I had, two days ago the favour of yours without a date,1 and thank you for the History of Sir John Dalrimple, whose Memoires2 would be sufficient to put me upon my guard, if I knew no more of him. He has seen the Imperial Ambassador. Pray, do you discover any of the Sentiments of the Austrian Family where you are. The old Rivalry, between that and Bourbon, the old Friendship and alliance with England. The new Ecclat and Power of an old Ennemy, and the declining forces of an old Friend, are circumstances that cannot escape the Notice, of the Sensible and aspiring Chief of that great House. The family alliance with France, is a lucky Circumstance at this time.3

I have received a few Journals, by the Way of Amsterdam.4 Young Coll Laurens has refused to come to Europe, I Suppose Smitten with the Charms of military Glory, and foreseeing the War was turning to his Town. You will See in the public papers before this reaches you all the News from America. We are waiting, with no Small Anxiety, the Arrival of News from Charlestown.

De Ternay Sailed the Second, and We hope Soon to have the News that the Armament from Cadiz, is Sailed. De Rochambeau is too weak wherever he is gone. He should have had more <Men> Force. The Spanish Force is very great. But, would it not be better Policy, both for France and Spain to send more ships and fewer Troops. The British Possessions in America, both upon the Continent and the Islands, depend upon the Sea for their Existence. According to the Bull in the English Play,5 the strongest Ground, or the only Ground they Stand upon is the Ocean. By a decided Superiority of naval force, upon the American Coasts and among the Islands, under active, vigilant and enterprizing Commanders, who will not think it beneath them to cruise for and watch the motions of transports and Merchantmen, the trade of America and the Islands would flourish, and the Supplies of the English totally cutt off. A few, french or Spanish Men of War, cruising in the Mass. Bay. A few more lying at anchor in the Harbour of Rhode Island and cruising occasionally, a few more lying in the mouth of the Delaware, a few more in Cheasapeak Bay—Say 3 ships and three frigates in each. This would make 12 ships of the Line and twelve frigates. These would, by cruising themselves occasionally and giving full scope to our privateers, more { 303 } certainly ruin the British Power <in America>, than four times that force in Europe. But Suppose there was only one ship of the Line and two Frigates Stationed in each. This would be only 4 ships and 8 frigates. These would either totally destroy the british Army, in America, by starving it, or compell the English to keep more than double their number in the North American station. This would weaken them so much in the W. I. Islands that the french and Spanish Forces there, would do whatever they pleased.

I know not the Reason of it, but the English dont seem to take Spain into their Account at all. They make their calculations, to equal or exceed the french a little, but reckon the Spaniards for nothing. A very little Activity on the part of these, would terrify the English beyond Measure. I suppose, but it is only conjecture that the Floridas are the Object of the Force from Cadiz. Gibralter occupies another immense force. These forces however, or the amount of their Expences, employed, in the American seas and kept constantly in Motion, would more certainly ruin the whole British Power, and consequently more certainly obtain the Floridas Gibralter or whatever else is desired of, than direct Attacks upon these Places. Attacking these places is endeavouring to lop of single Limbs, securing the Dominion of the American Seas, is laying the Ax to the Root of the Tree. But enough of my small Politicks. Adieu.

I have received the letter which you did me the honor to write me on the 10th. of this month. Altho' the writer of the letter, an extract of which I had the honor to enclose to you,2 may be right in his conjecture that the British Administration wish to know more than they do at present of3 my sentiments upon the great subject of a { 304 } pacification, yet I have had too long experience of their principles views and tempers, and I know that they are too well acquainted with mine, for me to expect that they will directly convey any propositions to me. When we hear them affirm in Parliament that America is upon the point of returning to an Allegiance to the King of England; and that they seriously believe America will return to such an Allegiance: When the Members of opposition, even those who are most inclined to peace, such as Mr. Hartley, General Conway &c. discover plainly by their motions and arguments, that their object is a seperate peace with America, in order to be the better able to gratify their revenge against France and Spain, I can have no expectations that they think of applying to me, because I think they must be convinced of this at least that I shall make no seperate peace.4

I thank your Excellency however, for your sentiments, that I ought to hear them, in case any overtures shou'd be made to me; I shou'd in such a case endeavour to hear them with decency and respect, but it wou'd require much Philosophy to hear with patience such absurd and extravagant propositions as are published in pamphlets and News-papers, and made in Parliament, even by the Members of Opposition who profess to be most zealous for Peace.5

Our Alliance with France is an honor and a security, which have ever been near my heart. After reflecting long upon the geographical situation of the old world and the new, upon the agriculture, commerce, and political relations [of] both; upon the connections and oppositions among the Nations of the former, and the mutual wants and Inter[ests] of both, according to such imperfect lights as I was able [to] obtain; the result has long since been this, that my Country in case she shou'd once be compelled to break off from Great-Britain, wou'd have more just reasons to depend upon a reciprocity of good offices of Friendship from France, Spain, and the other Sovereigns who are usually in their system; than upon those in the opposite scale [of] the ballance of Power. I have ever thought it therefore a natural Alliance, and contended for it as a Rock of Defence. This object I pursued in Congress with persevering assiduity, for more than a year, in opposition to other Gentlemen of much greater Name and Abilities than mine, and had at length the satisfaction to find my Countrymen very generally to fall into the same sentiment, and the honour to be appointed to draw the first Treaty which was sent to this Court.6 These facts have been well known in America even to the Tories, and the utility and importance of this Alliance being known to be deeply imprinted on my mind and heart, I suppose was a principal cause { 305 } why the present Trust was confided to me by my Countrymen.7 These facts, altho' they may have been unknown in France, yet having been well known to the Tories in America, I cannot suppose they are ignorant of them at the Court of St. James'. I therefore think that neither Administration nor Opposition in England, will ever think of applying to me, untill they are brought into such a situation as shall compel them to sue for peace with all the Powers at War; which to be sure does not appear to be the case at present, nor likely to be; at least before the end of this Campaign, nor then neither, without some notable good fortune on the part of the Allies in the progress of the War. I have the honor to be with the greatest Respect Your Excellency's most obedient and most humble Servant