Papers of John Adams, volume 20
d1790
I inclosed You a few days ago a parcel of printed papers some of which I conceived might contain interesting intelligence especially if the dispute between Britain & Spain shoud terminate in hostilities, as in such an event the government of the United States woud at least be involved in discussions of considerable importance to our country with one or both of those nations.
Among the rest you have an authentic copy of the memorial or
narrative of Mr Mears on the seisure of the british vessels
in Nootka sound—as also a sketch of the debate in parliament occasion’d by the message
of his britannic majesty on that affair.1
You will not however obtain from the sketch an adequate conception of the high tone in
which the minister spoke. It was thoroughly understood on all sides of the house—(I
speak this from having been an auditor) that in unanimously promising his majesty
national support against the insult of Spain the minister on his part was pledged to
obtain not only pecuniary reparation for the confiscated property and for the insult
offered to the british flag, but also a full dereliction from the Court of Spain of its
claim to exclusive sovereignty over the coasts in the vicinity of Nootka Sound and on
the northwest coasts of America and of exclusive navigation and commerce in those seas.
A categorical answer to a demand of this sort is pretended by the Court of London to be
expected from Madrid by the return of a messenger sent with it just four weeks ago.
Meanwhile the warlike preparations in every port and corner of the Island are most
vigourous and extensive. Ever since the summer of 1787 Spain has been putting her fleets
in the most formidable condition.— Nor can one believe that the mere menace of Britain
will make her under such circumstances yield the point in contest. In such a crisis it
was natural for both nations to turn their eyes on France with considerable anxiety. The
late discussion and determination in her national assembly of the great constitutional
question whether the power of declaring war shou’d be lodged with the Legislature or be
confided to the Executive was 370 doubtless hasten’d
by this anxiety. The settlement of this point in favour of the Legislative body is
conceived by many here as decisive that the french nation will take no part in a war
between Spain and Britain. But a more erroneous conclusion never was made. The military
spirit of the nation is more alive than ever—and if a majority of its representatives
shou’d after public discussion and debate decree to go to war, it wou’d be carried on
with more vigour than ever. A partial sale of the ecclesiastical remains for a paper
currency has opend a resource of finance that in case of state necessity might be vastly
amplified.2 And as to the supposed
hazard that Spain might interfere to attempt a counter-revolution in France the idea is
already scouted by the partizans of the reform. Two points only are wanting to produce a
decree of the french national assembly for war. 1. A persuasion that the spanish have
justice on their side in the present quarrel. and 2dly: That
it is for the interest of the french that the mines of South America shoud not become
british property. I expect to see both positions established by fact and argument shoud
Britain manifestly overstep the limits of equity in her claims. In the interim the naval
preparations in the ports of France will keep pace with those in the ports of
Britain.
From the moment that a spanish war was publicly known to be
impending—the people of the United States began to rise in the estimation of all ranks
of men here. Instead of being considered as heretofore a sort of republican banditti
enemies to kings and good order on land, and on the ocean one grade above the algerines
only—in the course of a very few days we became popular in the City and bearable I am
told even in the Cabinet!3 The unkind
behaviour of Capt Hendricks an american navigator at Nootka
sound—in not quarreling with the spanish Commodore was overlooked:4 and the leading Editors of the ministerial
newspapers have now orders to affirm that the offer of a treaty offensive and defensive
between Britain and America is already dispatchd across the atlantic.5 The principal inducements to an acceptance of
such a treaty on the part of Congress—is a guarantee of a free navigation of the river
Missisippi—a participation of some farther indulgencies as to the west india traffic—an
adjustment of all disputed boundaries and a speedy surrender of the posts.
I wish the present juncture cou’d be improved for the adjustment of
some criterion whereby our seamen might be discriminated from british seamen and
consequently exempted from the outrages of the british press gangs. The great point to
be guarded against on our part is—the first violence of having our mariners forced from
on board our 371 ships under a pretext that they are britons.— To do
away all colour for committing it some palpable species of prima facie evidence is
wanted—such as being immediately produced might stare every officer of a press gang in
the face and leave him without excuse if he ventured to depart from the orders of the
Admiralty Board by which he is ever directed to take no foreigners. A few days after I
had memorializ’d the Lords of the Admiralty and almost exacted by dint of diligent and
remonstrating assiduity the liberation of those six crews, or parts of crews which had
been impress’d, Mr Governeur Morris to whom I had
communicated my toils and their termination sent a note to the duke of Leeds and asking
for an hours conversation with him—stated verry forcibly to him the pernicious effect
that impressing our mariners must have on the commerce of Britain.6 The Duke listen’d to him, thanked him, seemed to
believe him and said orders shou’d be issued and measures taken to prevent the american
seamen from being impress’d in future. But there are real difficulties in the business
that general commands of this nature do not meet. As a zealous citizen I do wish some
effectual remedy to such a national mischief and indignity coud be devised. No moment
can be more favourable for attempting something of the sort than the present. The
perfect protection of our mariners from being impressed or impeded is just now a
desirable object to the commercial part of this nation. In former wars when the british
seamen were press’d to mann the navy—the merchants coud generally procure Swedes
Hollanders and other european seamen to supply their places—but at present all those
foreign seamen are engaged by their sovereigns in
war or by their fellow subjects—and the british merchant will be compeld to
resort to the United States for american seamen in lieu of them.
As I send this letter one post later than that by which the mail is
conveyed to Falmouth—it is necessary for me to close it immediately to obtain the chance
of its reaching Mr Rutledge at Falmouth.
I intreat Mrs Adams to accept with
yourself the best compliments and sincere good wishes of / Your respectful affectionate
/ and most obedt sert:
RC (Adams Papers); endorsed by CA: “J B Cutting”; notation by
CFA: “J. B. Cutting / June 3d 1790.”
For John Meares, see Descriptive List of Illustrations, No. 6, above.
In 1789 Spanish officers, acting in the name of King Carlos IV of Spain, seized
Meares’ ships and his trading post at Canada’s Nootka Sound for “good and lawful
prize.” Meares took it as a private loss of profit and, more significantly, as a
public humiliation of the British flag. In April 1790 he brought his grievances to
London, where he won powerful supporters who readied for war. George III addressed
Parliament on 5 May, denouncing Spain’s exclusive rights to 372 the Pacific Coast. William Pitt gave an
“animated” speech of support the next day. M.P.’s unanimously approved outfitting
forty ships of the line. Cutting enclosed Meares’ 30 April account of the affair,
titled Authentic Copy of the Memorial to the Right Honourable
William Wyndham Grenville . . . Containing Every Particular Respecting the
Capture of the Vessels in Nootka Sound, London, 1790.
When Meares traveled to London to press the House of Commons for
military reprisal and personal compensation, the Nootka Sound conflict erupted into a
full-blown international incident. Over the following months, the crisis laid bare the
unequal strength of two major European pacts: the Family Compact, last renewed in
1761, which committed France to aid Spain; and the 1788 Triple Alliance of Britain,
the Netherlands, and Prussia. While the Dutch Navy swept to Britain’s side, Spain had
a tougher time persuading France to uphold their agreement. In the first major
foreign-policy decision of the new French National Assembly, lawmakers resolved to
abstain from all wars of conquest. Following some diplomatic pressure, France relented
slightly. It outfitted fourteen ships of the line in a show of solidarity with Spain
and offered to mediate the dispute. Diplomatic efforts continued apace, with British
and Spanish negotiators meeting at Madrid in mid-summer to craft an agreement (vol.
19:309; London World, 6, 7 May 1790; Black, British Foreign
Policy
, p. 233–246).
The French National Assembly voted on 2 Nov. 1789 to seize
ecclesiastical property as partial payment for the national debt, and on 19 Dec. it
began auctioning off 400 million livres’ worth of land. Turning its focus to foreign
affairs, the assembly took the dramatic step, on 22 May 1790, of renouncing war for
military conquest. This was a critical shift of policy, for if the Nootka Sound
conflict triggered an Anglo-Spanish war, then France would be expected to uphold the
Family Compact and aid Spain in safeguarding its colonial possessions in South America
(Bosher, French Rev.
, p. xviii, 145; Schama, Citizens
, p.
487; Black, British Foreign Policy
, p. 237).
In Oct. 1789 George Washington dispatched Gouverneur Morris to
London to resolve some of the issues lingering from JA’s ministerial
tenure, namely, the ongoing impressment of American seamen and the British Army’s
refusal to evacuate the frontier posts. The president instructed Morris, acting as an
unofficial envoy, to renew negotiations for an Anglo-American commercial treaty and to
raise the possibility of exchanging ministers. Morris met with the Marquis of
Carmarthen and Pitt several times throughout the spring, but he made no headway on any
front. At the same time, Morris convened with the French foreign ministry in London
and he socialized with Pitt’s rival Charles James Fox, factors that hindered prospects
of diplomatic success. Reporting to Washington on 29 May 1790, Morris wrote: “It now
stands on such Ground that they must write a Letter making the first Advance
. . . and to that Effect I warned them against sending a Message by one of their Consuls” (Washington, Papers, Presidential
Series
, 4:179–181; 5:322–323, 430–438).
Capt. John Kendrick (ca. 1740–1794) commanded the 1787–1789
expeditions of the Columbia Rediviva and Lady Washington to China. Kendrick was at Nootka Sound when
Meares’ ships were seized, and Meares claimed that Kendrick supported the action (vol.
19:xiii;
AFC
, 9:91; London
Public Advertiser, 22 May 1790).
As the Nootka Sound conflict heightened, the British press
speculated that if the United States signed an offensive and defensive treaty with
Britain, then Britain would intervene with Spain to guarantee American navigation of
the Mississippi River (London Whitehall Evening Post, 1–3
June; London Public Advertiser, 3 June).
For Cutting’s efforts to counter the British Navy’s impressment of American sailors, see his letter of 5 July, and note 5, below.