4 Dane, Abridgment 70–72.
41. At least six townships had been granted within the Kennebec Purchase before 1772; Pownalborough, 1760, 4 A&R 287; Bowdoinham, 1762, 4 A&R 600; Hallo-well, 1771, 5 A&R 129; Winthrop, 1771, 5 A&R 132; Vassalborough, 1771, 5 A&R 135; Winslow, 1771, 5 A&R 136. These grants had not been confirmed by the Crown, however, a Charter requirement for lands north and east of the Sagahadoc River, which arguably included Pownalborough, part of Hallowell, part of Vassalborough, and part of Winslow. See 3 Hutchinson, Massachusetts Bay, ed. Mayo 244–245; Bowdoin to Pownall, 29 Sept. 1772, 1 Bowdoin-Temple Papers 295; 1 A&R 18–19.
42. 5 Acts, Privy Council (Col.) §304. Robert Auchmuty, Judge of the Admiralty Court, had been of counsel to the Company in important land actions in the prior decade. In June and Dec. 1774 he received payments totaling £282 os. iad., apparently for these services. No objection seems to have been raised on this ground, however. See 2 Kennebec Purchase Records 422; Accounts of Henry Alline, Kennebec Purchase Bills, Receipts, &c., MeHi.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0007-0002-0001

Author: Hurd, John
Recipient: Loring, Joshua Jr.
Date: 1769-04-13

John Hurd to Joshua Loring Jr.1

[salute] Dear Sir

The inclosd Informations were preparing by Mr. Claggett,2 and under Consideration of Mr. Parker the Deputy Judge of Admiralty, { 260 } when he received a Letter from the Honorable Judge Auchmuty suspending him from the Office.3 Mr. Claggett returnd them to the Surveyor General, and by his directions I forward them to you, to be laid before Mr. Auchmuty, who will know best to putt them in proper order; and if he thinks the Evidence sufficient forward them for Execution, as the Governor has already advisd. There will be further and more particular Information soon collected from some of the principal people at Law which shall be immediately sent along. I am with great Esteem and regard Dear Sir Your Most hum Servt.
[signed] John Hurd
Mr. Claggett is about leaving Us and sails soon for England. We shall miss him in some of our Affairs.
P.S. You have also inclosd a Diary of Willm. Ham Assistant Deputy, which may be of some use; after shewing it to the Judge You'll please to return it to the Surveyor General's Office.
1. RC, presumably in Hurd's hand. Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 185. Docketed by JA: “Mr. Hurd's Letter.” Enclosures not found. Hurd (1727–1809), Harvard 1747, was the son of Jacob Hurd, Boston goldsmith. After an unstable commercial career in Boston he developed New Hampshire land interests, became Wentworth's personal secretary, and held other administrative positions. He became an early settler in the upper Connecticut Valley and at the Revolution was a patriot. After losing in several political struggles, he returned to Boston in 1779, where he finished his life in the commercial community. 12 Sibley-Shipton, Harvard Graduates 164–171. Loring (1744–1789) was Deputy Surveyor of the Woods, as well as the last royal sheriff of Suffolk County. A tory, he is best known as General Howe's Commissary of Prisoners, a post for which he has received much abuse. Stark, Loyalists of Mass. 424–425; Jones, Loyalists of Mass. 199–200.
2. Wyseman Clagett (1721–1784), Attorney General of New Hampshire from 1765 to 1769. Son of an English barrister, he had been admitted an attorney in the King's Bench before his emigration to Antigua in 1748. He came to Portsmouth in 1758, where he took up practice and was soon made a justice of the peace. His severity with petty offenders was such that “I'll Clagett you,” became a popular threat. In 1769, as Hurd's postscript, below, indicates, he moved to England. Upon his return in 1771, he took up the patriot cause, serving in the Provincial Congresses and later on the State Committee of Safety and Council. From 1781 to 1784 he was a special Justice of the New Hampshire Superior Court and Solicitor General. DAB.
3. William Parker (1703–1781), Harvard A.M. (hon.) 1763, Deputy Admiralty Judge for the Province of New Hampshire. Admitted to the bar in 1732, Parker served in a variety of legislative and judicial posts, ending his active career as a Justice of the New Hampshire Superior Court (1771–1775). Charles H. Bell, The Bench and Bar of New Hampshire 26–28 (Boston, 1894). Since New Hampshire was under the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts Vice Admiralty Judge, Parker owed his authority to a deputation from Judge Auchmuty. He was apparently also commissioned by Governor Wentworth. See Ubbelohde, Vice Admiralty Courts 153–154; Jeremy Belknap, The History of New Hampshire, 1:421 (Dover, 2d edn., 1831). The cause of his suspension has not been determined, but he was still in office in 1773. Ibid. He had also sat on a case appealed from New Hampshire to Auchmuty's new District Court of Vice Admiralty at Boston in 1772. Lawrence S. Mayo, John Langdon of New Hampshire 42 (Concord, 1937). See p. 104 above.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0007-0002-0002

Author: Adams, John
Date: 1769-04-20

Adams' Draft of the Information1

Court of Vice Admiralty, Boston, 20 April 1769
Province of the Massachusetts Bay Court of vice Admty. 20th. April 1769To the Honble. Robert Auchmuty Esqr. Judge <of his Majestys said Court or to his lawfull Deputy> Commissary Deputy and surrogate of the Court of Vice Admiralty of Boston in the Province of the Massachusetts Bay
{ [facing 260] } { [facing 261] } { 261 }
John Wentworth Esqr. Surveyor General of all and singular his Majestys Woods on the Continent of North America shews that on the Twenty fourth day of March last he seized for his Majestys Use, at the several Places hereafter mentioned in said Province, the following white pine Logs; vizt at a Place called little Ossipee in the County of York in said Province Three hundred white Pine Logs from twenty four to fifty four Inches Diameter, and from Eighteen to Twenty four Feet long; at a Place called Narragansett in the County of York in said Province Three Logs from twenty five to Thirty Inches Diameter; at Faybans Mills so called in Scarborough in the County of Cumberland, Three hundred Logs.
At a Place called Dunstons Landing in Scarborough aforesaid, two Masts, vizt one of forty Inches Diameter and fifty seven Feet long, another of forty four Inches Diameter and Eighty seven feet long.
At a Place called Blue Point in Scarborough aforesaid one Mast of forty four Inches Diameter and Ninty three feet long, one of twenty Eight Inches Diameter and Eighty Eight feet and an half long; At a Place called Pepperellborough in the County of York aforesaid one Mast forty two Inches in Diameter and Sixty feet long, one of forty two Inches in Diameter and Eighty four feet long, one of Thirty Six Inches in Diameter and Eighty four feet long, one of forty two Inches in Diameter and fifty seven feet long, one of Thirty Six Inches Diameter and fifty seven feet long. At Narragansett in the County of York aforesaid Three Logs from twenty five to Thirty Inches Diameter; All cutt out of Trees growing in this Province, and not in any Township, or within the Bounds Lines or Limits thereof, or if growing within the Limits of any Town, those of twenty four Inches Diameter at twelve Inches from the Ground, not growing within any Soil or Tract of Land granted to any private Person before the Seventh Day of October Anno Domini 1690, and those under Twenty four Inches Diameter, not being the Property of any private Person or Persons, and felled by some evil minded Persons within Six Months last past, without his Majestys royal Licence first had and obtained; and by them removed to the aforesaid Places, contrary to the Laws in that Case made and provided.2
Wherefore as this matter is within the Jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the said John Wentworth prays sentence for the Forfeiture of said Logs to his Majestys Use, agreable to Law.
1. Copy in JA's hand. Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 185. Docketed by JA: “Wentworth vs. Logs. Form.” The caption of the document indicates that Auchmuty sat on the case in his capacity as Judge of the Massachusetts provincial court, rather than as Judge of the new district court to which he was appointed in the fall of 1768. See No. 46, notes 41–43; p. 102, note 16, above. Compare Ubbelohde, Vice Admiralty Courts 148–155.
2. For the statutes, the requirements of which are neatly summarized in the foregoing sentence, see No. 55, notes 6–932–35, 12–1738–43.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0007-0002-0003

Author: Wentworth, John
Recipient: Loring, Joshua Jr.
Date: 1769-04-10

John Wentworth to Joshua Loring Jr.1

[salute] Sir

Inclosed are informations against sundry Tresspassers upon the King's woods, in the (late called) Province of Main. Which I request you will immediately in my name enter Complaint of, before the Honorable Robert Auchmuty Esq. and pray that process may immediately issue thereon, for recovery of the penalty. The Trees were not seized mentioned in the information No. 5, As the offenders by violence and menaces rendered it too dangerous for any single Officer to perform, but I am determined in May next to go myself and convince them that Threats and wicked Intents are not enough to prevent any service being done;2 that is committed to my care. Whatever may be the Event, I will assuredly attempt and persevere in my duty. As Mr. Sewall is now (I am glad for him) constituted Judge,3 I am at a Loss who to direct to as Advocate, If he does not still act, I desire you'd employ John Adams Esq. in my behalf to prosecute and aid and advise in these suits. He was my Cotemporary at Cambridge, and will I dare say oblige me by his greatest care and assiduity herein, which I hope will give me opportunity to convince him that our Friendship long since commenced is still the object of my pleasing respect. I wou'd observe to you, That these People, Vizt. Ross, Ross, Denning and particularly Thompson, have thus, trespassed in open avowed defiance and contempt of the Law, publickly declaring they have done it, will persist, and that no Officer shall come among them; it is therefore necessary that a trusty, resolute and experienced Marshal be entrusted by the Court, to execute these Precepts.4 If they fail then adieu to all public reservations to the Crown, or private property of individuals. I therefore hope they'l be properly supported by the Sheriffs and other civil officers—it is too important to bear even a thought of disappointment, in bringing them to legal trial. I am resolv'd to carry this prosecution to effect, Mr. Adams will therefore be pleased to pursue the exact rules of the Law, and on our side I'le promise him the { 263 } most steady and vigorous support. Hitherto I have not been able to collect the additions5 to the names complain'd against, but am daily expecting them; these will be sufficient I presume to ground the respective process, and I shall be glad Mr. Adams will write me what further will be requisite to support our Complaints and informations. By the next post I shall send some further Evidence. I have this day wrote to the Judge on this subject, requesting to you, all necessary and legal Assistance. I beg you'd lose no time in these matters, for they are of the greatest consequence to the preservation of the Woods.
Have you yet heard any thing further from Albany of Colo. Bs. supposed tresspasses? We will now make a thorough business of reformation by the Vigor of Law, since these and these only are no other ways to be reclaim'd.6
I am exceedingly oblig'd by your good Father's interest to get the Young man discharg'd, it has made a Family very happy here. If this favor was asked in my name of Commodore Hood, I beg He would be so kind to make my most respectful acknowledgments for his politeness, which I shall at all times rejoice to retaliate. I was uncertain, therefore cou'd not mention anything about it, in a Letter I've lately had occasion to write to Commodore Hood.
My best regards attend your good Parents. I suppose your Father is quite a Farmer and you a Gardener—happy life indeed—and if completely so, long may it be continued to you. Pray be so good to make my Respects to Mr. Adams, I fear myself indebted to him a Letter from Worcester, but hope soon to repay him—better late than never.7

[salute] I am with great esteem my dear Sir, your very sincere friend and most hble servt.,

[signed] Wentworth
PS. Present the Lawyer rather a generous fee, I'le reimburse.
1. RC in Wentworth's hand, addressed to “Joshua Loring Junr. Esq.” Adams Papers. This letter, and that printed as Doc. IV, appear out of chronological order because they were discovered after the rest of the documents in this case had been set in type.
2. See p. 255, note 29 above.
3. That is, Jonathan Sewall, commissioned as Judge of the Vice Admiralty Court at Halifax. See No. 46, text at notes 41–43.
4. Libels in Wentworth's name against Robert Ross, William Ross, James Denning, and Samuel Thompson, were entered in the Vice Admiralty Court on 26 May 1769, but the respondents were not served. Vice Adm. Min. Bk., 26 May 1769.
5. That is, the degree or occupation and place of abode of the party, a necessary element in a pleading. See vol. 1, p. 32, note 19.
6. See p. 255, note 29 above.
7. Probably JA's letter to Wentworth from Worcester dated Sept. 1756; Photostat of FC in Adams Papers Files.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0007-0002-0004

Author: Adams, John
Recipient: Wentworth, John
Date: 1769-04-24

John Adams to John Wentworth1

[salute] Sir

I have prepared Eight Libells, and shall compleat the rest immediately. Those I mean whose Additions and Abodes are made known to me. The others must remain undone till I receive Directions con• { 264 } cerning the Persons. Should be glad if any further Informations are sent, to have the Names, Occupations, and Places of Abode of the Persons, that is, the Towns and Countys they live in. The Number of Trees they have cutt, not the Number of Logs, because if we prosecute for Penalties, those Penalties are to be measured by the Number of Trees, not of Logs, according to the Statutes.2 And also the Town and County where the Trespasses were done. As to the Riot or Assault upon Mr. Ham the officer, you desired that the Rioters might be rigorously prosecuted, but this cannot be done in the Court of Admiralty, which has no Jurisdiction of such Crimes, but must be left to the Kings Attorney and the grand Jury at the next Circuit of the Court of Assize.
In the Informations against Ross, Ross, Denning, and Thompson, I have put fifty Trees for each. In the Minutes I received it is Said they had cut 400 Logs each. It is possible that 50 Trees may not make so many as 400 Logs. But I thought that 50 Trees would probably be 25 times so much as the Culprits were worth, and therefore an omission of 100 Trees or so, would be of no Consequence to the Parties nor to the Crown.
I have given this Business all the Dispatch in my Power, encumbered as I have been during the whole of it, with the Hurry and Confusion of a Court in a wild, noisy, Smoaky Town. I wonder from my Soul what Fiend possessed me, when I left the <calm> Tranquility of Braintree for the Fatigue and Dissipation of Boston? But, hush my murmuring Imagination! I see more and more there is no disputing with Fate and Fortune. These inexorable Deities will dragg, if they cannot lead, and therefore the best Way is to trip it along as light as you can.
You see I feel a great Inclination to be upon a Footing with your Excellency and to be chatting about my self as I used twelve years ago. But I cant conceive what Business I have with a Wife and three Children when I am conversing with your Excellency. Excuse this Freedom and believe me, with great Respect and Esteem, your Excellency's most obedient, huml Servt.,
[signed] John Adams
1. FC in JA's hand. Adams Papers. Addressed to “His Excellency Governor Wentworth.”
2. 8 Geo. 1, c. 12, §5 (1722); 2 Geo. 2, c. 35, §2 (1729). See No. 55, text at notes 733, 1743.

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0007-0003-0001

Date: 1773-03

Questions Presented1

Court of Vice Admiralty, Boston, March 1773
1. Whether King James's Letters patent to Lodowick Duke Lenox and others,2 are allowed to be good and sufficient to vest the lands thereby granted in the Grantees in Fee simple?
2. Whether their grant to Bradford is also good, and sufficient to vest the lands thereby granted either in him and his heirs in fee simple, or in the Colony of New Plymouth so called, by virtue of the said grant and his surrender.3
{ 266 }
3. Whether it is granted that there are now living lawfull heirs of the said Bradford.
4. Whether it is contended, that private persons, mean private persons in opposition to Tenants in common or joint Tenants?4
5. Whether the Duke of Lenox et al. are to be considered as private persons within the meaning of the Charter and Statutes?
6. If a mere Trespasser should cut Masts on land, which was indisputably the property of private persons before 1690, and was, by the King, prosecuted for the penalty could he legally, give in evidence, that the soil on which such trees grew, was the property of private persons before the 7 of October 1690,5 and thereby prevent the Statutes operating against him?
7. If lands were duly granted to a private person or persons before 7 Octr. 1690 and one, not the Owner of such lands, should cut Masts on said lands, could the King by virtue of the Charter and Statutes recover said trees or masts?
8. Whether the Council of Plymouth ever surrendered their patent,6 and when?
9. Whether it is conceded that by force of the Charter or the Stat• { 267 } utes, the Claimants are obliged to derive their title from a date prior to 7 October 1690?
1. In an unidentified hand. Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 185.
2. That is, the patent of 3 Nov. 1620, to Lenox and other worthies, by which James I incorporated them as “the Councill established at Plymouth, in the County of Devon, for the planting, ruling, ordering, and governing of New-England, in America,” and granted to this council “and their Successors and Assignes forever,” all of New England from 40° to 48° North Latitude, and “from Sea to Sea, . . . to be holden of Us, our Heires, and Successors, as of our Manor of East-Greenwich, in our County of Kent, in free and common Soccage and not in Capite, nor by Knight's Service; yielding and paying therefore,” one-fifth of all gold and silver found to the Crown for “all Dutys, Demands and Services whatsoever.” 3 Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions 1827–1840.
3. In Jan. 1630 the New England Council, reciting its patent, note 2 above, granted to
“Wm. Bradford, his heires associates and assignes for ever,” both the lands in Massachusetts on which the Plymouth Colony was settled, and a tract “which lyeth within or between and Extendeth it self from the utmost of Cobest-cont alias Comasecont Which adjoyneth to the River Kenibeck alias Kenebeckick towards the Westerne Ocean and a place called the falls of Nequamkick in America aforesaid and the Space of Fifteen English milles on Each Side of the said River Commonly called Kenebeck River and all the said River Called Kenebeck that Lyes within the said Limitts and Bounds Eastward Westward Northward and Southward Last afore mentioned.”
The grantees were to pay one fifth of all gold and silver found to the Crown, and another fifth to the grantors, “for all Services and demands Whatsoever.” Morison, “The Mayflower's Destination and the Pilgrim Fathers' Patents,” 38 Col. Soc. Mass., Pubns. 387, 407–413 (1959). See 1 Andrews, Colonial Period 293–296. Bradford held directly from the King by virtue of the requirement of the Statute of Quia Emptores, 18 Edw. 1 (1290), which had not been waived in the 1620 patent. Id. at 335. Known as the “Plymouth Patent,” this grant was the foundation of the Kennebec Company's land claims in the 18th century. See Doc. II below. The “surrender” of the patent was the act by which Bradford, on 2 March 1641,
“by the free and full consent, approbacion, and agreement of the . . . old planters,” who had joined him in financing the early days of the colony, did “surrender into the handes of the whole Court, consistinge of the freemen of this corporacion of New Plymouth, all that ther right and title, power, authorytie, priviledges, immunities and freedomes granted in the said lettres patentes by the said right honorable counsell for New England, reserving his and their personall right of freemen, together with the said old planters aforesaid, except the said lands before excepted [certain tracts previously agreed to be reserved for the old planters], declareing the freemen of this present corporacion, together with all such as shalbe legally admitted into the same, his associates.” Records of the Colony of New Plymouth, 2:10–11 (Boston, ed. N. B. Shurtleff, 1855).
The patent was actually surrendered “in publick Court” and returned to Bradford for safekeeping. Id. at 11. See Morison, “Pilgrim Fathers' Patents,” 38 Col. Soc. Mass., Pubns. 397–398.
4. That is, “private persons” in the language of the Charter of 1691 and applicable statutes, text at notes 228, 1238, below. For earlier arguments that land held by proprietors in common was not held by “private persons,” see Knollenberg, Origin of the American Revolution 131.
5. The date set by statute. See text at note 1642 below.
6. Presumably, “the Councill established at Plymouth, in the County of Devon,” note 2 above, rather than the Plymouth Colony. The Council surrendered its patent to the Crown on 7 June 1635. Records of the Council for New England 75–80 (Cambridge, Mass., 1867). This action was part of an effort by Sir Ferdinando Gorges, moving force in the Council, to halt the infringement of the Massachusetts Bay Company upon his domains in New England. Charles I accepted the surrender in July 1637, shortly after the Crown had obtained a judgment in quo warranto in the King's Bench against the Massachusetts Bay charter. Gorges' plan was to divide the Council's patent among its members, the whole to be under a royal government loyal to the Crown. Only Gorges' own patent for a part of Maine was confirmed, however, as the onset of the civil war involved the other participants in different concerns. See 1 Andrews, Colonial Period 417–424; Barnes, “Land Tenure in English Colonial Charters,” in Essays in Colonial History Presented to Charles McLean Andrews 29–30, 34–35 (New Haven, 1931).

Docno: ADMS-05-02-02-0007-0003-0002

Author: Adams, John
Date: 1773-03-08

Adams' Minutes of the Argument1

Court of Vice Admiralty, Boston, 8 March 1773
Surveyor General vs. Loggs.
Kennebec Company. March 8. 1773.
Claim and Demurrer—which admits all in the Claim.2
Mr. Otis. In Event, as important a Cause as ever was decided in America.
The Navy, an important Object, without offence to any Sect or Party.
Charter. Reservation in it.3 We hold all we have under this Charter. No Gentleman will dispute the Validity of this Reservation.
A great deal of Talk and Scribbling about mutual Compact. Should as soon expect good and sound Law from N. Hampton in a N.W. Wind.4
Indian Natives had under God a Right to the Soil. That no good Title could be acquired by sovereign or subject, without obtaining it from the Natives.
No Man has a Right to a Foot of Land, who has not a good Purchase from the Natives, by a Licence from his lawfull Prince.
Proposal of large Forrests to be set apart, by Act of Parliament in Secula Seculorum.5
8. G. 1, c. 12, §5. 1721.6
2. G. 2, c. 35, §1. 2. No Trees to be cutt, excepting such as are the Property of private Persons. 1729.7
Plymouth Patent.
{ 268 }
Not in the Power of the King to grant Royalties. King deceived.8 Lit. §117. Socage Tenure. 1. Inst. 85. b.9
Sir F. Barnards Doctrine about holding as of our Manor of East Greenwich in the County of Kent.10
{ 269 }
Uncertain where the Bounds of the Patent are. What then?
Will it be said that the Patent is a Grant to private Persons? If so the Grant to Massachusetts, Province of Maine &c. are Grants to private Persons.11
1665 Grant to Boies &c.—a private Transaction.—Mem. by the Way Otis concedes tacitly at least we are within the Exception of Grants made to private Persons. Is forced to deny this to be a Grant to private Persons.12
This no Grant at all. No Estate passed by it. It is void.
Viner. Tit. Corporations B. pl. 1. “None but the King can make a Corporation.”13
E. pl. 1. a Name.14
{ 270 }
Mr. Fitch. 8. G.15 secures all Trees, let them be whose Property they will.
Boies had no Title.
Bradford—His associates could not take by the Grant. No Name of a Corporation.
The surrender is no Deed, nor Conveyance. Mem. our Law and Clause in the Charter.16
No Colony of New Plymouth.17
1. Inst. 295. b. “Confirmation doth not strengthen a void Estate.”18
Duely made, or any other lawfull Title.19
Law of Prov. 13. Wm.20
1. In JA's hand. Adams Papers, Microfilms, Reel No. 185.
2. See p. 257, note 39 above.
3. The Province Charter of 1691, set out, text at note 228 below.
4. Perhaps a reference to Joseph Hawley, Northampton lawyer, who was disbarred from 1767 to 1769.
5. Such proposals, intended to free large tracts of forest for general use, had been made periodically during the 18th century. The most recent effort, by Wentworth himself, had received some support in England in 1769, and by 1773 the Surveyor General had made extensive preliminary surveys for it. Robert G. Albion, Forests and Sea Power 268–272 (Cambridge, Mass., 1926). Otis' point here would seem to be that until such a plan received legislative sanction, all forest lands were subject to the laws.